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ABSTRACT 
“Ethnicity” and disparate group-based socio-economic development make governance in Africa 
problematic. Despite this existential reality, the “ethnic” question in African governance remains, 
largely, only the subject of general discourse. There appears to be very little rigorous scholarship 
on the economic and socio-cultural dimensions related to the socio-historical construct, 
“ethnicity”. Similarly, attempts to explain why African political culture, in general, continues to 
encourage the social reproduction of “ethnic” identities also appear to be largely lacking. This 
thesis aims to fill some of the gaps existent in scholarship of ethnicity vis-à-vis socio-economic-
cultural development by examining the antagonism between the Luo community and the Kenyan 
state. Its main objectives are to examine the specifics of the socio-economic consequences of the 
political marginalization of the Luo and to explain why “ethnicity” is, seemingly, strongly 
correlated with the crisis of state power in Kenya. This thesis is grounded on the following two 
major assertions: first, that “ethnicity”, like its correlative, “race”, is an ideological concept, 
devoid of any scientific substance; second, that “ethnicity” is an “exogenous construct”, imposed 
on aboriginal people of Africa mostly by European colonizers. The following research questions 
direct this thesis: What are the specifics of the negative socio-economic consequences of 
political marginalization within the Kenyan context? Why do the Kenyan governing structures 
and practices persist in promoting “ethnicity” despite its existential problems for particular social 
groups? This thesis tests the following five research assumptions/hypotheses: i) the Luo have 
enjoyed minimal public investment from the Government of Kenya because of opposition 
politics making them relatively poor compared to other communities; ii) political exclusion, 
during the period under study, has had the unwitting effect of fostering “ethnic” cohesion 
amongst the Luo; iii) political exclusion at the national level has translated into economic 
difficulties at the individual level for the Luo, limiting their chances of ever getting to power in 
Kenya; iv) the Luo are gradually adopting alien cultures in uniform/homogeneous fashion, owing 
to politically constructed and mobilized stereotypes and prejudices, to gain acceptance as fully-
fledged members of the Kenyan society at large; and v) the strong correlation between 
“ethnicity” and the crisis of state power in Kenya, and the pervasiveness of the ideological 
construct, are partly the result of the machinations of global capitalists and western interference 
in the country’s affairs. For its theoretical framework, this study adopts an eclectic approach: it 
fuses various propositions – obtained from a review of contemporary literature – on leadership 
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and socio-economic development, within the African context, with special reference to the 
Foucauldian notion of “panopticon”1 power, Istvan Mészáros’ refutation of “ideological 
neutrality” and the Instrumentalist Theory of “Ethnicity”. Accordingly, this study employs a 
mixed methods research design, which makes use of multiple sources of evidence, including the 
Kenyan Government’s Budget Speeches, Economic Surveys, and Statistical Abstracts. The 
results of a representative survey and focus groups have also been integrated within this study to 
explain the influence of ethnic-driven governance at the grassroots level in Kenya. The findings 
include, amongst others, that there appear to be strong links between state control and access to 
education, healthcare and rural water supply at particular periods in the country’s independence 
era, to the detriment of the Luo. Also, it appears that there is a power struggle between certain 
factions of capital – the so-called “globalists” and the African nationalist bourgeois class in 
Kenya (the nationalists).  
 
  
                                                          
1
 Panopticon power, according to Foucault, “is power that is invisible or hidden; it functions to dominate and mould 
people in order to make them more serviceable for the state. It orders and arranges every part of their life, so that 
they become convinced that state power is everywhere and inescapable” (See Schirato, Danaher & Webb, 2012, pp. 
86 – 87).  
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Chapter 1
2
 
Casting the Research Problem 
1.1 Introduction  
“Ethnicity”3 and disparate group-based socio-economic development make governance in 
Africa problematic; this thesis explores them to understand governance patterns in Kenya with 
special reference to its Luo community, 1963 – 2013. I have chosen Kenya for this task for the 
East African nation epitomizes the sobering description of African society as succinctly 
expressed by Miruka and Omenya (2009):   
 
To date, there is no evidence that the growing number of educated Sub-Saharan Africans 
has been trained especially in the virtues of collaboration beyond the basic needs of 
ethnic communities. Even today, major political parties in Sub-Saharan Africa are 
organized around tribal lines and are more reflective of regional groupings rather than 
ideological stands. Educational achievements seem to be revered for their own sake 
rather than as a means of fundamental transformation of society. (Civic Engagement 
section, para. 5)  
 
Indeed, despite advancements in education, in Kenya, group consciousness/“ethnicity” 
(“tribalism”) continues to hinder “common cause” insofar as nation-building is concerned; the 
country’s leaders persist in their manipulation of socially-constructed, ideologically-ensconced 
“identities” to structurally achieve their personal interests. This research is particularly concerned 
with examining the manner in which opposition to the state and its governing institutions, by 
certain “ethnic groups”4, affects the latter’s socio-economic development. Accordingly, I have 
                                                          
2
 A version of this chapter was published as an article titled “A survey of the influence of ‘ethnicity’, in African 
governance, with special reference to its impact in Kenya vis-à-vis its Luo community, 28 May 2017, in  African 
Identities. DOI: 10.1080/14725843.2017.1332984    
3
 Whilst “ethnicity” has no scientific basis, thus using it in this thesis does not imply the acceptance of this highly 
spurious concept. Where it is used in the text without inverted commas, it is simply to make the text less 
cumbersome. It should, nonetheless, be borne in mind throughout this thesis, “ethnicity”, like its correlative “race”, 
is an ideologically created concept, devoid of ANY scientific substance [cf. e.g. Tobias (1970), Nkrumah (1968), 
etc.] 
4
 I do not subscribe to the idea that humans belong to different “ethnic groups”; rather, humankind, since time 
immemorial, belongs to different historically-informed social formations, often co-existing, amicably, in the same 
geographical region, especially prior to the colonization of Africa in 1884/1885. In this sense, “ethnicity” is an 
“exogenous construct” imposed on the aboriginal people of Africa (cf. e.g. Mafeje, 1971; Mafeje, 2002).  
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
2 
 
chosen to focus on the Luo community, for it has consistently been in the vanguard of political 
social movements and collective action against the Kenyan state for a large part of the period 
under study, 1963 – 2013 (cf. e.g., Cohen & Atieno-Odhiambo, 2004, pp. 3 – 6) as narrated 
below.  
 
First, the Luo, under their de facto leader, Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, were the first 
Kenyan “ethnic group” to actively and demonstrably voice and display discontent against “new 
forms of political oppression, social injustice, corruption and the arrogance of political power in 
the hands of [the Jomo Kenyatta-led independent Kenya’s ruling elites that] started to make life 
difficult for the ordinary African human being” (Nyong’o, 2013, para. 5) soon after Kenya’s 
independence in 1963. Second, ever since the 1966 Kenyatta-Odinga fallout, which has been 
further interrogated in the problem statement in section 1.4 below, the Luo have been at 
loggerheads with the Kenyan state and, as a consequence of this enmity, have been largely 
politically excluded. Third, when “state oppression by [Kenya’s] dictatorial ruler [Moi], 
especially during the Cold War, precipitated a prevalent culture of fear and silence”, the Luo, 
specifically through the failed coup attempt of 1982, expressed “the outcry of citizens over gross 
violations of human rights” (Maathai, 1995, para. 13). Fourth, when the “‘third wave’ of 
democratization began to roll across sub-Saharan Africa in the early 1990s” (Lynch and 
Crawford, 2011), the Luo community, under the guidance of Kenya’s doyen of opposition 
politics, Jaramogi, was also at the forefront in advocating for the restoration of multi-party 
democracy in Kenya. Fifth, the Luo were instrumental in bringing to an end the forty-year reign 
of Kenya’s independence party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU). Indeed, as noted by 
Oyugi, Wanyande and Odhiambo-Mbai (2003), “it was Raila Odinga’s ‘blessing’ that had 
assured Mwai Kibaki of the joint opposition’s nomination in the ‘transitional election’ of 2002” 
(as cited in Wolf, 2009, p. 280). Raila Odinga’s gesture led “to a virtual walkover and the 
promise of tangible ‘change’ in the lives of ordinary Kenyans” (Wolf, 2009, p. 280). Sixth, 
during the disputed 2007 general elections in Kenya, which were characterized by violence, the 
Luo, under “Raila Odinga, the main opposition leader representing the Orange Democratic 
Movement (ODM)”, were at the centre of events that included “civil unrest . . . in Western 
Kenya to protest against reporting delays in some districts” (Rheault & Tortora, 2008, para. 2). 
Seventh, during the 2010 referendum, the Luo community, alongside others, voted 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
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overwhelmingly for Kenya’s new constitution. Concerning the phenomenon, a prominent 
Kenyan human rights activist, Maina Kiai, was quoted thus: “‘Look at the figures from Nyanza,’ 
he said, pointing to the lush province along Lake Victoria where Kenya’s pro-Constitution prime 
minister, Raila Odinga, is from. ‘It was completely, overwhelmingly ‘yes’” (Gettleman, 2010, 
para. 9). Eighth, in contemporary times where “democracy in Africa . . . features semi-
competitive elections that retain and entrench neo-patrimonialism and old networks of elite 
domination” (Nyong’o, 2013, para. 1), the Luo, under the stewardship of the Coalition for 
Reforms and Democracy (CORD)
5
 leader, Raila Odinga, and through collective action such as 
the 2016 protests against the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) that 
succeeded in bringing to a halt the term of office of Kenya’s electoral body’s top officials, are 
continuously leading the fight for social transformation (see, e.g., Standard Team, 2016). 
 
Having explained my choice of Kenya’s Luo community, in this attempt to elucidate the 
specifics of the negative consequences of ethnic-based political marginalization in Africa, and to 
explain why African governing structures and practices persist in promoting “ethnicity” despite 
its existential problems for particular social groups, I now briefly outline the structure of this 
introductory chapter. This chapter begins with an analysis of some scholarly perspectives on 
“ethnicity”; it then introduces the historical antecedents of the research problem, outlines the 
research problem itself, states the research questions to be answered, and gives the rationale for 
the research, its objectives, research assumptions/hypotheses, the conceptual framework, and 
some elements of the research methodology employed. Finally, it concludes with a look at the 
structural organization of this thesis. Rooted in the firm belief that “ethnicity”, like its 
correlative, “race”, is a spurious ideology, devoid of any scientific substance, and that it is an 
exogenous construct imposed on aboriginal people of Africa by mostly European anthropologists 
and colonialists, I now present the aforementioned components sequentially in this introductory 
chapter. 
 
1.2 Some Scholarly Perspectives on “Ethnicity” 
Contemporary scholarship on “ethnicity” in Africa – “by both expatriate theorists and 
                                                          
5
 In what has become typical of Kenyan political party behaviour, CORD repackaged itself as the National Super 
Alliance (NASA) in 2017, and will contest the country’s general election, against the Jubilee Government, with 
Raila Odinga as its presidential flag bearer. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
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emergent African middle-class ideologists” (Mafeje, 1971, p. 261) – seldom appreciates or 
acknowledges the unscientific, spurious and exogenous nature of this ideological construct; 
rather, more emphasis has been placed on the conceptualization of such studies alongside the two 
distinctions drawn in Lonsdale’s acclaimed work entitled “The Moral Economy of Mau Mau: 
Wealth, Poverty, and Civic Virtue in Kikuyu Political Thought” (see Berman & Lonsdale, 1992, 
pp. 315 – 467). In this scholarly piece, Lonsdale talks about “moral ethnicity” and “political 
tribalism”; whilst arguing that “ethnic” identity was initially an ambiguous concept, and that it 
was constructed by Africans as an instrument for countering colonialism, he describes “moral 
ethnicity” as a grassroots form of group consciousness necessary for ensuring survival and 
demanding freedom from oppressive regimes. On the other hand, “political tribalism”, he argues, 
emanates from society’s elite class and serves the purpose of creating divisions that facilitate the 
pursuit of the latter’s selfish interests. These two concepts have been the inspiration behind 
various works on “ethnicity” in Africa, generally, and Kenya in particular (cf. e.g., Carotenuto, 
2006; Carotenuto & Luongo, 2016; Comaroff & Comaroff, 2009; Lynch, 2011; MacArthur, 
2016; Ogude, 2001).  
 
With regard to scholarly literature on the Luo, Lonsdale’s “moral ethnicity”, which 
projects “ethnicity” as an African phenomenon with African origins, is predominant; for 
instance, whilst appearing to pander to Berman’s (1998) contention that “ethnicity is the product 
of a continuing historical process, always simultaneously old and new, grounded in the past and 
perpetually in creation” (p. 305), Carotenuto (2006) highlights the role played by the “Luo 
Union, an East African ethnically based welfare association … [with] beginnings in the urban 
centers of early colonial East Africa”, in “forg[ing] and govern[ing] a broad-based cultural 
identity among a diverse Dholuo-speaking population” (p. 53). Seemingly obsessed with 
providing an alternative perspective to the view that “ethnicity” is an exogenous imposition on 
the people of Africa, he argues that the Luo are a politically “unified” “ethnic group” not merely 
because of political marginalization; rather, he contends, “in Kenya, as elsewhere on the 
continent, the roots of contemporary ethnic identities lie in the era before independence” (p. 54). 
In a later work, entitled Obama and Kenya: Contested Histories and the Politics of Belonging, 
Carotenuto and Luongo (2016) give more examples, such as the activities of politicians like 
Oginga Odinga, the now defunct Ramogi, a Luo language newspaper, and the Luo vernacular 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
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radio station, Ramogi FM, in their attempts to substantiate the African role in the construction of 
“ethnicity” and in explaining the prevalent feelings of group consciousness amongst the 
members of this western Kenyan community. In a manner typical of prevalent contemporary and 
Eurocentric scholarship on “ethnicity” in Africa, they further argue that: 
 
An array of historical sources shows that Luoness has been constituted through origin 
myths and oral traditions, through histories written by Luo members of the academy and 
amateur scholars of the “tin trunk history” guild, and through the political projects and 
partisan maneuverings of Luo political actors. (p. 44) 
 
But should we accept completely these arguments and turn a blind eye to the Hamitic 
hypothesis? Long before a Luo scholar ever put pen to paper, European administrators, explorers 
and missionaries had conducted “research” and written on the Luo and other Africans from a 
racist and chauvinistic viewpoint (Campbell, 2006); this “white” lot approached history and 
anthropology from the warped perspective that “everything of value ever found in Africa was 
brought there by the Hamites, allegedly a branch of the Caucasian race” (Sanders, 1969). 
Moreover, 19th century European scholarship was fond of categorizing African social groups 
into “races”, “tribes” and eventually “ethnic groups”; in fact, labels such as “Zulu” and 
“Baganda”, which continue to divide Africans today, were coined during this era for purposes of 
convenient classification of African peoples by Europeans (Campbell, 2006). In acknowledging 
this European scholarly indiscretion, Thornton (1983, p. 512) states that “the term Bantu”, for 
instance, has “had even further reaching historical effects, both intellectual and political, since it 
came to designate, ambiguously, an imagined ‘race’, a conjectured common history…” (as cited 
in Campbell, 2006, p. 74). Accordingly, part of what Carotenuto and Luongo (2016) see as a 
contribution by Africans in constructing their “ethnicities” can alternatively be interpreted as an 
exercise aimed at dismantling and invalidating European racism, and intellectual impropriety and 
imposition, through the encouragement and actualization of the production of African history by 
Africans, notwithstanding the reality that a majority of the latter remain mentally colonized. 
Indeed, the “father of Kenyan history”, Bethwell Allan Ogot, who authored the celebrated 
“History of the Southern Luo”, was partly motivated by the fact that “European accounts of the 
19th century history of East Africa … are not only highly coloured and biased, often they are 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
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also inaccurate” (Ogot, 1967, p. 14). Moreover, he states: “When I decided in 1958 to study the 
pre-colonial history of East Africa, many of my friends and mentors ridiculed the decision on the 
ground that one cannot study what is non-existent” (Ogot, 1967, p. 13). Such is the danger posed 
by Western chauvinism; it serves mainly to discourage Africans from developing intellectual 
independence. 
  
The problem of Western intellectual imperialism persists, for current Western scholarship 
is seemingly geared towards silencing the viewpoint that the terms “race”, “tribe” and “ethnicity” 
are exogenous to Africa. In Neo-Traditionalism and the Limits of Invention in British Colonial 
Africa, for instance, Spear (2003) argues that “the case for colonial invention has often 
overstated colonial power and the ability to manipulate African institutions to establish 
hegemony” (p. 3). Whilst cleverly fusing three ideas – “invention of tradition”, “making of 
customary law”, and the “creation of tribalism”, in what appears to be a camouflaged bid to 
implicate the African in the construction of this often spurious concept, “ethnicity”, Spear (2003) 
would like us to believe that “ethnicity reflected long-standing local political, cultural and 
historical conditions in the changing contexts of colonial rule” (p. 3). He further faults the 
construction paradigm by arguing that this viewpoint makes “colonial duplicity overwhelm 
African gullibility” (Spear, 2003, p. 4). He is of the opinion that focus on colonial invention 
reduces “provocative concepts” to “ahistorical clichés” (Spear, 2003, p. 4). The Afrocentric 
scholar who seeks to liberate himself/herself from the yoke of European intellectual imperialism 
should find these arguments extremely unpalatable: the truth of the matter is that the fear of 
confronting Western bias has reduced and restricted analysis of “ethnicity” to Eurocentric 
approaches, such as those of Lonsdale’s, discussed above, and escapist, conformist investigation 
of the cradle of humankind. 
 
It is to a conscientious decolonized mind, therefore, that we must turn for a counter-
narrative that will emancipate and free us to undertake further meaningful research, vis-à-vis 
“ethnicity”, in a world in which established knowledge forms are increasingly under greater 
scrutiny and critical studies and forms of analysis (cf. e.g., Bourdieu, 1972[1977]; Giddens, 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
7 
 
1984; Habermas, 1981[1984]) are becoming ever so important even as the push for globalism
6
 
gains momentum. In this regard, the outstanding scholarly contributions of the celebrated 
African social scientist, Archie Mafeje, come into play. According to Mafeje (1971): 
 
European colonialism, like any epoch, brought with it certain ways of reconstructing the 
African reality. It regarded African societies as particularly tribal. This approach 
produced certain blinkers or ideological predispositions which made it difficult for those 
associated with the system to view these societies in any other light. Hence certain modes 
of thought among European scholars in Africa and their African counterparts have 
persisted, despite the many important economic and political changes that have occurred 
in the continent over the last 75 – 100 years. Therefore, if tribalism is thought of 
peculiarly as African, then the ideology itself is particularly European in origin. (p. 253) 
 
This liberated African scholar offers crucial insights with regard to the origins and evolution of 
the term “tribe”: the material base of “tribes”, whatever they may be, lies with colonial 
authorities; on the other hand, the ideological base of this often spurious term is to be traced to 
classical anthropologists who, according to Mafeje (1971, p. 257), depicted “tribes” as “self-
contained autonomous communities practicing subsistence economy with little or no external 
trade.” Mafeje’s work comprehensively highlights the conspiracies of, especially, Anglo-Saxon 
anthropologists, who refused to revolutionize their thinking; the latter, for instance, when faced 
with the reality that some parts of pre-colonial Africa comprised “centralised” states, refused to 
ascribe the more respectable label, “state”, to these entities, choosing instead to refer to them as 
“super-tribes” (p. 258). With time, the definition of the ambiguous term would move to “separate 
‘political communities’, each claiming exclusive rights to a given territory and managing its 
affairs independently of external control” (Schapera, 1956, as cited in Mafeje, 1971, p. 257) and 
eventually to “any group of people which is distinguished, by its members and by others, on the 
basis of cultural-regional criteria” (Gulliver, 1969, as cited in Mafeje, 1971, p. 258). Such is the 
nature – utter stubbornness and phenomenal self-contradiction – of those that preoccupy 
                                                          
6
 Globalism is an ideology of the capitalist elites associated with neoliberalism; it is mainly about liberalisation and 
integration of all markets. It is characterised by faith in market mechanisms and “free markets.” Whilst seeking to 
include all countries in the global trading system, it is largely directed by technology and tries to de-politicize and 
reduce issues to technical or administrative questions (G. Kline, personal communication, September 7, 2017). 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
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themselves with imposing their ideological terms of reference upon Africa. There is no doubt 
that “tribal ideology and sentiment” abound in the cradle of humankind; however, as Mafeje 
(1971) argues, “they have to be understood – and conceptualised – differently under modern 
conditions”, for besides having been “effectively penetrated by European colonialism” Africa 
has “been successfully drawn into a capitalist economy and a world market” (p. 258). In other 
words, the material, social and political conditions that characterized what Western-centric 
scholars call “tribe” (“ethnicity”/“ethnic group”) have been completely dismantled and the 
ideology totally exposed for the farce that it is. Accordingly, this study is partly a response to 
Mafeje’s (1971) call for scholars to conceptualize “ethnicity” with modern conditions in mind. 
Unlike Eurocentric scholars such as Lonsdale, and most African ideologists, it explicitly projects 
“ethnicity” for what it truly is – a bogus, ideological construct exogenous to Africa.  
 
Further justification for this study lies in Michel Foucault’s (1980) understanding of the 
“episteme”, that is, the cognitive framework in a given epoch (see also, Kuhn, 2012). To 
Foucault, the past is not definite; it is perpetually under construction and is subject to 
reconstruction and revision, by successive generations, as the knowledge base evolves. The 
various epistemic forms, under which studies on Africans, in general, and the Luo, in particular, 
have been conducted since the 19th century have been characterized by the following three broad 
theoretical lenses, among others: the Hamitic hypothesis; culture; and Lonsdale’s diametrically 
opposed concepts of “moral ethnicity” and “political tribalism”. The Hamitic hypothesis was 
dominant from the second half of the 19th century to the year in which Crazzolara (1950) 
published “The Lwoo”; this period was largely influenced by what Thornton (1983) has termed 
“arm chair theoreticians” (as cited in Campbell, 2006, p. 75). Amongst these “arm chair 
theoreticians” was one Richard Speke who argued that “the bearers of culture and civilization to 
Africa were light skinned Hamitic invaders from Christian Ethiopia” (Wolf, 1994, as cited in 
Campbell, 2006, p. 74). Crazzolara (1950), who investigated the history and customs of the 
Lwoo/Luo (Nilo-Hamitic peoples) from AD 1000, inaugurated the era (1950 – 1992) in which 
“regional history and culture” would replace the “race” myths propagated by the peddlers of the 
Nilo-Hamitic hypothesis, as the basis of analysis of the Luo and other African social groups (cf. 
e.g., Ayot, 1977; Malo, 1953; Ndisi, 1974; Ogot, 1967, Parkin, 1978; Cohen & Atieno-
Odhiambo, 1989). And from 1992 to 2016, when Carotenuto and Luongo (2016) published their 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
9 
 
work on Obama, texts on “ethnicity” in Kenya/Africa have been framed largely around 
Lonsdale’s diametrically opposed understandings of the concept of “ethnicity”: “moral ethnicity” 
and “political tribalism” (cf. e.g., Cohen & Atieno-Odhiambo, 2004; Comaroff & Comaroff, 
2009; Lynch, 2011; MacArthur, 2016; Ogude, 2001; Peterson, 2012; Shipton, 2007; 2009). We 
are currently living in what many analysts have referenced as the era of globalism, which is 
mostly characterized by multinational corporate domination, grave concentration of the world’s 
wealth and power, and an incestuous relationship between big business and government (cf. e.g., 
Heller, 2013; Roche, 2009). As transnational capital threatens the very soul of the nation-state, 
the knowledge base is becoming less shrouded: what Malcolm X called an “international 
Western power structure”7 and Nkrumah (1965) referred to as “neo-colonialism”, for instance, 
we now explicitly know as global banking cartels and corporations. These new developments – 
essentially an “evolution in the episteme” – proffer an opportunity for the scholar of “ethnicity” 
to probe and conceptualize the spurious concept differently and, hopefully, gain a modern 
understanding of what it really stands for. This study seeks to do just that; it is, partly, an attempt 
to conceptualize “ethnicity” with the aforementioned contemporary realities in mind. I now turn 
my attention to the specifics of the research problematic. 
 
1.3 Historical Antecedents of the Research Problem: “Ethnicity” and Governance in 
Africa 
1.3.1 Pre-colonial Africa: c. 1500 – c. 1900 
The highly controversial term “ethnic group”, an ideology first coined by Europeans and 
whose origins can be traced back to classical anthropology (cf. Mafeje 1971, p. 253), has been 
defined by Irobi (2005), from the perspective of Lonsdale’s “moral ethnicity”, as “a community 
of people who share cultural and linguistic characteristics including history, tradition, myth, and 
origin” (Theoretical Approaches to Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict section, para. 1). With regard to 
Irobi’s (2005) understanding of the term, Africa comprises numerous “ethnic groups”, in fact, 
thousands of them, and they have related in various ways throughout history – amicably and 
belligerently alike (cf. Berman, 1998, p. 311). Although strife existed in Africa before the advent 
of colonialism (Obioha, 1999), it must be emphasized that dissention usually pitted various 
                                                          
7
 See, for example, Bruce P. (Ed.). (1989). Malcolm X: The last speeches. New York, NY: Pathfinder Press, pp. 111 
– 149. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
10 
 
social formations – pastoralists against cultivators, fishing societies against trading societies, 
raiders against nomads, and so on (Rodney, 1973); “ethnic” identity rarely formed the basis for 
conflict, disagreement, domination or exclusion, prior to the colonization of Africa. In like 
manner, as Rodney (1973) argues, the notion of class was barely existent throughout most of the 
pre-colonial era for there was “equal access to land and equity in distribution” (p. 38). The 
communal nature of pre-colonial African society made it less prone to “ethnic” conflict. To 
illustrate the fact that “ethnic” identity was never a cause for conflict in Africa, Rodney (1973) 
further asserts that: 
 
[N]owhere in the history of pre-colonial independent Nigeria can anyone point to the 
massacre of Ibos by Hausas or any incident which suggests that people up to the 19th 
century were fighting each other because of ethnic origin. Of course there were wars, but 
they had a rational basis in trade rivalry, religious contentions, and the clashes of political 
expansion. What came to be called tribalism at the beginning of the new epoch of 
political independence in Nigeria was itself a product of the way that people were 
brought together under colonialism so as to be exploited. It was a product of 
administrative devices, of entrenched regional separations, of differential access by 
particular ethnic groups into the colonial economy and culture. (p. 229) 
 
1.3.2 Colonial Africa: c. 1900 – c. 1960 
Having argued above that group association/“ethnicity” is not inherently conflictive 
within the human condition, but its ideological/political manipulation for often economic reasons 
seems to be conflict generating, it is, accordingly, appropriate to further unravel this theoretical 
problematic in relation to this thesis for the following reasons: first, the ensuing exposition 
demonstrates that “ethnicity” has been deliberately constructed as divisionary strategy during the 
colonial period; and second, it also shows that the during the post-colonial period in Africa this 
highly questionable ideological construct of “ethnicity” continues to be used for a range of socio-
economic-political reasons as illustrated in my research domain, Kenya vis-à-vis the Luo. 
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The genesis of “ethnic” conflict and negative “ethnicity”8 that characterize Africa today 
was the Berlin Conference of 1884/85; in this unholy convention, European powers divided the 
cradle of humankind amongst themselves in an arbitrary manner that brought about a great deal 
of confusion. As a consequence, members of some “ethnic groups” would find themselves 
separated in different countries; examples include the Somali (found in Kenya, Somalia and 
Ethiopia) the Maasai (Kenya and Tanzania) and the Luo (Kenya and Tanzania) (Odinga, 2007).
9
 
There are three other ways in which colonialism constructed and furthered “ethnic” formations in 
Africa: first, upon establishing their administrative structures, the colonialists proceeded to create 
social orders that were based on “race” – Europeans (“whites”) ranked first, Asians second and 
Africans last. Second, in entrenching their divide-and-rule philosophy, the colonial powers 
confined Africans to certain distinct areas, popularly known as “reserves”; this ensured that 
African communities lived separately from each other. Limited interaction made it difficult for 
the latter to coalesce and sowed seeds of mistrust and resentment amongst them. Third, 
colonialism came with segregation in the professional realm. Having demonstrated the apparent 
acceptance of the ascribed “ethnicity”, such Africans often would have been admitted to the 
official corridors of power (governance), though they were often excluded from certain 
professions (obtainable professions included serving in the army or police force, and farm work, 
amongst others) (Odinga, 2007). These discriminatory structural predispositions, vis-à-vis 
particular employment categories, would prove detrimental to the African state when self-
determination was achieved, as succinctly argued by Odinga (2007): 
 
With the advent of political independence in the 1960s, the colonial divisions found 
relevance in the competition of different communities for scarce resources, particularly 
land. As well, communities that had co-existed in relative peace before and even during 
colonialism found themselves competing for political power. And because resource 
allocation and distribution under the colonial administration and the post-independent 
                                                          
8
 “Ethnicity” becomes negative when it is linked to discrimination and unequal differentiation (wa Wamwere, 
2010); and negative “ethnicity” is “a mindset that claims some ethnic communities are superior and deserve more 
resources, while others are inferior and deserve less” (wa Wamwere, 2010, para. 4). 
9
 In fact, the Somali peoples are also to be found in Djibouti and Eritrea. Moreover, this phenomenon is not confined 
to East Africa. All over the continent, members of particular “ethnic groups” find themselves separated by 
geographical boundaries demarcated by European powers during the advent of colonialism. Examples include the 
following peoples: Malinke, Ndembu, Ibibio, Fang, Chewa, Hausa and Ewe among others. 
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governments were always lopsided, unequal and discriminatory, political power was 
viewed by each community as the vehicle to “prosperity” (Ethnicity as a Vehicle for 
Political Competition section, para. 1) 
 
1.3.3 Post-colonial Africa: c. 1960 – 2017 and Beyond 
Indeed, the colonialist divide-and-rule tactics discussed in sub-section 1.3.2, above, have 
become a resource tool for self-seeking and egotistical politicians in post-colonial Africa. The 
latter, in their quest to retain or capture power, have followed in the footsteps of the colonial 
powers before them; as noted by Aquiline-Tarimo (2008), this political class has specialized in 
“manipulating ethnic identities for private interest” (para. 1). But what explains this obnoxious 
societal norm in Africa today? I contend that the rationale lies in the transformation of the system 
of production and distribution of resources: colonialism came with an alien economic system – 
capitalism – which equated human worth to wealth and destroyed African social conscience, by 
undermining the concepts of “collective life and social solidarity” (Touré, 1959, as cited in 
Nyasani, 1989, p. 13). Important symbols and procedures that had hitherto been sources of 
prestige within the traditional African society, such as sharing/brotherhood and other aspects of 
morality, and rites of passage, became largely redundant. Communalism gave way to the 
“survival of the fittest” and “everyone for himself/herself” dispositions.  To obtain “prestigious” 
standing amongst fellow humans, post-colonial Africans – in similar fashion to the inhabitants of 
every other society in which capitalism as a mode of production is prevalent – resorted to 
obtaining wealth by any and all means necessary. At the political level, access to this wealth was 
tied to state power/control. Since the ultimate goal was to get recognition and prestige (which lay 
in wealth) by any means necessary, greed overcame compunction in the internal battle within the 
self, and “ethnic” numbers took the place of policies, manifestoes and visions in politics even as 
politicians spread hatred amongst the various “ethnic groups” that comprised the voting 
population. Thus, seeds of mistrust, at the grassroots level, were sown even further. Also, at the 
grassroots/individual level, life became harsher under capitalism as everyone struggled to 
position themselves within this new economic order in the post-colonial state. As a result, 
citizens became easily susceptible and readily receptive to the political gospel of “we versus 
them”. “Ethnicity” thus became a weapon in the struggle for access to scarce resources.  
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Undeniably, state power in post-independent Africa has become the perpetual means 
through which the bourgeois class is either formed or safeguarded. The section of the political 
class in power, which owes its privileged material position to the control of state resources and 
the lopsided manner in which capital structures society (cf. Mészáros, 2001a, pp. 101 – 102), 
plays the “ethnic” card to maintain the status quo. Similarly, competition against it is waged on 
the platform of “ethnic” identity as opposition leaders go for their “turn to eat” (cf. Wrong, 
2009). Pre-occupation with constructed forms of “belonging”, that is, “ethnicity”, has thus 
become entrenched, especially in post-colonial Africa, because whoever controls state power 
also makes the decision regarding how national resources will be allocated vis-à-vis specific 
“ethnic” formations (cf. Odinga, 2007; Singh & vom Hau, 2015; Mullard, 2005). 
 
Other salient characteristics of the post-colonial African state – closely related to 
“ethnicity” – include autocracy, personal rule and centralization of power (Asingo, 2003; 
Odhiambo-Mbai, 2003; Noyoo, 2000). These ideologically constructed features are accompanied 
by systematic patron-client linkages in which “public sector jobs, material rewards and economic 
opportunities [are] offered as favours to clients [usually members of the President’s “ethnic 
group” and loyal ethno-regional leaders] who in turn mobilize political support [for the 
President] (Bratton & Walle, 1997, as cited in Asingo, 2003, p. 20). It is through these patron-
client linkages that “ethnic, sub-nationalist interests” (Throup, 1987) are often taken care of, for 
the modus operandi is replicated throughout the political system, from the level of the national 
government to the grassroots level (cf. Odhiambo-Mbai, 2003; Berman, 1998; Berman, 2010). 
Thus, in many countries across the continent – Kenya, Nigeria and Côte d'Ivoire included – 
economic development has become largely dependent on one’s (community’s or individual’s) 
relationship with the powers-that-be, that is, the state controllers (Kasfir, 1998). Ideologically, 
ethnic-based typologies of belonging (inclusion) in post-colonial Africa often seem to be 
repressed, where dissident communities are viewed/considered to be anti-status quo, that is, 
against the exclusionary practices of a particular government and related state structures, 
encompassing virtually every aspect of life – social, economic and political. 
 
Against the backdrop of the preceding exposition on the apparent “significance” of 
“ethnicized” forms of governance in Africa, Kenya seems to illustrate an African country still 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
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reeling from these repercussions of colonialism. “Ethnic” allegiances in the country continue to 
determine government formation and distribution of the scarce national resources. Moreover, 
political leaders in the East African nation repeatedly manipulate “ethnic” identities to serve their 
personal interests. As discussed in the introduction, the Luo community of Western Kenya has 
consistently been “anti-government” in the post-independence era. Accordingly, this research 
examines the specifics of the economic and socio-cultural consequences of the community’s 
perceived political stance, within the framework of the aforementioned characteristics associated 
with the post-colonial African state. The next section interrogates the research problem in greater 
depth. 
 
1.4 Research Problem 
Following my contention, in sub-section 1.3.3 above, that in post-colonial Africa the 
socio-economic development of particular communities is, more often than not, influenced to a 
considerable extent by the latter’s posture – perceived or real – towards the state, I now present 
the central research problem in this study, which focuses on the peculiar pattern of antagonism 
between the Luo community and the Government of Kenya (GoK) throughout the post-
independence era. Here, I further argue that there are overlapping thematic categories in the 
governance styles of the first three presidents of post-independent Kenya – Kenyatta, Moi and 
Kibaki – that have been detrimental to the Luo community and other Kenyans at large, since 
governance systems do not necessarily cease to exist with the demise of a particular leader; 
rather, a continuation occurs, via residual effects, on subsequent regimes.
10
 I, therefore, unravel 
the research problem in four historical phases, viz.: 1960 – 66 (The incipient stage of 
authoritarianism vis-à-vis Kenya); 1966 – 78 (The incipient stage of authoritarianism vis-à-vis 
the Luo); 1978 – 2002 (The advancement stage of authoritarianism vis-à-vis Kenya in general 
and the Luo in particular); and 2003 – 13 (The Machiavellian stage of authoritarianism vis-à-vis 
Kenya in general and the Luo in particular).    
 
1.4.1 1960 – 66: The Incipient Stage of Authoritarianism Vis-à-Vis Kenya 
Before examining the leadership styles of the three aforementioned presidents, as alluded 
                                                          
10
 For a detailed understanding about how the “residual effect” phenomenon associated with colonialism has 
occurred in post-colonial African society, see wa Thiong’o, N. (1986). Decolonizing the mind: The politics of 
language in African literature. Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers.   
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to in section 1.4 above, and vis-à-vis the Luo “ethnic group”, it is important to state that the 
period 1960 – 66 was one of liberation and independence euphoria in what became Kenya. 
Whereas there were concerns about domination of some “ethnic groups” by others owing to 
demographic differentials and other factors,
11
 as voiced during the Lancaster House Conferences 
of 1960, 1962 and 1963, apprehensions were nimbly anaesthetized by looming independence 
and, thereafter, by the ecstasy of self-determination. This made it difficult to discern any 
insincerity between the two pre-independence protagonists; KANU – which stood for centralized 
government – and Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) – which advocated a 
“Majimbo”/federal state. This euphoria played a significant role in enabling Kenyatta to outwit 
KADU. As Mue (2013) has argued: 
 
Exhausted at the slow pace of the negotiations and knowing he had “the numbers” in the 
forthcoming elections at the end of May 1963, Jomo Kenyatta called out his delegates 
[from KANU – which advocated a centralized system of government] and told them he 
was going to agree to the Majimbo constitution to enable them to get on with the election, 
and as soon as they had won the election and formed government, then they would re-
make the constitution in their own image. (para. 2)  
 
Although Kenya gained its independence under a federal constitution, and with Kenyatta as its 
first Prime Minister (PM), prevailing socio-economic-political conditions would 
stagnate/deteriorate as the latter would stay  
 
[t]rue to his word, soon after independence, [and lead] the process of mutilating the 
constitution to centralize all power to himself. He began by starving the regional 
governments of resources, then wooed the opposition to his side leading to its dissolution. 
He dissolved the Senate and abolished the regional governments. From there it was 
downhill all the way as Kenya became a one party dictatorship. (Mue, 2013, para. 4)  
    
By the time Jaramogi Oginga Odinga – Kenya’s first Vice-President and de facto leader of the 
                                                          
11
 For more details on the KANU – KADU divide and the stalemate that delayed independence in Kenya, see 
Asingo, P. O. (2003). The political economy of transition in Kenya. In W. O. Oyugi, P. Wanyande & C. Odhiambo-
Mbai (Eds.), The politics of transition in Kenya (pp. 15 – 50). Nairobi: Heinrich Boll Foundation.  
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Luo community disagreed with Kenyatta in 1966, the latter had consolidated power and every 
“ethnic group” in the Kenyan state, including the Luo, was under his complete control. The next 
section examines how events unfolded, for the Luo community, and other Kenyans at large, 
following the dispute between these two independence figures. 
 
1.4.2 1966 – 78: Kenyatta and the Incipient Stage of Authoritarianism Vis-à-vis the Luo   
The basis of the Kenyatta-Odinga fallout, mentioned in the preceding period, was mainly 
ideological and stems from the fact that Kenyatta’s view of life was influenced by “individual 
enterprise and personal virtue” while Odinga’s perspective was inspired by “clan-based 
communocratic and egalitarian values plus a tradition of resistance to authoritarianism of any 
sort” (Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002, p. 241). However, there was also a political element to the row: 
during the 1966 Limuru Conference, Kenyatta instigated the creation of eight posts of party vice-
chairman within KANU, without Odinga’s foreknowledge, outwitting and infuriating the latter to 
the point that he resigned (Kariuki, 2001, pp. 45 – 46; Auma-Osolo, 2013, p. 173). Odinga would 
then venture into opposition politics, forming a new party, the Kenya People’s Union (KPU), in 
April 1966. This new party would obtain its support mainly from Odinga’s Luo Nyanza. 
Following this split, the Luo were largely labelled anti-government and became associated with 
opposition politics. This tag made the community a prime target for political and economic 
exclusion. Indeed, to stem the “threat” that Odinga posed to the Kenyatta regime, the Kiambu 
(Kikuyu) “Kitchen cabinet” – comprising of Mbiyu Koinange, Njoroge Mungai, Charles Njonjo, 
James Gichuru and Kenyatta himself – commenced the process of marginalizing the Luo 
(Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002)
12
. Marginalization of the Luo, and other Kenyan “ethnic groups” was 
accomplished, in part, by what (Auma-Osolo, 2013, p. 168) has been referred to as the 
“Kikuyunization” of the civil service. Kenyatta preserved all strategic public service positions in 
Kenya for his Kikuyu “ethnic group”, thereby excluding other Kenyans. These posts included the 
following:  
                                                          
12
 Though Mbiyu Koinange died in 1981, a Nairobi court only recently adjudicated the division of his vast wealth 
amongst his family members. His enormous estate is valued at USD 163 million as of September 2015. This lends 
credence to my argument, in chapter two, that state control has been crucial in the formation of the indigenous 
African bourgeois class in Kenya, and that it is through the entrenchment of the state-ethnic nexus that the wealthy 
class is safeguarded. For more details on Koinange, see Muthoni, K. (2015 September, 28). Joy, heartbreak as court 
finally shares out Koinange’s multi-billion shilling estate. Standard Digital. Retrieved from 
http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000177793/kenya-joy-heartbreak-as-court-finally-shares-out-koinange-s-
multi-billion-shilling-estate/ (accessed 4 October 2015).  
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Divisional Officers to District Officers, Provincial Commissioners, Permanent 
Secretaries, Heads of Parastatal Agencies, Governor of the Central Bank, Commissioner 
of Police, Chief of General Security Unit (GSU), Director of Criminal Investigations 
(CID), Director of Special Branch, Principal Immigration Officer, Air Force Commander. 
(Auma-Osolo, 2013, pp. 167 – 168)     
 
The Luo community’s ties with the Kenyatta government were further eroded following the 
assassination of the charismatic Luo leader who had been pro-Kenyatta, Tom Mboya, and the 
banning of the KPU in 1969. When Kenyatta died in 1978, his deputy, Moi, ascended to the 
helm promising to follow in his “footsteps”; and he did. 
 
1.4.3 1978 – 2002: Moi’s “Nyayoism” – The Advancement Stage of Authoritarianism Vis-
à-vis Kenya in General and the Luo in Particular 
The “footsteps” alluded to in sub-section 1.4.2 above were to be popularized by Moi’s 
“newfound” philosophy, and clarion call, “Nyayo”, which emphasized “peace, love and unity” 
(Nyaroga, 1996, p. 10). These three pillars, Moi argued, had been the driving force behind 
Kenyatta’s leadership since independence; and now he, Moi, would incorporate them into his 
style of governance. Moi’s actions, though, were a complete antithesis of his words – at least as 
far as the Luo and Kikuyu “ethnic groups” were concerned. The incorporation and emulation 
seem to have mainly centred on the negative aspects of Kenyatta’s rule. Following the aborted 
coup attempt of August 1, 1982, the Moi government indicted Odinga and the Luo community 
(Throup, 1987). Because the Luo had for a long time been denied the opportunity to participate 
in the political process, the coup attempt was celebrated in Nyanza Province. The Luos in 
Nairobi also warmly welcomed the incident. Odinga and the Luo were suspected by the Moi 
regime because of the protracted history of antagonism between them – Moi and Kenyatta both 
exaggerated the threat that Odinga and the Luo posed to their regimes. Thereafter, Odinga and 
his Luo community were politically side-lined even further. Another interesting characteristic of 
Moi’s regime was his antagonistic relationship with the Kikuyu community. When Moi ascended 
to power, he inherited a state dominated by Kikuyu hegemony. To stamp his authority and 
entrench his rule, he made concerted efforts to “dismantle the economic foundations of the 
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Kenyatta State” and “diverted resources away from Central Province to the Kalenjin” (Throup 
1987, p. 60). Indeed, from 1978 – 2002, Moi dealt ruthlessly with the Kikuyu by expelling them 
from the civil service. He especially denied them the top, most influential positions (Amutabi, 
2009). These mechanisms of political marginalization were to be employed by his successor, 
Kibaki, in a modern, shrewd and subtle manner, as discussed in sub-section 1.4.4 below. 
 
1.4.4 2003 – 13: Kibaki and the Machiavellian Stage of Authoritarianism Vis-à-vis Kenya 
in General and the Luo in Particular  
Characterized by a “polite” demeanour, Kibaki struck the observer as a “hands-off” 
president – he appeared not to meddle in the affairs of his appointees, and cut for himself the 
image of a non-authoritarian. This approach, coupled with his efforts to slay the dragon of 
corruption during the early part of his tenure in office, endeared him to many a Kenyan. 
However, some of his actions soon began to raise eyebrows; as Kinyanjui and Maina (2008) 
correctly observe, Kibaki failed to honour a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed 
between himself and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) leader, Raila Odinga (Jaramogi’s son). 
This MoU, in which it is widely believed an agreement had been reached to create a prime 
ministerial position for Raila, had brought Kibaki to power, but was breached. Kinyanjui and 
Maina (2008), state that “the breakdown of the MoU disregarded the envisaged equitable 
distribution of power among the ethnic groups” (p. 86). In this respect, their argument is similar 
to the views of Foucault (1978 [1976]), who envisions power from the perspective of 
relationships and argues that it is not a possession but a complex circulation, which involves 
multiple relations between different societal areas and groups. Power is, therefore, bound to 
change with circumstances and time; it determines our identity (what we are), capability (what 
we can do) and perspective (our views about ourselves and the world). Following the Kibaki – 
Raila schism, the Luo were once again side-lined politically. Kibaki would also proceed to 
indulge the Gikuyu, Embu and Meru Association (GEMA) communities in public appointments 
throughout his reign at the expense of other Kenyans (Amutabi, 2009; Auma-Osolo, 2013). 
Having examined the relationship between “ethnicity” and governance, in the Kenyan context, 
and explored the evolution of the residual effects in Kenyan leadership structures, I pose a multi-
dimensional research question as outlined in sub-section 1.4.5 below.   
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1.4.5 Research Questions 
Given that Kenya’s independence from the British, in 1963, ushered in an era of resource 
distribution that was dependent on politics and “ethnicity” (Throup, 1987), this study poses the 
following multi-dimensional question: how did antagonistic relations, between the GoK and the 
Luo, influence the socio-economic development of Kenya, in general, and that of the Luo 
community in particular? The socio-economic consequences of political marginalization in 
Africa are thought of as harmful; however, this is a very general description that is not backed by 
evidence. What are the specifics of the negative socio-economic consequences of political 
marginalization within the Kenyan context? Could thinkers that hold the view that uneven 
development in Kenya is the result of the nature of capitalism and has nothing to do with post-
colonial GoK-instigated manipulations (cf. e.g., Oloo, 2004), in fact, have a point? This research 
concerns itself with equity – in terms of equality of access to opportunity, equality of 
participation in the opportunity, and the outcome of equal participation (cf. Mészáros, 2001a; 
Mészáros, 2001b; Mészáros, 2009) – and examines public provision trends with regard to the 
following five indicators of socio-economic development: education, healthcare, housing, 
electricity and rural water supplies.   
 
Whilst focused on finding answers to the questions posed above, and in recognition of the 
fact that self-aggrandizement by the ruling elites in Africa is not sufficient to explain political 
antagonisms (cf. Mafeje, 2002), this study acknowledges that ethnic-based political 
marginalization/exclusion, “is a metaphor for things which could be understood otherwise” 
(Mafeje, 2002, p. 56); that is, it is a proxy variable. Accordingly, there exists the need for this 
study to simultaneously examine why the African political culture encourages the social 
reproduction of “ethnic identities”, despite this being degenerate and socially destructive. Indeed, 
the fact that the various factions that form the African political elite class allow – or engage in – 
activities that yield ills such as the 2007 – 08 post-election violence in Kenya is puzzling for 
 
[h]istorically, it is unimaginable that members of a hegemonic class would engage in 
unbridled mutual extermination and preside over the destruction of their supreme 
instrument of social and economic control, the state, as has become the order of the day 
in Africa. (Mafeje, 2002, p. 56, emphasis added)  
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
20 
 
 
Consequently, this research will also seek to explain, by studying the antagonism between the 
Luo community and the Kenyan state, why “ethnicity” is strongly correlated with the crisis of 
state power in the East African nation, and poses the following additional questions: why does 
the Kenyan political elite class persist in promoting the scourge of “ethnicity” despite experience 
showing its existential problems for particular social groups? What informs “ethnic”-based 
political exclusion in Kenya, besides the desire to maintain/safeguard the social formation of 
capital? 
  
1.5 Rationale/Justification for the Research  
Based on the preceding historical context of the marginalization of the Luo in Kenya, it 
would appear that the “ethnic” question in African governance has been the subject of general 
discourse in numerous academic forums and scholarly works. However, its influence on the 
socio-economic development of particular communities is yet to be thoroughly analysed. 
Research by Kimenyi and Bratton (2008) examines the “ethnicity” factor in Kenyan voting 
patterns. According to them, Kenyans do not trust members of other “ethnic groups”, and 
therefore vote for their own. They also found that communities from western Kenya (especially 
the Luo and Luhya) are twice as likely to cry foul over “ethnic”-based discrimination compared 
to those in the GEMA complex or the Kamba. From their findings, the following questions then 
arise: what historical experience makes Kenyans feel like they have to vote for “their own” as 
opposed to voting on the basis of policies, manifestoes and visions? Why do Kenyans from 
different parts of the country identify divergently, and in a contrasting fashion, with “ethnic”-
based discrimination?  
 
Dersso (2008) blames the post-colonial state for Africa’s “ethnic” woes. The former, 
according to him, has failed to “recognize ethnic diversity and develop the necessary institutions 
and policies for accommodating the interests and identities of members of various groups” (p. 5). 
African governance features the domination of the state by some groups. This results in the 
political and economic alienation and marginalization of other groups. Society thus becomes 
dominated by competition as opposed to co-operation. Domination and exclusion take centre 
stage, closing the door for accommodation and inclusion. Bitterness, which sometimes can be 
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marked by violence, then ensues, making it almost impossible for nation-building to thrive. 
However, he does not undertake a comprehensive study of any “ethnic group” that would fall 
under what he refers to as marginalized, dominated and excluded by the controllers of state 
power. This study intends to address this gap by finding answers to the following question: in 
what ways has the post-colonial Kenyan state failed to accommodate the interests and identities 
of members of “dissident” “ethnic groups”? 
 
According to Ongaro and Osogo (2008), an imperial presidency is to blame for Kenya’s 
diversity problems and “ethnic” tensions. The old constitutional order accorded the presidency 
too much power and left other state organs inchoate and frail. More importantly, they highlight 
the effects of “ethnic”-driven politics and governance. They state that:  
 
[T]he ethnic proneness of Kenya’s politics affects not only who is elected, but also how 
jobs are allocated and affects the triumph of ethnic nepotism as one branch of corruption . 
. . Power-plays, capital transfers, loyalties and solidarities, jobs and opportunities, 
scholarships and bursaries, loans and gifts, are all influenced in one degree or another, by 
the pervasive power of ethnicity in Kenya. (p. 25)  
 
This study finds the aforementioned revelations very useful and, in conducting research on the 
influence of ethnic-based governance on the Luo, interrogates whether these observations of 
Ongaro and Osogo (2008) have translated into economic difficulties at the grassroots level for 
the community. These views are supported by Opalo (2011), who blames underdevelopment in 
Africa on the phenomenon of the imperial presidency. Imperial presidents, he argues, have 
manipulated and controlled economic outcomes for many years on the continent. A common 
feature of African governance is powerful “kitchen cabinets”, which so often take control of the 
presidency and hoard power and resources from other “ethnic groups”. Governments that 
practice political exclusion to perpetuate their stranglehold on power may indeed allow only 
minimal public investment in the home areas of dissident communities. This tendency not only 
discourages opponents, but keeps them poor. Economically disenfranchised communities find it 
very difficult to organize themselves politically and are easy to divide-and-rule. The study, from 
the aforementioned revelations, also poses the question: what are the specific means, in the 
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Kenyan case, by which resources have been hoarded from dissident “ethnic groups”? 
 
 Musila (2008) attributes violent contestation of state power, land clashes, displacement 
and skewed allocation of resources in Kenya to “ethnic”-based governance. He argues that the 
“ethnicity” question in Kenya arose from its heavy centralization. “Ethnicity” has been used to 
capture and maintain state power, and the result has been the exclusion of others. He explores 
federalism as the possible answer to Kenya’s “ethnic”-based governance problem. Musila’s work 
provides an excellent background and justification for the examination of the influence of 
“tribal” politics on those communities that have had limited or no access to state power, which 
this study seeks to do. Carr (1995) sees a direct co-relation between economic dissatisfaction and 
the strengthening of “ethnic” roots. According to her, economic disparities in Africa have often 
resulted in “ethnic” as opposed to class consciousness. She asserts that appraisal of political and 
economic chances in Africa takes place, mainly, within an environment and context of “ethnic” 
scuffle and rivalry. These insightful ideas are crucial in analysing whether the Luo of western 
Kenya joined hands to work together as a people, to help uplift their living standards, as a 
reactionary measure to being politically side-lined by the central government in Kenya during 
the period under study.  
 
Indeed, it would appear that “ethnicity” has greatly influenced the manner in which 
African countries are governed, how the ruling groups get to power, and, equally important, how 
they are opposed. However, the influence of “ethnic”-based governance on those “ethnic groups” 
considered to be anti-government (usually the politically-dominated groups), is yet to be 
comprehensively examined. By focusing on Kenya and its Luo community, this study set out to 
contribute to the exciting scholarly discourse surrounding “ethnicity” and socio-economic 
development in Africa. Besides, Kenya only recently promulgated a new constitution – on the 
27th of August 2010 to be precise – that was immensely celebrated by Kenyans of all walks of 
life. The event, held at Nairobi’s Uhuru Park, was held in high esteem, with its significance 
rivalling that of independence from the British in 1963. It has been termed in many quarters as 
the “Birth of the Second Republic”. This new constitution promises to solve the problems 
associated with “ethnicity”, governance and socio-economic development. This is especially so 
because of the new system of devolved government that it operationalized after the general 
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election of 2013. The objects and principles of the new Kenyan Constitution are as follows: 
 
a) To promote democratic and accountable exercise of power; 
b) To foster national unity by recognizing diversity; 
c) To give powers of self-governance to the people and enhance the participation of the 
people in the exercise of the powers of the State and in making decisions affecting them; 
d) To recognize the right of communities to manage their own affairs and to further their 
development; 
e) To protect and promote the interests and rights of minorities and marginalized 
communities; 
f) To promote social and economic development and the provision of proximate, easily 
accessible services throughout Kenya; 
g) To ensure equitable sharing of national and local resources throughout Kenya; 
h) To facilitate the decentralization of State organs, their functions and services, from the 
capital of Kenya; and 
i) To enhance checks and balances and the separation of powers (see The Constitution of 
Kenya, 2010, Chapter Eleven Section 174).       
 
In order for the new constitution to be implemented with the diligence and urgency it deserves, 
and in order for this new constitutional dispensation to be appreciated as it ought to be, I posit 
that the experiences of Kenyans under the old independence constitution need to be understood. 
This study has, therefore, been conducted with the aim of helping to realize this goal. Moreover, 
this study could help make sense of the post-election violence that was witnessed in the country 
in 2007 – 08. 
 
1.6 Objectives 
Based on the problem statement in section 1.4 above, the objectives of this study are to:  
i) Explain the marginalization of the Luo by examining the proportion of GoK investment 
in Nyanza, during the period 1963 – 2013, to enhance their effective participation in 
governance structures at a grassroots level and their concomitant to socio-economic 
development.  
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ii) Examine the Luo perspective of the influence of political exclusion on their socio-
economic and cultural development since independence. 
iii) Construct a conceptual framework to explain why “ethnicity” was strongly correlated 
with the crisis of state power in Kenya, 1963 – 2013, and why it has become a pervasive 
problem in the African country. 
 
1.7 Research Assumptions  
i. The Luo have enjoyed minimal public investment from the GoK because of 
opposition politics, making them relatively poor compared to other communities. 
ii. Political exclusion, during the period under study, has had the unwitting effect of 
fostering “ethnic” cohesion amongst the Luo. 
iii. Political exclusion at the national level has translated into economic difficulties 
for the Luo at the individual level, limiting their chances of ever getting to power 
in Kenya.  
iv. The Luo are gradually adopting alien cultures in uniform/homogeneous fashion, 
owing to politically constructed/mobilized stereotypes and prejudices, to gain 
acceptance as fully-fledged members of the Kenyan society at large.  
v. The strong correlation between “ethnicity” and the crisis of state power in Kenya, 
and the pervasiveness of the ideological construct, are partly the result of the 
machinations of global capitalists and western interference in the country’s 
affairs. 
 
1.8 Conceptual Framework 
This study is largely based on the principles of ex post facto research. According to Silva 
(2010), “[e]x post facto study or after-the-fact research is a category of research design in which 
the investigation starts after the fact has occurred without interference from the researcher” (p. 
466). It is “a systematic inquiry in which the researcher does not have direct control of the 
independent variables because their manifestation has already occurred or because they cannot 
be manipulated” (Kerlinger, 1975, as cited in Ogola, 2010, p. 27). Ex post facto research “is a 
substitute for true experimental research and can be used to test hypotheses about cause-and-
effect or correlational relationships, where it is not practical or ethical to apply a true 
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experimental, or even a quasi-experimental, design” (Simon & Goes, 2013, p. 1). This research is 
anchored on the premise that political exclusion at the national level, which has already occurred 
in the case of Kenya and its Luo community during the period under study, could have translated 
into economic and socio-cultural practices at the grassroots level with profound socio-economic-
political consequences at all levels of society. The main variable in this study is political 
exclusion; this variable has been considered independently and analysed in relation to cultural 
factors (male circumcision), economic difficulties, “ethnic” cohesion and minimal public 
investment. Figure 1.1, below, depicts how the variables under examination, in the quantitative 
phase of this study, relate to the research assumptions and the data that was collected. 
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: The Conceptual Framework. 
Source: Author’s construct (2017) 
 
The segment of this conceptual framework that links political exclusion with economic 
difficulties, “ethnic” cohesion, and minimal public investment derives from current literature 
discussed in section 1.5 above. Of particular note, however, is its assumption that, owing to 
“ethnic”-based political exclusion of the community from participation in governance structures, 
the Luo are adopting the alien culture of male circumcision, in homogeneous fashion, to conform 
Political Exclusion 
Cultural Factors 
Economic Difficulties 
“Ethnic” Cohesion 
Minimal Public Investment 
Dependent variables Independent variable 
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and gain acceptance in Kenyan society (cultural factors). As already stated, pre-colonial Africa 
was characterized by myriad rites of passage – each community (social group) with its own – 
which marked the transition from childhood to adulthood. To the Kikuyu community, which has 
controlled the Kenyan state for a lengthy time period since independence, circumcision was a 
major component of transition to adulthood; this was not the case for the Luo, as captured 
succinctly by Malo (1999[2003]) who wrote that:  
 
The Luo is a person who is proud, janyadhi, and he is also a Show off, jasunga. And so 
he calls everybody who hails from outside the Luo communities as ‘jamwa’. These are 
people who do not have the six lower teeth removed, holes in their ears and who bite into 
a bead, kayo ngaga. They are also people who are circumcised, eat insects or do not 
know the Luo language. (p. 73) 
 
This rite of passage issue has seemingly been politicized ever since independence from the 
British, particularly since 1969, as discussed in chapter two, and now seems to operate as an 
exclusionary factor vis-à-vis the Luo who do not necessarily subscribe to it. Accordingly, the 
“cultural factors” (rite of passage issue) component of figure 1.1, above, is framed around the 
concept of social death (cf. e.g., Mason, 2003; Patterson, 1982). Social death is the condition of 
those “who [have] ceased to belong and ha[ve] been expelled from normal participation in the 
community because of a failure to meet certain minimal legal or socioeconomic norms of 
behaviour” (Patterson, 1982, p. 41). Historically, social death often arose when dominant societal 
groups “annihilated [the dominated] people socially by first extracting them from meaningful 
relationships that defined personal status and belonging, communal memory, and collective 
aspiration and then incorporating these socially dead persons into the masters’ world” (Brown, 
2009, p. 1233). The cultural aspect of this study gets its justification from the work of Geertz 
(1973) who argues that culture is a “semiotic” and “public” concept (pp. 5 – 6). For this reason, 
there is no discomfiture in conducting studies of an ethnographic nature (“thickly describing 
culture” – Geertz, 1973, p. 6), as long as issues that could be regarded as “sensitive” are 
examined ethically. Besides, researchers should not be restricted by themes of “novelty” – a 
subjective term, anyway – since “studies do build on other studies, not in the sense that they take 
up where the others leave off, but in the sense that, better informed and better conceptualized, 
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they plunge more deeply into the same things” (Geertz, 1973, p. 25). Moreover, “[t]heoretical 
ideas are not created wholly anew in each study . . . they are adopted from other related studies, 
and, refined in the process, applied to new interpretive problems” (Geertz, 1973, p. 27). 
 
However, owing to the fact that Kenya’s “ethnic”-based political exclusion of the Luo – 
including the rite of passage myth on which it is structured (see chapter two) – is a proxy 
variable, and that there is a need to explain why the current African political culture encourages 
the practice despite it being socially destructive, the more significant challenge of this research 
was to “find an empirical approach to . . . ethnicity that [wa]s not reductionist and d[id] not 
[water down] the dynamic, interrelated and situated meanings of lived experiences [and causes] 
of . . . ethnicity” (Spencer, 2014, p. xvii). To eliminate this danger of reducing a complex 
historical process to a unidimensional cultural factor (cf. Mafeje, 2002; Spencer, 2014), I have 
adopted a pragmatic (“phronetic”) approach (cf. Flyvbjerg, 2001; Flyvbjerg, Landman and 
Schram, 2012) and employed a mixed methods research (MMR) design, which involves Focus 
Group Discussions (FGDs), a thorough examination of historical records and a systematic 
scrutiny of contemporary world events. This MMR design adopted for this study has yielded a 
more complete framework (cf. chapter 5 of this thesis) through which historical records have 
subsequently been examined to ensure a broader analysis of “ethnicized” politics. The FGDs 
have ensured that the voices of ordinary people, who have experienced the effects of ethnic-
based discrimination, have been heard. Whilst advocating for such an approach in the study of 
“ethnicity” in Africa, Mafeje (2002) has lamented that “there are now numerous texts on 
‘ethnicity’ in [Africa] and yet the supposed subjects of ‘ethnic conflict’ remain invisible and their 
representations are conspicuous by their absence in scholarly discourse, as if they are simply 
automatons” (p. 63). On the other hand, the examination of historical records and contemporary 
world events has ensured that external factors, which could have fostered “ethnicity”, such as 
western interference in the continent’s affairs, have been considered; this in turn has ensured that 
the emergent complex dynamics that inform “ethnicity” in Kenya and, by logical extrapolation, 
Africa, have been taken into account and that analysis of this ideological construct has been 
conducted through a holistic prism. A brief outline of some elements of the research 
methodology employed in this study is presented next. 
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1.9 Research Methodology 
This research has employed the case study research methodology. According to Yin 
(2009), case study research methodology is ideal for “how” and “why” questions. The method is 
also recommended in instances where researchers have minimal control over events and when 
“the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within a real-life context” (p. 2). A case study 
approach to this research was adopted since it has enabled me to utilize current theoretical 
propositions on “ethnicity” and governance. These theoretical propositions guided me in data 
collection and analysis, as evidenced in figure 1.1, above. Case study research methodology 
helps researchers cope technically in situations where variables of interest outnumber data 
points. It does this by “rel[ying] on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge 
in a triangular fashion” (Yin, 2009, p. 18). This case study is predicated upon two units of 
analysis: Luo Nyanza (the traditional homeland of the Luo community) and individual members 
of the Luo “ethnic group”. In studying Luo Nyanza, evidence was sought from a variety of 
sources, chief among which were the GoK’s Budget Speeches, Economic Surveys, and 
Statistical Abstracts. Baxter and Jack (2008) have argued that “This ensures that the issue is not 
explored through one lens, but rather a variety of lenses which allows for multiple facets of the 
phenomenon to be revealed and understood” (p. 544). This approach borrows from what 
Foucault (1969 [1972]) refers to as “archaeology” and “genealogy” of power. In his approach to 
writing history, Foucault begins by identifying the problem. He then works through historical 
archives of particular societies to disclose the discursive formations (or events) that have led to 
the field of inquiry (problem). He refers to this method as archaeology. The “archaeology of 
power” concept was found to be relevant and important for this study, as it allowed for the 
examination of the various aforementioned Kenyan historical documents – the GoK’s Budget 
Speeches, Statistical Abstracts and Economic Surveys – to establish how political power has 
been exercised in Kenya, and how it has influenced socio-economic development and outcomes 
in the country. 
 
To Foucault, the past is not definite, for it is perpetually in construction and is subject to 
reconstruction and revision by future generations, especially in instances where the knowledge 
base (episteme) changes (Foucault, 1980). To explain and disambiguate power, Foucault has 
looked to various historical events, which include an encounter in 1793 between physician 
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Phillipe Pinel and a bunch of chained lunatics, and a 1788 scenario involving a delusional King 
George III, his pages, and a visiting doctor. To further describe and demystify power, Foucault 
turns to social institutions like the psychiatric clinic, the market place and the prison; he also 
turns to practices such as Christianity, Psychiatry, and Government. These institutional 
structures, mediating/enforcing dominant power relations, he finds invaluable as sources of 
knowledge, since elements of power manifest themselves in such environments, according to 
him. Foucault also examines how power manifests itself, works and flows socially, in private 
scenarios such as family life and the body of the individual. He also examines the global 
commodity market as a public space for the manifestation of power (cf. Schirato, Danaher & 
Webb, 2012; McNay, 1994). In line with Foucault’s approach, survey respondents in this study 
were sought from institutions like Kenyan schools and environments like market places and 
residential areas in Kenya. The evolution of ideologies such as Christianity, Darwinism and 
eugenics, has also been examined to further uncover the genesis of the spurious ideological 
construct “ethnicity”. 
   
Genealogy – “the process of analysing and uncovering the historical relationship between 
the truth, knowledge and power” (Schirato, Danaher & Webb, 2012, pp. xx – xxi) is another 
approach that Foucault uses to write the history of power. According to Foucault, this method 
can be used to overcome the shortcomings of archaeology. Like archaeology, it consults and 
examines “parchments” that have been examined and re-examined over and over again. In this 
sense, there is not much difference between the two methods. However, genealogy is not limited 
by epistemic discontinuity; it overcomes the latter by embracing arbitrariness, and accepting the 
fact that in constructing history, errors will be made and confusion will occur (cf. Foucault, 
1977). It addresses two issues that cannot be explained satisfactorily by the archaeological 
method: “the relation between a critical or historiographical practice and its contexts; and the 
manner in which beliefs, rules and dispositions are embodied and maintained at the level of the 
everyday” (Schirato, Danaher & Webb, 2012, p. 38). The concept of “genealogy of power” was 
found to be relevant and important for this study, because in the Kenyan context, personal 
struggles and squabbles between political figures have been “externalized” and “universalized” 
to mean (and include) struggles between their “ethnic groups”. The “enmity” between Kenyatta 
(a Kikuyu) and Odinga (a Luo), for instance, continues to haunt Kenyan society long after the 
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demise of the two historical figures. Members of the Kikuyu and Luo “ethnic groups” seldom see 
eye to eye on any issue and are great political rivals. “Knowledge” and “truth”, in the context of 
Kenya and this research, have therefore been partly obtained by examining the historical 
relationship between these two “ethnic groups” – this aspect of the research was not limited by 
the existence, or lack thereof, of historical documents.  
 
This study employed the following data analysis strategies: relying on theoretical 
propositions and examining rival explanations (Rowley, 2002; Yin, 2009) to unravel the 
configuration of socio-economic-political power relations as they affect the Luo community. In 
this regard, two analytical techniques were important for this study: pattern matching and 
explanation building, drawing on discourse analysis in order to examine dominant narratives on 
the marginalization/exclusion of the “Luo community, 1963 – 2013 from the governance and 
socio-economic development structures” in Kenya. According to Trochim (1989), pattern 
matching logic (which can strengthen the internal validity of a case study) involves matching 
events that have been empirically observed to events that were theoretically predicted (as cited in 
Yin, 2009, p. 136). 
  
A survey was conducted within this case study to investigate the influence of ethnic-
based governance at the individual level (see Appendix A). According to Gable (1994), the 
integration of surveys within case studies can be useful for purposes of internal validity. The 
geographical sampling units were as follows: the four counties of Luo Nyanza – Siaya, Kisumu, 
Homa Bay and Migori – and the four cosmopolitan counties of Nairobi, Mombasa, Nakuru and 
Uasin Gishu. I employed a non-probability (purposive) sampling technique. In this technique, 
“items for the sample are selected deliberately by the researcher; his choice concerning the items 
remains supreme” (Kothari, 2004, p. 59). Although the element of bias always exists with this 
sampling technique, it often yields adequately reliable results when investigators commit 
themselves to impartiality. Moreover, it is suitable for individual research and where time and 
financial constraints prevail (Kothari, 2004, p. 59). To make the sample as representative as 
possible (especially in terms of the age of the respondents), participants were sought from 
diverse entities such as schools, market places and residential areas. The data collected from the 
respondents has been analysed discursively and presented using tables, graphs and percentages.  
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To establish whether the Luo are adopting the alien culture of circumcision 
uniformly/homogeneously across the counties in which the study was carried out, I conducted 
chi-square tests of homogeneity for both combined Luo Nyanza counties and the combined 
cosmopolitan counties. The chi-square test of homogeneity assesses whether two or more 
samples of discrete characteristics arise from identically distributed (homogenous) populations. I 
began by conducting a cross-tabulation – of adoption of the alien culture of circumcision and 
county of respondent – to assess the consistency of this phenomenon of adoption of circumcision 
by the Luo. The following hypothesis was tested: “The Luo are gradually adopting alien cultures 
in uniform/homogeneous fashion, owing to politically constructed/mobilized stereotypes and 
prejudices, to gain acceptance as fully-fledged members of the Kenyan society at large”. The 
organization of the remainder of this study is discussed next. 
 
1.10 Organization of the Study 
I have organized the rest of this study as follows: chapter two positions Kenya’s/Africa’s 
“ethnic” problem within the wider spectrum of profit and the push for globalism; it is inspired by 
Mafeje’s (1971) contention that, since Africa has “been successfully drawn into a capitalist 
economy and a world market” (p. 258), “ethnicity” has to be explained and conceptualized 
differently, with modern conditions in mind. Accordingly, it gives a wide berth to the largely 
Eurocentric notions of “moral ethnicity” as espoused by Lonsdale (see Berman & Lonsdale, 
1992). Chapter two also discusses the theoretical framework that has been adopted for this study, 
to interrogate the preceding research problematic. It gives the specifics of an eclectic approach, 
which fuses various propositions (obtained from the review of current literature) on leadership 
and socio-economic development within the African context, employing the Foucauldian notion 
of “Panopticon” power, Istvan Mészáros’ refutation of “ideological neutrality” and the 
Instrumentalist Theory of Ethnicity. The core argument of this theoretical framework is that the 
“ethnic groups” that control state power in Africa do not allocate an equitable share of the 
national largesse to the dominated groups perceived to be “dissident”. In keeping with the tenets 
of case study research (cf. Yin, 2009), I have also considered rival theoretical explanations on 
development, chief among which is the Theory of Uneven Development. Besides the concept of 
social death, the cultural aspect of this inquiry, which mainly explores the rite of passage debate 
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in Kenyan society, is predicated upon the work of Geertz (1973) who sees culture as a “public” 
phenomenon open to scrutiny. Chapter three discusses the research methodology, which has been 
employed to accomplish the study’s objectives, in greater depth. It also explains how the study 
area has been delimited – I have annexed a detailed description of the study area (see Appendix 
C). Besides the delimitation of the study area, and the research methodology, chapter three 
discusses the research design, the sampling procedure and the sample size; the data collection 
techniques, the research instruments and the data analysis procedures are also presented in this 
chapter. Chapters four, five and six, which focus on the practicality of the aforementioned 
theories, discuss the study’s research findings in a comprehensive manner, as explained below.  
 
Chapter four, which is based on the conceptual framework outlined in section 1.8, above, 
is a discussion of the quantitative results of this study. Its purpose is to establish how my 
experiential knowledge, and the conceptions and sentiments obtained from current literature on 
the influence of “ethnicized” politics in Africa, play-out at the grassroots level in Kenya. Chapter 
five presents the first phase of the qualitative results of the study – the complex views of the Luo 
on the socio-economic-cultural consequences of political marginalization, obtained through 
FGDs. In conjunction with a scrutiny of contemporary world events, the Luo people’s views 
discussed in this chapter have been used to construct a conceptual framework that can be 
employed in the analysis of “ethnicized” politics in Kenya. This conceptual framework, 
essentially an expounded version of the one presented in section 1.8, has been employed as a lens 
in chapter six –  alongside the theoretical framework – which besides examining the proportions 
of the GoK public provision allocations in five key areas (education, healthcare, housing, 
electricity and rural water supply) vis-à-vis the country’s various “ethnic” formations, also 
outlines the specifics of what appears to be a ferocious power struggle between globalists and the 
indigenous African bourgeois class that controls the Kenyan state. Chapter seven, the study’s 
final chapter, presents its conclusions and policy recommendations. It is essentially an 
integration of the study’s quantitative and qualitative results, a requisite component of an MMR 
design. The next chapter further explores the exogenous and amorphous nature of the concept of 
“ethnicity”, and positions this study within a more intricate theoretical framework of “ethnicity”, 
governance and socio-economic development in Africa. 
 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
33 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
34 
 
Chapter 2 
Literature Review: Positioning Kenya’s “Ethnic” Problem within the Spectrum of Profit 
and the Push for Globalism 
2 Introduction 
Having sided in chapter one with the conscientious, liberated African scholar, Mafeje 
(1971), in the contentious debate regarding the origins, nature and viability of the often nebulous 
concept “ethnicity”, I now further explore, examine and explain its exogenous and spurious 
character vis-à-vis Africa. My submission is that warped ideologies characterize the various 
epochs of human history – slavery, colonialism and the post-independence era – and have been 
continuously morphed and employed by society’s elite class to safeguard and perpetuate the 
structural determination of capital. Accordingly, I contend that it is through the lens of the 
incessant, insatiable pursuit of profit by society’s elite class that the contemporary scholar of 
“ethnicity” should seek to theorize and understand this problem. Following this contention, I 
will, in this chapter, construct an analytical framework to explore “ethnicity”, governance and 
socio-economic development in Africa, with special reference to the Luo community of Kenya. 
To achieve this objective, I have divided the chapter into four major sections – besides this 
introduction and the conclusion. Section 2.1 picks up from where chapter one left off vis-à-vis 
the argument of this thesis that “ethnicity” is an exogenous construct that has no meaningful 
scientific basis: it traces the path to the contemporary, “ethnic”-based political marginalization of 
the Kenyan Luo from the days of 15th century slavery and concludes by examining the nation-
state – capital – “ethnicity” nexus and its influence on “inter-ethnic” relations and socio-cultural 
developments in the Kenyan context. Section 2.2 briefly reviews current literature on “ethnicity”, 
governance and development in Africa to examine the proposition that “ethnicity” owes its 
existence largely to colonialism and that it thrives best in an environment dominated by 
capitalism and its associated exports – the centralized nation-state and multi-party democracy. 
Based on available literature, the section addresses the following questions in relation to 
“ethnicity” vis-à-vis its influence on governance: does “ethnicity” affect governance systems and 
patterns all over Africa? Is it a widespread phenomenon? Is it only attributable to colonialism 
and capitalism? Informed by the insights derived from the literature review, section 2.3 presents 
a theoretical framework to guide this study. Finally, in keeping with the tenets of case study 
research, as espoused by Yin (2009), section 2.4 presents the rival theoretical explanations that 
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have been considered alongside the theoretical framework in this quest to unravel the specifics of 
the negative consequences of ethnic-driven political exclusion. The exogenous nature of 
“ethnicity”, vis-à-vis Africa, is further discussed next. 
 
2.1 Tracing the Path to “Ethnic”-based Political Marginalization of the Kenyan Luo 
from a Capitalist Perspective 
As emphasized in the introductory chapter, the notions of “race” and “ethnicity” – its 
“allotrope” (cf. Jenkins, 1997, as cited in Spencer, 2014, p. xvi) – are not only spurious, but 
exogenous to Africa (cf. Mafeje, 1971; Mafeje, 2002; Nkrumah, 1968; Vail, 2010). In this 
section, therefore, with the objective of explaining how the political marginalization of the Luo 
community of Kenya arose, I examine the genealogy of these politico-economic constructs – 
their introduction to Africa and the world, and their eventual adoption by the Kenyan authorities 
in their governance styles, structures and systems – in three successive stages, viz.: Christianity, 
“Race” and Slavery: c. A. D. 1450 to c. A. D. 1900; Darwinism, Eugenics and Colonialism: c. A. 
D. 1900 to c. A. D. 1960; and “Ethnicity” in the Neo-colonial Era in Kenya: c. A.D. 1960 to the 
Present. Finally, I outline the manner in which the continued search for markets by Western 
countries, owing to exponential capacity and concomitant over-production, especially in the US, 
has led to the glorification of consumerism (Terreblanche, 2014) and I argue that this 
phenomenon – of search for new markets – should not be overlooked in the attempt to either 
understand or conceptualize the “ethnic” woes witnessed in Africa and elsewhere in the Global 
South. A brief critique of capitalism precedes this; as alluded to, I will argue that the insatiable 
pursuit of profit by society’s elites – both nationally and globally – is responsible for many of the 
planet’s woes, including the problems of “ethnicity” prevalent in Africa. 
 
2.1.1 Capitalism, the Global Elite and the Illusion of Laissez-faire 
At a superficial level of assessment, it is easy to fall into the trap of unquestioningly 
glorifying capitalism and laissez-faire economic liberalism, one of its core attributes. After all, as 
enthusiasts of the scholarly contributions of celebrated thinkers like Adam Smith, Jeremy 
Bentham and David Ricardo would emphasise, besides other advantages, laissez-faire ensures 
that individuals can pursue their aspirations and achieve their fullest potentials because, in 
addition to guaranteeing the latter’s rights and freedoms, this economic system accords them 
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enough room to participate in an unfettered manner. However, an in-depth scrutiny of the 
contemporary world economic system – believed to be largely characterized by what is 
considered to be free trade, free enterprise, non-intervention, free markets, individualism and the 
associated ideological constructs of democracy and multi-partyism – reveals a rather grim, 
antithetical outlook: “[w]e are living through an epoch where the concentration of the world’s 
wealth and power thanks to free market liberalism has reached proportions never experienced 
before in human history” (Roche, 2009, Finance capital section, para. 2, emphasis added). In 
what can be attributed to capitalism and free market economics, global corporations have grown 
in an unprecedented manner; entities such as Wal-mart and Cargill have become much wealthier 
than nation-states. At the individual level, the rich are getting richer as the poor get poorer 
(Roche, 2009; see also Heller, 2013). Contrary to the belief held by the adherents of trickle-down 
economics, free market liberalism has not worked to improve the conditions of the poor in 
society (Polanyi, 1944[2001]). In fact, laissez-faire-driven capitalism has largely led to the 
formation of two distinct classes in society – a tiny dominant minority and an overwhelmingly 
subordinate majority (Mészáros, 2001, p. 102). We are witnessing in contemporary times what 
Marx highlighted in his famed masterpieces – infinite accumulation. 
 
Yet, if these consequences were purely the result of free market liberalism, there might 
have been little or no justification for concern; the reality, however, as noted by Polanyi 
(1944[2001]), is that we have never really had “free markets” in the strict sense of the phrase 
(see also, Chang, 2010). The ideology of self-regulating markets, argues Polanyi (1944[2001]), 
was constructed to serve emergent industrial (often elitist) interests; it has only been partially 
applied for, whenever such interests are threatened or face challenges, government intervention 
is in many instances sought and accorded. Moreover, the international financial institutions, 
which regulate the global economy, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), have 
exhibited glaringly contradictory behaviour: on the one hand, they proclaim confidence in the 
free market system; on the other, however, they “regularly intervene in exchange rate markets, 
providing funds to bail out foreign creditors while pushing for usurious interest rates that 
bankrupt domestic firms…” (Stiglitz, 2001, p. x). Accordingly, the role of global institutions that 
regulate world trade, such as the World Bank and the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
especially with regard to the welfare of the largely impoverished masses, has to be critically 
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evaluated on a continuous basis. 
 
Neoliberalism, the prevalent contemporary product of laissez-faire economic liberalism, 
has been enforced upon the world by the aforementioned global institutions, often to the 
detriment of the poor masses of the Global South, as narrated succinctly by Stiglitz (2001): 
  
Free international trade allows a country to take advantage of its comparative advantage, 
increasing incomes on average, though it may cost some individuals their jobs. But in 
developing countries with high levels of unemployment, the job destruction that results 
from trade liberalization may be more evident than the job creation, and this is especially 
the case in IMF “reform” packages that combine trade liberalization with high interest 
rates, making job and enterprise creation virtually impossible. (p. x) 
 
And Maathai (1995), another critical thinker of our time, has had this to say about neoliberalism: 
  
[i]ndebtness of African states is making it difficult for the state to protect its citizen from 
being overwhelmed by international organisations on whose behalf IMF, World Bank and 
other donors demand liberalisation and free markets. Small local initiatives with 
comparatively little capital do not stand a chance against the onslaught . . . What is the 
reason for this economic marginalisation and impoverishment of Africa? It is partly 
because many of them do not participate in formulating and implementing their 
development policies. Decisions which affect their economic and political life are made 
by others in foreign capitals in the company of a few of their ruling elites. These are the 
policies and decisions which facilitate the siphoning of their wealth, literally from under 
their feet. In the process they are marginalised and disempowered economically, denied 
access to information, knowledge and resources and forced to over mine their 
environment thereby, jeopardizing even their future generations. (paras. 58 and 64) 
 
Besides the aforementioned difficulties experienced by the world’s largely impoverished masses, 
owing to the contemporary “self-regulating” market system, there are other susceptibilities and 
duplicities associated with laissez-faire, often attributable to society’s elite class, that are of 
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grave concern. Of particular note is what has been referred to as “the revolving doors of business 
and government” (Roche, 2010). According to Roche (2010), “[b]ig business infiltrates and 
controls government, and . . . government has become absorbed into big business” (para. 3). 
Corporations and rich individuals fund politicians who, in turn, align policies in accordance with 
the wishes of the former at the expense of the masses (workers). Moreover, “Capitalists and 
[politicians] freely interchange between government and private firms” (Roche, 2010, Revolving 
doors section, para. 1). Roche (2010) argues that “[c]ompanies are keen to employ former 
ministers as they hold inside information, or influence policy-making, which can advantage a 
bidding company” (Revolving doors section, para. 1). Also, public services have increasingly and 
speedily been privatized to increase the profits of big business players. Similarly, local 
authorities have seemingly deviated from their role of protecting the public interest by selling 
planning permission; upon receipt of “donations” from private companies, consent is often 
granted, contrary to the citizens’ welfare, for the establishment and expansion of business 
ventures or premises (Roche, 2010). In a nutshell, most socio-economic-political aspects of 
today’s society are largely influenced and directed by multinational corporations (big business), 
often to the detriment of the world’s largely impoverished masses – such is the myth and 
deception of laissez-faire. 
 
The domination of the masses by society’s elite class, through the construction, 
propagation and perpetuation of largely unfounded and deceptive ideologies, is not a new 
phenomenon. In fact, various insidious mechanisms and techniques have been employed by 
society’s elites to perpetuate and safeguard the social formation of capital – from the slave trade 
era to contemporary times that have seen the Luo become politically ostracized in Kenyan 
society ostensibly because the “ethnic group” does not circumcise its males (cf. Atieno-
Odhiambo, 2002). Before I examine these misguided ideologies, I will shortly turn my attention 
to wa Thiong’o’s (1986) work, which outlines the process of subjugation, that is, social death (cf. 
also, Patterson, 1982). In Decolonizing the Mind: The Politics of Language in African Literature, 
Ngugi wa Thiong’o (1986) meticulously explored the process by which colonial and imperial 
powers imposed their will and control over the inhabitants of the cradle of humankind. From his 
widely acclaimed piece, we see that efforts to subjugate the majority were preceded by the 
conjuring up of prejudiced ideologies that acted as justifications for the process, which always 
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involved the meting out of physical violence on the vanquished. This was then followed by 
subtle psychological forms of violence to aid in the maintenance of the newly-established status 
quos. Psychological violence involved the belittling of the conquered people’s culture, which 
was aimed at destroying it, and influencing or distorting the manner in which the latter viewed 
themselves vis-à-vis the rest of the world – the cultivation of self-hatred. A self-loathing people, 
it was thought, would be easy to manipulate and control. Somewhere along the process of 
colonization, the oppressors’ culture was invoked to dominate those of the oppressed; often, the 
dominated peoples came to define themselves via the alien cultural parameters forcibly 
introduced into their societies. Even the most radical opponents of the oppressive colonial socio-
economic order began to think that their liberation depended on conforming to the cultural 
standards set by the oppressors. Also, the oppressive dispensation in which colonialism thrived 
ensured that merit was suppressed in favour of spurious concepts such as “ethnicity” and “race”, 
besides one’s culture and place of origin. Such was the nature of the subjugation process. In this 
thesis, following the precedence set in the problem statement narrated in chapter one, I contend 
that overlapping, warped ideological archetypes, inspired by the pursuit of profit and modelled 
along the lines of the subjugation process described above, characterize the various epochs of 
human history – slavery, colonialism and the post-independence era – and have been 
continuously employed by society’s elite class to safeguard and perpetuate the structural 
determination of capital. Distorted ideologies prevalent in a particular epoch do not necessarily 
cease with its demise; rather, they are modernized for use in a succeeding epoch – besides being 
fused with nuanced, related diabolical philosophies – and this has been the case in human society 
since the 15th century at least. An examination of the prevalent twisted ideologies and the 
subjugation processes that characterized each of the aforementioned epochs and culminated in 
the negative “ethnicity” witnessed in Kenya/Africa today follows next. 
 
2.1.2 Christianity, “Race” and Slavery: c. A. D. 1450 to c. A. D. 1900 
Whenever the opportunity arises to accumulate capital and make profits, the sense of 
morality in humans, especially those who wield economic and political power, seems to take a 
hiatus; furthermore, when a prevailing oppressive economic order comes under threat, society’s 
elite class develops self-serving ideologies and shrewdly implants them in the psyche of the 
masses to maintain the status quo; this was largely the case when the Portuguese and Spanish 
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explorers began interacting with the West African coastal peoples in the mid-15th century, and 
during the era of the transatlantic slave trade, which began in earnest after Christopher Columbus 
arrived in the “New World” in 1492, and which lasted for several centuries, leaving behind a 
devastating socio-economic legacy on the continent of Africa. The period between the 15th and 
20th centuries, which saw Christianity manipulated to meet private interests like never before in 
human history, was also dominated by the prejudiced ideology of “race”, which saw Africans 
treated as chattel and paved the way for their commodification. Before examining these 
perverted ideas further, let us briefly examine the major players behind the transatlantic slave 
trade. 
 
According to Selfa (2010), the transatlantic slave trade involved “African slave 
merchants, European slavers and New World planters” (The African Slave Trade section, para. 
1). Adams (2008) whose work, entitled “Slave Trade Ideology”, is largely an apologetic piece 
that highlights the victim’s role in facilitating his/her maltreatment, rather than repudiating the 
enslaver’s treachery, gives us a clearer picture as to whom the major players and prime movers 
of this heinous crime against humanity were. He states: 
   
The sixteenth-century European seafaring societies bordering the Atlantic Ocean had 
several things in common . . . [A]ll but one was headed by an absolute monarch 
(Elizabeth I in England, Louis XIV in France, Dom João III in Portugal and Charles V 
and different Phillips in Spain). The West India Company, established in 1621, was a 
principal transatlantic conveyor of slaves, governed by a Council of Nineteen, whose 
members were usually of one mind in matters of trade. The trading company was the 
instrument of commerce and settlement, operating with delegated and partial funding 
from the state. Portugal, Spain, France, England, Holland and even Sweden set up 
companies with varying levels of authority and autonomy to link colonies to the home 
country. To cite their names is to conjure up the age of exploration and settlement: the 
Casa de Contracio (Portugal, 1510), the Caracas Company (1628), the Dutch West India 
Company (1621), Compagnie des Cent-Associés (Company of a Hundred Associates, 
1628), the Massachusetts Bay Company (1629), the Brazil Company (Portugal, 1649), 
the English Company of Royal Adventurers (1660), the Hudson Bay Company (1670), 
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and the Royal African Company (1672), among others. (p. 51)  
 
Although the personalities would eventually be replaced by their successors and monopoly 
companies’ names may have metamorphosed through the centuries, this description is 
undoubtedly similar to what Roche (2010) has referred to as an incestuous relationship between 
big government and big business in contemporary society. Indeed, regardless of whichever angle 
it is examined from, slavery was an elitist phenomenon; even the African element of it was elitist 
in nature, for “enslaved Africans were made available by the highest authorities of various 
regions of Africa, including the Kingdoms of Wolof, Igala, Oyo, Anziku, Ashanti, and 
Dahomey” (Adams, 2008, p. 46). Regarding America, “[t]he elites of settler communities in the 
New World were the ultimate customers of this inhuman trade” (Adams, 2008, p. 46). This is a 
typical example of how society’s elite class works, sometimes in unison and on a global scale, to 
enslave the masses in capitalist dispensations and the reason why Africa needs leaders who 
repudiate imperialism and detest the globalists/imperialists, like Robert Mugabe, and not 
“moderates” like Nelson Mandela and “potential puppets” like Morgan Tsvangirai. To further 
demonstrate the allure of profit, and the edge it wields over morality as a phenomenon, consider 
the case of two elites – Queen Nzinga Mbande (an African) and Queen Elizabeth I (a European) 
– who despite being unfavourably disposed towards the slave trade at the outset, eventually 
changed their minds, got involved and played a considerable role in facilitating it. According to 
Adams (2008), the Queen of Ndongo Kingdom – Nzinga Mbande – initially “refused to be a part 
of the transatlantic slave business . . . [and her] Imbangala mercenary warriors valiantly battled 
Portuguese slavers in the 1620s” (p. 47). This noble stance would however soon change for she 
is recorded as having become an ally of the Dutch, and engaging in numerous local minor wars 
aimed at supplying her newfound associates with supplementary slaves by enhancing what could 
be directly marshalled from within her kingdom (Thomas, 1997, p. 184, as cited in Adams, 2008, 
p. 47). As for the European monarch, Adams (2008) has had this to say: “Queen Elizabeth I 
initially opposed slavery, but in 1564 she became an investor in slaving expeditions” (p. 51). I 
now turn my attention to the two major twisted systems of thought that facilitated slavery – 
religion and racism. 
 
I reiterate that human beings – whatever “race” or “ethnicity” they are classified under – 
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are neither born racist nor inherently “ethnically” bigoted; rather, owing to the subtle 
machinations of society’s elite class, they are cajoled into adopting and incorporating these 
diabolical mannerisms, thereby creating a situation that enables the perpetuation of oppressive 
status quos and the pursuit of selfish elitist agendas. Historical evidence shows that religion and 
religious elites played a gigantic role in facilitating the enslavement of Africans by propping up 
twisted ideas on the nature of humans during the slave trade era. Rogers and Bowman (2005), in 
their work entitled “A History: The Construction of Race and Racism”, have argued that 
  
[d]uring the reformation (16th Century [1500s] & 17th Century [1600s]), a key question 
among Christian religious hierarchy was whether Blacks and ‘Indians’ had souls and/or 
were human . . . With the increasing importance of slavery, religion was used as a means 
to justify racist divisions, classifying people of color as ‘pagan and soulless.’ (p. 3). 
 
It is this perverse elitist logic that was used to prepare the rank and file European for 
intensified shipment of fellow humans – Africans – across the Atlantic. Such indoctrination 
would enable the elites of the day to carry out their business without raising eyebrows or 
attracting resistance. This European perception of Africans is even more laughable when one 
considers that Moors, who ruled Spain from 711 – 1492 (British Broadcasting Corporation 
[BBC], 2009), were Black Africans (McCreary, 2015) and that they are the ones who 
“enlightened Europe and brought it out of the dark ages to usher in the renaissance” (Derhak, 
n.d., para 1; cf. also, Atlanta Black Star [ABS], 2013). Following the Christian recapture of the 
Iberian Peninsula from the Moors, who had ruled it for about 800 years, the inflow of slaves to 
Spain and Portugal – mostly white Christians from Eastern Europe and some obtained through 
raids of the Byzantine Empire – came to a temporary halt. However, the first stage of the African 
slave trade, which was championed by the Portuguese explorers, Antam Gonsalvez and Nuno 
Trista, whose activities began in the first half of the 15th century and were blessed by Pope 
Eugene IV, reignited the trade in slaves – this time Africans – to Western Europe because it 
proved an enormously profitable venture (Abramova, 1979, p. 16). In addition, the conversion 
façade was employed to shrewdly mask the greed of the Europeans, as noted by Abramova 
(1979): 
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One often reads that Portuguese rulers, and among them Prince Henry, known as “the 
Navigator”, the organizer of Portuguese expeditions to Africa, sanctioned the import of 
Africans ostensibly to convert them to Christianity. It is true that the slaves were 
baptized, but nevertheless sold. (p. 17) 
 
For a large part of the slave trade era, the Catholic Church was complicit in the sanctioning and 
sanctification of the moral crime of slavery. It seems to us ridiculous that papal bulls could be 
unilaterally issued and granted to European monarchs, such as the one Pope Nicholas V used to 
grant Alphonso V – the King of Portugal – the permission to perpetually seize African lands and 
subjugate “heathens” (Abramova, 1979, p. 17). Adams also notes that “European religious 
ideology permitted the enslavement of God-cursed Hamitic ‘pagans’” (Adams, 2008, p. 46). It is 
this perverted religious philosophy that facilitated the shipment of Africans – from both Europe 
and Africa – and their subsequent enslavement in the various European colonies in America and 
the Caribbean from the 16th to the 19th century. Apparently, the Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, 
British, and French elites all managed to convince their citizens that “enslavement of Africans 
and the slave trade were sanctioned by the Bible. They alluded to Noah’s damnation of Ham and 
his progeny as evidence of the fact that Africans were predestined to be slaves” (Abramova, 
1979, p.17). Let us now examine the second prejudiced ideology that facilitated and helped 
sustain slavery – “race”. 
   
Since the transatlantic slave trade was such an unjust phenomenon, discussions around it 
evoke intense feelings and it is understandable that some, like Asante (2009), would argue that 
the impetus for the enslavement of the Indian, the white servant and the African was all racist. 
However, this argument is simplistic and not entirely true. First, there is a general consensus 
amongst scholars that slavery, which has existed in virtually every human civilization for as long 
as we have inhabited the earth, was never racial in character (cf. e.g., Finkelman, 2013; 
Patterson, 1982). Secondly, up to the point when religion totally lost its viability as a justification 
mechanism for the enslavement of humans in the 19th century – owing, mainly, to the work of 
abolitionists like the Quakers in Great Britain and the US (cf. Ambramova, 1979) – profit had 
been the major driving force behind slavery in the “New World”. There is no doubt that the 
relentless pursuit of profit, through slavery, created racism. In consequence of the fact that the 
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use of religion as a basis for enslavement had lost its viability, a new ideology, “race”, was 
fronted by society’s elite class, and thrust upon the masses to ensure that the journey towards 
total domination through untold riches would never be halted and that capital’s structural 
determination would remain. According to Asante (2009): 
 
European scientists, scholars, men and women of learning would propagate the most 
abhorrent nonsense about race. So-called biologists, anthropologists, physiologists, 
medical doctors would advance theories about brain size, genital size, and head bones to 
demonstrate their points concerning white supremacy. This would become the 
background for much of Western theorizing about the world (The Economic Thesis 
Reviewed section, para. 7) 
 
It was argued that “Africans were . . . sub-human, uncivilised, and inferior to Europeans in every 
way. And as they were ‘not one of us’, they could be bought and sold” (Bristol City Council 
[BCC], 1999, para. 1). Furthermore, because of the newfound racist philosophy, from the 17th 
century – when the plantation economies of the Americas and the Caribbean were gaining 
momentum – Africans came to be “defined legally as chattel” (Asante, 2007, Dehumanisation of 
Africans section, para. 4) for “European enslavers organised the category of blackness as 
property value” (Asante, 2007, Dehumanisation of Africans section, para. 1). On account of their 
blackness, enslaved Africans were commodified and dehumanized; they were considered to be 
“without soul, spirit, emotions, desires and rights [for] [c]hattel could have neither mind nor 
spirit” (Asante, 2007, Dehumanisation of Africans section, para. 1). But what are the specifics, 
from a capitalist perspective, of the factors that necessitated society’s elites of the “New World” 
to pollute the minds of the masses with such diabolical thoughts? 
  
The solution to the puzzle of indoctrination in the English North American scenario is 
threefold. Firstly, it was done to eliminate “the problem of constantly having to recruit labor as 
servants’ terms expired” (Selfa, 2010, Unfree labor in the North American colonies section, para. 
9) – the multicultural workforce, before the large-scale importation of Africans, comprised 
mainly of white indentured servants, including prisoners and victims of kidnap, from Britain 
(Selfa, 2010; cf. also Abramova, 1979). If Africans were chattel, then they had no rights and 
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could not move freely. Besides, the planters would have no obligation to pay them and would 
only be required to provide food and shelter. Moreover, chattel would give birth to chattel 
ensuring the perpetual availability of cheap labour (Asante, 2007). Secondly, such warped ideas 
helped to diminish the competition that arose from white indentured servants who were allowed 
to establish their own farms once they had completed their contractual obligations (Selfa, 2010). 
Thirdly, and most importantly, chattelization was instituted to prevent the formation of a union 
between white indentured servants and enslaved Africans – this might have altered the status quo 
by overthrowing the planters through a revolt. According to Selfa (2010), white servants from 
Europe knew about the idea of individual rights and freedoms for they had witnessed the 
revolution that challenged the hierarchical societal order centred on “royalty” in England. Owing 
to this, the status of “things” that had been ascribed to Africans in the racial order of the 17th 
century British North America (Asante, 2007), could not be pinned on them. Fundamentally, this 
chattelization of Africans epitomizes the divide-and-conquer technique that has been in operation 
since capitalism came to fruition as a mode of production. It also opened the floodgates for 
further psychological warfare on the oppressed to ensure that they were pacified sufficiently to 
accept their inhuman treatment and role in a racist society. 
  
In “Decolonizing the African Mind: Further Analysis and Strategy” Hotep (2003) has 
explained the process of psychological warfare/indoctrination that was waged against Africans as 
they were being prepared to take up their role of slaves. He argues that American slaveholders, 
who referred to the process and practice as “seasoning”, employed it to mollify and hegemonize 
enslaved Africans and that this method of control has been in use by European ruling elites ever 
since. Seasoning, or deculturalization, as practiced in British America was – and continues to be 
– a three stage process: first, enslaved Africans were taught to feel ashamed of their heritage; 
second, they were taught to admire, respect, adopt and practice the European heritage; and third, 
if they obeyed and submitted to the process, they got access to more opportunities through which 
they were further indoctrinated (Hotep, 2003, p. 4). Concerning the seasoning process of the 
large numbers of Africans that experienced the middle passage following the formalization of 
chattelization in the British colonies in North America, Hotep (2003) has had this to say: 
  
African prisoners of war . . . were subjected to a vivacious, European orchestrated, three 
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to four years of seasoning during which the most important expressions of their African 
heritage were brutally stripped away from them and brutally replaced with the European 
colonizer-slave master-oppressor’s cultural practices and beliefs. Africans enslaved in the 
North American British colonies, for example, were forbidden to use their original 
African names, languages and religions. They were forced to use their European 
colonizer-slave master-oppressor’s names, language and religion. This is why most 
Africans born in the United States have European surnames, speak English and practice 
some form of Christianity. (p. 4) 
 
Outrageous pseudo-scientific theories, which had existed in relatively subdued fashion 
from the late 17th century, were intensified in the 19th century. In the main, it was argued that 
“Africans in general were intellectually inferior to Europeans, that Negroes . . . stood closer in 
the line of development to apes than to human beings” (Abramova, pp. 23 – 24). Anthropologists 
like J. C. Prichard and W. Winwood Reade contributed greatly in feeding this false narrative: 
whilst the former argued that owing to the “law of nature” “savage” “races” – Africans – would 
be wiped out, the latter, as if to prepare the world for the colonization of Africa, claimed that 
England and France would preside over the cradle of humankind (cf. Rogers & Bowman, 2005, 
p. 5) – and for most of the 20th century, Reade’s “prophecy” would be fulfilled as Europeans 
invented more twisted ideas and methods, chief among them eugenics, and proceeded to subject 
Africa to even greater horrors and miseries as discussed in the next sub-section.  
 
2.1.3 Darwinism, Eugenics and Colonialism: c. A. D. 1900 to c. A. D. 1960 
The duplicitous elitist forces behind the global capitalist system tricked the planet’s 
ordinary citizens into believing that they had finally come to the realization that slavery was evil; 
however, unbeknownst to many, especially the American and European masses, a more lucrative 
profit venture had been identified and earmarked for pursuit as early as 1807 – the colonization 
of Africa, to facilitate the looting of the continent’s mineral wealth/resources, which would in 
turn provide the much needed raw materials for European industries. In this regard, the hypocrisy 
of Great Britain, in particular, shall never be forgotten. Abramova (1979) described this 
deception with great precision when he noted that: 
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British industry called for increasing amounts of raw materials and new markets, and in 
this respect its interests became concentrated on Africa. Great Britain headed an 
international campaign to abolish the export of slaves from Africa. This allowed her to 
preserve till today the reputation of an allegedly disinterested champion of Africans’ 
freedom. Foreseeing the emergence of its future colonies in Africa, Great Britain found it 
highly profitable to [pose] as liberator in the eyes of Africans. (p. 25) 
 
As we have already seen in the previous epoch, any envisaged elite-driven economic activity, 
structure or system, has to be in congruence with society’s prevalent set of ideologies and belief 
systems for it to be considered legitimate by the masses – only then can its successful pursuit be 
guaranteed. In respect of European countries establishing colonies in Africa, Christianity stood in 
the way of the global elite class. Woodworth (n.d.), in his work, “Darwinism and the American 
Eugenics Movement,” highlighted the following two major tenets of the Christian faith which, I 
contend, proved a great obstacle for the global elite forces that contemplated and continuously 
mulled the takeover of Africa from the onset of the 19th century: first, “the basic worldview 
advanced by the Bible . . . that the universe was the creation of an infinite, personal God” 
(Woodworth, n.d., para. 2); and, second, the idea that “all humans were descended from one 
original couple and were therefore related, part of a very large human family” (Woodworth, n.d., 
para. 4). Fundamentally, these Biblical principles were the foundation upon which the concept of 
human rights was based (Woodworth, n.d.). If these principles continued to prevail in the minds 
of the European and American masses, how would the violent takeover of Africa be justified? 
Moreover, the abolitionists, who played a major role in ending slavery, had based their 
opposition towards the inhumane phenomenon upon these very principles, which contended “that 
rights should be equal among different groups within this [human] family, regardless of ethnic 
characteristics” (Woodworth, n.d., para. 4). Unless this prevalent Christian perspective on the 
origin and nature of the human being was perverted, therefore, the actualization of colonialism in 
Africa would most probably have remained a pipe dream. Accordingly, the period between 1807 
and 1808, when Britain and the US abolished slave trade, respectively, and the Berlin 
Conference of 1884/1885, would be characterized by overwhelming, iniquitous propaganda, 
such as the masses of Europe and America had never seen before. And the works of the “Sage of 
Down House” would prove pivotal to the global elite in guiding the propagandist cause of the 
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19th and 20th centuries. 
   
English naturalist Charles Darwin argued in 1859 that “life had evolved from a single-
cell organism to human beings by means of natural selection – the survival of the fittest” (as 
cited in Woodworth, n.d., para. 3). He further asserted “that living species are not fixed and 
unvarying, but are subject to modification and development, becoming specialized to meet the 
problems of their environment, or else deteriorating and becoming extinct when they fail to meet 
the challenge of life” (as cited in Pearson, 1966, p. 9). These general aspects of his theory 
epitomized the ingenuity of the human mind and from a natural science standpoint, it is only 
proper that they be acknowledged. However, his specifics about the nature of humankind were 
immensely twisted. He posited, according to BCC (1999), that 
 
Europeans were related to Africans and that all humans were related to the apes. Whilst 
this upset the anthropological theories about separate species, other aspects of the 
evolutionary theory still “proved” the superiority of the white races over all others. His 
theory saw the Anglo-Saxons, that is, the British, at the top of the evolutionary scale. The 
British were at the top of the family tree of the human race, as the most “civilized” race. 
The African, as a “primitive” race, was considered childlike and unintelligent. Such 
“inferior” races were doomed to be either ruled by or destroyed by the “superior” races. 
Survival of the fittest was the rule in Darwin’s theory of evolution. (para. 7) 
 
Darwin’s largely atheistic and materialist ideas would prove detrimental to world history and 
human socio-economic-political development at large; they, like other philosophies and 
ideologies before them, were hijacked by the global elites and employed in the quest for further 
world domination and to safeguard and ensure the continuity of the structural determination of 
capital. Indeed, Darwin opened a can of worms; not only were his evolutionary ideas fed to the 
European and American masses to pacify them as Africa was being taken over, they significantly 
paved the way further for scientific racism, eugenics and secularism in human society. Before I 
briefly outline the eugenicist thinking that Darwin’s evolution theory inspired, let me emphasize 
that the ubiquitous persuasion amongst the European masses at the advent of colonialism was 
that the occupants of the cradle of humankind were “primitive, infidel, backward, savages, 
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nonhuman, beast[s] of burden, soul-less, heathens, pagans, biologically and evolutionarily 
inferior, uncivilized and without history” (Milwood, 2012, p. 62). The global elite class had 
succeeded in its quest to persuade the European and American masses that the colonization of 
Africa was acceptable. This Darwin-inspired, elite-propelled perverted view of Africa was the 
basis for inter-societal eugenics, a “form of eugenics [which] extends the notion of genetic basis 
for dominance to imperial notions of ‘progress’ and ‘civilisation’” (cf. Spencer, 2014, p.293). 
  
Eugenics, which sprung from Darwin’s evolution theory, was the brainchild of the latter’s 
cousin, Sir Francis Galton, who defined it as “the science which deals with all influences that 
improve the inborn qualities of a race; also with those that develop them to the utmost 
advantage” (Galton, 1904, p.1). According to Winfield (2007), eugenics aims at “intentional 
weeding out of the human population of those deemed weak or malformed” (p. xvii). Besides the 
inter-societal eugenics already referenced, Spencer (2014) has identified three forms of eugenics, 
viz.: positive eugenics, that is, “selective breeding using ‘superior’ genetic material (for example, 
sperm donated by a Nobel scientist)”; negative eugenics, that is, “forced sterilization, ethnic 
cleansing, genocide”; and intra-societal eugenics, that is, “a genetic cause for problems such as 
crime, poverty and disease that occur within a society” (p. 293). 
  
To understand the brainwashing tactics and the dangers posed to society by this 
Darwinist offshoot, eugenics, let us examine some of the thoughts and arguments contained in a 
collection of essays by anonymous authors edited by arguably the most racist scholar of the 20th 
century, Roger Pearson (1966), entitled Eugenics and Race. In the foreword, Pearson (1966) 
himself argues that “[t]here can be no guarantee of enduring progress until a thorough 
appreciation of the implications of heredity has been acquired by those who shape the policies of 
governments and the destinies of nations” (p. 5). This is undoubtedly a subtle call for the state to 
take control of the private affairs of citizens on bogus premises; in other words, a justification for 
dictatorship being implanted in the psyche of the masses. In the article “Mendelian Heredity,” it 
is argued that “a cross between two species of mankind results in an extremely intricate pattern 
of genes . . .” (p. 22). However, humans are simply humans; there is nothing as misguided as the 
suggestion that there are various species or gradations within the human race. All too often, 
society’s elite class employs this tactic to keep the masses divided and therefore easy to control 
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and manipulate; and this seems to be a major agenda behind eugenic thought and practice. In the 
section of Pearson’s (1966) compilation entitled “Sir Arthur Keith and Evolution”, the author 
belabours to highlight this champion of eugenics’ understanding and definition of the concept 
“race”: “Races or sub-species are evolutionary variants within a species-experimental forms 
which are on their way to becoming separate species by themselves” (p. 25), he/she states. The 
concept “tribe” is not spared either: “a tribe or a nation is a corporate body which ‘nature has 
entrusted with an assortment of human seed or genes, the assortment differing in some degree 
from that entrusted to any other tribe . . .’” (p. 25), it is stated. The concepts of “race” and 
“tribe”, I consistently maintain throughout this thesis, are “false classifications of people . . . 
created for . . . political and economic purpose[s]” (cf. Rogers & Bowman, 2005, p. 2, italics 
added). It is also disturbingly argued that 
 
[i]f a nation with a more advanced, more specialised, or in any way superior set of genes 
mingles with, instead of exterminating, an inferior tribe, then it commits racial suicide, 
and destroys the work of thousands of years of biological isolation and natural selection. 
(p. 26) 
         
Do not these ideas sound very much like they could have been the inspiration behind and 
justification for the practice of apartheid in South Africa? In the collection’s fourth essay, 
“Devolution in Action,” the author states: 
     
More significant is the inequality of the reproduction rate between sections of a non-
homogeneous population, which can lead to the predominance of one set or type of 
people within the course of a single generation: hence the insistence of the geneticist that 
a watch be kept on the all-important question of who are becoming the parents of the next 
generation. (p. 31) 
 
Governments and other authorities anywhere on earth should not have the power to preside over 
such personal issues and if they do it is undoubtedly an infringement on individual freedoms. 
However, since the world’s elite class appears to have for quite a lengthy period operated in 
subtle ways to implement its selfish agendas, we should begin questioning whether, in fact, the 
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idea of family planning is being employed covertly and cynically to determine the composition 
of the world’s population. Rogers and Bowman (2005) have noted that “Norplant, a temporary 
sterilization drug, employed racist stereotyping in their advertising – adopting the conservative 
message that welfare mothers should be temporarily sterilized” (p. 10). The fifth article in 
Pearson’s (1966) collection is entitled “Artificial Insemination: Curse or Boon?” The author 
argues that 
  
[i]f the biological fitness or worth of the [sperm] donor were properly studied, then 
within a few generations, or within one generation even, a new super-generation could be 
produced, descended lineally from only the fittest and more capable of the previous 
generation, and the first nation-state to introduce this procedure would eventually 
dominate the rest of the world – so superior would its individual members be. (p. 36) 
  
Underpinning the eugenics movement is this peculiar obsession on the part of its advocates, of 
attaining some envisaged pinnacle of humanhood. As far back as 1966, it was noted that “Nobel 
Prize-winner Dr. L. Tatum of the Rockefeller Institute claim[ed] that only a few barriers 
remain[ed] to the goal of controlling human heredity by the manipulation of genes” (Pearson, 
1966, p. 36). In 1978, thanks to In Vitro Fertilisation (IVF) technology, the world welcomed its 
first “test-tube baby” – Louise Joy Brown.13 This was followed by the birth of Dolly, the cloned 
Finn Dorset sheep, in 1996.
14
 Given that “in 2008, researchers successfully created the first five 
mature human embryos using somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT) where the nucleus of a 
somatic cell was taken from a donor and transplanted into a vacant host egg cell” (Dvorsky, 
2014, para. 3), has a human already been cloned behind the scenes? If so, what will the 
implications of this clandestine undertaking be for the planet? The last essay in Pearson’s (1966) 
collection, “A Belief in the Future,” further exposes the twisted philosophy behind the discreet 
means and methods employed by society’s elite class to perpetuate the subjugation of the 
planet’s masses: 
                                                          
13
 See, for instance, Davies, M. (2015, July 24). World’s first ‘test-tube baby’ reveals her mother received blood-
splattered HATE MAIL when she was born – including a letter containing a plastic foetus. Mail Online. Retrieved 
from http://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-3173446/World-s-test-tube-baby-reveals-mother-received-blood-
splattered-HATE-MAIL-born-including-letter-containing-plastic-foetus.html (accessed 11 December 2016).  
14
 See, for instance, Vos, S. (2004). Dolly and the clone wars. Retrieved from 
http://novaonline.nvcc.edu/eli/evans/HIS135/events/dolly96/Dolly_Module.html (accessed 11 December 2016). 
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To think and practice eugenic and racial morals ourself is our duty, but this is not enough 
in the troubled state of the world today. It is necessary for each of us to work to bring 
these ideas home to our fellow beings. We must talk and write about eugenics and race; 
we must help to make the ideas “fashionable” as quickly as we can. (p. 41)  
 
Evidently, society’s elite class realizes that the masses do not have a problem co-existing 
amicably. However, harmonious societies, in which people believe in the equality of humankind, 
are not ideal for exploitative economic orders because, in such situations, the oppressed are 
likely to unite and pose serious threats to the status quo. 
  
In Race and Empire: Eugenics in Colonial Kenya, Campbell (2007) has narrated how 
eugenics was practiced in Kenya, by the colonial authorities, especially in the 1930s. It was 
mainly the type referred to by Spencer (2014, p. 293) as intra-societal eugenics and was “based 
upon late-Victorian and Edwardian research” (MacKenzie, 2007, p. ix). Championed by the 
elites of Colonial Kenya, including aristocratic farmers, medical professionals, and colonial 
officials and administrators – under the banner of the Kenya Society for the Study of Race 
Improvement (KSSRI) – the eugenics movement in Colonial Kenya concerned itself with 
examining the relationship between race and intelligence (Campbell, 2007). Fascinated by – and 
“concerned” about – African “backwardness”, European eugenicists argued that “the brain of the 
‘Kenya native’ was different and inferior” (Campbell, 2007, p. 6). Apparently, European 
missionaries did not condemn these eugenic activities and have been described by Campbell 
(2007) as being “silent on the issue” (p. 6) and “terrifically eugenic minded” (p. 1). One of the 
main reasons why eugenical research thrived in Colonial Kenya, according to MacKenzie 
(2007), was because “[i]t had a white settler population which was interested in such concepts as 
a way of supposedly legitimating and regulating their position in the territory and their 
relationship with its indigenous peoples” (p. ix). This supports my argument, in chapter one, that 
perverted ideologies were introduced to Africa by external forces to facilitate the capitalist 
exploitation of the continent, and that they have been upheld and continuously employed by 
African leaders to aid the political elites in structurally achieving their personal interests in the 
post-colonial era. From Campbell’s (2007) work it is evident that the main reason behind the 
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widespread nature of eugenic thought in Colonial Kenya was the fact that most of the British 
officials and settlers had already been brainwashed by Social Darwinism long before they took 
the trip to Africa. 
  
Before turning our attention to independent Kenya, let us briefly examine the 
deculturalization process that was employed by the British authorities in the Colony and 
Protectorate of Kenya. According to wa Thiong’o (1986), the advent of the Mau Mau Uprising in 
Colonial Kenya was followed by a well-calculated, systematic effort by the British colonial 
authorities to brainwash African students. From 1952, independent African schools run by 
African nationalists, who prioritized teaching in African languages, were hijacked by Europeans, 
positioned beneath District Education Boards chaired by the latter, and English imposed upon 
learners as the language of formal education. Besides the elevation of the colonialist language, 
wa Thiong’o (1986) argued that students were simultaneously taught to hate indigenous 
languages: 
 
In Kenya, English became more than a language: it was the language, and all others had 
to bow before it in deference. Thus one of the most humiliating experiences was to be 
caught speaking Gikuyu in the vicinity of the school. The culprit was given corporal 
punishment – three to five strokes of the cane on bare buttocks – or was made to carry a 
metal plate around the neck with inscriptions such as I AM STUPID or I AM A 
DONKEY. (p. 11) 
 
Wa Thiong’o’s (1986) narrative is a classic example of how society’s elite class reacts when its 
privileged position is threatened and when oppressive socio-economic orders – based on the 
structural determination of capital – are endangered. In such situations, dominant segments of 
society – power wielders – discredit the cultures, mannerisms and languages of the oppressed in 
a bid to socially engineer the latter, and perpetuate the status quo. Indeed, the oppressed, who 
struggle for liberation, end up being demonized. The deculturalization tactics of the colonial era 
in Kenya were subsequently morphed and utilized by the Kenyan state in the post-independence 
era, vis-à-vis the country’s Luo community, as discussed next. 
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2.1.4 “Ethnicity” in the Neo-colonial Era in Kenya: c. A.D. 1960 to the Present 
The allure of profit and capital accumulation is of such nature that once an individual 
“crosses the Rubicon”, ceases to be a “worker”, and joins the accumulating side, he/she often 
tends to forget the cause for which his/her former group was fighting and the predicament of 
former fellow oppressed “workers”. Fifty-four years after Kenya’s independence, most survivors 
of the lot that took to the forests to wage the guerrilla war that partly contributed to Kenya’s self-
determination – predominantly Kikuyu – and their descendants, remain largely landless, 
disillusioned and economically disenfranchised.
15
 This is the reality, despite the fact that three 
out of the four Kenyan presidents since independence have been from the Kikuyu “ethnic 
group”. In fact, until Kibaki took over the reins of power in December 30, 2002, the Kenyan 
state continuously declined to acknowledge the contribution of the guerrillas (Kinyatti, 2005). 
Apparently, the trappings of capitalist accumulation, facilitated by control of state power, had 
greater allure than the principles of the fair, just, non-discriminatory, egalitarian society that most 
Kenyan African nationalists had fought and hoped for. Although Kenyatta must be commended 
for a fairly successful attempt at navigating the difficult course of uniting a nation divided along 
racial lines, owing to a racialized, oppressive economic order, he seems to have been 
preoccupied with safeguarding the interests of nervous white settler farmers, and appeasing the 
latter as opposed to pushing the cause of landless African guerrillas at independence. The 
Kenyatta that came out of prison in 1961 was even more moderate and spoke of “constitutional 
means”16 to freedom; he denounced the Mau Mau and stated the following: “I’ve never approved 
of any violence at all. My leadership has not been to darkness and death, but to light and 
prosperity”.17 Perhaps a behind-the-scenes deal had been reached between him and a shadowy 
globalist cabal to safeguard the latter’s interests in an independent Kenya before his release.18 
Although we shall never know this for sure, Kenyatta’s case points to the possibility of the 
existence of an African political class that is in cahoots with globalists, to the detriment of its 
                                                          
15
 See, for instance, Weru, J. (2016, December 12). Meet Mau Mau fighters who have never tasted fruits of 
independence. Standard Digital. Retrieved from https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000226534/meet-mau-
mau-fighters-who-have-never-tasted-fruits-of-independence (accessed 13 December 2016). 
16
 See Citizen TV. (2014, December 11). Jamhuri Day special: Jomo Kenyatta talks to white settlers. [Video file]. 
Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6dyeaTk8S-Y (accessed 13 December 2016). 
17
 Ibid. 
18
 In a review of Oginga Odinga’s autobiography, Not Yet Uhuru, for instance, Roberts (1968) describes the 
leadership of the country as “. . . the men who rule Kenya today for Western interests” (p. 85). See Roberts, D. 
(1968). Not yet uhuru: An autobiography by Oginga Odinga. World Outlook, 6(4), 84 – 85.   
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citizens; in these confounding, contemporary times, this possibility should not be taken lightly.
19
 
Odinga’s opposition to Kenyatta’s approach would not only hurt his political career, but also set 
the Luo community on a trajectory of enmity with the latter – and his Kikuyu followers – and 
eventually lead to the collective political marginalization of the Luo community. Indeed, 
“Jaramogi’s socialist leanings became his political waterloo; leaving government to form Kenya 
People’s Union in 1966 signaling the start of the longest sojourn in political Siberia. His party 
was labelled illegal, members, including Jaramogi detained in 1969.”20 
   
However, the event that would forever change the fate of the Kenyan Luo, by ushering in 
– to the community’s detriment – the “formalization” of “ethnic”-based political ostracization, 
and systematic attempts at deculturalization, was the assassination of Tom Mboya on 5th July 
1969. The unfortunate event made the already sour Kikuyu-Luo relations worse; fearing an 
uprising and retaliatory measures by the Luo – for it was widely believed that Kenyatta’s 
administration had played a role in the death of Mboya – an already paranoid Kenyatta turned to 
the divide-and-conquer and deculturalization tactics that he had seen the British colonialists 
employ. To safeguard state power, the source of his immense wealth, Kenyatta convinced 
“Kikuyu[s] by the thousands [to take part in] swearing oaths against fellow Kenyans in the 
President’s backyard”21 – his Gatundu residence. Time Magazine further noted in 1969 that: 
  
[t]he Kikuyu, according to one participant, strip naked, then hold hands in a circle around 
a darkened hut and chant an oath before entering it. Inside the hut they eat soil and swear 
to follow the oath. “The government of Kenya is under Kikuyu leadership, and this must 
be maintained,” goes the pledge. “If any tribe tries to set itself up against the Kikuyu, we 
                                                          
19
 Basing his arguments on French scholar Renan’s views of a nation-state, Lonsdale is of the opinion that Kenyatta 
took this approach for he wanted “. . . Kenya . . . to have a nationalist history that included all Kenyans” (see 
Berman & Lonsdale, 1992, p. 266). He contends that “. . . as Kenya’s first president [Kenyatta] could scarcely 
permit the pangs of its birth to be borne by one heroic minority, the Mau Mau fighters, alone” (ibid). 
20
 See Editor. (2016, November 10). The Odingas: A family of crusading firebrands. Standard Digital, para. 3. 
Retrieved from http://www.sde.co.ke/thenairobian/article/2000222904/the-odingas-a-family-of-crusading-firebrands 
(accessed 13 December 2016). 
21
 Time (1969, August 15) Kenya: Ominous oaths. Retrieved from 
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,901233,00.html (accessed 18 December 2016); See also, 
Mathangani, P. (2016, December 18). Secrets of Kenyatta oaths that set Kenya on the path to ruin. Standard Digital. 
Retrieved from https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000227153/the-kenyatta-oath-that-shook-kenya (accessed 
18 December 2016). 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
56 
 
must fight them in the same way that we died fighting the British settlers. No 
uncircumcised leaders [for example, the Luo] will be allowed to compete with the 
Kikuyu. You shall not vote for any party not led by the Kikuyu. If you reveal this oath, 
may this oath kill you.”22 
 
To further understand why Kenyatta would take to adopting such un-African moves, and 
the consequences of his actions on Kenyan society, let us turn to the details of how capitalism 
developed in Kenya. As argued in chapter one, state control was – and continues to be – crucial 
in the formation of the indigenous African bourgeois class since independence. Leys (1978) has 
described the Kenyan case succinctly: 
 
The control of this class over the state…originally largely through ethnic links, led to the 
accumulation of surplus through state-protected merchant, distribution and service 
activities. Increasingly this allowed the indigenous bourgeoisie to buy out foreign capital 
in farming, service and manufacturing sectors, helped…by capital accumulated through 
the ivory, charcoal and coffee trade (as cited in Kaplinsky, 1980, p. 84).  
 
Table 2.1 below, whose details are beyond the scope of this study, has been adapted from 
Kaplinsky (1980): It depicts the most prominent indigenous African capital accumulators in the 
Jomo Kenyatta era; for this reason, it has been referenced.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
22
 Time, op. cit. 
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Table 2.1: Capital Accumulators in the Kenyatta Era 
            Indigenous Kenyans 
    Nuclear Family   
 
(non-family)   
                
  
Total No. of 
Firms No. 
Personal 
Equity K£ 
Total 
Equity K£ No. 
Personal 
Equity K£ 
Total 
Equity K£ 
Julius K. Kalinga 4 2                  28  
                
25  2                   608  
               
13,900  
James Njenga Karume 14 2           46,800  
         
62,000  11              38,569  
             
224,878  
Peter Muige 
Kenyatta
23
 15       6              30,822  
             
460,899  
J. Matere Keriri 0             
Kenneth Matiba 5 1                  99  
              
100  1                   100  
                 
1,600  
Ngengi Muigai 18 1                  99  
              
100  9            768,500  
          
7,279,029  
Charles Njonjo 10             
Dustan Omari 5       2                   203  
                 
7,500  
Charles Rubia 4 1             4,000  
           
5,000  2                3,350  
               
16,000  
James Maina Wanjigi 11 4             1,003  
           
1,007  4              16,651  
               
52,624  
Francis Mwangi Thuo 6       3                2,040  
                 
9,000  
Eliud Mathu 8 3             8,002  
           
8,004  2                1,110  
               
25,020  
Udi Gecaga 11 5   
       
520,000  2                6,000  
               
35,000  
Source: Adopted from Kaplinsky, 1980, p. 94. 
 
It is noteworthy that, out of this list of thirteen, twelve hail from Kenyatta’s “ethnic group” 
                                                          
23
 Kaplinsky (1980) made an error by referring to “Peter Muigai Kenyatta” as “Peter Muige Kenyatta” in his work. I 
have adopted the table without making any alterations to it whatsoever. 
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(Kikuyu). About Udi Gecaga and Ngengi Muigai, Kaplinsky (1980) states that “both used close 
family relationships with Kenyatta to build their empires and amongst Kenyan industrialists 
Muigai is known as the political heavyweight and Gecaga as the shrewd businessman” (p. 91). 
This further suggests that state control and “ethnic” ties have been synthesized to determine 
economic fortunes and outcomes in Africa, generally, and in Kenya, in particular. The 
accumulators of wealth become the “private property class” in the context of Marx’s class 
struggle analysis. In order to protect their privileged position, they shield themselves by ensuring 
that all the important and powerful posts in the civil service, police and armed forces, are filled 
by their fellow tribesmen and women. Together, they become the dominant group and ensure 
tribal hegemony. During his first term, for instance, Kibaki reserved about one half of the cabinet 
posts in his government to GEMA communities. According to Amutabi (2009): 
  
In 2006, there were 19 permanent secretaries from GEMA-related ethnic groups out of 34 
in the country. In 2002, there had been 14 permanent secretaries from the Kalenjin, and 
related ethnic groups out of 26. In 2006, members of the GEMA group headed 23 out of 
the 34 public corporations. (p. 73)  
 
The dominated “ethnic groups” – the Luo have consistently fallen into this category in the post-
independence era – are thus consigned to “wage-labour” status. In the Marxian model of class 
struggle, they would be the “proletariat”; whilst this particular class seeks “radical restructuring 
of the established order of society”, members of the wealthy “private property class”, and their 
tribal associates, are “interested in change only to the extent to which reforms and concessions 
can be integrated or institutionalized” (Mészáros, 1971, pp. 98 – 99). These dialectics of 
“ethnicity” and economic development partly explain why post-election violence is increasingly 
becoming a prominent feature of the Kenyan society. State controllers are usually very 
conservative and do everything within their power to frustrate regime change – even rig 
elections. When regime change fails, the dominated groups frequently resort to violence – a 
situation akin to what Marx refers to as “self-abolition” (cf. Mészáros, 1971, pp. 92 – 93). 
    
The socio-cultural dynamics associated with the safeguarding of the social formation of 
capital, in the Kenyan context, have often revolved around “othering” centred, mainly, on the 
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practice of male circumcision. “Othering”, according to Abdallah-Pretceille (2003), involves 
“objectification of another person or group” or “creating the other” (p. 13). Staszak (2009) 
defines the “other” as a “member of a dominated out-group, whose identity is considered lacking 
and who may be subject to discrimination by the in-group” (p. 43). He contends that: 
  
[o]therness is the result of a discursive process by which a dominant in-group (“Us,” the 
Self) constructs one or many dominated out-groups (“Them,” Other) by stigmatizing a 
difference – real or imagined – presented as a negation of identity and thus a motive for 
potential discrimination. (Staszak, 2009, p. 44) 
Long after Kenyatta launched his “deculturalization” (social death) technique, it continues to be 
claimed, in Kenyan political parlance, that leadership is the preserve of the circumcised. This 
argument has often been used by Kikuyu (dominant) politicians of Central Kenya against their 
Luo (dominated) competitors, who culturally do not practice male circumcision. Atieno-
Odhiambo (2002) observed that: 
 
This Gikuyu notion of civil society was extended to the political arena of the state by 
Kenyatta from 1966 to 1969, when he accused the KPU opposition of being chameleons 
– definitely not part of civil society and therefore, by extension, not legitimate citizens of 
the Kenya state that he ran. The Luo were targeted for this rhetorical exclusion ostensibly 
because they did not practice male circumcision. This specifically central Kenyan 
discourse on being cut – “the narcissism of small differences”, as Freud once spoke of it, 
the tendency to think of ourselves as superior to others because of some laughably 
superficial and non-essential feature – resurfaced in 1992 as two Gikuyu barons, Kenneth 
Matiba and Mwai Kibaki, bid for the presidency against Oginga Odinga. It was widely 
asserted that Odinga should not be elected because he was not circumcised. (p. 243) 
 
Indeed, the “symbol” of circumcision has over the years – thanks to the derogatory, politically-
inspired ethnocentric views and ideologies of Kenyatta and cunning politicians of successive 
generations – been profoundly fronted, in Kenya, as a desideratum for qualification (in terms of 
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“bona fide” citizenry, human worth and ability to lead).24 This cultural element, which is alien to 
the Luo, has been so vociferously emphasized that Kiai (2009) thinks that Obama (the 44th US 
president whose father was Luo) would not win an election in Kenya because of his “ethnicity”. 
When a people’s identity is ridiculed, owing to an element of culture that they do not practice, 
they may be coaxed into adopting that which is alien to conform (to be socially compatible). This 
study assesses the impact of political exclusion on cultural dispositions within this context. In an 
interview with Vogue, Oscar-winning-actress Lupita Nyong’o talks about the despondency she 
felt growing up as a young girl in Kenya, for being Luo. Besides her dark pigmentation (Luos, 
originally from Southern Sudan, are darker than the average Kenyan in most instances) barring 
her from being accepted on Kenyan television, she states that she associated her Dholuo dialect 
with ignominy (cf. Sykes, 2015). It is not inconceivable, therefore, that politically-constructed 
stereotypes and prejudices could have had profound socio-cultural effects and ramifications at all 
levels of society in Kenya. I will now briefly examine consumerism, the brainwashing ideology 
of the 21st century, which has not only served to perpetuate an oppressive global economic 
order, but has also become a very important tool for the purposes of feeding the global elite 
class’s insatiable appetite for profits. 
   
2.1.5 Consumerism in the 21st Century 
The 20th century was undoubtedly the American century and the same is the case, 
arguably to a lesser extent, with the first two decades of the 21st century. Whether by way of 
diplomacy, chicanery or warfare, the US has and continues to spread, with significant success, its 
notions of what constitutes proper, sophisticated and/or acceptable socio-economic-political 
norms and values the world over (cf. Chomsky, 2016a; Chomsky, 2016b; Chomsky & Vltchek, 
2017). More often than not, this imperialistic behaviour, on the part of the world’s superpower, 
has been motivated by the desire to find markets for its products, owing to “over-capacity and 
over-production” (Terreblanche, 2014, p. 438). Terreblanche (2014) has argued that 
 
[t]he US intervention in Latin America during the first half of the twentieth century 
created an opportunity for it to launch the transnational corporation as a typical American 
                                                          
24
 See, for instance, Nation Reporter. (2015, January 13). Outrage as Moses Kuria makes another hate remark. Daily 
Nation. Retrieved from http://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/Outrage-as-Moses-Kuria-makes-another-hate-remark-
/1064-2588378-dvdi2sz/index.html (accessed 6 March 2017). 
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business organisation that was destined to play an extraordinary dominant role in the 
American-led empires in the period after the Second World War. (p. 437) 
 
For the US form of capitalism – largely founded on consumer goods – to survive, it requires that 
the masses, both at home and abroad, engage in continuous spending – impulsive and 
ostentatious. In this sense, Christianity, especially during the first half of the 20th century, 
proved an obstacle for it instilled in Americans the virtues of self-discipline, austerity and 
restraint. Moreover, most upper class Americans were driven by the desire to join the rentier 
class; consequently, they were given to saving significant portions of their income (Terreblanche, 
2014). In order to eliminate this stumbling block, corporate elites “. . . turned to propaganda 
campaigns to convince consumers – local and foreign – to satisfy not only their rational needs 
but also their artificially created desires” (Terreblanche, 2014, p. 439). Thus, courtesy of mass 
media, consumerism has revolutionised capitalism and ensured the preservation of the privileged 
position of the global elites (Osborne, 2006, as cited in Terreblanche, 2014, p. 429) as captured 
in Terreblanche’s (2014) work: 
 
[w]hat started as American private corporations, created through litigation in the 
twentieth century for exploitative imperial operations in Latin America, have in the 
twenty-first century multiplied to about forty thousand TNCs worldwide that play a 
hegemonic role on behalf of the United States in economic, political and cultural 
imperialism in the rest of the world. (p. 437) 
 
Indeed, “[a]fter the Second World War the US would . . . export its corporatism, its consumerism 
and its financial services – i.e. the American version of capitalism – to Western Europe, and 
from the 1980s to the rest of the world” (Terreblanche, 2014, pp. 438 – 439). 
   
The manner in which society’s elite class institutes new ideologies to perpetuate financial 
gain is conspicuous as has been demonstrated, above, in the case of consumerism; this minority 
group appears to be determined to focus on its narrow self-interests at all costs. An insatiable 
appetite for profit by the global elite class could well explain the move taken by the international 
observer mission, led by former US Secretary of State John Kerry, which rushed to give a clean 
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bill of health to the 8 August 2017 Kenyan general election, despite it being marred by numerous 
irregularities and illegalities. Does the West care more about stability – which is crucial for its 
business interests – than for genuine democracy in Africa? Having examined the historical 
trajectory of the events that culminated in the formation of the socio-historical construct, 
“ethnicity”, and outlined the contemporary “twisted” ideology of consumerism being employed 
by the global elite class to exploit the planet’s masses, I now turn my attention to a review of 
governance and socio-economic development on the continent of Africa, vis-à-vis “ethnicity” 
and capitalism, for even though “race and ethnicity are mythical constructs”, as we have seen, 
they nevertheless “are very much an everyday reality” (Spencer, 2014, p. xvii). 
 
 
2.2 “Ethnicity” in Scholarly Literature on Africa?  
In this section, I examine governance patterns, with regard to “ethnicity”, and cover the 
following countries, besides Kenya: Ghana, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe and Côte d'Ivoire. 
These countries have been selected because they are “ethnically” heterogeneous according to 
particular historical experiences and as based on interpretations in particular literature (cf. 
Posner, 2004; Easterly & Levine, 1997). With the exception of Ethiopia, which only experienced 
Italian occupation, they all experienced colonial rule for a protracted time period. Moreover, 
these countries have continuously adopted capitalist economies in the post-colonial era because 
of the increasing influence of western centralized economic structures, which have remained 
largely intact in the post-colonial era. This excludes Ethiopia, whose ideology from 1974 to 1991 
was Marxism-Leninism, largely because it did not experience colonial rule. Negative “ethnicity”, 
I contend, thrives best in environments in which there is stiff competition for scarce resources 
and where the overriding ideology is “survival of the fittest” and “accumulation of profit at all 
costs”. Ethiopia is thus included to facilitate an analysis of the development of “ethnicity” in a 
scenario that is devoid of the stranglehold of the effects of colonialism and its associated exports 
– capitalism and democracy. 
     
Mbatia, Bikuru and Nderitu (2009) have examined the challenges that “ethnicity” poses 
to state building and multi-party democracy in the continent, using Kenya as a case study. They 
find that “multiparty democracy [has] heightened ethnic nationalism [leading to] ethnic 
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violence” (para. 1). For multiparty democracy to function successfully, they argue, the 
foundations of ethnic-based politics must be demolished. All networks and associations that 
encourage and preserve negative “ethnicity” ought to be extinguished. African States can 
accomplish this feat by formulating and enforcing legislation that deters and diminishes political 
parties that are founded on the basis of “ethnic” identity. Also, they contend, “ethnic auditing 
should be conducted regularly to identify and penalize those who engage in practices that enforce 
ethnic exclusion in hiring or distribution of public resources” (The Way Forward section, para. 
4). 
 
From the work of Attafuah (2009) it is evident that tribalism is also a problem in Ghana. 
Asante – Ewe rivalry dominates the political scene in that country, and has been manipulated by 
politicians for personal gain since independence in 1957. Despite business ties and inter-
marriages, ethnocentrism, discrimination and prejudices continue to hinder nation-building. The 
phenomenon of tribalism is deeply entrenched since “formation of political parties, patterns of 
voting in presidential and parliamentary elections, political appointments and termination of 
public sector appointments, formulation of development policies and programs, and distribution 
of development projects are all heavily influenced by ethnic considerations” (Background 
section, para. 3). He recommends the replacement of the winner-takes-all governance system 
with a mechanism of proportional representation. Only then, he contends, can bloc “ethnic” 
voting be trumped by ideology and the interests of dominated and marginalized communities get 
addressed. 
 
Concerning Nigeria, Achimugu, Ata-Agboni and Aliyu (2013) have found that negative 
“ethnicity” remains an enormous risk to the survival of the nation as a cohesive entity. “Ethnic” 
considerations are more significant than eminence and national interest when it comes to 
employment in public service and public appointments. To underscore the magnitude of the 
situation, they state: 
 
Ethnic mistrust and tension runs high in Nigeria[n] politics, ethnic loyalty remains 
stronger than national loyalty. All the ethnic groups complain of one form of 
marginalization or the other. The Hausa/Fulani are accused by other groups…of 
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monopolizing . . . political power, the Hausa/Fulani accuse the Yoruba of dominating the 
economy and civil service, the Igbo blame their woes on the Hausa/Fulani political 
domination and also [complain about Yoruba] domination of [the] economy and federal 
bureaucracy. (p. 50)   
 
Competition for political positions at all levels in Nigeria – National, State and Local – are 
driven by “ethnicity”: various “ethnic groups” sponsor their own candidates with the objective of 
sharing in the spoils of office (Adebayo, 2006, as cited in Achimugu, Ata-Agboni & Aliyu, 2013, 
p. 57). 
   
 In Zimbabwe, Shona – Ndebele rivalries and antagonisms dominate many facets of 
government operation and society. Following the 1982 fallout between the Zimbabwe African 
National Union – the Patriotic Front (ZANU – PF) and the Zimbabwe African People's Union 
(ZAPU) and the subsequent ferocious Operation Gukurahundi (1982 – 1987, in which about 
20,000 Zimbabweans, mostly Ndebele, lost their lives), the Ndebele have consistently resented 
the central government (Muzondidya & Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2007, p. 285); according to Ranger, 
Alexander and McGregor (2000) they “feel marginalized from both central government decision-
making processes and the economy” (as cited in Muzondidya & Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2007, p. 286). 
Resentment towards the government has, since 1987, been expressed through the ballot; ZANU 
– PF seldom gets any meaningful votes from the Matabeleland provinces. There have also been 
calls for federalism to address the perceived marginalization of the traditional homeland of the 
Ndebele – the Provinces of Midlands, Matabeleland North and Matabeleland North (Muzondidya 
& Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2007, p. 286). Musemwa (2006) has attributed the disinclination of the 
Zimbabwean Government towards sponsoring the Zambezi Water Project (meant to provide 
water to Zimbabwe’s second largest city, Bulawayo, which is located in Matabeleland) to 
negative “ethnicity” and “ethnic” politics. To him, the government was penalizing the city for its 
disapproval (as cited in Muzondidya & Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2007, p. 289). 
     
 The situation in the Côte d'Ivoire is even more complex: besides the problematic of 
xenophobia, negative “ethnicity” and sectarian dynamics characterize the formation and 
operation of government, and the organization of opposition towards it (Ogwang, 2011). The 
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country’s citizenry comprises a huge chunk of nationals of immigrant origin. Its cocoa and 
coffee industries have for a long time been dependent on immigrant labour from neighbouring 
countries like Mali, Ghana, Guinea and Burkina Faso (Ogwang, 2011; Ištok & Koziak, 2010). 
Immigrants, seen as a cheap labour source, were introduced into the country by the French in 
colonial times. Félix Houphouët-Boigny, founding father of the nation, and perhaps the most 
economically and politically astute of the five leaders the country has had so far (others being 
Aimé Henri Konan Bédié, Robert Guéï, Laurent Gbagbo and the current president, Alassane 
Dramane Ouattara), accorded them citizenship and property ownership rights (Ogwang, 2011). 
This community has significantly grown and become an important part of the country’s 
population. Indeed, in “1998, immigrants and their descendants numbered four million – about 
25 percent of Ivory Coast’s population” (Ogwang, 2011, p. 3). Economic difficulties, attributed 
to slumps in cocoa and coffee prices in the world market, and which originated in the 1980s, 
have been blamed, naively and in an escapist fashion, on the immigrant community such that 
“strong anti-immigrant sentiments” (Collier, 2009, as cited in Ogwang, 2011, p. 3) abound. 
According to Langer (2010), economic hardships have not only worsened disputes between 
aboriginal Ivorians and immigrants, but also between northerners and the natives of the 
prosperous south (as cited in Ogwang, 2011, p. 3). 
  
These xenophobic sentiments have been exploited by politicians in their quest to retain 
power (Ogwang, 2011). For instance, the current president, Ouattara, was constantly barred from 
contending for the presidency prior to 2010, owing to the belief that one of his parents was not 
Ivorian. In fact, President Bédié introduced and oversaw the enactment of legislation to that 
effect (Mwendwa, 2011, as cited in Ogwang, 2011, p. 4). Bédié also coined the notion of 
“Ivoirité” (“Ivorianess”) ostensibly for the purposes of cultural unity. Prévention Genocides 
(2002) saw the concept as: 
  
[a]n ideology and propaganda directed by those in power created, little by little, in the 
social imagination two identity groups: the “100 percent Ivorians” from the “roots”; and 
the “dubious Ivorians,” of whom the leader is Alassane Ouattara, leader of the opposition 
RDR (former prime minister of Houphoët Boigny.) He was excluded from elections for 
his “dubious Ivorianess.” Besides him, his whole community is targeted. Beyond his own 
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community, there is a linkage of “dubious Ivoirians” with foreigners. An equation is 
readily made: Ouattara = RDR militants = people of the north = Muslims = Dioulas = 
foreigners. In these representations, the cleavage “us versus them” is deeply embedded. 
(p. 1) 
                  
From the work of Ogwang (2011) it is clear that Houphouët-Boigny was aware of the 
sensitivity of “ethnicity” since he “introduced a system of ethnic quotas within government 
institutions” (p. 2). Nevertheless, in the lead-up to the first multi-party elections held in the 
country in 1990, Gbagbo’s Ivorian Popular Front (IPF) blamed him for championing the 
concerns of his Baoulé “ethnic group”, besides those of “foreigners” and communities from the 
north (Crook, 1997, as cited in Ogwang, 2011, p. 4). During the reign of his successor, Bédié, 
government was dominated by officials from the Christian south, with very minimal inclusion of 
politicians from the Muslim north (Ištok & Koziak, 2010, p. 3). And Gbagbo, following in the 
footsteps of Bédié, maintained the diehard attitude of barring northerners from government 
participation – a stance which eventuated in a foiled coup attempt in 2001, and outright civil war 
in 2002 (Ogwang, 2011). 
 
 Perhaps paradoxically, Ethiopian society, which did not experience colonial rule, has also 
been bedevilled by a history of “ethnic” domination and exclusion (Nzongola – Ntalaja, 1999). 
During the reign of Emperor Haile Selassie I (1930 – 1974) the Amhara were greatly favoured as 
opposed to other “ethnic groups” (Nzongola – Ntalaja, 1999). Lefort (1983) highlights the all-
important statistic: Although comprising a mere 25% of the population of Ethiopia in 1970, the 
Amhara constituted 70% of the armed forces and dominated other state organs (as cited in 
Nzongola – Ntalaja, 1999, p. 42). Opposition to the centralized state in Ethiopia has also been 
largely organized along “ethnic” lines. During the reign of the Marxist-Leninist Derg 
Government (1974 – 1991), for instance, resistance took the form of ethnic-based entities like the 
Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), the Tigray 
People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) (Van der 
Beken, 2003, as cited in Teshome, 2008, p. 789). According to Keller (2002) since 1991, the 
Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) Government, itself an ethnic-
based entity, has encouraged dominated Ethiopians to coalesce around “ethnic” identity in order 
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to air out their grievances (as cited in Teshome, 2008, p. 791). This lends credence to the 
argument of Osaghae (2006) that “demands made in the name of ethnic groups tend to be taken 
seriously by State power holders who know the destructive capacity of festering and unattended 
to ethnic demands” (p. 6). 
                  
From the preceding review of “ethnicity” in selected African countries, the following 
pattern can be observed: “ethnic” tensions and rivalry are prevalent in each country that 
experienced colonialism and adopted capitalism as its economic ideology. Therefore, the 
assertion that “ethnicity” owes its existence to colonialism and that negative “ethnicity” 
(tribalism) thrives best in an environment dominated by capitalism and its associated exports – 
the centralized nation-state and multi-party democracy – holds true. It is also clear, from the 
analysis of Ethiopia, that the problem associated with “ethnicity” transcends the colonial 
experience and, in some instances, cannot be totally pinned on capitalism. However, the western 
ideas of democracy and the nation-state, make “ethnicity” in Africa problematic, no matter what 
economic ideology a country adopts; it should be noted that when the Derg Government ruled 
Ethiopia, it “theoretically accepted the Marxist-Leninist ideology of the right to self-
determination of all ethnic groups or nationalities in the country . . . [but] it did not implement 
this theory in practice, hence Ethiopia remained a centralized state” (Teshome, 2008, p.788). In 
conclusion, therefore, this colonial construct, “ethnicity”, has rendered African societies largely 
dysfunctional. Ostensibly, the western ideals of capitalism and democracy have largely failed to 
work for the betterment of African societies, especially with regard to the masses. These ideals 
are, more often than not, responsible for the incessant bloodshed in Africa, for wherever 
economic problems associated with capitalism arise, “ethnic” tensions follow. Indeed, these 
western imports – capitalism, democracy and the nation-state – are substantially serving to harm 
the African society by further entrenching inequalities of all kinds, “ethnic” inequality included. 
    
With regard to “ethnicity”, salient trends that derive from the preceding literature review 
include the following: there seems to be a consensus that “ethnicity” determines government 
formation in Africa; there is also a consensus that dissident communities (or “ethnic groups”) are 
marginalized when it comes to the allocation of scarce national resources; still, attempts have not 
been made to comprehensively examine the economic and socio-cultural development of 
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particular communities vis-à-vis the state and its governing institutions/institutions of 
governance. The preceding historical trajectory on the formation of “ethnicity” in African 
societies in general and Kenya, in particular, constitutes the raison d'être to construct an 
analytical framework to explore “ethnicity”, governance and socio-economic development in 
Africa, with a special reference to the Luo community of Kenya. 
 
2.3 Theoretical Framework 
Following the insights arising out of the review of literature, especially on the insatiable 
pursuit of profit by society’s elite class, its subjugation mechanisms, and the nation-state and the 
role it plays in the economic and socio-cultural development of its citizens, this study adopts, for 
its theoretical framework, an eclectic approach. Besides Lonsdale’s ideas of “moral ethnicity” 
and “political tribalism”, there are no mature (established) theories to explore “ethnicized” 
politics in Kenya/Africa; however, many theoretical propositions emanate from this literature 
review to explain the development and persistence of the phenomenon as discussed in the 
rationale/justification presented in section 1.5 of chapter one. This study, therefore, fuses various 
theoretical propositions (drawn from the review of current literature) on leadership and socio-
economic development in the African context, with the Foucauldian notion of “Panopticon” 
power, Istvan Mészáros’ refutation of “ideological neutrality” and the Instrumentalist Theory of 
Ethnicity, to inaugurate a complex whole. Consider Mészáros’ views: 
[T]he national state remain[s] the ultimate arbiter of comprehensive socioeconomic and 
political decision-making as well as the real guarantor of the risks undertaken by all 
significant transactional economic ventures. (Mészáros, 2015, p. 97)  
 
[There exists an] adversarial/antagonistic framework in which one section of the 
population – a . . . minority – has to dominate the . . . majority as a matter of 
insurmountable structural determination. That is to say, a form of domination that totally 
expropriates for itself the power of decision making. Labor as the antagonist of capital 
has absolutely no power of decision making; not even in the most limited context. 
(Mészáros, 2001a, pp. 101 – 102)   
 
Following these insights from the works of Mészáros, the study posits that political 
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power is a vehicle to economic prosperity in Africa, since whoever controls the state decides the 
manner in which the scarce resources will be allocated (cf. Odinga, 2007; Singh & vom Hau, 
2015; Mullard, 2005). This phenomenon thrives because most African countries have not 
enshrined particulars regarding the division of the national bounty in their constitutions. 
Therefore, whoever lacks political power cannot chart their own economic destiny and is at the 
mercy of the custodian of the state. In Kenya, whereas constitutional advancements were made in 
2010, the situation nevertheless persists, albeit to a lesser extent: governance is mediated by 
relations of power often exercised by the dominant parties in competition with one another. 
Accordingly, certain institutions of governance, especially at the local level, are often 
fragmented in respect of providing access to constitutionally enshrined rights, as buttressed and 
supported by specific regulations/laws. In Foucault’s (1995 [1975]) terminology, these relations 
of power operate in the form of a “panopticon” ensuring that, to a lesser or greater extent, rights 
claimed or demanded by citizens at the grassroots level are seldom implemented in total, but 
curtailed in practice.
25
  
According to Foucault (2003 [2006]) power can be very productive in terms of effect; 
however, it is important to note that power is only productive in an environment of freedom 
(Schirato, Danaher & Webb, 2012). For Foucault (1984) freedom is not a possession/thing; 
neither is it a target or objective to be realized or attained. It is a continuous application of certain 
principles and ideologies. Foucault (1984) argues: 
 
[I] do not think that there is anything that is functionally – by its very nature – absolutely 
liberating. Liberty is a practice. So there may, in fact, always be a certain number of 
projects whose aim is to modify some constraints, to loosen, or even to break them, but 
none of these projects can, simply by its nature, assure that people will have liberty 
automatically, that it will be established by the project itself. The liberty of men is never 
                                                          
25
 On August 24, 2015, for instance, the Supreme Court of Kenya upheld a decision by the Court of Appeal to award 
teachers a pay rise of between 50 to 60 per cent. Teachers, in Kenya, are paid meagrely and find it difficult, to make 
ends meet, financially. However, instead of carrying out the court’s orders, President Uhuru Kenyatta opted to close 
all schools on the premise that implementation of the award would cripple government operations since the increase 
had not been budgeted for. Thus, the rights of teachers, and more importantly, those of children – to education – 
were violated. And days later, the Teachers Service Commission announced a vacancy of about 70,000 teaching 
jobs, a move largely seen as a blackmail tactic to coerce teachers back to class. For more details on the award and 
controversy surrounding it, see Ouma, W. (2015, August 22). State uneasy as supreme court rules on 50pc teachers’ 
pay rise. Daily Nation. Retrieved from http://www.nation.co.ke/news/Supreme-Court-Teachers-Salaries-Increase/-
/1056/2842856/-/j4yo64z/-/index.html (accessed 1 October 2015).      
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assured by the institutions and laws that are intended to guarantee them. This is why 
almost all of these laws and institutions are quite capable of being turned around. Not 
because they are ambiguous, but simply because “liberty” is what must be exercised. (p. 
245)   
 
From this perspective, when African countries got rid of the colonialist, they did not necessarily 
attain freedom. They will be free when they apply, execute and/or exercise practices, which 
according to Schirato, Danaher & Webb (2012) should encompass the following: the respect of 
human rights, the rule of law, a liberal, democratic environment, reasonable living standards, free 
trade, freedom of expression, free press, and so on. From Foucault’s (1984) definition of 
freedom, power – in a socio-cultural sense – can only be productive in an environment where 
people have an enlightened attitude towards others of a different “race”, “ethnicity” and even 
religious beliefs. Totalitarian, despotic, and oppressive regimes, on the other hand, can make 
power coercive (Schirato, Danaher & Webb, 2012). Indeed, power emits a repressive effect, in 
autocratic dispensations, and this has largely been the case in post-independent Africa. 
   
African communities have come to realize the connection between state control and 
economic well-being and are using “ethnicity” as a weapon in the struggle for political power. 
“Ethnic groups” are, therefore, groups of interest (cf. Glazer & Moynihan, 1975; Portes & Bach, 
1985); and instrumentalists are correct when they say that “ethnicity operates within 
contemporary political contexts and is not an archaic survival arrangement carried over into the 
present by conservative people” (Cohen, 1969, p. 190). Since “politicization of ethnicity all over 
the African continent has in turn generated deep-rooted suspicions [and] mistrust” (Odinga, 
2007, Ethnicity as a Vehicle for Political Competition section, para. 5) this study is guided by the 
premise that the “ethnic groups” that control state power do not allocate the dominated groups an 
equitable share of the national largesse. 
 
2.4 Rival Theoretical Explanations 
Owing to the fact that there is no agreement regarding how to understand the “ethnicized 
politics” in Kenya, various rival explanations of the Kenyan case have emerged to elucidate 
uneven and/or unequal development in the Kenyan state vis-à-vis its Luo community. This 
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phenomenon can best be explained by the certitude that “ethnicity” is an emotive issue. Analysts, 
therefore, sometimes fail the test of neutrality and/or objective description. This study considers 
the arguments and theories of Oloo (2004) and Kuria (2011) equally important in the 
examination of Kenya’s socio-economic development because case study research methodology 
involves identifying rival explanations at the outset of the research process and considering these 
rival explanations during the interpretation of a study’s findings.26 Since Oloo’s (2004) 
arguments are based on the Theory of Uneven Development, I’ll introduce this theory first, before 
examining the analyst’s contentions. 
  
The Theory of Uneven Development was first propounded fully by Lenin in 1915; its 
precepts derive from the works of Marx – Capital and Grundrisse (cf. Smith, 1990; Bond, 1999). 
It is founded on Marx’s argument that “capitalism . . . [leads to] the simultaneous emergence of 
concentrations of wealth and capital (for capitalists), on the one hand, and poverty and 
oppression (for workers), on the other” (Bond, 1999, para. 1). The emergence of the 
phenomenon (uneven development), which can be associated with “differential growth of 
sectors, geographical processes, classes and regions at the global, regional, national, sub-national 
and local level” (Bond, 1999, para. 1) has been explained in various ways by different scholars: 
whilst Smith (1990) attributes it to rampant development of division of labour, Mandel (1968) 
perceives it as the result of variation in finesse amongst distinct producers in a given community, 
prolificacy differences amongst animals and soils, and fortuitous happenings in life and nature 
(as cited in Bond, 1999). 
  
Basing his arguments on the Theory of Uneven Development, Oloo (2004) contends that 
poverty in Luo Nyanza can be explained by the fact that: 
    
[C]apitalism develops in contradictory ways both within the boundaries of a single 
country, across regions and a global scale. Well known examples include South Africa 
under apartheid where you basically had two nations and two economies co-existing 
within the confines of a single racist state; some have cited the North/South divide within 
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 For details on the importance of identifying rival explanations at the outset of a case study and considering these 
explanations during the interpretation stage, see Yin, R. K. (2009). Case study research: design and methods (4th 
ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, p. 34.
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Nigeria, Uganda, Italy, Sudan and other parts of the world. (What is Uneven 
Development? section, para. 1) 
 
According to Oloo (2004) the colonial history of Kenya depicts a situation in which the British 
pursued a policy of uneven development flagrantly and unashamedly. Infrastructure growth and 
expansion was carried out in correspondence with colonial economic concerns, pursuits and 
investments. The reason for “the social and economic disparities between towns and the 
countryside, various districts and provinces and even within individual towns, districts and 
provinces”, lies in this phenomenon (Oloo, 2004, What is Uneven Development? section, para. 
4). Therefore, impoverishment in any region of the country can neither be attributed directly to 
the inhabitants nor to superficial “ethnic” rivalry amongst various “ethnic groups” (Oloo, 2004). 
  
Another rival explanation on the economic state of Luo Nyanza is based on the concept 
of poor leadership. Kuria (2011) argues that “since independence, the political leadership of the 
region has held the people hostage to a self-defeating ideology of blaming everybody except 
themselves for the region’s woes” (para. 2). According to him, underdevelopment in the 
traditional homeland of the Luo community is as a result of the culture of overdependence on the 
government and lack of personal initiative. He suggests that the region needs to make the fishing 
industry its focal point and modernize it – proceeds from which would uplift the locals. If 
deployed for irrigation purposes, he argues, Luo Nyanza’s plentiful water sources could 
transmute the region into the country’s new bread basket. He also advocates for the sagacious 
resuscitation of industries such as Kisumu Cotton Mills (KICOMI), which slumped in 1999. The 
conclusion of this chapter is next. 
  
2.5 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter has been to theorize the problem of “ethnicity” away from the 
conventional and widely accepted and acknowledged diametrically opposed understandings of 
the ideological construct espoused by Lonsdale – “moral ethnicity” and “political tribalism” (cf. 
Berman & Lonsdale, 1992, pp. 315 – 467). Basing its premise on the contentions of Mafeje 
(1971) that, since Africa has “been successfully drawn into a capitalist economy and a world 
market” (p. 258), “ethnicity” has to be explained and conceptualized differently, with modern 
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conditions in mind, it has positioned Kenya’s “ethnic” problem within the spectrum of profit and 
the push for globalism. As well, to uncover the genesis and development of the spurious 
ideological construct, the evolution of closely-related ideologies and their concomitant driving 
forces – such as race, Christianity, slavery, Darwinism, eugenics, colonialism and consumerism 
– has been examined. The chapter has scrutinized governance patterns with regard to “ethnicity” 
in various African countries that have subsequently adopted capitalist economies in the post-
colonial era, because of the increasing influence of Western centralized economic structures, 
which have remained largely intact in the post-colonial era. It has also discussed the theoretical 
framework that has been adopted for this study, to interrogate the research problematic. It has 
given the specifics of an eclectic approach, which fuses various propositions (obtained from the 
review of current literature) on leadership and socio-economic development, within the African 
context, with the Foucauldian notion of “Panopticon” power, Istvan Mészáros’ refutation of 
“ideological neutrality” and the Instrumentalist Theory of Ethnicity. The core argument of this 
theoretical framework is that the “ethnic groups” that control state power in Africa do not 
allocate an equitable share of the national resources to the dominated groups perceived to be 
“dissident”. In keeping with the tenets of case study research (cf. Yin, 2009), this chapter has 
also considered rival theoretical explanations on development, chief among which is the Theory 
of Uneven Development. The next chapter outlines the research methodology that was adopted in 
this study. 
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Chapter 3 
Research Setting and Methodology  
3 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the research methodology that I have employed to accomplish this 
study’s objectives, which are chiefly to explain the marginalization of the Luo in Kenya and why 
“ethnicity” is strongly correlated with the crisis of state power in this particular African nation. 
More specifically, the research methodology used in this chapter aims at shedding light on the 
following concerns: i) the socio-cultural-economic factors arising out of political exclusion and 
domination by the successive governments of post-independent Kenya; and, ii) the proportion of 
public investment undertaken by the GoK in Luo Nyanza during the period 1963 – 2013 to 
enhance the community’s effective participation in governance structures, at grassroots level, 
and its concomitant socio-economic development. 
  
The ethno-political context from which the research problem derives has already been 
discussed in detail in chapters one and two. However, since this study is partly grounded on 
Geertz’s (1973) “thick description” technique, I have annexed a detailed description of the study 
area (see Appendix C), whose delimitation criterion will be discussed shortly. This is aimed at 
making the findings on the influence of “ethnic”-based politics on the Luo more meaningful, 
especially to the non-Kenyan reader. Thus, this chapter begins by explaining how the study area 
has been delimited. Overall, the purpose of this chapter is to elaborate on the research 
methodology section in chapter one, and to show that proper mechanisms have been applied in 
conducting this study. With the view to enhance the overall clarity of my research methodology, 
I have organized this chapter around ten major topics, namely: delimitation of the study area, 
research methodology, quantitative research design, qualitative research design, MMR data 
collection techniques, data validity and reliability, data analysis, research instruments, research 
scope and limitations and the ethics statement. Each of the preceding ten sections of this research 
methodology chapter is now presented sequentially. 
 
3.1 Delimitation of the Study Area 
The delimitation of the study area in this research is based on the criterion of 
contextualization (cf. Compton-Lilly, 2013; Cappelli & Sherer, 1991; Johns, 2006; Elsbach & 
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Pratt, 2007; Bamberger, 2008). Contextualization, which advocates for the “linking of 
observations to a set of relevant facts” (Rousseau & Fried, 2001, p.1) ensures that participants’ 
sets of circumstances/situations – for example, institutional and political – are considered before 
a study is undertaken (Compton-Lilly, 2013, pp. 54–65). Other situational factors considered key 
by various scholars include normative or social environments like culture (Barmberger & Biron, 
2007), economy-wide characteristics (Rowley, Behrens & Krackhardt, 2000), and physical 
workplace conditions (Elsbach & Pratt, 2007). 
 
In this study, Luo numerical superiority/inferiority is the key contextualization 
consideration. I contend that in Luo Nyanza (Kisumu, Migori, Siaya and Homa Bay Counties) 
where the Luo is the main “ethnic group”, the latter interacts less with Kenyans of other “ethnic 
groups” as opposed to the Luo who reside in the country’s cosmopolitan areas. For a more 
meaningful and balanced exploration of the manner in which “ethnicized” politics influences 
socio-economic and cultural developments in Kenyan society, therefore, I have extended this 
study to the four cosmopolitan counties of Nairobi, Mombasa, Nakuru and Uasin Gishu. In these 
four cosmopolitan counties, the Luo are to be found co-existing with fellow Kenyans, but are not 
the dominant group. To my knowledge, no other research on Kenya’s “ethnicized” politics has 
delimited its study area on the premise that numerical dominance of an “ethnic group” within a 
specified geographical area and exposure, or lack thereof, to other “ethnic groups” and their 
cultures could influence the manner in which the dynamics of ethnopolitics play out. The next 
section introduces the research methodology that has been adopted in this study. 
 
3.2 Research Methodology 
This section explains the research design that has been employed in this study. It reviews 
the research instruments and the sampling procedure that was used to collect the empirical data 
in addition to the techniques that have been utilized in the analysis of data. Moreover, this 
section also designates the time frame within which the research was conducted.  
3.2.1 Research Design 
For this study, I have employed an explanatory sequential mixed methods research 
design, as depicted in Figure 3.1 below. 
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Figure 3.1: Research Design. 
      Phase     Procedure    Product 
  
 Structured questionnaire              Nominal/Ordinal Data 
       
   
      
Frequencies                  Descriptive/Inferential statistics 
     Tables        
     Graphs        
     Chi-square tests      
     Kruskal-Wallis tests      
             
  
 
 
     Focus Group Discussions                 Text Data (Documents) 
     GoK Hansard        
     Budget Speeches      
     Economic Surveys 
     Statistical Abstracts 
 
 
                   
   Thick Description          Codes and themes  
       Pattern matching, explanation building          
       Categorical aggregation  
       Direct interpretation,  
       Naturalistic generalizations 
        
 
 
 
     Interpretation and explanation of the         Discussion 
     quantitative and qualitative results        Implications 
               Future research 
Source: Author (2017) 
 
This design comprises two distinct stages – quantitative followed by qualitative. I began by 
collecting numeric data using a structured questionnaire, which was administered on a face-to-
face basis. The nominal data obtained in this stage has been analysed for descriptive statistics 
Quantitative   
Data Collection 
Quantitative  
Data Analysis 
QUALITATIVE 
Data Collection
QUALITATIVE 
Data Analysis 
Integration of the 
Quantitative and 
Qualitative Results 
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through the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) and has been presented in the 
form of tables and graphs. On the other hand, the ordinal data obtained at the initial stage of this 
research has also been analysed via SPSS, for inferential statistics, as explained in section 3.7, 
below. In order to explain the inceptive results in an all-encompassing manner, I followed the 
above procedure with FGDs. However, this second phase was not confined to the FGDs; I have 
also analysed the GoK’s budget speeches, economic surveys and statistical abstracts, covering 
the period 1963 – 2013, to compare the prevalent sentiments at the grassroots level with 
historical records. My motivation for adopting this MMR design is briefly discussed next. 
   
3.2.2 Rationale for Mixed Methods Research (MMR) Design 
My adoption of this MMR design has been informed by the fact that “ethnicity” is an 
emotive issue, and that there is no scholarly consensus on how to approach and/or understand 
“ethnicized politics” in Kenya. Whilst MMR is not common in the analysis of Kenya’s 
“ethnicized” politics (cf. e.g., Kimenyi and Bratton, 2008; Bannon, Miguel and Posner, 2004), I 
found it appropriate for various reasons: first, it provided an avenue for the formation and 
inclusion of different forms of knowledge – experiential, epistemological and historical – in the 
analysis of Kenya and its Luo “ethnic group”, thereby ensuring a balanced study. Indeed, the 
pragmatic nature of MMR allowed for the combination of paradigms and worldviews in this 
research. In “A Participatory Inquiry Paradigm”, Heron and Reason (1997) have argued that even 
though the constructivist paradigm/worldview is important for/in research, it fails to account for 
experiential knowledge, which is equally indispensable in conducting research, for the researcher 
cannot extricate himself/herself from the society he or she is studying. He/she is not only a part 
of the society (“cosmos”) but a product of it. Being a Kenyan of Luo “ethnicity”, I have factored 
in my personal experience of life in the Kenyan society and used it in conjunction with current 
literature on “ethnicized” politics in Kenya to formulate the conceptual framework outlined in 
section 1.8 of chapter one and the structured questionnaire used in the quantitative phase of this 
study (see Appendix A).  
 
Secondly, MMR “provides strengths that offset the weaknesses of both quantitative and 
qualitative research” (Creswell & Clark, 2011, p. 12). For instance, the pragmatic nature of 
MMR created room in this study to test, measure and analyse how the independent variable 
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(political exclusion) relates with the dependent variables (cultural factors, minimal public 
investment, “ethnic” cohesion and economic difficulties). Pure use of a qualitative approach 
would have made it difficult, if not impossible, to gauge how these variables relate. On the other 
hand, the use of a structured questionnaire may be construed as “bring[ing] individuals into a lab 
(a contrived situation)” (Creswell, 2013, p. 45); MMR was thus employed in this study to 
counter this “weakness”, by utilizing FGDs in the second phase of this research. The use of 
FGDs introduced the element of “natural setting”, where exploration took centre stage and 
predetermined information (post positivism) took a back seat (cf. Creswell, 2013, pp. 45 – 48). 
Through the FGDs, which were conducted in the field, the voices of participants have been 
honoured. I spoke directly with members of the Luo community, interacted with them and sought 
information on how Kenya’s history of “ethnicized” politics has affected them economically and 
socio-culturally. 
  
Thirdly, I concur with the view that “knowledge is not neutral” (Mertens, 2003, as cited 
in Creswell & Clark, 2011, p. 44). At the onset of this study, I bore in mind the possibility that 
the data provided by the GoK may not be in agreement with the actual lived realities of ordinary 
individuals at the grassroots level – so this made me settle for the MMR design, for its holistic 
nature would enable me to find out if, in fact, this is the case with the Luo of Kenya. 
Accordingly, owing to the holistic nature of MMR, I have been able, where appropriate, in this 
study’s conclusion, to call for and recommend measures that will assist in unyoking the Luo 
from the impediments brought about by unreasonable and prejudiced formations that restrict self-
progress and self-establishment. It is my hope, thanks to this MMR design, that the conclusions 
and recommendations of this study will serve as fertile ground for the generation of “a political 
debate and discussion so that [real] change will occur” (see Creswell, 2013, p. 26). Having 
examined the rationale behind the use of MMR for this study, and explained the specific MMR 
design that was adopted in this study, I now focus my attention on the finer details of the 
remainder of the research process, beginning with the quantitative research design. 
 
3.3 Quantitative Research Design 
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3.3.1 Sampling of Participants for the Structured Questionnaire 
Quota sampling was used to select the participants for the quantitative phase of this 
study. In quota sampling, participants are selected in a non-random fashion, according to some 
fixed quota (Neuman, 2000, Kothari, 2004). According to Kothari (2004), “the interviewers 
[research assistants] are simply given quotas to be filled from the different strata, with some 
restrictions on how they are to be filled . . . the actual selection of the items for the sample is left 
to the interviewer’s discretion” (p. 59). This non-probability sampling technique was chosen for 
three main reasons: first, whilst the total Luo population in Kenya is known to have stood at 
4,044,440 persons in 2009, the community represents a very scattered sample frame owing to the 
fact that the Luo – like any other Kenyan “ethnic group” – are to be found all over the country’s 
47 counties, and their number in each of the counties is not known. 
27
 This fact, coupled with the 
country’s obvious “ethnic” heterogeneity, makes it impractical to employ probability/random 
sampling, which would have been ideal if all the “ethnic groups” (everyone) in Kenya were 
under study. Second, the purpose of this study was not necessarily to give each and every Luo in 
Kenya an equal chance of being selected to participate, but to ensure that the sample selected 
represented the major characteristics of the Luo population in terms of gender and age 
distribution. Third, this study was largely concerned with the descriptive level of statistical 
analysis and was not designed to subject the collected quantitative data to extensive inferential 
treatment. 
   
3.3.2 Sample Size  
In this study, the sample size (N) = 1,600; a quota of 200 questionnaires was distributed 
to participants in each of the targeted counties, namely, Kisumu, Homa Bay, Migori, Siaya, 
Nairobi, Mombasa, Nakuru and Uasin Gishu. According to Melero (2011) “[t]he optimal sample 
size . . . [should] . . . be large enough to allow for confident conclusion[s] and decisions to be 
made against the stated objectives, but not so large as to be uneconomical” (p. 26). And Fink 
(2003) contends that “the best sample is representative or a model, of the population” (p. 1). Fink 
(2003) further argues that “[a] sample is representative if important characteristics (e.g., age, 
                                                          
27
 For a detailed look at the results of the 2009 Kenya Population and Housing Census, released by Hon. Wycliffe 
Ambetsa Oparanya, Minister of State for Planning, National Development and 2030, on 31st August 2010, see 
http://www.knbs.or.ke/index.php?option=com_phocadownload&view=category&id=109:population-and-housing-
census-2009&Itemid=599 (accessed 12 December 2015). 
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gender, health status) of those within the sample are distributed similarly to the way they are 
distributed in the larger population” (p. 1). These arguments formed the basis upon which the 
sample size for the study was arrived at. In this study, the age and gender of the participants were 
chosen for purposes of representativeness as further discussed below. 
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3.3.2.1 Luo Nyanza Counties 
3.3.2.1.1 Kisumu County Sample Size and Representation 
For Kisumu County, n = 200; the quotas were filled as shown in table 3.1, below, which was computed using the Kisumu 
Population Pyramid based on the 2009 Kenya Population and Housing Census.
28
  
 
Table 3.1: Kisumu County Quota Allocation 
Age Group Female (F) Male (M) Total (F+M) % (F) % (M) Quota for Age Group Quota Allotted (F) Quota Allotted (M) 
50+ 47,406 40,176  87,582 (13.01%)  54 46 26 14 12 
30 - 50 80,318 80,169  160,487 (23.85%)  50 50 48 24 24 
20 - 30 98,263 88,245  186,508 (27.71%)  53 47 55 29 26 
15 - 20 120,100 118,303  238,403 (35.42%)  50 50 71 36 35 
Totals 
  
 672,980 (100%)  
  
n = 200 103 97 
Source: Computed from Kisumu Population Pyramid Age Groups - 2009 (Kenya Open Data) 
   
For convenience purposes, the sample was divided into four distinct age groups, viz.: 15 – 20 years; 20 – 30 years; 30 – 50 years; and 
50+ years. Each gender and age group received the allotment of questionnaires directly proportionate to its percentage of the total 
population of Kisumu in 2009. Age group 0 – 10 years was omitted from this study because it was not considered mature enough, 
experience-wise, to participate; it stood at 147,594 males and 147, 877 females in 2009. Also, age group 15 – 20 years is actually 10 – 
20 years in the original source. However, for the purposes of this study, I considered only those aged 15 years and above to be relevant 
– that is, experienced enough to participate. Responses were sought from various sources as follows: high/secondary schools (15 – 20 
years); tertiary learning institutions like colleges and universities (20 – 30 years); marketplaces, villages, towns, residential and other 
                                                          
28
 For an in-depth look at the Kisumu Population Pyramid, see information from Kenya Open Data available at https://www.opendata.go.ke/Population/Kisumu-
Age-Pyramid/eak7-w66f (accessed 2 December 2015).  
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areas (30 – 50 years and 50+ years). The following sub-sections outline the quota divisions in the other counties that took part in this 
study, beginning with Homa Bay. 
 
3.3.2.1.2 Homa Bay County Sample Size and Representation 
For Homa Bay County, n = 200; the quotas were filled as shown in table 3.2, below, which was computed using the Homa Bay 
Age Pyramid, which in turn is based on the 2009 Kenya Population and Housing Census.
29
 
 
Table 3.2: Homa Bay County Quota Allocation 
Age Group Female (F) Male (M) Total (F+M) % (F) % (M) Quota for Age Group Quota Allotted (F) Quota Allotted (M) 
50+ 51,881 39,768  91,649 (14.41%)  57 43 29 17 12 
30 - 50 78,113 62,310  140,423 (22.09%)  56 44 44 25 19 
20 - 30 86,325 70,010  156,335 (24.59%)  55 45 49 27 22 
15 - 20 121,278 126,119  247,397 (38.91%)  49 51 78 38 40 
Totals 
  
 635,804 (100%)  
  
n = 200 107 93 
Source: Computed from Homa Bay Population Pyramid Age Groups - 2009 (Kenya Open Data) 
  In Homa Bay County, age group 0 – 10 years stood at 164,060 males and 163,577 females, respectively, in 2009. It was left out for its 
experiential incapacity. Also, age group 15 – 20 years is actually 10 – 20 years in the original source. The next sub-section examines 
Migori County. 
                                                          
29
 For an in-depth look at the Homa Bay Age Pyramid, see information from Kenya Open Data available at https://www.opendata.go.ke/Census/Homa-Bay-Age-
Pyramid/nhef-kxrw (accessed 2 December 2015). 
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3.3.2.1.3 Migori County Sample Size and Representation 
As with the precedence already set, for Homa Bay County, n = 200; the quotas were filled as shown in table 3.3, below, which 
was computed using the Migori Age Pyramid, which is in turn based on the 2009 Kenya Population and Housing Census.
30
 
 
Table 3.3: Migori County Quota Allocation 
Age Group Female (F) Male (M) Total (F+M) % (F) % (M) Quota for Age Group Quota Allotted (F) Quota Allotted (M) 
50+ 38,642 31,160  69,802 (11.82%)  55 45 24 13 9 
30 - 50 72,604 63,087  135,691 (22.98%)  54 46 46 25 21 
20 - 30 82,674 69,417  152,091 (25.76%)  54 46 52 28 25 
15 - 20 115,487 117,375  232,862 (39.44%)  50 50 79 40 39 
Totals 
  
 590,446 (100%)  
  
n = 200 106 94 
Source: Computed from Migori Population Pyramid Age Groups - 2009 (Kenya Open Data) 
   
In Migori County, age group 0 – 10 years stood at 163,058 males and 163,161 females, respectively, in 2009. It has been left out for 
its experiential incapacity. Also, age group 15 – 20 years is actually 10 – 20 years in the original source. An examination of Siaya 
County follows in the next sub-section.  
 
3.3.2.1.4 Siaya County Sample Size and Representation 
In like manner, for Siaya County, n = 200; the quotas were filled as shown in table 3.4, below, which has been computed using 
the Siaya Age Pyramid, which in turn is based on the 2009 Kenya Population and Housing Census.
31
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 For an in-depth look at the Migori Age Pyramid, see information from Kenya Open Data available at https://www.opendata.go.ke/Population/Migori-Age-
Pyramid/8qbs-vr5v (accessed 2 December 2015).  
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Table 3.4: Siaya County Quota Allocation 
Age Group Female (F) Male (M) Total (F+M) % (F) % (M) Quota for Age Group Quota Allotted (F) Quota Allotted (M) 
50+ 64,411 43,195  107,606 (18.62%)  60 40 37 22 15 
30 - 50 71,828 56,660  128,488 (22.23%)  56 44 44 26 19 
20 - 30 71,578 58,686  130,264 (22.54%)  55 45 45 25 20 
15 - 20 104,073 107,516  211,589 (36.61%)  49 51 73 36 37 
Totals 
  
 577,947 (100%)  
  
n = 200 109 91 
Source: Computed from Siaya Population Pyramid Age Groups - 2009 (Kenya Open Data) 
   
In the County of Siaya, age group 0 – 10 years stood at 132,328 males and 131,471 females, respectively, in 2009. It has been left out 
for its experiential incapacity. Also, age group 15 – 20 years is actually 10 – 20 years in the original source. An examination of the 
cosmopolitan counties, beginning with Nairobi, follows next.   
 
3.3.2.2 Cosmopolitan Counties 
It is not possible to obtain the exact “ethnic” demographic specifications for any of the numerous “ethnic groups” living in the 
cosmopolitan counties: despite the fact that the Kenya Population and Housing Census gives total national figures for the various 
“ethnic groups” in the country, it does not concern itself with sub-national level (provincial/divisional/locational/county) 
breakdowns.
32
 Therefore, the general population trends of the cosmopolitan counties were taken to be representative of those of the 
Luo too. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
31
 For an in-depth look at the Siaya Age Pyramid, see information from Kenya Open Data available at https://www.opendata.go.ke/Population/Siaya-Age-
Pyramid/ahqa-zyrt (accessed 2 December 2015). 
32
 In fact, the inclusion of tribe/ethnicity as a subject of analysis in Kenyan census initiatives has elicited controversy over the years. See, for example, BBC. 
(2010 August, 31). Kenya defends tribal census figures. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-11143914 (accessed 5 February 2016).   
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3.3.2.2.1 Nairobi County Sample Size and Representation 
For Nairobi County, n = 200; the quotas were filled as shown in table 3.5, below, which has been computed using the Nairobi Age 
Pyramid, which in turn is based on the 2009 Kenya Population and Housing Census.
33
 
 
Table 3.5: Nairobi County Quota Allocation 
Age Group Female (F) Male (M) Total (F+M) % (F) % (M) Quota for Age Group Quota Allotted (F) Quota Allotted (M) 
50+ 67,578 98,639  166,217 (6.84%)  41 59 14 6 8 
30 – 50 335,273 472,092  807,365 (33.21%)  42 58 66 28 38 
20 – 30 494,464 445,685  940,149(38.68%)  53 47 77 41 36 
15 – 20 281,306 235,723  517,029 (21.27%)  54 46 43 23 20 
Totals 
  
 2,430,760 (100%)  
  
n = 200 98 102 
Source: Computed from Nairobi Population Pyramid Age Groups - 2009 (Kenya Open Data) 
   
In the County of Nairobi, age group 0 – 10 years stood at 351,281 males and 352,757 females, respectively, in 2009. It has been left 
out for its experiential incapacity. Also, age group 15 – 20 years is actually 10 – 20 years in the original source. The next sub-section 
features Mombasa County.  
 
3.3.2.2.2 Mombasa County Sample Size and Representation 
For Mombasa County, n = 200; the quotas were filled as shown in table 3.6, below, which has been computed using the 
Mombasa Age Pyramid, which in turn is based on the 2009 Kenya Population and Housing Census.
34
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 For an in-depth look at the Nairobi Age Pyramid, see information from Kenya Open Data available at https://www.opendata.go.ke/Population/Nairobi-Pop-
Pyramid-Age-Groups-2009/u6e3-zmvi (accessed 2 December 2015). 
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Table 3.6: Mombasa County Quota Allocation 
Age Group Female (F) Male (M) Total (F+M) % (F) % (M) Quota for Age Group Quota Allotted (F) Quota Allotted (M) 
50+ 25,823 33,536  59,359 (8.35%)  44 56 17 7 10 
30 - 50 94,309 137,253  231,562 (32.56%)  41 59 65 27 38 
20 - 30 130,033 120,694  250,727 (35.25%)  52 48 70 36 34 
15 - 20 88,861 80,755  169,616 (23.85%)  52 48 48 25 23 
Totals 
  
 711,264 (100%)  
  
n = 200 95 105 
Source: Computed from Mombasa Population Pyramid Age Groups - 2009 (Kenya Open Data) 
   
In Mombasa County, age group 0 – 10 years stood at 114,153 males and 113,083 females, respectively, in 2009. This age group has 
been omitted due to its experience-related incapacity. Also, age group 15 – 20 years is actually 10 – 20 years in the original source. 
The next sub-section features Nakuru County.  
3.3.2.2.3 Nakuru County Sample Size and Representation 
For Nakuru County, n = 200; the quotas were filled as shown in table 3.7, below, which has been computed using the Nakuru 
Age Pyramid, which in turn is based on the 2009 Kenya Population and Housing Census.
35
  
 
Table 3.7: Nakuru County Quota Allocation 
Age Group Female (F) Male (M) Total (F+M) % (F) % (M) Quota for Age Group Quota Allotted (F) Quota Allotted (M) 
50+ 66,829 65,176  132,005 (11.67%)  51 49 23 12 11 
30 – 50 156,400 165,708  322,108 (28.47%)  49 51 57 28 29 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
34
 For an in-depth look at the Mombasa Age Pyramid, see information from Kenya Open Data available at https://www.opendata.go.ke/Population/Mombasa-
Age-Pyramid/eiye-fv86 (accessed 2 December 2015). 
35
 For an in-depth look at the Nakuru Age Pyramid, see information from Kenya Open Data available at https://www.opendata.go.ke/Population/Nakuru-Age-
Pyramid/6r82-s6ja (accessed 2 December 2015). 
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20 – 30 165,240 151,640  316,880 (28.00%)  52 48 56 29 27 
15 – 20 177,969 182,419  360,388 (31.85%)  49 51 64 31 33 
Totals 
  
 1,131,381 (100%)  
  
n = 200 100 100 
Source: Computed from Nakuru Population Pyramid Age Groups - 2009 (Kenya Open Data) 
   
In the County of Nakuru, age group 0 – 10 years stood at 239,240 males and 232,015 females, respectively, in 2009. It has been left 
out for its experiential incapacity. Also, age group 15 – 20 years is actually 10 – 20 years in the original source. The next sub-section 
features the final county, in which this research was conducted, Uasin Gishu.  
 
3.3.2.2.4 Uasin Gishu County Sample Size and Representation 
For Uasin Gishu County, n = 200; the quotas were filled as shown in table 3.8, below, which has been computed using the 
Uasin Gishu Age Pyramid, which in turn is based on the 2009 Kenya Population and Housing Census.
36
  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.8: Uasin Gishu County Quota Allocation 
Age Group Female (F) Male (M) Total (F+M) % (F) % (M) Quota for Age Group Quota Allotted (F) Quota Allotted (M) 
50+ 33,593 33,993  67,586 (10.69%)  50 50 21 11 11 
30 – 50 81,498 89,562  171,060 (27.06%)  48 52 54 26 28 
                                                          
36
 For an in-depth look at the Uasin Gishu Age Pyramid, see information from Kenya Open Data available at https://www.opendata.go.ke/Population/Uasin-
Gishu-Age-Pyramid/9ete-q9fq (accessed 2 December 2015). 
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20 – 30 97,189 91,986  189,175 (29.93%)  51 49 60 31 29 
15 – 20 103,059 101,241  204,300 (32.32%)  50 50 65 32 32 
Totals 
  
 632,121 (100%)  
  
n = 200 100 100 
Source: Computed from Uasin Gishu Population Pyramid Age Groups - 2009 (Kenya Open Data) 
 
In the County of Uasin Gishu, age group 0 – 10 years stood at 131,874 males and 129,614 females, respectively, in 2009. It has been 
left out for its experiential incapacity. Also, age group 15 – 20 years is actually 10 – 20 years in the original source. A summary of the 
specific and the amalgamated final quota tallies is depicted in table 3.9, and figure 3.2, below.   
 
Table 3.9: Summary of Study Sample 
COUNTY KISUMU HOMA BAY MIGORI SIAYA NAIROBI MOMBASA NAKURU UASIN GISHU TOTALS 
MALE 97 93 94 91 102 105 100 100 782 
FEMALE 103 107 106 109 98 95 100 100 818 
TOTALS n = 200 n = 200 n = 200 n = 200 n = 200 n = 200 n = 200 n = 200 N = 1,600 
Source: Author (2017) 
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Figure 3.2: Summary of Study Sample. 
 
Source: Author (2017) 
 
The qualitative research design is briefly discussed next. 
 
3.4 Qualitative Research Design 
The qualitative phase of this research is multifaceted: it begins with FGDs and concludes 
with a thorough examination of historical records. The historical records include Budget 
Statements for the fiscal years 1962/1963 to 2013/2014; Statistical Abstracts (Statistical Abstract 
1963 to Statistical Abstract 2013) and Economic Surveys (Economic Survey 1963 to Economic 
Survey 2013). 
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3.4.1 Sampling of Participants for the FGDs 
Purposive sampling was used to select the participants for the FGDs. In purposive 
sampling, “the inquirer selects individuals and sites for study because they can purposefully 
inform an understanding of the research problem and central phenomenon in the study” 
(Creswell, 2013, pp. 299 – 300). I sought the participants from various institutions such as 
secondary/high schools, colleges and universities. Other participants were sourced from 
marketplaces, residential areas and villages. Within institutions such as secondary schools, where 
I envisaged a sizeable number of enthusiastic participants, random selection mechanisms were 
applied (cf. Eliot & Associates, 2005, p. 4). Elsewhere, participants were volunteers, who were 
sourced, amongst other ways, through flyers and advertisements (cf. Eliot & Associates, 2005, p. 
4). Owing to the fact that only one “ethnic group” – the Luo – was under consideration, the 
FGDs, from the outset, were already homogeneous in nature. However, further homogeneity was 
ensured, or achieved, by conducting separate sessions for males and females. This was done to 
avoid any “sensitivity”37 issues that may have arisen out of discussions centred on circumcision 
and was aimed at “creat[ing] comfort within the group[s] and . . . enhanc[ing] more fluid 
discussion among the group participants” (Liamputtong, 2011, p. 35). A total of 24 FGDs were 
carried out; I was guided, in this regard, by the principle of “theoretical saturation”, that is, the 
juncture where fresh enlightenments ceased (cf. Krueger & Casey, 2015). Various benefits are 
associated with FGDs. According to Conradson (2005), FGDs produce substantial and 
comprehensive material regarding thoughts, perceptions, understandings, impressions and 
feelings of people in their own words. Another benefit of this method is its flexibility as an 
instrument of research – it can be utilized to gather information on any topic, from manifold 
groups of people and in miscellaneous settings (Stewart, Shamdasani, & Rook, 2007). According 
to Liamputtong (2011), FGDs can be used as ventilation avenues for marginalized groups. 
Through FGDs, marginalized groups can air out their grievances and improve their chances of 
being heard and apprehended by policy-makers. Thus, FGDs empower the marginalized. 
Moreover, in this study, the FGDs have enhanced the exploration of non-statistical dimensions of 
socio-economic development. 
 
                                                          
37
 This is in no way a deviation from my agreement with Geertz’s (1973: 9) assertion that culture is “public”.    
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FGDs have not escaped criticism, though; the methodology has been besmirched for 
being vulnerable to the influence of assertive and authoritative participants, who may hijack 
control from the moderator. Moreover, their aggressiveness may intimidate other participants (cf. 
Krueger & Casey, 2015; Liamputtong, 2011; Dilshad & Latif, 2013). Also, FGD outcomes are 
largely not generalizable owing to the fact that they are seldom based on random samples. 
Nevertheless, as already intimated, the cardinal objective of qualitative studies remains to 
“explor[e] and examin[e] what people think, how they think, and why they think the way they do 
about the issues of importance to them without pressuring them into making decisions or 
reaching a consensus” (Liamputtong, 2011, p. 5). All this, of course, is in their own words, and 
within a specific context – quantitative approaches and techniques do not offer this (cf. Mishler, 
1986). FGDs have also been faulted for yielding large data amounts, of which part may be erratic 
or peripheral with regard to the research subject matter. This often makes data analysis and 
encapsulation strenuous. Moreover, the processes of congregating participants for FGDs and 
transcribing interviews are rarely facile (Liamputtong, 2011). 
 
I dealt with the aforementioned shortcomings associated with FGDs in various ways: to 
alleviate domination by any would-be assertive participants, from the onset of each session I 
provided a secure and congenial environment to encourage equitable, honest and open 
expression from all participants (cf. Kelly, 2003, p. 56); the “generalizability” concern has been 
diluted by the quantitative survey, which I ensured was as representative as possible, by factoring 
in the age and gender of respondents; to make the process of congregating participants less 
cumbersome, some of the FGDs were held on location (e.g., in schools, institutions of higher 
learning and even marketplaces); and to ease the process of data analysis and encapsulation, I 
made use of ATLAS.ti, a software package for qualitative coding; also, I sought professional 
transcription services accordingly. 
 
3.5 MMR Data Collection Techniques 
After arriving at a suitable sample size and ensuring representativeness, in terms of age 
and gender for each of the counties under study, the stage was set for the collection of data, 
which was conducted in two phases, viz. the pre-data collection and the actual data collection, as 
discussed next. 
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3.5.1 Pre-Data Collection Procedure 
Prior to the commencement of data collection, I trained my field assistants – graduate 
students sourced from institutions of higher learning – for approximately two weeks. I informed 
them about the purpose of conducting this research, following which we collectively reached an 
agreement on the common terms and meanings of the variables used in the questionnaire and 
FGD guide. Following the training sessions, we proceeded to pre-test the research instruments 
and, as a research team, thereafter made revisions and appropriately adjusted them. These pre-
fieldwork endeavours were aimed at minimizing response bias in the data collection process. 
Response bias delineates a situation in which the responses do not embody the “accurate” 
opinions or behaviours of the respondents; it arises when respondents misunderstand the 
questions posed to them. The questionnaires were, thereafter, administered on a face-to-face 
basis until all the quotas were filled. 
 
3.5.2 Actual Data Collection 
The actual data collection process started in May 2016 and ended in September 2016. 
The structured questionnaire (see Appendix A) was administered in secondary schools, 
institutions of higher learning, marketplaces, residential areas, villages and other public places, to 
gauge the disposition of the ordinary Luo towards the themes emanating from current literature 
and my experiential knowledge. It tested the ordinary Luo’s experiences on cultural issues like 
circumcision, and other socio-economic aspects of this research such as “ethnic” cohesion, 
economics and public investment. The FGDs, explored the ordinary citizen’s opinions and 
understandings of “ethnicized” politics and its influence on the socio-economic-cultural 
development of individuals at the grassroots level. The FGD guide is contained in Appendix B. 
   
3.6 Data Validity and Reliability 
The value of research is judged by various parameters, among which are justifiability, 
authenticity and irreproachability. If research meets these standards, it is widely regarded to be 
both valid and reliable (Merriam, 2009). Research, especially of a qualitative nature, is further 
thought to be valid and reliable if it is credible, transferable, dependable, confirmable, and 
consistent (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Merriam, 2009; Leedy & Ormrod, 2010). Whilst 
acknowledging these insights, this study was guided by three traits fronted by Leedy & Ormrod 
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(2010), to ensure validity and reliability: accuracy, meaningfulness and credibility. Accordingly, 
I put adequate controls in place to ensure that conclusions drawn from data analysis were 
justified, for trustworthy research findings are likely to trigger interventions from policymakers, 
which benefit ordinary citizens at the grassroots level. First and foremost, the aforementioned 
two-week training session for the research assistants was held. The aim of the training session 
was twofold: clarifying the concepts used in the structured questionnaire and FGD guide, and 
ensuring that the research team had an unwavering and standard understanding of the concepts 
applied in these instruments. Besides, the pre-testing and piloting of the two instruments 
enhanced the validity and reliability of the findings of this research. The pre-testing or piloting 
exercise made it possible for my research team to pinpoint problematic aspects in the data 
collection instruments. Such concerns were thereafter tackled and fine-tuned satisfactorily. Pre-
testing (pilot) exercises are seen by Creswell (2014) as paramount in the quest to establish 
content validity in research. 
 
Similarly, triangulation – “corroborating evidence from different sources to shed light on 
a theme or perspective” (Creswell, 2013, p. 251) – was employed to enhance the validity of this 
study. The binary nature of the fieldwork – that is, the use of the structured questionnaire and 
FGDs to gather homogenous information – enhanced the validity and reliability of this study. 
According to Leedy and Ormrod (2010), triangulation is an indispensable characteristic of MMR 
designs, which strengthens the validity and reliability of the research findings. Moreover, the 
findings and conclusions of this research transcended the fieldwork: this study also examined 
crucial historical documents such as GoK budget speeches, economic surveys and statistical 
abstracts, to gauge equity and the outcome of the public investment undertaken by the GoK. 
 
Thick description (cf. Geertz, 1973, pp. 5 – 6; 9 – 10) has also been employed in this 
study, to enhance its validity and reliability. Thick description aims at presenting facts with 
precision; that is, portraying the opinions collected from “natives”, on a specific issue, in a literal 
and detailed way. Thick description has been fronted by various analysts as being an efficacious 
control measure when it comes to validity and reliability. This principally applies to the 
qualitative phase of an MMR design (Erlandson, Harris, Skipper, & Allen, 1993; Roth, 2005; 
Creswell 2013). Through rich, thick description, readers get a greater comprehension of the 
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problem of research; it not only “transports” readers to the scene of the research, but accords the 
discourse the additional ingredient of shared experiences (Leedy & Ormrod, 2010). In this study 
I have endeavoured to richly narrate the Luo community’s discernments and accounts on 
“ethnicized” politics, and its influence on socio-economic-cultural developments. 
 
Last but not least, I endeavoured to control the quality of the quantitative survey on a 
regular basis. I reviewed the filled questionnaires, returned by the research assistants, to verify 
and ensure consistency. Incomplete and inconsistent questionnaires were returned to the field 
assistants for verification; where appropriate, the latter were requested to venture back to the 
field for correct completion. Moreover, the quantitative data was entered twice, on SPSS, to 
comply with my quality control measures. For purposes of ensuring credibility, with the aid of 
two field assistants I conducted the FGDs. Whilst I moderated the FGDs, the assistants took 
notes. The note-takers were astute, alert individuals; I encouraged them to prompt me to 
investigate certain issues further, where the need for clarification arose. As part of the validation 
process, I also reiterated the main issues discussed during the FGDs to enable feedback from the 
participants. All the FGD conversations were captured on tape; this measure helped to ensure 
that the information obtained from the participants was accurately recorded. Transcription, which 
enabled visual analysis, then followed. As I conducted the FGDs, I stayed mentally alert – this 
regarding the fact that “reality is multiple as seen through many views” (Creswell, 2013, p. 21). 
In instances where the FGDs were conducted in Dholuo, they were translated into English. 
    
3.7 Data Analysis  
Data analysis can be described as “the search for patterns in data and for ideas that help 
explain those patterns, interpreting those patterns, deciding what they mean and linking [one’s] 
findings to those of other research” (Bernard and Ryan, 2010, p. 109). The search for patterns 
and ideas in this research has taken both quantitative and qualitative forms; the former is 
discursive, whilst the latter is iterative, as discussed below. 
  
3.7.1 Quantitative Data Analysis 
The nominal data (whose main purpose was to search for patterns) generated from the 
structured interviews/questionnaire has been analysed discursively. According to Pierce (2015), 
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discursive analysis is both formal and impersonal. It first introduces the subject matter and then 
discusses each theme/concern (under the subject matter) individually/independently. I considered 
this approach relevant for the quantitative phase of my study since it enabled me to transition 
smoothly from one theme to another. Discursive analysis aims at “present[ing] a balanced and 
objective examination of a subject” (Pierce, 2015, para. 2). Discursive analysis maintains a 
balanced approach even in cases where the subject matter is deemed to be contentious, enabling 
the researcher to present various aspects of an issue, whilst undertaking an evaluation. 
Nevertheless, it is not driven by the principle/ideology of neutrality; backed by evidence 
obtained from research, the researcher may draw his/her conclusions about the subject matter and 
present them to readers. This technique has enabled me to give specific attention to the various 
dependent variables introduced in chapter one: cultural factors, economic difficulties, “ethnic” 
cohesion and minimal public investment. In analysing these variables, I have employed tables 
and graphs, as appropriate, to “facilitate comprehension and comparison” (University of 
Leicester [UoL], 2012, p. 1). 
 
With regard to the analysis of the ordinal data obtained in the quantitative phase of this 
study, two tests were carried out to derive inferential statistics – the chi-square test of 
homogeneity and the Kruskal-Wallis Analysis of Variance – as explained below. To establish 
whether the Luo are adopting the alien culture of circumcision uniformly/homogeneously across 
the counties in which the study was carried out, I conducted chi-square tests of homogeneity for 
both combined Luo Nyanza counties and the combined cosmopolitan counties. The chi-square 
test of homogeneity assesses whether two or more samples of discrete characteristics arise from 
identically distributed (homogeneous) populations. The following hypothesis was tested: “The 
Luo are gradually adopting alien cultures in uniform/homogeneous fashion, owing to politically 
constructed/mobilized stereotypes and prejudices, to gain acceptance as fully-fledged members 
of the Kenyan society at large”. Also, in order to ascertain if the feeling within the community 
that influential Luos do not assist fellow Luos access economic opportunities is a consistent 
phenomenon across the counties in which the study was conducted, I performed chi-square tests 
of homogeneity for both combined Luo Nyanza counties and the combined cosmopolitan 
counties and tested the following hypothesis: “The prevalent feeling within the community that 
influential Luos do not assist fellow Luos access economic opportunities occurs consistently 
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throughout the study areas.” And to further probe the relationship between political exclusion 
and the economic development of Luo Nyanza, I carried out the Kruskal-Wallis Analysis of 
Variance on the ordinal data obtained in both the Luo Nyanza counties and the cosmopolitan 
counties. Coined by Kruskal and Wallis in 1952, it is a non-parametric method for testing 
whether independent samples originate from the same distribution. It extends the Mann-Whitney 
U Test to more than two groups and is most often used to compare the central tendencies 
(median) of samples. The analysis of the qualitative data is discussed next. 
 
3.7.2 Qualitative Data Analysis 
In this study, the qualitative phase of data analysis, whose main driving force was the 
explanation and interpretation of patterns emerging from the quantitative survey, has been 
guided by the iterative process. According to Bassett (2010), 
 
[i]terative refers to a systematic, repetitive, and recursive process in qualitative data 
analysis. An iterative approach involves a sequence of tasks carried out in exactly the 
same manner each time and executed multiple times. Meaning is provided to this 
repeatable formulation in qualitative research by calling upon a prior, recognized 
authorized usage. The interplay between elements of the research, such as that between 
design and discovery, or among data collection, preliminary analysis, and further data 
collection, are examples of an iterative approach in qualitative research...The philosophy 
behind an iterative approach to research is that of flexibility and ongoing change that 
meets the needs of the research design, data requirements, and analysis methods in 
response to new information as it is collected. (p 504)   
    
The FGD transcripts and historical data – budget speeches, economic surveys, and statistical 
abstracts – have been comprehensively subjected to iteration. Sub-sections 3.7.2.1 and 3.7.2.2, 
below, narrate the specificities of the processes that were subjected to iteration. 
  
3.7.2.1 FGD Analysis 
Besides the use of ATLAS.ti for data coding as already indicated, the following process 
was followed when analysing the data from the FGDs. I began by classifying the qualitative data 
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produced from the FGDs into various themes (Riessman, 2008). This was followed by 
systematic juxtaposition amongst the various emergent themes, in order to integrate similitudes. 
Once this was finalized, the patterns discovered were reinforced in narrative form using the 
experiential tales of the participants. This inductive-deductive cycle was repeated over and over 
again until the objectives of the study were met. As this process took place, I made sure to 
safeguard validity by listening to the tape recordings, severally, and contrasting them with the 
visual transcripts for consistency purposes. Since the qualitative phase of this research was aimed 
at exploring the community’s perceptions of the effects of “ethnicized” politics, narrative 
analysis and writing was found to be appropriate, for it accurately represents the voices of the 
Luo. Narratives shift the focus from statistics, taxonomies, tables and models to “reflect[ing] 
what the natives really say” (Geertz, 1973, p. 6), thus ensuring thick description and originality – 
the latter is crucial in capturing the attention of policymakers. 
     
3.7.2.2 Historical Data Analysis 
With iteration as the guiding principle, I have applied two major techniques in analysing 
the historical documents under scrutiny in this study – pattern matching and explanation 
building. Pattern matching juxtaposes “an empirically based pattern with a predicted one (or with 
several alternative predictions)” (Trochim, 1989, as cited in Yin, 2009, p. 136). I have, therefore, 
thoroughly scrutinized the budgets, statistical abstracts and economic surveys of post-
independence Kenya to analyse how allocations have been made during the period under study 
(1963 – 2013). This has aided me in determining whether the GoK has disproportionately 
favoured those “ethnic groups” that support it and/or marginalized those that oppose it (like the 
Luo). Explanation building involves the construction of a narrative/rationale from available data. 
The outcomes of public investment undertaken by the GoK during the period under study are 
also discernible from the economic surveys and statistical abstracts. Coupled with the 
aforementioned “ethnic” dynamics that characterize Kenyan politics, they made for a pretty 
decent source of data, through which narratives as to “how” and “why” economic 
marginalization of the Luo might have occurred from 1963 – 2013 could be constructed. Iterative 
examination of these documents has enabled me to factor in evidence that might seem to 
corroborate alternative theoretical standpoints, such as those espoused by Oloo (2004) and Kuria 
(2011). Ultimately, the analysis of historical data in this study depended on “complex reasoning 
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through inductive and deductive logic” (Creswell, 2013, p. 45). The following statement from 
Creswell (2013) epitomizes the process that I employed in analysing historical data in this 
research: 
 
[R]esearchers build their patterns, categories, and themes from the “bottom up,” by 
organizing the data inductively into increasingly more abstract units of information. This 
inductive process involves researchers working back and forth between the themes and 
the database until they establish a comprehensive set of themes…researchers also use 
deductive thinking in that they build themes that are constantly being checked against the 
data. The inductive-deductive logic process means that the…researcher uses complex 
reasoning skills throughout the process of the research. (p. 45) 
 
The rationale behind the questions posed by the two research instruments used in this study is 
briefly discussed next. 
 
3.8 Research Instruments 
The structured questionnaire consisted of five sections as depicted below:  
Section A General Information (Personal/Biographical Data) 
Section B Cultural Factors 
Section C Economic Difficulties 
Section D Strengthening of Ethnic Roots 
Section E Minimal Public Investment. 
The rationale behind the questions posed in each of the aforementioned sections was as 
explained in table 3.10 below. 
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Table 3.10: Rationale behind the Questions Posed by the Research Instruments 
SECTION QUESTIONS RESEARCH ASSUMPTIONS JUSTIFICATION/LITERATURE REVIEW 
A General    
Information 
1-5 Personal/Biographical Data Personal/Biographical Data 
B Cultural Factors 6-9 The Luo are gradually adopting 
alien cultures, because of politically 
constructed/mobilized stereotypes 
and prejudices, and are therefore 
slowly losing their identity as fully-
fledged members of the Kenyan 
society at large. 
Drawing on the apparent significance of 
circumcision as an essential cultural symbol for 
admission into the circles of leadership in 
Kenya, as revealed in the works of Atieno-
Odhiambo (2002), I posed these four questions 
to gauge how politically-instigated “othering” is 
playing out at the grassroots level. Could the 
Luo, in fact, be adopting a practice alien to them 
to be accepted in Kenyan society? I sought to 
find out.      
C Economic       
Difficulties 
10-13 Political exclusion, at the national 
level, has translated into economic 
difficulties, at the individual level, 
for the Luo, limiting their chances 
of ever getting to power in Kenya. 
The inspiration behind these questions partly 
stems from the arguments of Ongaro and Osogo 
(2008) who state that ethnic-driven politics 
affects how capital is transferred, and the 
manner in which jobs, opportunities, 
scholarships, bursaries and loans, are awarded, 
distributed, and allocated. Money is power: 
could political exclusion at the national level be 
closing economic doors for the Luo, thus 
denying them the economic capacity to organize 
themselves more effectively as a political entity? 
I also set to find answers to this question. 
D Strengthening of 
ethnic roots 
14-16 Political exclusion, during the 
period under study, has had the 
unwitting effect of fostering ethnic 
cohesion amongst the Luo. 
Section D’s questions derive from Carr’s (1995) 
insights that economic dissatisfaction has a 
direct correlation with ethnic cohesion. It is a 
well-known fact, that the Kenyatta, Moi and 
Kibaki regimes have hoarded leadership 
opportunities from the Luo (cf. Amutabi, 2009; 
Auma-Osolo, 2013; Throup, 1987) translating, 
logically, into economic difficulties at all levels 
of society. Could this have awakened “ethnic” 
consciousness, amongst the Luo, given that in 
Africa, “most people assess political and 
economic opportunities within the ethnic 
framework of competition and struggle?” (Carr, 
1995, para. 5).  
E Minimal public 17 The Luo have enjoyed minimal Governments that practice political exclusion, to 
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investment public investment from the 
Government of Kenya because of 
opposition politics making them 
relatively poor compared to other 
communities. 
perpetuate their stranglehold on power, may 
indeed allow only minimal public investment in 
the home areas of dissident communities (cf. 
Opalo, 2011). This not only discourages 
opponents, but keeps them poor. Economically 
disenfranchised communities find it very 
difficult to organize themselves politically and 
are easy to divide-and-rule. It is this section that 
called for the examination of historical 
documents such as the budget speeches, 
economic surveys and statistical abstracts, to 
analyse how the feelings of the Luo at the 
grassroots level of society relate with the 
information accorded by the GoK. This has, 
hopefully, enabled me to reach a balanced, 
unbiased and more meaningful conclusion. 
 
Source: Author (2017) 
 
The FGD guide was modelled along the lines of the structured questionnaire and follows the 
same logic discussed in table 3.10, above. The questions posed by the FGD guide were 
essentially the same, but this stage of the research sought to explore participants’ responses as 
opposed to ushering them into a contrived situation. As alluded before, in this chapter, the 
insights gained from the FGDs have been crucial in explaining the responses obtained from the 
structured questionnaire. The study’s scope and limitations are discussed next. 
 
3.9 Research Scope and Limitations 
This study set out to examine the influence of “ethnicized” politics on the socio-
economic-cultural development of politically marginalized communities in Africa, with a special 
reference to the Luo “ethnic group” of Kenya. Typical of explanatory sequential MMR designs, 
the main limitation of this study was that it was not designed to subject the quantitative data to 
stringent statistical analysis. Notwithstanding this, and the fact that the envisaged quantitative 
survey and FGDs were not carried out in all of the 47 counties of Kenya, the research findings 
should proffer crucial erudition with respect to the effects of governance formations on the lives 
of ordinary citizens at the grassroots level of society in the African country. Furthermore, the 
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research strategy espoused in this study may be employed in other contexts for the purpose of 
examining socio-economic-cultural development in Africa. This is especially so because the 
holistic approach this research design adopts takes into consideration various knowledge forms – 
experiential, epistemological and historical. Also, owing to the fact that I found it difficult to 
access corporate institutions, such as banks and insurance companies, the administration of the 
structured interview/questionnaire to certain ideal citizens was challenging. However, every 
effort was made to reach and involve such potential participants by visiting their residential 
areas. Finally, the figures provided for Nyanza Province, in the Statistical Abstracts and 
Economic Surveys, have been taken to wholly represent Luo interests when, in fact, the province 
is also home to the Kisii and Kuria “ethnic groups”. The findings, however, can still be largely 
relied upon for the Luo are overwhelmingly predominant in this province and Luo Nyanza forms 
a considerable part of it. 
 
3.10 Ethics Statement 
This study adhered to the University of the Western Cape’s (UWC’s) Ethical Policy for 
research, which is aimed at avoiding and/or eliminating potential misconduct and impropriety. 
Accordingly, in the interest of the integrity of this research, ethical protocols were followed 
throughout its three stages, viz. pre-fieldwork, fieldwork (data collection) and data analysis. In 
the pre-fieldwork stage, the research proposal for this study was submitted to the UWC’s Faculty 
of Economic and Management Sciences (EMS) and the approval of Senate High Degrees 
Committee obtained in January 2016 (see Appendix G). Request for permission from an 
Institutional Review Board approved by the Kenya National Council for Science and Technology 
(NCST) was also sought and granted (see also Appendix G). During the fieldwork stage, due 
protocol was followed to engage individuals of selected communities and institutions. The 
informed consent of participants was sought and their participation was voluntary (see Appendix 
F). They were also informed of their right to withdraw, at any time of their choice, and assured 
of the confidentiality of their identity and the information they provided. They were further 
informed that there were no costs to the participants for partaking in or withdrawal from the 
study. Upon the completion of the fieldwork, all identifiers on the questionnaires were removed. 
The interview information was carefully protected, while the study continued, and has been 
destroyed now that the study has been completed. I took full responsibility to ensure that all 
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information collected was treated with utmost sensitivity and confidentiality. Also, during the 
analysis stage, care was taken not to mention the participants’ names. For instance, no names 
have been used when making reference to the FGD participants. The conclusion of this chapter is 
next. 
  
3.11 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the research methodology that was employed to accomplish 
this study’s objectives, which were as follows: i) to explain the marginalization of the Luo in 
Kenya, and ii) to explain why “ethnicity” is strongly correlated with the crisis of state power in 
this particular African nation. Aimed at elaborating on the research methodology section – in 
chapter one – and showing that proper mechanisms have been applied in conducting this study, 
the chapter has explained how the study area has been delimited. Besides this, it has discussed 
eight other major topics, viz.: the research methodology, the quantitative research design, the 
qualitative research design, the MMR data collection techniques, data validity and reliability, 
data analysis, the research instruments, the scope of the research and its limitations. The chapter 
concludes with an ethics statement that assures that this study adhered to the University of the 
Western Cape’s (UWC’s) Ethical Policy for research. The next chapter – chapter four – 
discusses the results of the quantitative phase of this research. 
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Chapter 4 
A Quantitative Analysis of the Influence of Kenya’s “Ethnicized” Politics Vis-à-vis its Luo 
Community, 1963 – 2013 
4 Introduction 
This chapter presents the results of the first phase of this research, which was conducted 
using a structured questionnaire based on the conceptual framework outlined in section 1.8 of 
chapter one. The purpose of this chapter is to establish how my experiential knowledge, and the 
views obtained from current literature on the influence of “ethnicized” politics in Kenya/Africa, 
relate with the lived experiences of the Luo at the grassroots level in Kenya. I have employed 
discursive analysis and made use of graphical illustrations as appropriate. The presentation 
begins with the descriptive summary statistics and proceeds with a systematic analysis of the 
results obtained from the questions that were posed to the respondents (see Appendix D for the 
detailed tabular results). The data has been presented and analysed in two phases, as follows: the 
overall data, followed by a juxtaposition of the Luo Nyanza and cosmopolitan county results. 
The chapter concludes with a summary of the research findings vis-à-vis the study’s dependent 
variables.   
 
4.1 Descriptive Summary Characteristics of Respondents 
The study population was comprised of 48.9% males and 51.1% females. 32.5% of the 
respondents fell under the 15 – 20 age group, while the 20 – 30 and 30 – 50 age groups formed 
29.1% and 26.6%, of the study population, respectively. The remaining 11.9% were aged 50 and 
above. With regard to the marital status of the respondents, 54.3% were single, 39.1% married, 
2.3% separated and 1.2% divorced; 3.1% were either widowers or widows. Concerning the level 
of education of the respondents, 14.8% had attained the primary level, whilst 50.6%, 21.6%, 
11.6% and 1.4%, had attained the secondary, college, undergraduate and postgraduate levels, 
respectively. With respect to the occupation of the respondents, 19% were employed, 31.6% self-
employed, 10.3% unemployed and 39.1% students. Table 4.1, below, depicts these 
characteristics of the respondents.    
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Summary Statistics of Respondents 
Characteristics of Respondents (N = 1,600)   Frequency 
(%) 
    LN C  
Gender of Respondent     
Male    375 407 782 (48.9) 
Female    425 393 818 (51.1) 
       
Age of Respondent (Years)     
15 – 20    301 219 520 (32.5) 
20 – 30    202 263 465 (29.1) 
30 – 50    183 242 425 (26.6) 
50 and above   114 76 190 (11.9) 
       
Marital Status of Respondent     
Single    472 397 869 (54.3) 
Married    282 344 626 (39.1) 
Separated   19 17 36 (2.3) 
Divorced    12 7 19 (1.2) 
Widow(er)   15 35 50 (3.1) 
       
Education Level of Respondent    
Primary    73 164 237 (14.8) 
Secondary   430 380 810 (50.6) 
College    172 173 345 (21.6) 
Undergraduate   108 77 185 (11.6) 
Postgraduate   17 6 23 (1.4) 
       
Occupation of Respondent     
Employed   193 111 304 (19.0) 
Self-employed   154 352 506 (31.6) 
Unemployed   113 52 165 (10.3) 
Student    340 285 625 (39.1) 
       
Source: Author's fieldwork (2017): LN = Luo Nyanza; C = Cosmopolitan Counties. 
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The results of the amalgamated data, from both Luo Nyanza and the cosmopolitan counties, are 
hereby presented using graphical illustrations and analysed discursively; the detailed percentages 
and tabular forms of these findings have been annexed (see Appendix D).  
4.2 Rite of Passage Debated 
As already highlighted and discussed in chapters one and two, the rite of passage issue 
has seemingly been politicized following Kenya’s independence from the British, and especially 
since Mboya’s 1969 assassination, and now seems to operate as an exclusionary factor vis-à-vis 
the Luo who do not necessarily subscribe to it. With regard to the awareness, or lack thereof, of 
this phenomenon, the response frequency was as presented in figure 4.1 below. 
 
Figure 4.1: Awareness of circumcision being fronted as a prerequisite leadership trait. 
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017) 
 
While 30.9% of the respondents strongly agree that they have heard about the link between this 
particular rite of passage and leadership in Kenya, 20.1% agree and 7% responded neutrally. On 
the other hand, 21.5% of the respondents disagreed and 20.4% strongly disagreed. According to 
these results, more than half of the respondents sampled showed awareness of the rite of passage 
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issue in the Kenyan political arena, indicating that it continues to be manipulated by politicians 
in their quest to either acquire or monopolize power; indeed, it would seem from the participants’ 
responses that this cultural element, a symbol of masculinity in some of the country’s 
communities, is being employed as an excuse to bar communities perceived to be opposition 
supporters from participation in governance structures in the country, especially at the national 
level. The fact that most respondents attribute their awareness of this rite of passage phenomenon 
to politicians (see Table D2) further corroborates the argument of this thesis that the largely 
Western ideals of multiparty democracy and capitalism have contributed significantly in 
fostering animosity in the African continent. 
  
When asked whether they had either faced ridicule or heard of a fellow Luo being 
ridiculed over the rite of passage issue, the participants responded as shown in figure 4.2 below. 
29.0% of the respondents strongly agree, while 29.0% agree, 10.6% are neutral, 21.4% disagree, 
and 10.0% strongly disagree, respectively. Whilst a sizable percentage of the respondents have 
not encountered any belittling linked to this rite of passage, which is largely alien to the Luo, an 
even more significant proportion has been ridiculed or heard a fellow Luo being ridiculed 
because of it. It can be rightfully argued, therefore, that this rite of passage issue, so often linked 
to politics and governance in Kenyan society, is also playing a substantial role in undermining 
social and inter-ethnic relations in the country. 
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Figure 4.2: Circumcision and ridicule. 
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017) 
 
The responses with respect to the adoption of this rite of passage by the Luo are depicted in 
figure 4.3 below: 25.3% of the respondents strongly agree that they have either undergone 
circumcision or know of a fellow Luo who has embraced this alien rite of passage; 27.3 agree 
with this proposition. The rest of the participants responded as follows: 14.4% were neutral, 
21.6% disagreed, while 11.5% strongly disagreed. These results imply that the numbers of the 
Luo that are either undecided or hostile towards this rite of passage seem to be drastically 
dwindling. Due to either ridicule or the desire to obtain a greater level of approval from their 
counterparts from other “ethnicities”, the Luo are adopting this rite of passage in large numbers. 
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If this trend continues, it is highly likely that the entire community will embrace this rite of 
passage, unconventional to them, in the near future. 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Adopting alien culture of circumcision. 
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017) 
 
The findings on the relationship between political exclusion and grassroots level economics are 
discussed next. 
   
4.3 Political Exclusion and Grassroots Level Economics 
This study also sought to find out the manner in which political exclusion (association 
with opposition politics) has affected the economic development of the members of Kenya’s Luo 
community. The thoughts of the respondents on the relationship between their “ethnicity” and 
access to economic opportunities, such as employment, were as depicted in figure 4.4 below.  
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Figure 4.4: Denial of economic opportunity/employment for being Luo. 
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017) 
 
According to the findings, 18.0% of the respondents strongly agree with the proposition that they 
have been denied access to economic opportunities and/or employment because of their 
“ethnicity”; 23.3% agree, 19.5% take a neutral stance, 27.5% disagree and 11.7% disagree, 
respectively. If the neutral respondents are put aside, the figures for those who respond 
affirmatively and those opposed to the notion of denial of opportunity on the basis of “ethnicity” 
are almost equivalent. From these results, it is very difficult to unreservedly argue that Luos have 
been denied economic opportunities in Kenyan society on the basis of their “ethnicity”. Access 
to economic opportunities for the Luo or denial thereof in Kenya appears to be a matter of a 
Strongly Agree
Agree
Neutral
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
0 5 10 15 20 25
11.7%
27.5%
19.5%
23.3%
 
 
Percentage (%)
A
18.0%
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
110 
 
coin-toss. With regard to whether their Luo identity has limited their access to better jobs and 
opportunities, the response was as depicted in figure 4.5 below. 
 
Figure 4.5: Belief that being Luo has denied them better jobs and opportunities. 
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017) 
 
Whilst 13.9% of the respondents strongly believe that their Luo identity has hampered their 
access to better jobs and opportunities, 16.0% agree with the idea. On the other hand, 35.6%, 
22.2% and 12.3% responded neutrally, disagreed and strongly disagreed, respectively. From 
these responses, it is clear that most of the participants in this study took a neutral stance when 
confronted with the question as to whether they have faced discrimination, owing to their 
“ethnicity”, insofar as access to better ranking jobs and opportunities is concerned. The high 
neutral figure can partly be explained by the fact that a great number of the respondents were 
students who are yet to venture into the employment market. Nevertheless, a greater number of 
respondents either disagree or strongly disagree with the idea of denial of access to better jobs 
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and opportunities on the basis of “ethnicity”, as opposed to those who either agree or strongly 
agree. Overall, these findings indicate that the issue of discrimination when it comes to better 
jobs and opportunities is not a grave concern for the Luo in Kenya. The participants’ responses 
on their experiences with regard to access to promotion opportunities at the workplace are given 
in figure 4.6 below. 
 
Figure 4.6: Promotion opportunities are limited for Luos at my workplace. 
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017) 
 
While 6.6% of the respondents strongly agree that promotion opportunities for Luos are limited 
at their workplaces. 10.3% of the respondents agreed with this notion, as 59.7% took a neutral 
stance; 14.9% disagreed and 8.5% strongly disagreed. The figure for neutral respondents is 
comparatively astronomical; this can be explained by the fact that only 19% of the respondents 
were employed. The neutrals, therefore, are mainly the unemployed, the self-employed and the 
students – these might not have had the workplace experience. A look at the affirmative and 
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negative respondents does not show meaningful difference between the two camps. This means 
that it is neither easy nor difficult for the Luo to get promoted at the workplace on the basis of 
“ethnicity”; the situation looks more like a matter of fate. The findings of this research, with 
regard to whether participants’ living standards would be better had they not been Luo, are as 
depicted in figure 4.7, below. The participants responded as follows: 13.3% strongly agreed, 
15.5% agreed, 20.3% were neutral, 32.9% disagreed, whilst 18.1% strongly disagreed. 
 
Figure 4.7: My living standards would be better if I were not Luo. 
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017) 
 
A majority of the Luos who participated in this study do not believe that their living standards 
would be better if they were from another “ethnicity”; though they have been politically 
excluded, historically, it seems that they have refused to let the idea get into their psyche that 
politics determines the kind of food one puts on their plate at dinner time. The interplay between 
political exclusion and “ethnic” cohesion is discussed next.  
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4.4 Political Exclusion and Ethnic Cohesion 
Figure 4.8, below, depicts the thoughts of the respondents when asked whether they 
would carry out affirmative action towards fellow Luos, to help them catch up with members of 
other “ethnic groups”, if they were to be given positions of influence in society.  
 
Figure 4.8: I would carry out affirmative action to help Luos catch up. 
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017) 
 
As shown above, in figure 4.8, 35.8% of the respondents strongly agree with the idea of 
affirmative action, while 20.6% agree; 12.9% take a neutral stance as 16.5% and 14.2% disagree 
and strongly disagree, respectively. It is ironical that, even though most respondents had 
indicated that they did not believe that their living standards would be better if they were from 
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another “ethnicity”, a majority of them, nevertheless, would state that they would favour fellow 
Luos if they were to be given positions of influence in society. Their earlier stance on their living 
standards may be informed by the fact that Luos are a proud people (cf. e.g., Malo, 1999[2003], 
p. 73) that seldom acknowledge vulnerabilities or weaknesses of any kind. Ultimately, the fact 
that a majority of respondents strongly agree with the idea of affirmative action towards fellow 
Luos indicates a feeling that their history of political marginalization has put them at an 
economic disadvantage as a people. When faced with the question whether influential Luos assist 
fellow Luos to access economic opportunities, the responses of the participants were as captured 
in figure 4.9, below.  
 
Figure 4.9: Influential Luos assist fellow Luos to access economic opportunities. 
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017) 
 
We find that 13.1% strongly agreed, 18.4% agreed, 15.7% were neutral, 31.4% disagreed, while 
21.3% strongly disagreed with the proposition, respectively. Despite having been politically 
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excluded for much of the period in which Kenya has been independent, it seems that most Luos 
have not developed feelings of oneness and/or sympathy towards their kin. When asked whether 
it is better for a Luo to marry a fellow Luo than a non-Luo, the participants responded as shown 
in figure 4.10 below.   
Figure 4.10: Marriage between Luos is better than intermarriage. 
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017) 
 
Whilst 22.4% of the respondents strongly agree and 15.9% agree that it is better for a Luo to 
forge marriage ties within the “ethnic group”, 12.2% took a neutral stance; on the other hand, 
26.7% and 22.8% disagreed and strongly disagreed, respectively. Overall, a majority of the 
respondents do not feel that it is better for a Luo to marry a fellow Luo. Seemingly, political 
exclusion during the period under study has not translated into strong feelings of exclusivity in 
the area of marriage for members of the community. The thoughts of the participants, with 
regard to political exclusion of the Luo, and public investment by the GoK, in Luo Nyanza, are 
examined next. 
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4.5 Political Exclusion and Public Investment 
Figure 4.11, below, depicts the responses of the participants when asked whether Luo 
Nyanza would be more developed, economically, if Luos had not been politically excluded by 
the central government as a result of opposition politics. 
Figure 4.11: Luo Nyanza would be more economically developed were it not for exclusion 
by central government. 
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017) 
 
Here, 39.6% of the respondents strongly agree with the notion that Luo Nyanza would be more 
economically developed were it not for exclusion by central government; 20.9% agree with this 
proposition, while 11.9% take a neutral stance and 17.8% and 9.8% disagree and strongly 
disagree, respectively. There is a strong feeling amongst the Luo that they have been short-
changed by the GoK in the provision of public investments during the period under study. The 
sentiments at the grassroots level overwhelmingly support the notion that Luo Nyanza would be 
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more developed, economically, were it not for political exclusion of the community by the GoK. 
The next section compares the sentiments of the cosmopolitan Luo and the Luo based in Luo 
Nyanza to examine how, if at all, the varying degree of interaction with members of other 
“ethnic groups” has differentiated and influenced the experiences, attitudes, sentiments and 
behaviours of the members of the community. I have maintained the sequence employed in 
analysing the overall results discussed above. 
 
4.6 Juxtaposed Rite of Passage Perspectives 
According to the results presented in table figure 4.12, below, Luos who reside in 
cosmopolitan areas of Kenya are more aware of the link between the rite of passage issue and 
leadership in Kenya, compared to their counterparts from the Luo-dominated Luo Nyanza. Fully 
56.4% (32.5% strongly agree, 23.9% agree) of the 800 cosmopolitan respondents that 
participated in this study responded in the affirmative to this query; on the other hand, 45.8% 
(29.4% strongly agree, 16.4% agree) of the other 800 respondents based in Luo Nyanza indicated 
awareness of circumcision being used as a prerequisite leadership trait in Kenya.    
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Figure 4.12: Awareness of circumcision being fronted as a prerequisite leadership trait. 
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017) 
 
The Kenyan rite of passage myth appears to be thriving more in areas considered to be 
“ethnically” heterogeneous; from these findings, we can infer that the classification of human 
beings into often spurious and highly controversial social categories like “race” and “ethnicity” 
plays a significant role in breeding contempt and animosity and should, therefore, be 
discouraged. Also, since these cosmopolitan areas witness stiffer competition for scarce 
resources, the findings are an indication that uncertainty breeds antagonism amongst humans 
especially in situations in which survival is dependent on “fitness”, as is the case with capitalism. 
The opinion of the participants on whether politicians had anything to do with their awareness of 
the apparent importance of this rite of passage for Kenyans seeking leadership positions is 
depicted in figure 4.13 below. 
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Figure 4.13: Politicians made me aware of the link between circumcision and leadership. 
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017) 
 
If the figures for neutrals, which represent the respondents who indicated that they are yet to hear 
of the apparent significance of this rite of passage as a prerequisite leadership trait, are ignored, it 
is evident from figure 4.13, above, that Luos from cosmopolitan counties (50.2%) show more 
awareness, as opposed to their Luo Nyanza counterparts (33.0%), of the role played by 
politicians in fronting the myth. Again, it would seem that stereotypes and falsehoods abound 
more in places considered to be “ethnically” heterogeneous. This contention is further evidenced 
by figure 4.14, below, which depicts the participants’ responses on whether they had ever been 
ridiculed or heard a fellow Luo being belittled over the rite of passage issue. Luos who live in 
cosmopolitan areas (63.3%) associate more with ridicule arising out of the rite of passage issue 
compared to their counterparts who reside in their native Luo Nyanza (52.8%). 
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Figure 4.14: I have experienced or know of a kinsman who has faced ridicule because of the 
rite of passage issue. 
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017) 
 
The responses depicted in figure 4.15, below, show that Luos in both sets of counties – Luo 
Nyanza and cosmopolitan – are increasingly adopting this rite of passage, contrary to their 
traditions. This behaviour is slightly more profound in Luo Nyanza (56.3%), as opposed to the 
cosmopolitan areas surveyed (48.8%), despite the fact that the ridicule is much more in the 
cosmopolitan areas. This finding is somewhat paradoxical, given that one would expect 
cosmopolitan Luos, who reside alongside members of other “ethnic groups”, to be under more 
pressure to “conform”. It would seem that, besides reasons connected to politically-instigated 
“othering” and stereotyping, members of the Luo community of Kenya are adopting the practice 
as a result of other reasons such as cleanliness and health. A juxtaposition of Luo perspectives on 
political exclusion and grassroots level economics follows next. 
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Figure 4.15: Adopting the alien culture of circumcision. 
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017) 
 
4.7 Juxtaposed Perspectives on Political Exclusion and Grassroots Level Economics 
The participants’ responses on whether they have ever been denied economic 
opportunities, such as employment, on account of their “ethnicity”, are as shown in figure 4.16, 
below. While 46.7% of cosmopolitan respondents affirm that they have been victims of “ethnic” 
discrimination in the employment and wider economic arena, only 36.0% do so in the Luo 
Nyanza areas.  
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Figure 4.16: I have been denied economic opportunities or employment for being Luo. 
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017) 
 
The results show that Luos living in Luo Nyanza are less likely to experience ethnic-based 
discrimination when it comes to seeking employment opportunities. Cosmopolitan Luos relate 
more with the experience of being denied access to opportunities because of their “ethnic” 
identity. These results indicate that “ethnic”-based discrimination is thriving in 21st century 
Kenya; this reality, a confirmation of Miruka and Omenya’s (2009) observation that besides 
going to school, Africans have not understood “the virtues of collaboration beyond the basic 
needs of ethnic communities” (Civic Engagement section, para. 5), should worry those who 
believe that for Africa to achieve its full potential, nationalism should supplant ethno-
nationalism. In what could also be interpreted as the prevalence of “ethnic”-based discrimination 
in 21st century Kenya this study found, as shown in figure 4.17 below, that Luos residing in 
Nyanza (46.3% either disagree or strongly disagree) are less likely to cry foul, compared to their 
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cosmopolitan counterparts (22.8% either disagree or strongly disagree), when it comes to access 
to higher ranking jobs and better opportunities. However, most of the cosmopolitan Luos who 
participated in this study responded neutrally (48.5%) to this question. This is most likely the 
case because most respondents in the cosmopolitan counties happened to be self-employed. 
 
Figure 4.17: Being Luo has denied me better jobs and opportunities. 
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017) 
 
When asked whether promotion opportunities for Luos were limited at their workplaces, the 
participants’ responses were as exhibited in figure 4.18 below. 
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Figure 4.18: Promotion opportunities for Luos are limited at my workplace. 
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017) 
 
The majority of the respondents in the cosmopolitan counties were either students or the self-
employed; this explains the inordinately high figure for the neutral cosmopolitan respondents 
(86.3%) in figure 4.18 above. The fact that most of the cosmopolitan respondents were either 
students or self-employed Luos could also mean that members of the community find it 
challenging to obtain white-collar jobs in areas where they are considered “outsiders”. Indeed, in 
Uasin Gishu County, I found that most Luo men were mechanics; moreover, it was difficult to 
locate Luo women in Uasin Gishu. In Nakuru County, there seemed to be fewer Luo men than 
women. This phenomenon, I was made to understand, arose out of the fact that many Luo men 
fled the county in the aftermath of the 2007 – 08 post-election violence. Most are yet to return to 
the area for they do not feel safe there. Nevertheless, this study finds that more Luos from 
Nyanza respond negatively (40.4%) to the assertion that promotion opportunities are limited for 
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them at their workplaces than those who respond affirmatively (26.5%). This means that 
whenever an area is dominated by a particular “ethnic group”, chances of discrimination against 
it dwindle substantially when it comes to promotion at the workplace.  
 
Figure 4.19, below, depicts the responses of the participants when asked whether their 
living standards would be better if they were from a different “ethnic group”. The results were 
very similar: in the Luo Nyanza areas, 51.8% responded negatively, while 28.7% responded 
affirmatively; on the other hand, in the cosmopolitan areas, 50.3% responded negatively, while 
28.9% responded affirmatively. The figure for neutral respondents in Luo Nyanza was 19.6%, 
whilst that one for cosmopolitan respondents stood at 20.9%. The trends in both the traditional 
homeland of the Luo and the cosmopolitan counties are such that both sets of respondents appear 
to be convinced that their living standards would not be better, even if they belonged to another 
“ethnicity”, despite the decades of political exclusion that the Luo have faced in Kenya in the 
post-independence era.  
 
Figure 4.19: My living standards would be better if I were not Luo. 
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017) 
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A comparison of Luo Nyanza and cosmopolitan perspectives on political exclusion and “ethnic” 
cohesion follows next. 
 
4.8 Juxtaposed Perspectives on Political Exclusion and “Ethnic” Cohesion 
The participants’ responses, when asked whether they would carry out affirmative action 
to help fellow Luos catch up with other communities that have held power in Kenya, were they 
to be given positions of power, were as depicted in figure 4.20, below. In both sets of counties, 
more respondents agree with the idea of affirmative action (63.8% Nyanza, 49.1% cosmopolitan) 
than those who dissent (22.7% Nyanza, 38.8% cosmopolitan). Despite being adamant that their 
living standards would not be any better had they not been Luo, respondents from both Luo 
Nyanza and the cosmopolitan counties exhibit the desire to implement affirmative action to help 
their kin to compete favourably with the communities that have held power in Kenya, or those 
that have maintained friendly ties with the GoK during the period under study. This indicates an 
agreement, albeit inadvertently, with the idea that their living standards are not where they might 
or ought to be. But again, as explained earlier in the analysis of the amalgamated data, Luos are a 
proud people who seldom admit to having any vulnerability. 
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Figure 4.20: I would carry out affirmative action to help Luos catch up. 
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017) 
 
With regard to the question whether influential Luos help fellow Luos to access economic 
opportunities, participants’ responses were as presented in figure 4.21, below. 
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Figure 4.21: Influential Luos help fellow Luos access economic opportunities. 
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017) 
 
Affirmative responses were as follows: Nyanza (35.2%) and cosmopolitan (27.9%); on the other 
hand, the negative responses were as follows – Nyanza (47.7%) and cosmopolitan (57.9%). 
There is a consensus amongst both Luo Nyanza and cosmopolitan Luos that influential Luos do 
not assist their kin to access economic opportunities. This phenomenon seems to be more 
profound in the cosmopolitan areas than it is in Luo Nyanza. It is difficult to understand why 
members of a politically excluded community do not see the sense in uniting and cooperating, as 
a mechanism to lessen the negative effects of exclusion from participation in a country’s 
governance structures. Perhaps the explanation for this unanticipated finding lies in wa 
Thiong’o’s (1986) notion of a colonized mind; according to him, society’s dominant groups 
often mete out subtle psychological forms of violence to aid in the maintenance of oppressive 
status quos. Psychological violence involves the belittling of the conquered people’s culture, 
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aimed at destroying it, and influencing or distorting the manner in which the latter view 
themselves vis-à-vis the rest of society – cultivation of self-hate. A self-loathing people, it is 
thought, are easy to manipulate and control. Could this be the result of Kenyatta’s “othering” 
technique? A comparison of the responses on whether it is better for a Luo to marry a fellow Luo 
than a non-Luo is captured in figure 4.22 below.  
 
 
Figure 4.22: Marriage between fellow Luos is better than intermarriage. 
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017) 
 
Overall, cosmopolitan Luos reject the idea that it is better for a Luo to espouse a fellow Luo as 
opposed to tying the knot with someone from a different “ethnic group” (57.8% negative, 31.8% 
affirmative and 10.5% neutral). On the other hand, Luos in Nyanza agree with the assertion: 
41.4% negative, 45% affirmative and 13.9% neutral. Indeed, the findings show that whilst the 
Luo from Nyanza is more likely to settle for a fellow Luo in marriage, the cosmopolitan Luo 
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disagrees with the idea that marriage between fellow Luos is better than intermarriage. It seems 
that the more people interact with members of other “ethnic groups”, the more they get used to 
the latter and overcome any prejudices and stereotypes that they may harbour about them. 
Certainly, more interaction between and amongst members of different “ethnic groups” is both 
crucial and essential for nation-building; perhaps the GoK should seek to formulate policies and 
institute programmes that encourage inter-ethnic interaction to assist in diffusing “ethnic” 
tensions amongst Kenyans. A comparison of Luo opinions on the interplay between political 
exclusion and public investment is examined next. 
 
4.9 Juxtaposed Perspectives on Political Exclusion and Public Investment 
When the question was posed to them whether Luo Nyanza would be more economically 
developed were it not for political exclusion by the central government, during the period under 
study, the participants responded as depicted in figure 4.23, below. The responses in Luo Nyanza 
were as follows: 61.9% affirmative, 28.2% negative and 10.0% neutral. On the other hand, the 
cosmopolitan responses were as follows: 59.1% affirmative, 27.0% negative and 13.9% neutral. 
There is an overwhelming feeling in both Luo Nyanza and the cosmopolitan areas in which this 
study was conducted that Luo Nyanza would be more economically developed were it not for 
political exclusion by the GoK. Chapters five and six probe this finding further in a quest to 
demystify this prevalent Luo sentiment and to establish whether there is credible justification for 
it. 
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Figure 4.23: Luo Nyanza would be more economically developed were it not for political 
exclusion by central government. 
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017) 
 
The next section presents a summary of the research findings vis-à-vis the study’s dependent 
variables – cultural factors, economic difficulties, “ethnic” cohesion and minimal public 
investment. 
 
4.10 Summary of Research Findings Vis-à-vis the Dependent Variables 
4.10.1 Cultural Factors 
There is a very strong link, the results of this quantitative phase of this study suggest, 
between political exclusion and the adoption of alien cultures among the Luo. The study shows 
that, largely due to politically-instigated “othering”, the Luo community of Kenya is increasingly 
adopting the practice of male circumcision, which it has not been historically associated with. In 
strongly agree
Agree
Neutral
Disagree
strongly disagree
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350
9.4%
10.3%
17.6%
17.9%
13.9%
10.0%
23.6%
18.1%
35.5%
43.8%
 
 
Count
A
 Cosmopolitan Counties  Luo Nyanza Counties
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
132 
 
fact, the study shows, the adoption of this practice is so profound that there is a high likelihood 
that the entire community will embrace it in the near future. Concerning this rite of passage, this 
study shows, the venom spewed at the national level by politicians, in a bid to divide the Kenyan 
citizens and make them easy to rule, is seemingly making its way quickly to the grassroots level, 
and in widespread fashion. To establish whether the Luo are adopting this alien rite of passage 
uniformly/homogeneously across the counties in which the study was carried out, I conducted 
chi-square tests of homogeneity for both combined Luo Nyanza counties and the combined 
cosmopolitan counties. The chi-square test of homogeneity assesses whether two or more 
samples of discrete characteristics arise from identically distributed (homogenous) populations. I 
began by conducting a cross-tabulation – of adoption of alien culture of circumcision and county 
of respondent – to assess the consistency of this phenomenon of adoption of circumcision by the 
Luo. The following hypothesis was tested: “The Luo are gradually adopting alien cultures in 
uniform/homogeneous fashion, owing to politically constructed/mobilized stereotypes and 
prejudices, to gain acceptance as fully-fledged members of the Kenyan society at large”. The 
results of the cross-tabulation are as presented in table 4.2 below. 
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Table 4.2: Adopting alien culture of circumcision * County of respondent Cross tabulation 
(Count) 
Adopting alien culture of 
circumcision 
County of respondent 
Total Migori  
Homa 
Bay  Siaya  Kisumu  Nairobi  Mombasa  Nakuru 
Uasin 
Gishu  
  Strongly agree 55 59 58 64     236 
Agree 41 61 57 55     214 
Neutral 29 21 35 26     111 
Disagree 36 39 25 28     128 
Strongly disagree 39 20 25 27     111 
Total (Luo Nyanza Counties) 200 200 200 200     800 
  Strongly agree     41 55 41 31 168 
Agree     58 53 66 45 222 
Neutral     19 39 26 36 120 
Disagree     66 47 50 54 217 
Strongly disagree     16 6 17 34 73 
Total (Cosmopolitan Counties)     200 200 200 200 800 
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017) 
 
The results of the chi-square tests of homogeneity, regarding the uniform adoption of the alien 
culture of circumcision by the Luo, are as presented in table 4.3 below.  
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Table 4.3: Chi-Square Tests of Homogeneity Results – Adoption of Alien Culture of 
Circumcision 
Residence Value Df Asymptotic Significance (2-sided) 
Luo Nyanza Counties Pearson Chi-Square 19.738
a
 12 .072 
Likelihood Ratio 19.705 12 .073 
Linear-by-Linear Association 4.538 1 .033 
N of Valid Cases 800   
Cosmopolitan Counties Pearson Chi-Square 45.643
b
 12 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 45.973 12 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 6.561 1 .010 
N of Valid Cases 800   
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 27.75. 
b. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 18.25. 
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017) 
 
The result for the Luo Nyanza counties, showed a chi-square value of x² = 19.738 (p = 0.072) at 
a 5% level of significance, and 12 degrees of freedom, respectively; it is statistically significant, 
indicating that the adoption of the alien culture of circumcision in Luo Nyanza is occurring in 
uniform fashion. In other words, the null hypothesis that assumed homogeneous Luo adoption of 
circumcision, in the case of Luo Nyanza, is accepted. On the other hand, the result for the 
cosmopolitan counties, showed a chi-square value of x² = 45.643 (p = 0.000) at a 5% level of 
significance and 12 degrees of freedom respectively. The result is statistically insignificant; this 
means that whilst many cosmopolitan Luos might be adopting male circumcision, the 
phenomenon is occurring inconsistently. The null hypothesis, in the case of the cosmopolitan 
counties, is therefore rejected. This outcome is somewhat strange, given that one would expect 
cosmopolitan Luos, who reside alongside members of other “ethnic groups”, to be under more 
pressure to “conform” by adopting the practice. It would seem that, as the FGDs to be discussed 
in chapter five revealed, the Luo in Nyanza has been more consistent in adopting the practice 
owing to other reasons such as health. Indeed, most government and non-governmental 
organization (NGO) initiatives that link the practice to health, such as Kenya’s Ministry of 
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Health’s Voluntary Medical Male Circumcision (VMMC) Programme, mainly target Luo 
Nyanza.
38
 The second dependent variable, economic difficulties, is discussed next. 
 
4.10.2 Economic Difficulties 
According to the findings of the quantitative phase of this study, political exclusion at the 
national level has not entirely led to profound economic difficulties at the grassroots level 
amongst the Luo of Kenya. Evidence from this study shows that the argument for either side of 
the debate cannot be decisively made. Luos are almost evenly split when appraising the denial of 
economic opportunity on the basis of “ethnicity”. Indeed, the findings of this study further 
indicate that, when it comes to seeking access to better jobs and opportunities, the issue of 
ethnic-based discrimination has not been a grave concern for the Kenyan Luo. Rather, hard work 
and luck have had a lot to do with the progress of the individual members of the community at 
the grassroots level. These findings are, generally, consistent with Oloo’s (2004) argument that 
impoverishment in any region of the country can neither be attributed directly to the inhabitants 
nor to superficial “ethnic” rivalry amongst various “ethnic groups”; they specifically echo 
Mandel’s (1968) views that wherever uneven development occurs, it is the result of variation in 
finesse amongst distinct producers in a given community, prolificacy differences amongst 
animals and soils, and fortuitous happenings in life and nature (as cited in Bond, 1999). A look at 
the third dependent variable, “ethnic” cohesion, follows next.   
 
4.10.3 “Ethnic” Cohesion 
The issue of political exclusion and “ethnic” cohesion is a very complicated one in the 
sense that the manner in which these two variables relate seems to be perpetually changing as 
history unfolds. The findings of this quantitative phase show that, as things stand, political 
exclusion during the period under study has not led to any meaningful strengthening of “ethnic” 
roots amongst the Luo of Kenya. Most respondents indicate that influential Luos do not assist 
fellow Luos to access economic opportunities. Despite having been politically excluded for 
much of the period in which Kenya has been independent, it seems that most Luos have not 
developed feelings of oneness and/or sympathy towards fellow Luos. A majority of the 
                                                          
38
 See, for instance, Talbot, J. R., Cole, C., May, M., & Weintraub, R. (2012). Cases in global health delivery: 
Voluntary medical male circumcision in Nyanza Province, Kenya. Harvard: Harvard Business Publishing. Retrieved 
from https://cb.hbsp.harvard.edu/resources/marketing/docs/GHD027p2.pdf (accessed 11 September 2016). 
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respondents do not feel that it is better for a Luo to marry a fellow Luo. Seemingly, political 
exclusion during the period under study has not translated into strong feelings of exclusivity 
amongst the Luo in the area of marriage. However, it would seem that the Luo might be 
gradually waking up to the reality of how to survive in an “ethnic”-driven society because a 
majority of the respondents indicated that they would carry out affirmative action towards their 
fellow Luos given a position of influence in society. In order to ascertain if the feeling within the 
community that influential Luos do not assist fellow Luos access economic opportunities is a 
consistent phenomenon across the counties in which the study was conducted, I also performed 
chi-square tests of homogeneity for both combined Luo Nyanza counties and the combined 
cosmopolitan counties. A cross-tabulation exercise, featuring the county of the respondent and 
the responses to the question as to whether influential Luos assist fellow Luos access economic 
opportunities, was conducted. With regards to the chi-square tests of homogeneity, the following 
hypothesis was tested:  “The prevalent feeling within the community that influential Luos do not 
assist fellow Luos access economic opportunities occurs consistently throughout the study 
areas.” The results of the cross-tabulation are as presented in table 4.4 below. And table 4.5, 
below, depicts the results of the chi-square tests of homogeneity for both Luo Nyanza and the 
cosmopolitan counties, with regard to the question whether influential Luos assist fellow Luos to 
access economic opportunities.  
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Table 4.4: Influential Luos Assist Fellow Luos to Access Economic Opportunities * County 
of Respondent Cross tabulation (Count) 
Influential Luos assist fellow Luos 
access economic opportunities 
County of respondent 
Total Migori  
Homa 
Bay  Siaya  Kisumu  Nairobi  Mombasa  Nakuru 
Uasin 
Gishu  
  Strongly agree 30 33 42 40     145 
Agree 31 36 43 27     137 
Neutral 37 22 36 42     137 
Disagree 55 63 51 57     226 
Strongly disagree 47 46 28 34     155 
Total (Luo Nyanza Counties) 200 200 200 200     800 
  Strongly agree     16 17 16 16 65 
Agree     43 49 35 31 158 
Neutral     37 28 27 22 114 
Disagree     61 61 76 79 277 
Strongly disagree     43 45 46 52 186 
Total (Cosmopolitan Counties)     200 200 200 200 800 
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017)  
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Table 4.5: Chi-Square Tests of Homogeneity Results – Influential Luos assist fellow Luos to 
access economic opportunities 
Residence Value Df Asymptotic Significance (2-sided) 
Luo Nyanza Counties Pearson Chi-Square 21.287
a
 12 .046 
Likelihood Ratio 21.932 12 .038 
Linear-by-Linear Association 4.806 1 .028 
N of Valid Cases 800   
Cosmopolitan Counties Pearson Chi-Square 14.052
b
 12 .297 
Likelihood Ratio 13.942 12 .304 
Linear-by-Linear Association 4.904 1 .027 
N of Valid Cases 800   
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 34.25. 
b. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 16.25. 
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017) 
 
The result for the Luo Nyanza counties showed a chi-square value of x² = 21.287 (p = 0.046) at a 
5% level of significance, and 12 degrees of freedom, respectively – this result not statistically 
significant. This indicates that the feeling is not consistent, meaning that the phenomenon – of 
influential Luos not helping less fortunate “tribes mates” – is greatly concentrated in some areas 
of Luo Nyanza and may be absent in others, regardless of its overall profound nature. The null 
hypothesis, in the case of Luo Nyanza, is therefore rejected. On the other hand, the results of the 
cosmopolitan counties – a chi-square value of x² = 14.052 (p = 0.297) at a 5% level of 
significance and 12 degrees of freedom, respectively – are statistically significant. This means 
that in the cosmopolitan counties the feeling that Luos do not assist each other is ubiquitously 
prevalent. Owing to the statistical significance of the cosmopolitan county result, the null 
hypothesis, in the case of the cosmopolitan counties, is accepted. This outcome indicates that 
Luos whose mentality has been relatively less polluted – those who have experienced direct 
“othering”/ridicule/deculturalization to a lesser extent – appreciate their worth more as human 
beings, and are therefore more likely to be their “brothers’/sisters’ keepers”. The cosmopolitan 
Luo, on the other hand, in what could be interpreted as the result of profound direct 
objectification/ridicule, has grown to appreciate himself/herself less, and seems not to care much 
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about the welfare of his/her kin. The final dependent variable examined in this study, minimal 
public investment, is discussed next. 
 
4.10.4 Minimal Public Investment 
The results of the quantitative phase of this study show that there is a solid relationship 
between political exclusion and minimal public investment. There is an overwhelming feeling 
amongst the Luo that they have been short-changed by the GoK in the provision of public 
investment during the period under study. Many Luos feel that political exclusion by the GoK 
has greatly affected their economic well-being in a negative manner. To further probe this 
prevalent feeling on political exclusion and economic development of Luo Nyanza, I carried out 
the Kruskal-Wallis Analysis of Variance to understand the nature and magnitude of its 
distribution amongst both the Luo Nyanza counties and the cosmopolitan counties. Coined by 
Kruskal and Wallis (1952), it is a non-parametric method for testing whether independent 
samples originate from the same distribution. It extends the Mann-Whitney U Test to more than 
two groups and is most often used to compare the central tendencies (median) of samples. With 
regards to the Kruskal-Wallis tests, the following hypotheses were assessed: 
 
Null hypothesis: “There is no statistical difference amongst the respondents that believe that Luo 
Nyanza has been short-changed by the central government in Kenya when it comes to the 
provision of public investment during the period under study.” 
 
Alternative hypothesis: At least one county in either of the two categories – Luo Nyanza and 
cosmopolitan – shows statistical difference amongst the respondents that believe that Luo 
Nyanza has been short-changed by the central government in Kenya when it comes to the 
provision of public investment during the period under study.” 
 
The results of the tests were as shown in the boxplots depicted in figures 4.24 and 4.25 below. 
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Figure 4.24: Kruskal-Wallis Analysis of Variance – Luo Nyanza Counties 
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017) 
 
The results for the Luo Nyanza counties, as depicted in figure 4.24 (a median of “2”) above, 
show consistency in terms of the responses from the participants; most respondents tend to agree 
with the assumption of this research that the Luo have enjoyed minimal public investment from 
the GoK because of opposition politics making them relatively poor compared to other 
communities. The results for the cosmopolitan counties depicted in figure 4.25 below, however, 
indicate that there is a statistical difference amongst the four counties. Whilst Nairobi, Mombasa 
and Nakuru counties show a median of “2” (agree), Uasin Gishu’s is “3” (neutral). In the case of 
Luo Nyanza counties, therefore, the null hypothesis is accepted; it is rejected when it comes to 
the cosmopolitan counties. 
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Figure 4.25: Kruskal-Wallis Analysis of Variance – Cosmopolitan Counties 
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017) 
 
It is not easy to explain the nonconformity of Uasin Gishu; however, a probable cause for this 
result would be that the residents of the county, which is very cosmopolitan in nature and 
notorious for being a hotspot for post-election violence in Kenya, are collectively beginning to 
realize the value of peace and, therefore, are reluctant to be associated with anything that could 
prompt or further fuel feelings of antagonism. Indeed, the county has been bedevilled by a 
history of land grievances, which date back to the colonial days. The land issues have been 
intertwined with politics and are amongst the major sources of incessant conflict witnessed in the 
region. These land issues are widely regarded as being the major reason behind the 2007 – 08 
post-election violence in Kenya (cf. Uasin Gishu County Government [UGCG], 2013, p. 41). 
The next chapter presents the results of the first stage of the qualitative phase of this research.  
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Chapter 5 
An Analysis of Luo Views on the Impact of Kenya’s “Ethnicized” Politics, 1963 – 2013   
5 Introduction 
This chapter presents the first phase of the qualitative results of this study. As stated in 
chapter three, it explores the ordinary citizen’s opinions and understandings of “ethnicized” 
politics and its influence on the socio-economic-cultural development of individuals at the 
grassroots level of society in Kenya. In this manner, it gives more meaning to the quantitative 
results presented in chapter four, for the results presented here were obtained from the Luo 
“without pressuring them into making decisions or reaching a consensus” (Liamputtong, 2011, p. 
5). It is informed by Mafeje’s lamentation – as stated in chapter one – that “there are now 
numerous texts on ‘ethnicity’ in [Africa] and yet the supposed subjects of ‘ethnic conflict’ 
remain invisible and their representations are conspicuous by their absence in scholarly 
discourse, as if they are simply automatons” (Mafeje, 2002, p. 63). Its objectives are twofold: 
first, to seek the specifics of the socio-cultural-economic consequences of political 
marginalization within the Kenyan context, with the view to establish how antagonistic relations 
between the GoK and the Luo have influenced the socio-economic development of the 
community, in particular, and that of the East African nation in general; and, second, to construct 
a conceptual framework – using the Luo people’s views and an examination of contemporary 
world events vis-à-vis Kenya – through which to analyse “ethnicized” politics in Kenya. 
Accordingly, this chapter will, in its closing stages, attempt to explain why “ethnicity” was 
strongly correlated with the crisis of state power in Kenya, from 1963 to 2013, and why it has 
increasingly become a pervasive problem in the East African nation. Since the experiences of the 
Luo are numerous and varied, the aim of this chapter is not necessarily to “narrow the meanings 
into a few categories or ideas”, but “to look for the complexity of views” (cf. Creswell, 2013, p. 
24). The diverse views of the Luo on the socio-economic-cultural consequences of political 
marginalization, which form the core of this chapter, are discussed next. 
 
5.1 Twenty-first Century Perspectives and Influences of the Kenyatta – Odinga Rivalry 
Fifty years after the fallout between Kenya’s founding father and his first vice-president, 
bitterness and regret still abound amongst members of the Luo community, owing to the sour 
relationship the two leaders had. Many Luos blame their woes on the conflict between these two 
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historical figures and will seldom discuss anything, with regards to their welfare, experiences 
and grievances, without revisiting the rivalry. They lament Jaramogi’s “folly”, epitomized by the 
latter’s refusal to ascend to power, despite it being offered to him on a silver platter by the 
colonial regime, on the premise that Kenyatta was more deserving for the Kikuyu community 
had apparently paid the heaviest price in the liberation struggle. Most Luos contend that 
Odinga’s “generosity of spirit” and sense of “African unity” are behind the woes the community 
faces in Kenya today. According to them, Odinga should have taken a different approach: he 
should have taken power, first, and put the new Kenyan state under his firm control before 
having Kenyatta released from jail. Luos largely contend that Kenyatta, especially because of the 
confidence the colonialists showed in Odinga by offering him power, developed a certain kind of 
paranoia towards the Luo leader, and made it his life mission to sabotage the latter. Kenyatta’s 
ability and success at outwitting Odinga, they allege, partly stems from his “superior” intellect, 
given that he was educated abroad. Moreover, his dalliance with overseas education made him 
narcissistic; to him, no-one else was more qualified to lead Kenya, and he could not see his 
equal, for the rest had been educated locally. Kenyatta’s ill-treatment of Odinga – for owing to 
their political rivalry he would eventually detain the Luo leader – has fostered an enmity between 
their respective communities; a perpetual feud that cannot be extinguished despite intermarriages 
that characterize contemporary Kenyan society. Most Luos are certain that none of them can 
genuinely cast a vote for a Kikuyu, for instance; such an occurrence, they allege, could only be 
the result of bribery. 
 
The findings of this study suggest that Kenyatta’s supposed treachery, epitomized by his 
“betrayal” of Odinga, has had many negative consequences, of which two particularly stand out. 
First, Odinga has posthumously become an object of ridicule amongst some Luos who consider 
their deceased leader a “fool” who “died like a monkey” (FGD with men in Nakuru County). 
This ridicule has not been confined to Odinga alone; members of other “ethnic groups”, 
especially the Kikuyu, continuously hurl insults at their Luo counterparts, too. The arguments of 
one participant illuminate the ridicule that Luos often go through in contemporary Kenyan 
society: “Then later on in life – during the 1990s – he [Odinga] again begged to be given just 
two minutes in power during the rebirth of multipartyism. This two minute thing . . . these people 
[Kikuyus] really hurl insults at us because of it (FGD with men in Nakuru County). Second, 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
144 
 
relations between the Luo and the Kikuyu have deteriorated immensely. Untold mistrust 
characterizes associations between members of two of Kenya’s most notable “ethnic groups”. 
Besides indicating their cautiousness, most participants warned fellow Luos and Kenyans at 
large to be very wary about Kikuyus: “Do not reveal your secrets to them; hide your heart and 
true thoughts away from them completely. They can study you, establish your weaknesses, and 
end up harming you” (FGD with men in Nakuru County). There is a strong feeling among most 
Luos that Kikuyus are thieves, who scamper for dishonest gain, right from the grassroots to the 
government level. Whilst they acknowledge that Kikuyus are good at doing business, most Luos 
argue that Kikuyu endeavours are laden with plenty of dishonesty. Many participants in this 
study raised concern over the manner in which their Kikuyu acquaintances’ financial fortunes 
suddenly and astronomically improved. Examples of incidences of sudden riches included one in 
which “a Kikuyu man . . . walks around selling plastic bags [on a particular day] . . . [and] . . . 
drives a pick-up distributing goods for wholesale trade [the next day]” (FGD with men in 
Nakuru County). In support of this view, another participant stated the following: “In my 
workplace, where I am a construction worker [carrying building stones] I have witnessed similar 
occurrences. Today a [Kikuyu] colleague of mine is poor, carrying stones; tomorrow you see 
him building a house for himself” (FGD with men in Nakuru County). Similar sentiments abound 
amongst the Luo in their assessment of Kikuyu-dominated Kenyan leadership: “They 
discriminate and discriminate and eventually time comes they give it [Presidency] to another 
one of their own sons. So, these people are oppressing us badly. They are taking everyone for a 
ride . . . Uhuru is stealing from public coffers, in broad daylight, without any shame whatsoever” 
(FGD with men in Nakuru County). 
 
Even as relations between the Luo and Kikuyu continue to deteriorate over the Kenyatta-
Odinga rivalry, contemporary perspectives from the Luo indicate a new development: an aura of 
invincibility seems to be gradually encircling the Kikuyu community. The Kikuyu, according to 
most participants, have become arrogant and spiteful towards the Luo and other Kenyans, to the 
point of proclaiming that they will rule the country until they get tired of enjoying power. As the 
Kikuyus become “invincible”, the Luo seem to be moving in the opposite direction – they are 
exhibiting great desperation that borders on hopelessness. Some are turning to religion for solace 
as depicted in the words of one participant: “Let them eat. The world has favoured them; let them 
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eat. God is seeing them. Let them eat. And let us remain as hungry as we are” (FGD with men in 
Nakuru County). There is a strong feeling among the Luo that if Raila Odinga, their de facto 
leader, fails to win the presidency in the forthcoming 2017 general elections in Kenya, their 
hopes of addressing the injustices and oppression they face in Kenyan society will be dashed 
forever. Following Uhuru Kenyatta’s 2015 “triumph” at The Hague, most Luos fear that 
“impunity” on the part of the Kikuyu will continue unabated for the avenues that would ensure 
accountability have been narrowed down. They fear that the upcoming elections in Kenya will 
not be free and fair, for the Kikuyu establishment has been emboldened and will now do 
anything within its power – lawful or unlawful – to retain power. The next section examines the 
multifarious understandings of the Luo on the socio-economic-cultural consequences of political 
marginalization. 
 
5.2 Inside the Luo Perspective on the Socio-cultural-economic Consequences of Political  
Marginalization 
5.2.1 Culture, Politics and Leadership in Kenya 
More than thirty years after his demise, Kenyatta’s “othering” technique, which was 
pegged on the male “cut”, appears to be profoundly haunting Kenyan society generally and the 
Luo community in particular. The circumcision myth, popularized by this fabled African leader 
and his Kikuyu associates has become so deeply entrenched in Kenyan society that even the 
“mentally ill” seem to be aware of it. This interesting revelation was captured clearly in a 
participant’s response to the query as to whether she had heard of the link between circumcision 
and leadership: 
 
There is a “madman” around this place that once insulted Luos. His utterances made me 
question his mental illness for he seemed to understand what he was saying. He said that 
Luos cannot get what they are looking for because they are not circumcised. Can we 
really say he is mentally incapacitated given that he understands that Luos do not 
culturally circumcise their males? How did he know? (FGD with women in Mombasa 
County) 
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The above narrative demonstrates the incredible level to which the Luo have become a subject of 
ridicule, in contemporary Kenyan society, thanks to the struggle for power and the conspiracies 
of paranoid politicians. The so-called “madman”, in the above account, is clearly a victim of 
capitalism that uses the pretext of mental illness in his quest to eek out a living. Though rib-
tickling at face value, serious thought should be given to the risk he is willing to take when he 
temporarily abandons the role he is playing – to evoke sympathies of unsuspecting fellow 
citizens and probably fleece them of pocket change in the process – in order to insult an entire 
community. The Luo are certainly very much aware of the association of circumcision and 
leadership in Kenya and how it is used as a tool to monopolize and retain political power. They 
allude to the numerous times Central Kenya politicians have made reference to Odinga’s 
genitalia, especially during election time, as captured in the response of one participant:  “I don’t 
know if Raila went and got circumcised. They come up with some issues which I see here . . . 
when people are politicking you hear them saying, ‘He is not circumcised; he cannot lead us.’ 
You see? ‘He is not a man.’ They say such things” (FGD with women in Mombasa County). This 
subjugation device – the circumcision myth – is being utilized beyond the national/political 
level; it appears to be playing a noticeable role at the grassroots level in diminishing ordinary 
Luos’ chances of earning a decent living and obtaining anticipated and commensurate reward for 
effort and hard work. Another participant lamented:  “There’s a day I went to look for a job. The 
first question they asked me was whether I have been circumcised” (FGD with men in Nairobi 
County). 
  
There appears to be a subtle, well-calculated strategy to keep the Luo completely outside 
mainstream societal affairs in Kenya. The pattern emanating from the above testimonies points 
towards the total frustration of a people, from the national/political to the grassroots/individual 
level, and may be considered to be invisible socio-economic extermination. The Luo are largely 
a frustrated people and they are dealing with their discontent in various ways. Amongst some 
members of the community, there is a secessionist desire, as captured in the words of a 
exasperated participant: “Of what benefit is the government to me? I neither care about nor need 
the government. I am my own government” (FGD with women in Mombasa County). However, 
the violent methods utilized by the Kenyan state in quashing secessionist movements (cf. Al-
Safi, 1995; wa Njeri, 2013; Willis & Gona, 2012) seem to have held in check any breakaway 
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attempt by the Luo, some of whom appear to be opting, instead, for conformist measures geared, 
amongst other aims, towards gaining them acceptance as fully-fledged members of the Kenyan 
society. Indeed, as indicated unequivocally by one participant, “Luos are getting circumcised 
nowadays - even children” (FGD with women in Mombasa County). Whilst recounting her 
experience with her children, another participant stated the following: 
 
They told me, “Mum, we want to go get circumcised”. The reason for this, they said, is 
because their mates or colleagues laugh at them. So we just take them for circumcision; 
not because we like it, but when a child is pestering you, what can you do? Yes . . . they 
are ridiculed in class where they go to school (FGD with women in Uasin Gishu 
County). 
 
Although other reasons, like cleanliness and Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired 
Immunodeficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS) prevention have contributed to the increased adoption 
by the Luo of a cultural practice that is alien to them, a combination of embarrassment and 
stigma, whose origins can be traced to Kenyatta’s deculturalization technique, have profoundly 
influenced Luo posture towards male circumcision. The next section examines the diverse 
perspectives of the Luo with respect to the influence of political marginalization on economic 
development at the grassroots level. 
 
5.2.2 Political Exclusion and Grassroots Level Economics 
5.2.2.1 “Ethnicity” and Access to Credit Facilities and Funding Opportunities 
When Mzee Jomo Kenyatta took the stance that owing to the fact that the Luo did not 
practice male circumcision the community was “not part of civil society and therefore, by 
extension, not legitimate citizens of the Kenya state that he ran” (Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002, p. 
243), he intended, mainly, to play into the psyche of his most formidable political opponents and 
secure his presidency; even he could not have comprehended at that time the injurious potential 
of his posture on Kenyan society. Scores of years after Kenya’s first president adopted the 
aforementioned standpoint – the findings of this particular phase of this research strongly suggest 
– political exclusion at the national level has translated into tremendous economic difficulties at 
the grassroots level for the majority of Luos. The most conspicuous of these difficulties seems to 
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be access to loans from financial institutions. Most participants alleged that Kenyan banks, 
particularly Family, Equity and K-Rep (now Sidian), which are largely Kikuyu-owned and 
controlled, impose additional requirements before they will grant loans to Luos. These additional 
requirements, which mainly come in the form of household items that act as security, are often 
not mandatory for non-Luos. This has made it difficult for Luos seeking to expand their retail 
businesses. In other instances, Luo customers of these banks are forced to avail guarantors, 
sometimes against the norm, before they can get access to credit – even for very small amounts. 
The element of tribalism that characterizes the operations of these particular establishments was 
captured ubiquitously in participants’ responses, with one lamenting that “for a Kikuyu it is very 
easy to get a loan. They get it immediately. The rest of us encounter so much difficulty for they 
ask for so many requirements/items” (FGD with men in Mombasa County). Another participant 
echoed the above narrative with the following sentiments: 
 
You know it depends on what your name is. Wanjiku [Kikuyu female name] is granted an 
opportunity; Odhiambo [Luo male name] is taken around in endless circles. Family and 
Equity Banks . . . these are their [Kikuyu] establishments. Even officers . . . you know, we 
form women groups to seek loans with a united voice and as a unit . . . if the officer is a 
Luo, we are considered; if it is an officer from another ethnic group, he or she considers 
their people (FGD with women in Uasin Gishu County). 
 
It appears that some financial institutions in Kenya, especially those founded and run by 
members of the ruling “ethnic groups”, exist fundamentally to serve the interests of their kin; this 
could well be a ploy to perpetuate the social formation of capital as argued by Mészáros (1971). 
Prejudiced experiences, such as the ones narrated above, have led some Luos in Kenya to believe 
that their lives would be better if they were from another “ethnic group”, as attested to by various 
participants’ accounts, including one shop owner who stated the following with regard to the 
issue of “ethnicity” and living standards: “Eeeh; now I’d have been higher. I’d have been higher! 
My shop wouldn’t be as small as this one. I’d have had a wholesale. I’d be running a wholesale. 
But I thank God. Even if my shop is small, it is helping me” (FGD with women in Mombasa 
County).  
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The Luo also experience difficulties in connection with access to government funds and 
grants targeted at individual development. In this regard, the Luo surname, which often begins 
with an “O”, is proving to be their Achilles heel as captured by one participant: “We applied for 
government funding with these Kikuyus . . . When they got it, they told me, ‘Dude, we did not tell 
you: you were supposed to use another name; not ‘O’! ‘O’ was not supposed to be there’” (FGD 
with men in Uasin Gishu County). Indeed, African surnames are very revealing; they are of such 
nature that it is easy to tell the “ethnic” origin of an individual by merely glancing at the spelling 
of their name. In its quest to subdue the Luo, this study reveals, the Kenyan state has taken 
advantage of this vulnerability and largely utilized it to deny the community access to much-
needed funding for individual advancement. I now focus my attention on other aspects of denial 
of economic opportunities as recounted by the Luo. 
   
5.2.2.2 Other Aspects of Denial of Economic Opportunities for being Luo 
According to a majority of the participants in this study, monopolization of power by 
members of the Kikuyu and Kalenjin “ethnic groups” has made it difficult for the Luo to obtain 
employment, especially in the civil service. The fact that power in post-independence Kenya has 
consistently changed hands between these two “ethnic groups”, in successive fashion, has 
enabled them to entrench their dominance with regards to employment in the government. They 
have taken most of the jobs and ensured that “dissident” communities like the Luo are not 
proportionately represented. Besides their regular remuneration, they engage in wanton 
corruption and kleptocracy, which are facilitated by their numerical supremacy in government 
spheres. They are looting state coffers because there is no-one to keep them accountable as 
detailed by one participant: 
 
You know during the time of the Grand Coalition Government, our son [Raila] was there. 
Where they attempted to go out of line, he told them off. “That is not good”, he warned 
them. So they used to steal sparingly. But at the moment, they are looting state coffers. 
This is now theirs; at the moment the country belongs to them (FGD with men in Nakuru 
County). 
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Education, according to most participants, is now playing second fiddle to “ethnicity” when it 
comes to the Luo obtaining employment in Kenya, especially in the civil service. When seeking 
employment, a competent Luo will more often than not get snubbed in favour of a less qualified 
competitor deemed to be from the “right” “ethnicity”. The Kenyan situation is such that citizens 
from the ruling “ethnic groups” are more likely to obtain better paying jobs, notwithstanding 
their qualification levels vis-à-vis those perceived to be from “dissident” communities. The 
predicament of the Luo is such that during job interviews, for instance, less qualified competitors 
from other “ethnicities” are considered before them. Interview performance scores are usually 
supplanted by “ethnic” considerations and corruption, to the detriment of the Luo. Owing to 
preposterous levels of corruption and “ethnic” bias against the Luo, most of the community’s 
members have opted to engage in their own businesses. 
  
Similarly, lack of access to credit facilities, on the basis of “ethnicity”, has made it 
difficult for members of the Luo community to acquire government contracts and tenders. 
Intelligence, knowledge and skill are not enough if one is to compete with other contractors and 
bidders; machines and other equipment, in relation to one’s area of specialization, are necessary, 
too. Most capable Luos lack these fundamentals due largely to their limited access to credit 
facilities and, often, fare poorly in the stiff competition for government opportunities both 
nationally and locally. Luos residing in cosmopolitan areas often fall victim to “ethnic” 
discrimination in their attempts to win business opportunities in the form of government tenders 
and contracts. One participant raised this concern when he stated that , “At the moment we have 
MCAs [Members of County Assemblies] . . . they are in-charge of awarding contracts at the 
ward level . . . but when it comes to Luos, they don’t give them; they discriminate” (FGD with 
men in Nakuru County). This predicament transcends the public sector; in the private sector, 
some companies that are managed and controlled by members of the “ethnic groups” that are in 
control of state power in Kenya, especially the Kikuyu, are practicing the same kind of 
discrimination expressed in the narrative above. Such companies, especially those in which 
Kikuyus are in control of the purchasing and supplies departments, seem to be granting business 
opportunities mainly to members of their “ethnic groups” and frustrating attempts of the 
dominated “ethnic groups”, like the Luo, at getting such openings. To circumvent such obstacles, 
some Luos are forming companies using proxies from other “ethnic groups”, for this increases 
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their chances of getting tenders and contracts. Kikuyus, who overwhelmingly control the Kenyan 
economic sphere, usually have lesser qualms about other Kenyan communities, as opposed to 
their Luo rivals. 
 
Another effect of political exclusion manifesting itself at the grassroots level in Kenya is 
“ethnic zoning”, in terms of access to certain markets and/or entry into certain 
professions/business ventures. In some cases, members of rival “ethnic groups” will not 
patronize each other; in the extreme form of this kind of “zoning”, a dominant “ethnic group” 
will only allow “outsiders” to practice certain professions in what it considers its “turf”. Luos, 
for instance, find it very difficult to do business in Central Kenya, the traditional homeland of the 
Kikuyu community. Kikuyus are so heavily prejudiced towards their Luo counterparts that they 
will not purchase anything from a Luo-run shop. According to one participant, “A Luo can work 
in Kikuyuland only as a mechanic . . . But business that you can get money . . . No; they won’t 
allow you” (FGD with men in Nakuru County). These findings – coupled with the difficulties 
Luos face in obtaining bank loans – when compared with the current literature on ethnicity and 
governance in Kenya, reaffirm and give more meaning and details to the arguments of Ongaro 
and Osogo (2008, p. 25) that “ethnicity” transcends presidential elections in Kenya, for it 
determines access to financial services, education funds, employment opportunities and other 
aspects of socio-economic development – in the East African nation – as well. The next sub-
section examines the manner in which political exclusion has influenced intra-“ethnic” relations 
amongst the Luo. 
 
5.2.3 Political Exclusion and Intra-“ethnic” Relations amongst the Luo 
Economic dissatisfaction is thought to have a direct correlation with “ethnic” cohesion 
(Carr, 1995). In the problem statement in chapter one, I narrated how the Kenyatta, Moi and 
Kibaki regimes hoarded leadership opportunities from the Luo (Amutabi, 2009; Auma-Osolo, 
2013; Throup, 1987); this leadership style, as sub-section 5.2.2 above has since revealed, has 
translated into a myriad of economic difficulties faced by the Luo at the grassroots level. I now 
analyse, from the Luo perspective, how, if at all, these economic difficulties have awakened 
“ethnic” consciousness among the Luo. To begin with, this study sought to find out whether, if 
given positions of influence in society, the Luo would carry out affirmative action towards 
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fellow Luos, to give them opportunities aimed at catching up with the Kikuyu and Kalenjin who 
continue to control state power in Kenya. The responses of Luos on this issue fall in two broad 
categories. The dominant view of the respondents holds that all humans are created equal and 
would, therefore, not retaliate by favouring fellow Luos if granted influential positions in society. 
Such respondents are sceptical about tribalism and would strictly employ people in accordance 
with their qualifications. Tribal adherents, they argue, risk employing incompetent people. 
However, owing to politically-instigated economic afflictions, the sense of humaneness is 
gradually deadening in some Luos. This set of fed-up Luos subscribes to, and advocates for, the 
eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth, philosophy. Participants representing this perspective stated that 
they would implement affirmative action towards the Luo, as demonstrated by the following 
narrative: “I can . . . because of what they are doing to us. I can strongly say that Luos be given 
an opportunity . . . we are learned and we have brains. Given the chance we can deliver” (FGD 
with men in Mombasa County). This pro-affirmative action group stressed that, given an 
opportunity of influence in society, they would begin by catering to the interests of immediate 
family members, then look at the welfare of Luo friends, and consider the wider Luo “ethnic 
group”, before taking into account the interests of other Kenyans, regardless of qualifications. 
Their stance is mainly informed by Kikuyu hegemony, which has systematically been entrenched 
in Kenyan society using similar means and methods. 
  
This study also sought to find out whether prominent members of the community assist 
fellow Luos. The Luo perspective, on whether Luos help each other, given the predicament they 
collectively face – the harmful economic derivatives of political exclusion discussed above in 
sub-section 5.2.2 – is almost completely negative. Narratives from the discussions held with 
members of the community disclose an overwhelming phenomenon that can, perhaps, best be 
described as “self-hate”. The findings of this study indicate that this “self-hate” phenomenon 
prevails far and wide amongst the Luo, from the grassroots level to the national level of Kenyan 
society. The community’s political leaders, under the stewardship of Raila Odinga, the country’s 
former PM and now Official Leader of the Opposition, are seen by a significant constituent of 
the respondents as being in the vanguard of feeding and perpetuating this absurd phenomenon. 
During his tenure as the country’s PM, some participants contend, a large portion of the few 
lucky Luos who held high ranking public service positions were either axed or demoted. 
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Seemingly, Luos are largely an envious, selfish people who seldom cherish the successes of their 
kin; on the contrary, they relish the prospects of seeing fellow Luos positioned below them, 
status-wise, all the time. The contrary can be said of the hegemonic “ethnic groups”, such as the 
Kikuyu, as captured in one participant’s narrative: 
 
Other tribes, like the Kikuyus . . . I can say someone like Uhuru Kenyatta . . . it is very 
easy for him to help somebody. Even you, right now, if you go to him and face him 
directly and tell him…one, two, three . . . he will help you. Uhuru is an open person 
(FGD with men in Uasin Gishu County). 
           
Luos, according to an overwhelming majority of the participants in this study, are a very proud, 
narcissistic group. Amongst the community’s affluent members, resides a feeling of contempt 
towards their underprivileged kin. It is not unusual to find well-educated jobless Luos, with 
relatives who hold senior positions in the country’s corporate arena, languishing in Kenyan 
society. The fear of being outdone by upcoming, talented kin is apparently stronger, in the 
affluent Luo, than any drive and desire that he/she may have to offer assistance. These 
revelations, especially on the character of Raila Odinga, indicate that it is, perhaps, time for the 
Luo community to seek alternative leadership and unyoke itself from the control of the Odinga 
family. Jaramogi’s son could be exploiting the Kenyatta-Odinga rivalry and using the Luo 
electorate for his own personal ambition and gain. These findings on Odinga lend some credence 
to the assertions of Kuria (2011, para. 2) that “since independence, the political leadership of the 
region has held the people hostage to a self-defeating ideology of blaming everybody except 
themselves for the region’s woes”. 
 
Luo self-detestation, coupled with the arrogance that seemingly characterizes a large 
section of Luos, could be playing an immense role in keeping the community out of state power 
and perpetuating their subjugated condition. These insights were captured clearly in the words of 
one participant: 
  
There’s another problem with Luos. Luos have vehicles, Nissans, but during election 
time, when people are on their way to vote . . . these Luos find old women walking very 
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long distances to go and cast their votes. They cannot carry them in their vehicles. They 
cannot. You see? But these other tribes carry their old to polling stations. So that also 
contributes immensely to our backwardness and our state of being dominated. The 
elderly usually ask themselves, “Will we really walk all that distance just to cast the 
vote?” The other tribes offer their vehicles, fuel them and transport the elderly to the 
polling stations to vote. So that is our undoing (FGD with women in Uasin Gishu 
County). 
  
Though bewildering, for it is the very antithesis of what one would expect from an oppressed 
people, this phenomenon of “self-hate”, amongst the Luo, can be understood in the context of wa 
Thiong’o’s (1986) process of deculturalization discussed in chapter two. It is possible that 
alongside colonialism and capitalism, the “othering” policy employed by Kenyatta – also 
discussed in chapter two – is somehow behind this Luo characteristic. Perhaps in support of the 
assertion that in capitalist dispensations, which are often characterized, perpetuated and upheld 
by the “deculturalization” and “dehumanization” of the “working class”, by the 
“accumulating/wealthy class”, “self-hate” amongst the former arises. Malcolm X bemoaned the 
attitude exhibited by the African American community in the US in one of his famous speeches 
in 1962: 
 
Who taught you to hate the texture of your hair? Who taught you to hate the colour of 
your skin, to such extent you bleach, to get like the white man? Who taught you to hate 
the shape of your nose and the shape of your lips? Who taught you to hate yourself from 
the top of your head to the soles of your feet? Who taught you to hate your own kind? 
Who taught you to hate the race that you belong to so much so that you don’t want to be 
around each other?
39
 
 
The next sub-section examines the perspectives of the Luo on marriage.  
 
                                                          
39
 See Antihostile. (2007, June 6). Malcolm X: Who taught you to hate yourself? [Video file]. Retrieved from 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gRSgUTWffMQ (accessed 3 January 2016). 
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5.2.4 Inside the Luo Perspective on Marriage 
The findings of this research show that “ethnic”-based political exclusion has not resulted 
in the rise of a singular dominant collective Luo view on intermarriage. Several divergent views 
emerged from the participants, the most salient of which are hereby discussed. There is the 
“liberal” view that holds that marriage is a personal issue that unconcerned parties should not 
interfere with – individuals should be free to make their own choices regarding whom to 
espouse. Proponents of this view hold that marriage is inevitable and, as an institution, its 
strength transcends the superficiality of the concept of “tribe”. They would not get in the way of 
their children’s choices, for this would only be counterproductive, especially since marriage is 
the plan or will of the Almighty. A majority of the proponents of the “liberal” view are those that 
are educated, religiously or academically, that is, enlightened as to the true essence of what it is 
to be human – those whose minds are decolonized or de-ethnicized. They are mainly comprised 
of Luos who have interacted widely, or to a reasonable extent, with members of other “ethnic 
groups”. 
  
  There is a portion of Luos that accepts intermarriage, but remains very sceptical about 
forming such ties with the Kikuyu and Kalenjin “ethnic groups”. This indicates that the Kikuyu – 
Luo enmity, at the political level, is also manifesting itself at the grassroots level, in various 
other forms. The following narrative showcases some of the feelings of this lot of “sceptics”: 
   
Aiii! If a child brings a Kikuyu in my homestead . . . aiiii . . . I will chase him out of my 
yard with a huge cane. I’d beat them up thoroughly. A Kikuyu . . . Aiiii! . . . The rest he 
can just bring to me. But a Kikuyu . . . never! If your child has bought a vehicle or even a 
piece of land . . . they are in danger. Kikuyus examine carefully to see the kind of job 
your child does. That big post is what they want. Their women are cunning. They track 
you in school . . . they also go after you in church . . . if your prospects are bright, they 
stick to you. A Kikuyu I don’t want in my home, I don’t . . . they can only succeed in 
bringing one if I am too old to object strongly (FGD with women in Uasin Gishu 
County). 
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The above narrative supports the argument presented in section 5.1 above, that Luos perceive 
Kikuyus to be dishonest, treacherous, thieves and betrayers. A closely-linked view concerning 
the Kalenjin “ethnic group” also emerged when one participant stated the following: “Eeeh . . . I 
have lived with Kalenjins and I vehemently oppose intermarriage with them. They are not worth 
it. You’d rather just stay single. They are very crafty and devious!”(FGD with women in Uasin 
Gishu County).  Amongst this lot that cautions against intermarriage with the Kikuyu and 
Kalenjin, one participant made the following eye-catching comment: 
  
Intermarriage is OK since nowadays there’s a mixture. You cannot restrict someone. 
We’re trying to get rid of tribalism, but it’s not easy. The person who’s a tribalist is the 
Kikuyu. And the Nandi [Kalenjin sub-tribe] . . . Those people are very tribalist. They 
have taken the behaviour of the white man (FGD with women in Mombasa County). 
   
It is interesting that the participant that gave the above account considers “tribalist” Kikuyus and 
Kalenjins to have acquired the vice from the “white man”. This view supports the central 
argument of this thesis that “ethnic” identities have been constructed over time. It also underpins 
the argument that the term “ethnicity” is not only a spurious but also an exogenous creation and 
imposition (cf. Mafeje, 2002), and that the comprehension of this fact remains crucial to 
understanding the trajectory that political, economic and socio-cultural development has taken in 
Africa. 
   
 Amongst the Luo, there is a portion that is convinced that marriage between and amongst 
Luos is problematic. This group laments Luo pride and sees it as an obstacle to success in the 
important societal institution. For this reason, they would rather espouse individuals from other 
“ethnic groups”. Intermarriages, this lot claims, guarantee respect, a key ingredient for success 
and prosperity. With intermarriage, this group believes, it is easier to make economic progress 
and advancement in other related areas, whilst at the same time avoiding jealousies and envies, 
amongst in-laws and other family members that characterize Luo unions. These firm proponents 
of intermarriage point to Luo politicians such as James Orengo, the current Senator of Siaya 
County, as an example of such successful inter-ethnic unions. The final set comprises “realists” 
who, though convinced that “ethnicity” has no place when it comes to marriage, nevertheless 
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urges their fellow kinsmen and women to be practical and put into consideration the possibility 
of hardships associated with intermarriage in cases of political strife and conflict associated with 
power struggles as narrated by one participant: 
   
As a Christian, I don’t look at the tribe. But the society in which we live makes me think 
twice . . . Look at the post-election violence, for example; that thing taught us a lot. If you 
marry another tribe like the Kikuyu you are marginalized when such unfortunate things 
happen in a society. You are told, “Go with your wife”. So it is always very good to 
marry your tribe, because you will be able to understand them better (FGD with men in 
Nakuru County). 
  
The above narrative expresses and epitomizes the dialectic between religion/Christianity (the 
notion that all humans are created equal) and the reality of elite-driven politically-instigated 
“ethnic” “othering”/antagonisms that led, for instance, to the 2007 – 08 post-election violence in 
Kenya. Evidently, political exclusion at the national level has not translated into a single distinct 
perspective of marriage amongst the Luo. The various meanings of development, vis-à-vis 
political exclusion, as espoused by the Luo, are examined next. 
5.2.5 Political Exclusion and Economic Development in Luo Nyanza 
There is an assortment of views amongst the Luo community regarding the relationship 
between political marginalization and economic development. Some Luos feel that opposition 
politics has made the GoK apathetic towards Luo economic development. The GoK, for instance, 
seldom makes efforts to assist the region’s leaders to complete promising projects, as it does for 
other regions. A reduction of opposition politics would attract the goodwill of the government, 
which would go out of its way to assist the region’s governors to complete stalled promising 
projects such as market infrastructures. Others are of the opinion that opposition politics has, in 
fact, led to the development of not only Luo Nyanza, but the whole of Kenya. Proponents of this 
school of thought argue that the Luo-led struggle against oppression by the central government in 
Kenya has culminated in devolution of state resources, which is benefitting all citizens by 
ensuring the equitable distribution of the national bounty. County governments have empowered 
the citizen at the grassroots level of society by ensuring greater access to electricity and clean 
drinking water, besides paving the way for construction of better classrooms and roads at 
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constituency and village levels. The role of the Luo in bringing about this new dispensation was 
captured succinctly by one participant: 
    
Devolution of state resources has been brought about by the opposition. This opposition 
was driven, mainly, by one ethnic group – the Luo. The Luo sought the support of other 
ethnic groups and sensitized them to come together and call for this kind of government 
(FGD with men in Homa Bay County). 
  
A third group of Luos opines that there is no link, whatsoever, between development and 
opposition politics. It argues that development depends on the character of the individual and has 
nothing to do with opposing the government; in other words, orientation towards economic 
progress is inherent (inborn) and can never be pegged to the side of the political divide that a 
community leans toward. This perspective further argues that being in control of government 
does not necessarily translate to progress for it does not guarantee that one will help his/her 
people. It links development to ideas and not provision of funds. Luos who fall under this 
category see Raila Odinga as a wise leader who, notwithstanding his alleged ungenerous 
demeanour, has generated ideas that have culminated in freedoms and devolution of state 
resources that Kenyans enjoy today. 
Some Luos argue that, due to opposing the GoK, Luo Nyanza has witnessed outright 
economic sabotage, instigated by the state. Holders of this view contend that economic 
incapacitation of Luo Nyanza has been carried out surreptitiously – and with impunity – over the 
years. They cite the following examples of sabotage: disruption of rice irrigation schemes at 
Nyando, Kano and Ahero; the lack of support for the sugar industry, particularly the impairment 
of Miwani, Muhoroni and Chemelil sugar factories throughout the post-independence era; 
closure and relocation of production plants such as the Kenya Breweries in Kisumu; the 
incapacitation of the Molasses Project in Kisumu; and the establishment of fish processing 
industries in Central Kenya, some hundreds of miles away from Lake Victoria. These state 
orchestrations have had a devastating economic effect on Luo Nyanza over the years, particularly 
because they left many Luos jobless, idle and economically incapacitated.  
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To camouflage its punitive posture, this cluster of Luos opines, the Kenyan state has 
often appointed and worked in cahoots with “Uncle Toms” – Luo leaders who are mainly driven 
by personal enrichment and do not have the interests of the community at heart. “Uncle Toms” 
have, over the years, been made part of the oppressive Kenyan state to quell disquiet amongst the 
Luo whilst simultaneously sanctifying the state’s iniquities. They are given no space to function 
independently and bring about meaningful change in their people’s lives – they are “toothless 
bulldogs”. The Odingas, proponents of this school of thought maintain, are legitimate since they 
have often declined to accept posts in oppressive governments, and chosen the people’s side in a 
bid to bring about the desired societal changes. This perspective of Odinga challenges Kuria’s 
(2011) portrayal of Luo politicians as poor leaders and the community as aimless whiners.  It 
makes Kuria’s understanding of a competent leader seem like an individual who unquestionably 
bows to an oppressive socio-economic-political order; similarly, it casts his understanding of a 
progressive community as one that “suffers peacefully”. 
  
However, many Luos believe that those areas of Luo Nyanza associated with Luo 
political leaders that back the government – considered modern “Uncle Toms” by some – receive 
more government attention and support and are relatively more developed than the rest of the 
region. Participants highlighted the relatively more developed constituency of Rongo, whose 
Member of Parliament (MP), Dalmas Otieno, has consistently maintained cordial ties with the 
Kenyan state. Rongo, according to one participant, “is ever green. During the times of Moi, 
sugarcane farmers were paid promptly and well. There was market for the sugarcane” (FGD 
with men in Mombasa County). With regards to Rarieda Constituency, once the domain of 
Raphael Tuju, another of the contemporary Kenyan “Uncle Toms”, a participant remarked as 
follows: “If you go to Rarieda, which was under Tuju who supported government, you will 
realize that its infrastructure is developed. The roads there are well-tarmacked; schools are 
well-built” (FGD with men in Mombasa County). This perspective resonates with the Swahili 
slogan popularized by Moi during his tenure as President: “siasa nzuri, maisha nzuri; siasa 
mbaya, maisha mbaya” [prudent politics, prosperous life; uncalculated politics, impoverished 
life]. 
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The final Luo perspective on development and opposition politics in Kenya is a 
lamentation: it decries hypocritical leadership, in which Luo politicians call for unison amongst 
Luos, when it comes to rebelling and opposing the central government, but largely “eat” the 
“spoils of war” by themselves. When they get government positions, for instance during the 
reign of the Grand Coalition Government of 2008 – 13, they forget about the welfare of the 
community. The following narrative supports this view: 
  
Had it been that Luo politicians were opposing and fighting the government and using 
the little they have to assist us in our quest to develop, it would be ok. But they only keep 
to themselves, the little that they have, for they are very selfish; they never use it to help 
us. (FGD with men in Uasin Gishu County) 
 
The above narrative epitomizes the typical African politician, depicted in the introductory 
chapter of this thesis, who, having learnt from his/her colonial “mentor”, deploys the sham 
notion, “ethnicity”, for individual advancement (cf. Aquiline-Tarimo, 2008). In conclusion, the 
perceptions of the Luo, on the economic development of Luo Nyanza vis-à-vis the community’s 
political stance, are varied. The thoughts of the Luo, on whether political exclusion has translated 
into economic difficulties that have, in turn, limited the community’s chances of getting to power 
in Kenya, are outlined next. 
   
5.2.6 Kenya’s Politics of Financial Might and Alternative Perspectives for the Luo  
Politics and finances go hand-in-hand; the process of seeking political office, often 
characterized by expansive campaign efforts, involves the spending of huge sums of money 
whether it eventuates in success or not. Concerns are emerging amongst some Luo that their de 
facto leader, Raila Odinga, faces a tumultuous task if he is to dislodge his Uhuru Kenyatta-led 
Kikuyu opponents who, owing to protracted control of state power, have become comparatively 
well-heeled over time. Participants lamented that Kikuyus have continuously utilized their 
largely ill-gotten wealth to corrupt the country’s electoral body, the IEBC, by bribing its 
officials. They contend that the Luo leader, Odinga, is not in a position to use the same devious 
mechanisms, for he lacks the requisite financial wherewithal. Accordingly, there are calls 
amongst some Luo for initiatives geared towards the community’s economic empowerment, 
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which would then put the Luo in a better position to compete favourably in all socio-economic-
political facets of Kenyan society. In some quarters, calls for empowerment of the Luo appear 
not to be limited to that which is considered “legal” or “moral” – some participants call for the 
few Luos who find themselves in positions of power to engage in kleptocracy like their Kikuyu 
counterparts. They seek and call for emancipation by any means necessary. There is also the call 
for Luo leadership at all levels to apply itself insofar as creativity in devising means of raising 
funds to assist the members of the community at the grassroots level is concerned – even if it 
means aping the empowerment tactics employed by leaders of other Kenyan communities, such 
as fundraising for schools, churches and womens’ groups, through collaboration with influential 
friends from other “ethnic groups”. Proponents of such creative means of empowerment urge for 
the substitution of a confrontational stance with other resourceful mechanisms such as the 
prudent utilization of Constituency Development Funds (CDF) as captured in the account below:  
 
When the government was centralized, it was very difficult to bring development in a 
country. Now we have CDF which is given to every constituency. If a particular 
constituency lags behind in development, the central government cannot be blamed. The 
leader in-charge of the CDF funds must take the blame. Street protests and riots will not 
help us. Let our minds awaken to reality. If Raila dies today, life will go on (FGD with 
men in Mombasa County). 
 
The preceding thought-provoking narrative, which reminds the Luo that life will have to go on 
when Raila eventually breathes his last, concludes this sub-section. The next section examines 
other salient themes that emerged from my interaction with Kenyan Luos, relates them to 
contemporary Kenyan and global events, and uses the admixture, alongside the aforementioned 
Luo views, to construct a “holistic” framework to understand Kenya’s “ethnicized” politics and, 
hopefully, demystify what Mafeje (2002, p. 56) referred to as “a metaphor for things which could 
be understood otherwise”, while referring to the “ethnic” strife that bedevils the cradle of 
humankind. 
 
5.3 Towards the Unveiling of Mafeje’s “Metaphor”: Understanding Kenya’s 
“Ethnicized” Politics up to the 2013 General Election  
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As indicated in chapter one, the conceptual framework in section 1.8 is incomplete for 
ethnic-based political exclusion because it is representative or symbolic of something else 
(Mafeje, 2002) – it is a proxy variable. Through further analysis of the FGD responses and a 
systematic scrutiny of national and global events, therefore, this section outlines some of the 
components of the more complete framework – see figure 5.1 below – that, I contend, address 
the following three research questions, posed in chapter one: i) Why is “ethnicity” strongly 
correlated with the crisis of state power in Kenya? ii) Why does the Kenyan political elite class 
persist in promoting the scourge of “ethnicity” despite experience showing that this only leads to 
disaster? iii) What informs ethnic-based political exclusion in Kenya, besides the desire to 
maintain/safeguard the social formation of capital? I, however, hereby emphasise that the 
dynamics of African politics, in general, and Kenyan politics in particular, are fluid; whilst the 
West appeared to have been behind Raila Odinga in the lead-up to Kenya’s 2013 general 
election, for instance, the former seems to have altered its posture by giving a clean bill of health 
to an electoral process fraught with irregularities and illegalities that saw Uhuru Kenyatta 
declared winner in the recent 8 August 2017 general election in Kenya. Accordingly, the 
framework outlined in figure 5.1, below, is only applicable to Kenya in the context of the 
country’s 2013 general election. 
 
5.3.1 Fear and Extrajudicial Killings in Kenya 
The fieldwork for this research coincided with the IEBC protests, which began in May, 
2016. The IEBC demonstrations, organized by the leading opposition coalition in Kenya, CORD, 
under the leadership of former PM Raila Odinga, were geared towards the institution of wide-
ranging reforms in the electoral body, which has lost the faith of many Kenyans. Owing to these 
protests, which were at times characterized by unnecessary and excessively violent responses 
from the Kenya Police, several Kenyans lost their lives especially in Luo Nyanza where 
opposition to the government is fiercest. It would seem that, due to the violent manner in which 
the Kenya Police confronted the largely peaceful demonstrators, an element of fear is beginning 
to creep in amongst members of the Luo community, especially in the former Rift Valley 
Province, where the cosmopolitan counties of Nakuru and Uasin Gishu lie. Luos in these two 
areas raised concerns about organized gangs, which are funded and backed by politicians; these 
criminal groups, they contend, plan and execute attacks every time Kenya nears an 
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electioneering period. They operate discretely, away from the public eye, making it difficult for 
the undiscerning citizen to detect them. Owing to the possibility of impromptu attacks from such 
militia, Luos that reside far away from Nyanza are increasingly paranoid as Kenya heads for 
another General Election in 2017. Many Luos who registered to vote in cosmopolitan counties, 
especially Nakuru, are beginning to question their decision. Amongst this lot, there are some 
advocating for early voting followed by a mass exodus to Luo Nyanza before the results of the 
General Election are announced; others are contemplating changing their voting stations from 
precarious areas to Luo Nyanza. 
    
 Also, due to the anxiety and “ethnic” tensions, the Luos in the cosmopolitan areas of 
Nakuru and Uasin Gishu are not investing much in assets, like household items, for these would 
present a transportation challenge in the event of violence. The fear of losing their possessions to 
looters in the wake of post-election violence constrains them from expressing their economic 
desire and wherewithal to their fullest extent. In the case of Kenya, there is a strong possibility 
that some organized gangs are state-sponsored; participants stated that these criminal elements 
are given police uniforms by the GoK to mask activities associated with opaque election 
processes. These illegal gangs seem to embrace members of the “ethnic groups” in control of 
state power. They work to support state organs like the police and military, which in the case of 
Kenya are usually already compromised for they are deliberately structured to include, largely, 
members of the “ethnic groups” in control of state power. Again, this lends credence to 
Mészáros’ arguments that the “private property class”, which in the case of Africa is/was formed 
by way of fusing state power and “ethnic” ties as I have already explained in chapter two, and 
their tribal associates, are “interested in change only to the extent to which reforms and 
concessions can be integrated or institutionalized” (Mészáros, 1971, pp. 98 – 99). 
       
 Equally important, events in contemporary Kenyan society suggest, society’s 
“watchdogs” – individuals who are politically mature and understand how “ethnicity” is 
manipulated to safeguard the social formation of capital – are a hunted prey in Kenya. Indeed, 
under the reign of Uhuru and Ruto, whose first term officially ended in August 2017, 
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extrajudicial killings have increased;
40
 the most notable of these is the recent murder of 
billionaire-businessman, Jacob Juma. Juma was at the forefront in exposing what are believed to 
be egregious corruption scandals in the Jubilee Administration, some of which include the 
National Youth Service (NYS) and Eurobond allegations.
41
 Another concern that arises from an 
analysis of the FGD responses is that the Luo, who staunchly support their de facto leader, Raila 
Odinga, often without questioning the character and motives of the astute politician, could, in 
fact, be blindly following him to the detriment of their own well-being. 
 
5.3.2 Raila Odinga, the Enigma: Can he be Trusted with the Stewardship of Kenya? 
Many consider a good leader to be one who has the interests of his/her community at 
heart. Goodwill, on the part of a political aspirant, can at times be expressed by charitable works 
and social responsibility initiatives, which serve to demonstrate generosity and care, 
notwithstanding that these may not necessarily be genuinely from the heart; indeed, some would 
interpret such “charitable acts” as being amoral and geared towards bribing the 
electorate/populace to obtain votes. Nevertheless, there is a feeling amongst some Luos that their 
son, Raila Odinga, is a very tight-fisted individual who seldom demonstrates compassion in 
tangible terms; this is especially so when he is compared to his greatest opponent in the current 
political scenario in Kenya – President Uhuru Kenyatta – as narrated by one participant: 
  
Raila is very tight-fisted; that is why those people [Kikuyus] are outwitting him. For 
example . . . I am a widow and my husband left me with a grass-thatched house. During 
the last general election, in 2013, Uhuru Kenyatta sent his local agent to do some 
construction work for us. Everyone was given 25 iron sheets. You see? And if your 
location comprised at least ten houses, you were also given a Kentank [plastic water 
container] of a capacity of 100 litres. You know it, don’t you? During the rainy season, 
we fetch water and preserve it. When drought comes, we make use of the water. So you 
tell me . . . such a person . . . can you deny him your vote? Can you? You can’t. And, this 
                                                          
40
 See, for instance, Rajab, R. (2016, July 20). Extrajudicial killings are sanctioned by top government organs – 
Human Rights Watch. The Star. Retrieved from http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2016/07/20/extrajudicial-killings-
are-sanctioned-by-top-government-organs-human_c1388964 (accessed 26 August 2016). 
41
 See, for instance, BBC. (2016, May 6). Kenyan businessman Jacob Juma shot dead in Nairobi. Retrieved from 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-36225157 (accessed 26 August 2016).  
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one of ours [Raila], there’s no day he has ever done such a thing for us . . . It’s just that 
your mother cannot abandon you; that’s why we vote for Odinga (FGD with women in 
Uasin Gishu County). 
 
Although Raila strikes many Luos as trustworthy – in the sense that he has oftentimes declined to 
assume an “Uncle Tom” position, choosing instead to “suffer” with the people – and a champion 
for freedom, equality and equity, his “tight-fisted” demeanour calls into question his real motive 
for acquiring power: is he a man that can be trusted not to sell out the country entirely by 
acceding to the whims of the forces that control the world monopoly capitalist system at the 
expense of his people? It will be remembered that, during the lead-up to the 2013 General 
Election in Kenya, the Western world appeared to back the Luo politician by discrediting his 
International Criminal Court (ICC) indicted opponents, Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto, now 
President and Deputy President of Kenya, respectively. Concerning a potential Jubilee Alliance 
(the Uhuru – Ruto alliance) election victory, the then British High Commissioner to Kenya, 
Christian Turner, was quoted as saying: 
  
Whether or not the position would be for a win, we will cross that bridge when we get 
there. It is well known the position of my government and others is that we don’t get in 
contact with the ICC indictees unless it is essential. But it is not a policy specific to 
Kenya but it is a global policy and we have discussed it here with the elders.
42
 
  
And his American counterpart, Johnny Carson – the then US Assistant Secretary of State for 
African Affairs – reiterated this threat-convoyed Western stance by stating that “choices have 
consequences” as he reminded Kenyans in a tele-conference that they “live[d] in [an] inter-
connected world” in which “people should be thoughtful about the impact of their choices on the 
nation and the world”.43 In Peeling Back the Mask: A Quest for Justice in Kenya, Miguna (2012), 
                                                          
42
 See Anami, L. (2013, January 16). UK to avoid contact with ICC suspects. Standard Digital. Retrieved from 
http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000075151/uk-to-avoid-contact-with-icc-suspects (accessed 26 August 
2016). 
43
 See Mathenge, O., & Msau, N. (2013, February 8). US warns of ICC consequences. The Star. Retrieved from 
http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2013/02/08/us-warns-of-icc-consequences_c736028 (accessed 26 August 2016). 
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Raila Odinga’s former aide, paints a grim picture of the latter; one that is synonymous with the 
illustration in the FGD excerpt at the beginning of this sub-section: 
 
But once Raila was in office, being a Luo, unless you were a relative of Raila’s, did seem 
to be a hurdle to advancement . . . Ironically, when it came to his siblings, family or 
relatives, Raila conveniently forgot that they were Luos; hence the formal employment of 
Oburu (assistant minister, elder brother), Akinyi Wenwa (diplomatic post, sister), Beryl 
Achieng’ (board chair, sister), Ruth Adhiambo (personal assistant/MD Spectre, sister), 
Rosemary Akeyo (personal assistant, daughter), Fidel (personal assistant, son) and Raila 
Junior (personal assistant, son), Jakoyo Midiwo (chief whip, cousin), Elkanah Odembo 
(ambassador to the US, Jakoyo’s brother in law), Carey Orege (permanent secretary, 
cousin), Joe Ager (Kenya Power, cousin), Paul Gondi (chairman, geothermal authority, 
cousin), James Ogundo (CDF board, cousin) and many, many others. (p. 345) 
  
The callous, selfish and nepotistic depiction of Raila by Miguna should be concerning to the 
ardent Odinga supporter: although Miguna is thought to have been on a vendetta regarding the 
former PM, owing to the fact that he was sacked by the latter, it would be naïve to completely 
ignore his allegations for he was close enough to the man to know him better than the ordinary 
observer. 
 
 If indeed Odinga was a “darling” of the West, from whence the forces behind the world 
monopoly capitalist system emanate, before the Uhuru Kenyatta Jubilee Administration 
ascended to power in 2013, then he might well have been prone to manipulation and become a 
President who succumbed to new-fangled “neoliberalist” agendas and fresh neo-colonialist 
impulses at the expense of his people. It is important to note that the ruling class in Kenya also 
has its own interests: it would, therefore, not have easily allowed a “darling” of the West or a 
“puppet” politician to ascend to the presidency in the East African nation. What appears to be 
ethnic-based post-election violence in Kenya before the 2017 general election may well have had 
a hidden element to it: a struggle between the indigenous African bourgeoisie and the Western-
based globalist forces. It may well be that the Kikuyu-dominated indigenous African bourgeois 
class in Kenya was preventing the “complete” takeover of the country by neo-colonialists – an 
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objective that could be easily achieved through a “puppet” “President Raila Odinga”. If this is 
the case, then the Luo were unknowingly following their son to their own detriment. In light of 
these additional revelations, from a scrutiny of the FGDs and contemporary events, figure 5.1, 
below, depicts this study’s attempt at unveiling the “metaphor” spoken of by Mafeje (2002). I 
posit that a surreptitious power struggle between the globalists and the African nationalist 
bourgeois class in Kenya (largely comprising Kikuyus and Kalenjins) was the major reason why 
“ethnicity” was strongly related to the crisis of state power in the country up to the 2013 general 
election.
44
 One side of the political elite class (the comprador bourgeoisie largely comprising 
Luos) was very likely under the sponsorship of globalists, who seek total domination of world 
economic affairs. The ruling (Kikuyu) nationalist bourgeois class in Kenya seems not to have 
been willing to cede its economic independence to the globalists; accordingly, it persisted in 
promoting the scourge of “ethnicity” despite experience showing that this leads to disasters, like 
post-election violence, which it considered a lesser evil in comparison to neo-colonialism. 
                                                          
44
 “Ethnic” animosity persists, in Kenya, even as it gears itself for a repeat election in October 2017, following the 
nullification of Uhuru Kenyatta’s 8 August 2017 “win” by the country’s Supreme Court on 1 September 2017. 
However, in a very strange twist of events, and perhaps to demonstrate the fluidity of African politics and the 
duplicity of the globalists, it appears that the West has dumped Odinga; it now seems to prefer Kenyatta, the face of 
Kenya’s Kikuyu/Kalenjin hegemonic class. Are the two camps of capitalists now in bed with each other at the 
expense of the impoverished Kenyan masses? One wonders.   
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Figure 5.1: Conceptual Framework to Understand “Ethnicized” Politics in Kenya up to 2013. 
Source: Author’s construct (2017) 
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It could be said, therefore, that the Luo have thus been consistently and continuously excluded 
from political participation because they have been doing the bidding of the globalists, albeit 
unknowingly, by vehemently supporting the latter’s “agent” in Kenya – Raila Odinga – during 
the period under study. A summary of the findings of this constructivist stage of the research 
follows next. 
 
5.4 Summary of Findings  
The preceding discussions focused on Luo interpretations of the socio-cultural-economic 
consequences of political exclusion/marginalization. Based on Foucault’s methodology – 
genealogy of power – the chapter has revisited the Kenyatta-Odinga rivalry and outlined 
contemporary perspectives of the Luo on the enmity. The chapter reveals that owing to the 
rivalry between the two historical figures, relations between the Luo and the Kikuyu “ethnic 
groups” have deteriorated immensely in Kenya. More than three decades after his demise, 
Kenyatta’s deculturalization technique, discussed in chapter two, remains profoundly embedded 
in Kenyan society. The latter’s subjugation device – the circumcision myth – is, seemingly, 
being utilized subtly in a well-calculated strategy to keep the Luo completely outside mainstream 
societal affairs in Kenya. It looks like the circumcision myth is operating beyond the 
national/political level; it appears to be playing a noticeable role at the grassroots level in 
diminishing ordinary Luos’ chances of earning a decent living and obtaining anticipated and 
commensurate rewards for effort and hard work. 
 
Owing to frustrations associated with the myth, widespread feelings of apathy and utter 
resentment towards the GoK are beginning to arise amongst the Luo with some of the 
community’s members exhibiting a desire for secession. However, the violent methods utilized 
by the Kenyan state in quashing erstwhile secessionist movements seem to have held in check 
any breakaway attempts by the Luo, some of whom now appear to be opting instead for 
conformist measures geared, amongst other aims, towards gaining them acceptance as fully-
fledged members of the Kenyan society. Jomo Kenyatta’s standpoint, which linked civility and 
legitimate citizenship to male circumcision, has translated into tremendous economic difficulties 
at the grassroots level for the majority of Luos. The most conspicuous of these difficulties seems 
to be lack of access to loans from financial institutions. The study suggests that some financial 
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institutions in Kenya, especially those founded by members of the ruling “ethnic groups”, exist 
fundamentally to serve the interests of their kin in what could well be a ploy to perpetuate the 
social formation of capital. The study also shows that the African surname is playing the 
unenviable role of facilitating prejudice in socio-economic relations experienced by the Luo in 
Kenyan society. Other areas of economic difficulty for the Luo, associated with attempts to 
safeguard the structural determination of capital in Kenya, include difficulties with government 
funds and grants, employment, access to certain markets and/or entry into certain 
professions/business ventures, and government contracts and tenders. 
  
Despite the economic hardships associated with political exclusion of the Luo in Kenya, 
the study reveals, a section of the community remains convinced that all humans are created 
equal and would, therefore, not retaliate by favouring fellow Luos if granted influential positions 
in society. However, owing to politically-instigated economic afflictions, this sense of high-
mindedness is gradually waning in some Luos. This portion of exasperated Luos subscribes to, 
and advocates for, the eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth philosophy. The Luo perspective, on 
whether Luos help each other, given the predicament they collectively face – the economic 
consequences of political exclusion – is almost completely negative. Narratives from the 
discussions held with members of the community disclose an overwhelming phenomenon that 
can, perhaps, best be described as “self-hate”. This “self-hate” phenomenon not only thrives 
amongst the community’s political leaders, but abounds at the grassroots level as well. Most of 
the other Kenyan “ethnic groups”, the study suggests, are relatively more “intelligent” and are 
appraising their political and economic chances in Kenya with the reality that they live in an 
environment and context of “ethnic” competition and rivalry. The Luo are ostensibly yet to wake 
up fully to this reality; otherwise, they would put aside their arrogance and “self-hate” and join 
hands to work together as a people, to help uplift their living standards, as a reactionary measure 
to being politically side-lined by the GoK, during the period under study. 
 
The Luo perspective on marriage is significantly multidimensional; evidently, political 
exclusion at the national level has not translated into the adoption of exclusivity amongst the 
Luo, with regard to this social phenomenon. Similarly, the findings of this research indicate that 
there is a multiplicity of views amongst those in the Luo community, regarding the interplay 
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between political marginalization and economic development. The various perspectives 
uncovered in this study include the following: Luo opposition has generated government apathy 
and stands in the way of the extra state provision that would assist Luo Nyanza leaders in the 
completion of some of the region’s projects; opposition politics has, in fact, led to greater 
development of not only Luo Nyanza, but of the whole of Kenya; development is a matter of 
individual wisdom and character and has no link whatsoever to opposition politics; due to 
opposing the GoK, Luo Nyanza has witnessed outright economic sabotage, instigated by the 
state; those areas of Luo Nyanza associated with Luo political leaders that back the GoK – 
considered modern “Uncle Toms” by some – receive more GoK attention and support and are 
relatively more developed than the rest of the region; and, lastly, there is hypocritical leadership, 
in which Luo politicians call for unison amongst Luos when it comes to rebelling and opposing 
the GoK, but largely “eat” the “spoils of war” by themselves. 
  
Various other important issues emerged during the FGDs that warrant a mention, for 
some of them may well determine the trajectory of Kenyan and Luo politics in the years to come. 
As Kenya heads towards the 2017 General Election, the study shows, an element of fear is 
beginning to creep in amongst the Luo community. This is especially the case with those Luos 
who live in cosmopolitan counties like Nakuru. This paranoia is largely due to the violent 
manner in which the Kenyan Police confronted the largely peaceful demonstrators, which called 
for fundamental changes in the electoral body, the IEBC. Also, concerns are emerging amongst 
some Luo that their de facto leader, Raila Odinga, faces a tumultuous task if he is to dislodge his 
Uhuru Kenyatta-led Kikuyu opponents who, owing to protracted control of state power have 
become comparatively well-heeled over time. As a result, in some quarters, calls for 
empowerment of the Luo appear not to be limited to that considered “legal” or “moral” – a 
portion the community is calling for emancipation by any means necessary. Other Luos, in what 
seems like a change of tactic, are calling for the substitution of a confrontational stance with a 
more resourceful (creative) one, epitomized by the employment and maximization of alternative 
means to economic empowerment and development, including the prudent utilization of CDF 
funds. 
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Finally, concerning Raila Odinga, the study reveals that there are various antithetical 
characteristics with regards to his persona – some of which would make one question whether, in 
fact, he is the leader who can propel Kenya to the next frontier, in terms of the good and 
accountable leadership they yearn for. Most Luos/Kenyans still regard him as their legitimate 
leader, who has the interests of the community/county at heart, since he has often declined to 
accept government posts for personal gain and is seemingly a wise adviser, whose ideas have led 
to freedom, development and equitable distribution of resources in Kenya. However, to some he 
is a very tight-fisted individual who seldom demonstrates compassion in monetary terms – a 
callous, selfish and nepotistic potential “puppet” of the West. What appeared to be ethnic-based 
post-election violence in Kenya until 2013 may well have had a hidden element to it: a struggle 
between the indigenous African nationalist bourgeois class (“anti-Odinga forces”) and the 
Western-based, globalist forces behind the world monopoly capitalist system (“pro-Odinga 
forces”). 
  
The next chapter examines historical records to gauge the GoK’s economic engagement 
with Luo Nyanza during the period under study, with a special focus on Mészáros’ 
understanding of “equity”, that is, equality of access to opportunity, equality of participation in 
the opportunity, and the outcome of equal participation (cf. Mészáros, 2001a; Mészáros, 2001b; 
Mészáros, 2009). It does this through the prism of what appears to have been a ferocious power 
struggle between the nationalist bourgeois class in Kenya and the globalists – the forces behind 
the world monopoly capitalist system – during the period ending 2013, as depicted in figure 5.1 
above. It is also guided by the theoretical framework and alternative theories discussed in chapter 
two; the analysis centres on five areas of public provision, as follows: education, healthcare, 
housing, electricity and rural water supplies. 
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Chapter 6 
An Historical Analysis of the Impact of Kenya’s “Ethnicized” Politics on the Socio-
economic Development of the Luo, 1963 – 2013  
6 Introduction 
The findings in chapters four and five suggest that there is a strong relationship between 
opposition politics and minimal public investment in Luo Nyanza during the period under study. 
In order to verify the validity of these sentiments, this chapter looks at independent Kenya’s 
historical records – Budget Speeches, Economic Surveys and Statistical Abstracts – to establish 
the proportions and outcomes of public investment undertaken by the GoK in the country’s eight 
provinces from 1963 – 2013. The analysis is centred on five areas of public provision, as 
follows: education, healthcare, housing, electricity and rural water supplies. As enunciated in the 
problem statement in chapter one, this chapter concerns itself with equity – in terms of equality 
of access to opportunity, equality of participation in the opportunity, and the outcome of equal 
participation (cf. Mészáros, 2001a; Mészáros, 2001b; Mészáros, 2009). Alongside chapter two’s 
theoretical framework and literature review, analysis of findings have been carried out and 
conclusions drawn vis-à-vis the various meanings of development as espoused by the Luo, in 
chapter five. For convenience purposes, this chapter, the second qualitative phase of the research, 
is divided into five historical phases as follows: 1963 – 1973; 1973 – 1983; 1983 – 1993; 1993 – 
2003; and 2003 – 2013. In full cognizance of the fact that development, whichever its kind, does 
not occur in a vacuum, this chapter adopts some of the ideas espoused in the conceptual 
framework unveiled in figure 5.1, in chapter five, that developments in Kenya – be they social, 
political or economic – take place within a context characterized by tensions and power struggles 
between the indigenous African nationalist bourgeois class and the forces behind the world 
monopoly capitalist system (globalists). Accordingly, in each historical phase, the state of 
Kenyan politics and economy, vis-à-vis prevalent global interactions, intrusions and events, will 
be discussed, as appropriate, followed by the development projects and programmes undertaken 
by the GoK, and an analysis of the outcome of these government initiatives. This will give the 
historical phase of this study a contextual background and make the findings of this crucial stage 
more meaningful. Each of the aforementioned historical phases is now sequentially analysed. 
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6.1 1963 – 73: The Era of Squatter Settlement and Debt Accumulation in Kenya 
6.1.1 State of the Kenyan Economy, 1963 – 73  
As Kenya prepared itself for self-determination in 1963, few would-be citizens of the 
East African nation realized the real situation that lay ahead of them: they would not only be 
victims of the negative consequences of the “ethnic” divisions instigated by the British 
administrators at the advent of colonialism, but also continuous toilers, overwhelmed by the 
uncertainties of life under the “indomitable” capitalist regime that loomed. The same ignorance, 
though, cannot be attributed to Malcolm MacDonald, the last Governor of British Kenya, who in 
1963 was quoted as aptly capturing, albeit inadvertently, the situation that the desire for socio-
economic-political world domination spearheaded by his “Queen” had created for Africans even 
if he fell short of apportioning the blame to his “race”: “You can allay suspicions, curb passions, 
and weaken rivalries, and combine the tribes and communities which have divided Kenya in the 
past into the united nation of the present and the future. The slogan for that effort is Haraambe” 
(Government of Kenya Hansard [GoKH], 1963, p.11). The British colonialists acceded to 
Kenya’s demands for independence not merely because the African guerrilla had outdone the 
latter, but largely because colonialism had accomplished its intended role of affixing Africa 
unswervingly into the maelstrom of the world monopoly capitalist economy (cf. Oloo, 2004) and 
had prepared the continent for the next stage of exploitation – neo-colonialism. The particular 
role crafted for Kenya was shrewdly mentioned, and is discernible to the keen observer, in 
another statement attributed to Governor MacDonald: 
         
One of the Government’s and your duties will be to exploit further Kenya’s natural 
resources: to preserve and develop its agriculture, expand the variety of its economy, 
encourage local and overseas investors, extend its home and external markets, cherish 
that national treasure, your Game Reserves and National Parks, and in any other way 
stimulate the country’s material developments. The chief purpose of all that is to provide 
the means to give employment, education, health and a good living standard to everyone. 
(GoKH, 1963, p. 17)    
 
Kenya’s role would be to produce agricultural products for sale, in unprocessed form, in order to 
“quench the thirst” of European industries. No significant form of technology, necessary for 
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ensuring “true” independence of the “new” country, would be transferred to the Africans – this 
would perpetuate their state of dependency and play a huge role in hampering the desirable 
“good living standards” alluded to in the above quotation. Granted, it is naïve to expect anyone 
to haphazardly transfer technological knowhow that gives him/her an edge over fellow humans, 
given the competitive nature of the world; however, in a situation of goodwill, in which a “new” 
nation-state is born, it is not analytically injudicious to contemplate this probable gesture. Kenya 
was apparently also encouraged to depend on foreign capital (overseas investors) for its 
economic growth and open up its other natural resources, parks and reserves, for enjoyment by 
leisure-seeking, moneyed Europeans. In a nutshell, Kenya did not truly gain independence in 
1963; colonialism mutated. This reality was succinctly captured in the words of Kenya’s first 
Finance Minister (1963 – 70), James Gichuru, who stated the following in 1968: “Kenya is a 
country which is very much at the mercy of world economic forces over which we have little or 
no control” (GoKH, 1968, p. 1135). 
   
A perceptive individual, Kenyatta was amongst the first Kenyan/African leaders to 
understand Kenya’s/Africa’s vulnerability; Kenya, indeed, was a banana republic. The 
realization that he was not really in charge of affairs, that circumstances beyond his control 
would determine the nation’s economic trajectory, made the old man panic; in order to appear 
like he was the one running the show and ensure that he remained relevant in the eyes of his 
“subjects”, he moved fast to consolidate state power. Indeed, by 1965 he had amended the 
Independence (Majimbo) Constitution that “provided for regional governments and also for a 
new set-up of local authorities” and “transfer[ed] . . . primary education, roads, health, including 
graduated personal tax from county councils to Central Government” (GoKH, 1970, p. 1420). 
Throughout the period 1963 – 73, the GoK experienced tremendous challenges with regard to the 
country’s balance of payments position; predictably, Kenya imported more than it exported. The 
internal demand for capital goods far outweighed the external market for the country’s main 
foreign exchange earners, coffee and tea. To further comprehend the magnitude of “independent” 
Kenya’s predicament and subservient position, consider Gichuru’s 1966 lamentations: 
              
[T]here is no point in industrial countries claiming to want to help and then failing to 
provide markets for the produce of the poorer nations who frequently have seen the 
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benefits of greater production lost through falling prices, lack of markets and increases in 
prices of imports. Indeed, restrictive trade measures against goods from developing 
countries are becoming quite widespread in the industrial nations. This international 
problem requires re-examination of aid and trade policies, for what under-developed 
countries need is not only aid but also trade. (GoKH, 1966, p. 717)    
  
With regard to Kenya’s dependency on foreign aid, the country was inundated with offers 
of financial “assistance” in the form of loans from various external quarters. “Assistance” was 
obtained from, amongst other entities, the British Government, the West German Government, 
the International Bank, the Colonial Development Corporation, the US Government, and the 
Commonwealth Development Corporation; other “assistance” was acquired from international 
financial institutions like the IMF and the World Bank. Through this “assistance”, Kenya 
financed its settlement programmes – to be discussed in greater detail shortly – and the usual 
recurrent and development expenditures. Notably, though, the severity of the country’s 
dependency on foreign aid was such that it had to wait till the financial year 1968 – 69 to finally 
finance its entire recurrent expenditure budget without factoring in funds sourced externally; this 
fact supports my “mutation” assertion. External debt obligations arising from this “assistance” 
would in the following decades cripple the country’s development agenda almost in its entirety. 
Moreover, desperation arising from this consequence would further cement Kenya’s 
submissiveness and expose the country to the whims of the IMF and World Bank – the 
cryptograms of the world monopoly capitalist (globalist) forces – which were enforced in Kenya 
in the 1990s through neoliberalism and its associated structural adjustments. Loans from these 
international financial institutions are nothing more than indirect subjugation tools; bait used to 
hook unsuspecting, developing nations. Once the loanee countries are overburdened and cannot 
afford to meet their debt obligations, they are “taken over” by external forces: they are given 
concessions and/or further aid assistance on condition that they totally liberalize their economies 
for conquest, usually by the globalist forces associated with the world monopoly capitalist 
system that run/control the international financial institutions. Nevertheless, the period 1963 – 73 
will go down as a glorious decade when compared to others that followed it; the country’s Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) growth was both stable and consistent, as depicted in figure 6.1 and 
table 6.1 below:   
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Table 6.1: Kenya’s Economic Performance, 1963 – 73 
YEAR 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
GDP GROWTH (%) 6.5 5.3 0.8 10.4 4.7 6.6 5.6 6.3 5.7 6.9 6.5 
Source: Republic of Kenya Economic Surveys, 1963 – 73  
Figure 6.1: Kenya’s GDP Growth Rate, 1963 –73. 
Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya’s Economic Surveys, 1963 – 73 
  
The highest GDP growth rate was recorded in 1966 and the decade’s average GDP growth rate – 
approximately 6% – was impressive. Although borrowing for purposes of development was 
intense at this time, the GoK seemingly struck a good balance between proposed development 
projects and programmes, and its spending capacity. The manner in which the country made use 
of its largely, externally sourced finances between 1963 and 1973 is examined next. 
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6.1.2 GoK Development Initiatives, 1963 – 73  
6.1.2.1 Land Settlement Schemes 
The GoK’s development agenda from 1963 to 1973 was primarily dominated by land 
settlement schemes. The British colonial policy of appropriating fertile African land for purposes 
of actualizing European capitalist enterprises (settler agriculture) left many Africans (mainly 
Kikuyus, Maasais and the Kalenjin) landless; squatter-settlement thus became a major issue in 
the Kenyatta Administration’s agenda immediately upon its ascension to power. The state, 
undoubtedly, was to play a leading part in purchasing land for poor Africans: negotiations for a 
five-year expanded settlement scheme, in which 1,000,000 acres of land were to be transferred to 
the latter, had been concluded prior to independence in 1963 (GoKH, 1964, p. 220). As already 
mentioned, loans from the British Government were pivotal in financing settlement. The priority 
accorded to settlement was such that out of a total estimated expenditure of £14.1 million in 
financial year 1963 – 64, £6.2 million was apportioned to such schemes (GoKH, 1963, p. 23); 
and out of the £16 million set aside for development in financial year 1965 – 66, £6 million was 
used for settlement (GoKH, 1965, p. 264). By 1964, about 15,000 families had benefited from 
the scheme; in 1965, about 12,000 more families would benefit (GoKH, 1964, p. 220). 
  
Present-day Kikuyu dominance in an area that is not their traditional homeland – for 
currently, they are the major landowners in the former Rift Valley Province of which Nakuru and 
Uasin Gishu Counties were part – indicates that the community was the greatest beneficiary of 
this settlement scheme. Kalenjin bitterness, arising out of the fact that Kenyatta “gave” the 
community’s land to his “tribesmates”, is one of the major grievances that led to the 2007 – 08 
post-election violence in Kenya. Moi’s eventual appointment by Kenyatta to the Vice-
Presidency, following the Odinga fallout, was a tactful move by the founding father to quell 
disquiet amongst the aggrieved Kalenjin. Concerning the Luo, they most certainly were not 
considered under this scheme, for the community did not lose its land during the colonial era: 
indeed, about Luo Nyanza, it was noted by European administrators around 1905 that “[t]he 
native interests [we]re predominant [and that] there exist[ed] very little land in large blocks 
available for white settlement”; moreover, it is further stated in the colonial administrators’ 
records that “[t]he climatic conditions of these areas however [we]re such as not to be favourable 
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for white settlement”.45 Technically, though, they could benefit, if they so wished, from a 
parallel, market-driven scheme, operated on a willing-buyer-willing-seller basis, and financed by 
loans from the Land Bank in Kenya. The manner in which Kenyatta dealt with the settlement of 
squatters is demonstrative of one of the arguments espoused in the theoretical framework of this 
thesis that political power is a vehicle to economic prosperity in Africa, since whoever controls 
the state decides the manner in which the scarce resources will be allocated (cf. Odinga, 2007; 
Singh & vom Hau, 2015; Mullard, 2005); however, on the part of the Luo, history definitely 
conspired against the community with regard to this land issue. Concerning the Kalenjin case, 
these findings also support another core argument of this thesis: indeed, the original owners of 
much of the land that was appropriated by colonialists could not get it back because, as this study 
argues in its theoretical framework, the “ethnic groups” that control state power do not allocate 
the dominated groups an equitable share of the national bounty. The next sub-section analyses 
agricultural development during the period 1963 – 73. 
  
6.1.2.2 Agricultural Development, 1963 – 73  
Another priority area on the GoK’s development agenda during the period 1963–73 was 
the agricultural sector. A thorough scrutiny of this sector reveals that strong arguments can be 
made for either side of the debate as to whether Luo Nyanza was short-changed by the central 
government in the provision of public investment regarding agriculture. The two prevalent 
perspectives – capitalism and uneven development, and subtle sabotage, as discussed in the 
theoretical background to this thesis in chapter 2 – are hereby examined. 
 
6.1.2.2.1 Capitalism and Uneven Development Vis-à-vis Kenyan Agriculture 
Historical records – the budget speeches – show that the GoK engaged coffee and tea 
farmers more meticulously, addressing their concerns in holistic fashion, as opposed to those that 
grew wheat, maize and sugarcane. Even though the GoK periodically reviewed its pricing 
policies to boost the income of maize and wheat farmers (GoKH, 1971, p. 1175), for instance, it 
went a step further in its efforts to support the coffee and tea sectors, as substantiated by the 
Finance Minister in the 1967 Budget Speech: 
                                                          
45
 See Report on the progress and condition of the Kisumu Province, East Africa Protectorate, for the twelve months 
ending 31st March 1908 (KNA/PC/NZA/1/3), p. 1. 
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The plan for tea development . . . [which involves] . . . [i]mproved methods of producing 
better quality planting material are being applied and the Government is hopeful that by 
1970, there should be no limit of the planting material available to the smallholders. It is 
also planned to build 11 more factories to bring the total number of factories at the 
disposal of the smallholders to 18 factories by 1973. (GoKH, 1967, p. 967) 
 
This behaviour on the part of the GoK can be explained by the fact that coffee and tea are the 
country’s foremost foreign exchange earners; for Kenya to be able to engage in international 
trade, therefore, these two cash crops have to be prioritized. Of equal importance, this study 
shows, donor countries and agencies have a great say in, and sometimes even dictate, the 
development agenda of aid recipients. In 1963, for instance, it was stated by Kenya’s Finance 
Minister that “[o]n the agricultural side we are following closely the recommendation of the 
World Bank, and the programme for tea development is going ahead according to plan” (GoKH, 
1963, p. 23). This statement supports my earlier contentions that when “independence” was 
finally granted to the East African nation, a specific, “suitable” role had already been identified 
for it in the world monopoly capitalist system. Tea and coffee, which seem to be very important 
to the industrialized nations that often control the world market, happen to grow, mainly, in the 
areas occupied by the Kikuyu and Kalenjin; Luo Nyanza, on the other hand, is suitable for the 
growth of sugarcane and cotton. It may be argued that the importation of sugar by the GoK (cf. 
e.g., GoKH, 1972, p. 123), though geared towards meeting the country’s needs, may have served 
to sabotage the efforts of Luos in this agricultural sub-sector; however, from a realistic viewpoint 
and from Kenya’s world market perspective, sugar and cotton are not as strategic as coffee and 
tea (see figure 6.2 below). This somewhat nullifies the notion of sabotage – when it comes to 
development – that can be attributed to crop farming, for soil and climate suitability issues are 
not a consequence of man’s actions, but those of supernatural forces whose activities have been 
referred to as fortuitous happenings in some quarters (cf. Mandel, 1968, as cited in Bond 1999). 
These findings corroborate the arguments of Oloo (2004), a major advocate of the Theory of 
Uneven Development, who contends that poverty in Luo Nyanza can be explained by the fact 
that “capitalism develops in contradictory ways . . . within the boundaries of a single country” 
(What is Uneven Development? section, para. 1). The alternative perspective, in which it may be 
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argued that the GoK imperceptibly sabotaged the agricultural efforts of Luos in a bid to frustrate 
the supporters of its fiercest critics, is briefly discussed next.   
 
 
Figure 6.2: Composition of Kenya’s Exports in 1961. 
Source: Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Economic Survey 1962, p. 10 
 
6.1.2.2.2 Subtle Sabotage of Luo Nyanza? 
There is a very strong possibility – evidence from the budget speeches seems to show – 
that the GoK engaged in a very subtle kind of discrimination geared at sabotaging the 
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agricultural prospects of Luo Nyanza during the period 1963–73. It would seem that, in the case 
of Luo Nyanza, support was limited to the provision of roads for the sugar areas (cf. e.g., GoKH, 
1968, p. 1147); on the other hand, extension services and loans were availed to small-scale tea 
and coffee farmers, as described below: 
 
[S]mall-holders have become the principal producers of coffee in Kenya. Indeed, the 
great increase in the production by small-holders of a number of other crops, not only 
coffee, is an indication of the success of the Government’s policies of land consolidation 
and registration, and of the rapid increase in the provision of agricultural extension 
services and credit facilities. (GoKH, 1968, p. 1139) 
 
It may be argued that the provision of roads, no matter how essential and well-intentioned, is an 
obligatory exercise that does not directly intervene in an individual’s life; facilitation of loans for 
small-scale holdings is much more direct and has a greater bearing on people’s lives. Coupled 
with the “questionable” importation of sugar undertaken by the GoK towards the end of this 
period, avoidance of the aforementioned direct engagement with the Luo leaves the Kenyatta-led 
GoK susceptible to allegations of favouritism towards its enthusiasts – mainly members of the 
Kikuyu “ethnic group”. This finding of possible favouritism of the Kikuyu by Kenyan authorities 
resonates with the numerous lamentations of the Luo discussed in the FGDs and the school of 
thought that argues that due to opposing the GoK, Luo Nyanza has witnessed outright economic 
sabotage, instigated by the state, as explained in sub-section 5.2.5 of chapter five. I now turn my 
attention to the specific projects undertaken by the GoK from 1963 to 1973.  
 
6.1.2.3 GoK Development Projects, 1963 – 73 
A general examination of the development projects undertaken by the GoK from 1963 to 
1973 reveals an element of robustness and all-inclusiveness; the approach adopted by the state 
was of such nature that the interests of the diverse economic sectors and most “ethnic groups” 
were catered to in one way or another. Regarding Luo Nyanza, the budget speeches show that the 
traditional homeland of the Luo community was considered, in some way, in most of the 
development schemes undertaken in this era. A brief discussion of some of these development 
projects vis-à-vis Kenya in general, and the Luo in particular, follows next.  
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In a bid to ensure that Nairobi’s water supply needs were met, in 1963 the GoK embarked 
on a project aimed at raising the Sasumua Dam – a project funded by aid from the US and the 
UK, following deals brokered by James Gichuru, Tom Mboya and Masinde Muliro in August 
1962. Provision of electricity, a pressing need all over the country, was also prioritized: in this 
regard, the GoK initiated the hydro-electric power project at Seven Folks Dam. The Mombasa 
Road Project, which sought to link the port town to the city of Nairobi and other nearby areas, 
was also initiated during this period. In the course of this phase, the GoK financed projects 
geared at ensuring and stabilizing water supply in Mombasa, as well. Perhaps to demonstrate its 
policy posture concerning the East-West Rivalry of the Cold War Era in 1965, prior to the fallout 
between Odinga and Kenyatta, the Russian Hospital Project at Kisumu was approved by the 
GoK; Gichuru, the Finance Minister, stated unequivocally that the country was “in this matter 
completely non-aligned, and . . . only too eager to receive aid in acceptable form from any 
country or overseas institution” (GoKH, 1965, p. 270). The Chemelil Sugar Project in Luo 
Nyanza, supported entirely by funds from West Germany, in which a factory was constructed, 
factory machinery financed and £1 million provided for the growth and development of 
sugarcane also characterized this era (cf. GoKH, 1965, p. 270).  
 
From 1966, when animosity towards the Odinga-led opposition by Kenyatta’s 
Government began to become evident, other “nationalistic” projects were undertaken by the state 
including the following: a Teacher-Training College at the Coast, the Ngong Medium Wave 
Transmission Station, and the Forest Department’s Extraction Roads Unit at Kaptagat (cf. 
GoKH, 1967, p. 956). In 1967, possibly to prove that the Kenyatta – Odinga animosity was not 
amongst the determinants of its policy stance on development, the GoK unveiled development 
plans, which included Luo Nyanza when the Finance Minister, Gichuru, stated the following:    
 
Among the new projects to be financed are the Eldoret/Tororo and Athi River/Namanga 
roads, otherwise known as the Great North Road, Sugar roads in the Chemelil/Muhoroni 
area, Mombasa Television, the Kenyatta National Teaching Hospital, improvements to 
Airports and Airstrips, and building works at the University College, Nairobi. Projects 
already started which are expected to be completed during the year include the 
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Nairobi/Mombasa road, Kenya Polytechnic Extensions, Homa Bay Hospital and the One 
Million-Acre Settlement Scheme. (GoKH, 1967, p. 957)                   
 
Also, inclusion of Luo Nyanza in the GoK’s development agenda prevailed shortly before 
Odinga’s KPU was proscribed and Mboya assassinated in 1969; this is apparent in the following 
excerpt obtained from the statement of Financial Year 1968 – 69:  
 
The biggest single project in the field of health will be the start of the extensions of the 
Kenyatta National Hospital which as Honourable Members will know is to become the 
teaching hospital for Kenya medical students. The new hospital at Homa Bay will be 
completed and the programme of modernizing such facilities as kitchens, laundries, out-
patient sections at the provincial and district hospitals all over the country at an estimated 
cost of K£200,000 will be pursued. (GoKH, 1968, p. 1148)   
 
This crucial historical phase, in which the framework for Kenya’s economy was constructed, saw 
a myriad of other government projects embarked on in the interests of the nation, including the 
following: housing programmes for middle-income earners such as Nairobi’s Uhuru Estate; 
Nairobi Industrial Estate; the Forestry Development Programme; water programmes for North-
Eastern Province; Turbo Afforestation Scheme; Broderick Falls Pulp and Paper Mill; housing for 
the Armed Forces and the Police; and, Embakasi Airport extension (cf. GoK Budget Speeches, 
1963 – 73).  
 
 In concluding this sub-section, it is noteworthy that, based on the major development 
projects undertaken by the GoK during this phase of the study, it is difficult to make a case for 
the deliberate short-changing of the Luo in the provision of public investment, owing to 
opposition politics, during the first decade of independence. At face value, the development 
projects undertaken by the GoK during this era exhibit national interest, robustness, and all-
inclusiveness, and seem to transcend the Kenyatta-Odinga rivalry. An examination of the 
outcome of the GoK’s development programmes and projects, in a bid to establish whether, in 
fact, this conclusion – that the Luo were not short-changed – is cast in stone, follows next.    
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6.1.3 An Analysis of the Outcome of GoK Public Investment, 1963 – 73  
I have already discussed, in this historical phase of the study, how Kenyatta had 
completely centralized power by 1965 and, amongst other things, transferred the role of 
provision of primary education, roads and health from county councils to the Central 
Government. In this sub-section, I carry on one step further and examine the outcomes of public 
investment instigated at the national level of government as disclosed by various historical 
records – the GoK’s Economic Surveys and Statistical Abstracts. My focus is on five areas of 
public provision, viz.: education, health services, housing, electricity and water supplies. 
 
6.1.3.1 Education Outcomes, 1963 – 73 
The outcome of GoK public investment in primary school education was as depicted in 
figure 6.3 below; the GoK provides figures of enrolment in primary school, from the year 1965, 
which serves as the beginning point in the analysis of this particular public provision.
46
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
46
 For a comprehensive look at the exact numerical figures, from whence the graphical illustrations contained in this 
entire chapter derive, refer to Appendix E. 
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Figure 6.3: Primary School Enrolment by Province, 1965 – 73. 
Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1965 – 73   
 
The outcome of GoK investment in primary education shows that the greatest beneficiary was 
the president’s backyard – Central Province – which experienced a continuous steady rise in 
enrolment figures. Eastern was second, followed by Nyanza, the traditional homeland of the Luo, 
Rift Valley, and Western, in that order. Coast, Nairobi and North Eastern were sixth, seventh and 
eighth, respectively. Although Nyanza witnessed a general growth in primary school enrolment 
over this historical phase, continuous stable progress was not witnessed in the province until 
after 1970. This is unlike Central and Eastern, whose figures show stable growth throughout this 
historical phase. A vast majority of the country’s school-going population lives in the rural areas 
of the country; this largely explains the poor performances of Nairobi and Coast Provinces, 
which are home to some of the country’s largest metropolitan areas. North Eastern, on the other 
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hand, is a very sparsely populated arid area. The enrolment outcomes at the secondary school 
level were as shown in figure 6.4 below.     
 
 
Figure 6.4: Secondary School Enrolment by Province, 1968 – 73. 
Source: Constructed from Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1968 – 73  
 
In a trend similar to the one depicted in the primary school category, the president’s backyard led 
in the secondary school enrolment numbers, which were characterized by a steady rise 
throughout the period 1968 – 73. It is striking that the other provinces, especially Eastern, 
Nyanza, Rift Valley and Western, which performed well in enrolment at a primary level, did not 
witness the same success in this category. The fact that Nairobi, which enrolled far fewer pupils 
at the primary level, consistently recorded greater numbers at the secondary level than the 
aforementioned four provinces, shows that transition rates to secondary school in the rest of 
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Kenya were very poor. This indicates that the Luo and other non-Kikuyu Kenyan “ethnic 
groups” did not have equality of participation in secondary education during the first decade of 
independence in Kenya. The dismal figures recorded by the North Eastern Province can be 
explained by the fact that it is a very sparsely populated region because of its unfavourable semi-
arid climate. The outcomes of public provision in health services are examined next.  
 
6.1.3.2 Health Provision Outcomes, 1963 – 73 
As early as the 1970s, Kenya had established a national family planning programme 
aimed at providing free service for patients who desired to plan their families. This programme, 
besides providing family planning services, targeted maternal and child health and was aimed at 
combating malnutrition. Family planning centres were run, mainly, from provincial and district 
hospitals. Mobile clinics were also operationalized for this purpose. The figures for attendance at 
these family planning clinics, which the GoK started to provide from the year 1970, were as 
depicted in figure 6.5 below.  
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Figure 6.5: Attendance at Family Planning Clinics by Province, 1970 – 73. 
Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1970 – 73  
 
The evidence clearly shows that the greatest beneficiaries of this public provision were the 
capital, Nairobi, and Central, the president’s turf. They were followed by Eastern, Coast and Rift 
Valley Provinces, respectively. Perhaps owing to a combination of religious-inspired negative 
attitudes towards the practice and the nomadic lifestyle of most of its largely Muslim pastoralist 
inhabitants, this service was not accorded to the North Eastern Province. However, it is 
important to note that, historically, the region has been at loggerheads with the Kenyan state and 
this could also be a factor behind its neglect. The figures for Nyanza Province, wherein lies Luo 
Nyanza, were dismal; in fact, Nyanza was consistently amongst the two worst performers, 
alongside Western Province, during this first historical phase, indicating a lack of equality of 
access to these crucial services. These findings suggest that there was a strong link between a 
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community’s posture, perceived or real, and access to health services during the first decade of 
independence in Kenya. The figures for hospital beds and cots, by province, during this historical 
phase of the study, which the GoK also began to provide from 1970, were as depicted in figure 
6.6 below.    
 
 
Figure 6.6: Hospital Beds and Cots by Province, 1970 – 73. 
Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1970 – 73 
 
Again, Nairobi, the capital, was dominant as a beneficiary in this category of public provision. It 
was closely followed by Rift Valley, Central and Eastern in that order. Coast, Nyanza, Western 
and North Eastern were fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth, respectively. Based on these figures and 
patterns, it is difficult to create a case for politically-instigated sabotage in the provision of health 
services with the number of beds and cots as indicators; however, it is clear from figure 6.6, 
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above – particularly with reference to Nairobi and North Eastern Provinces – that capitalism 
leads to uneven development across regions at the nation-state level. Nairobi, the greatest 
beneficiary, happens to be the country’s industrial, commercial and political capital; North 
Eastern, on the other hand, owing to its unfavourable climate and soils, has historically been 
economically overlooked by Kenyan authorities since the advent of colonialism. The outcome of 
public provision with regard to housing is examined next.   
         
6.1.3.3 Housing Provision Outcomes, 1963 – 73 
The National Housing Corporation (NHC), a GoK statutory body established in 1953, has 
continuously been tasked with the provision of affordable, decent housing for Kenyans. Its 
figures for houses completed, by province, from 1968 to 1973, were as captured in figure 6.7 
below.  
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Figure 6.7: No. of Houses Completed by NHC by Province, 1968 - 73. 
Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1968 – 73  
 
NHC figures, as depicted in figure 6.7 above, show that during the first decade of Kenya’s 
independence the corporation paid no heed to equity in its attempts to provide low-cost housing 
to Kenyans. The amalgamated outcome of the units of houses constructed to accommodate low-
income earners during the historical phase 1963 – 73 shows that Nairobi got the lion’s share at 
58.72%, followed by Coast (12.66%), Rift Valley (12.65%), Central (6.02%), Nyanza (3.75%), 
Western (3.82%), Eastern (2.01%) and North Eastern (0.36%). The major determinant factor 
behind the provision of affordable housing by the NHC during the period 1963 – 73 seems to 
have been logic, suitability and practicality. Owing to its more sophisticated infrastructure and its 
choice as a destination for employment seekers, presumably, it made more sense for the GoK to 
apply this provision to the city’s dwellers, as opposed to the nomads of the North Eastern 
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Province, for instance. Urban areas were, thus, prioritized; this posture can be directly linked to 
the uneven development that inevitably accompanies capitalism as a mode of production. 
Electricity provision outcomes are discussed next.      
 
6.1.3.4 Electricity Provision Outcomes, 1963 – 73  
The GoK provides statistics on electricity consumption in independent Kenya, from the 
year 1966. Distribution to the country’s regions during this particular historical phase of this 
study is classified under six categories, viz.: Kitale, Kisumu, Eldoret, Rift Valley, Coast, and, 
finally, Nairobi and Mt. Kenya. Whilst Kisumu represents the interests of the Luo, those of 
President Jomo Kenyatta’s Kikuyu “ethnic group” are recorded under Nairobi and Mt. Kenya, 
the latter of which includes Nanyuki, Nyeri, Meru and Embu, the home areas of the GEMA bloc 
of communities – a Bantu organization formed with Kenyatta’s approval to advance the socio-
economic-political interests of the Kikuyu, Embu, Meru and Akamba “ethnic groups”, especially 
in relation to the perceived Luo threat – which has dominated Kenya for a protracted period of 
time. The patterns for electricity sales by area, which essentially represent a combination of the 
purchasing power of various “ethnic groups”, and government provision of street lighting during 
the period 1966 – 73, are given in figure 6.8, below.       
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Figure 6.8: Electricity Sales - Small Consumer Lighting, Domestic Consumption and Street 
Lighting by Area, 1966 – 73 ('000 kWh).   
Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1963 – 73  
 
Figure 6.8, above, shows that electricity supply was heavily skewed in favour of Nairobi and Mt. 
Kenya insofar as small consumer lighting, domestic consumption and street lighting were 
concerned. The Coastal area, which is home to Kenya’s second most important city, Mombasa, 
was a distant second, followed by Rift Valley, Kisumu, Eldoret, and Kitale, in that order. 
Equality of access to this opportunity of enjoying the benefits of electricity was completely 
lacking. The president’s “ethnic group”, the Kikuyu, appears to have had immense leverage vis-
à-vis other communities like the Luo, in terms of the ability to purchase electricity at the 
individual consumption level. These findings support my contention, in sub-section 6.1.2.2.2, 
that facilitation of loans for small-scale holdings, which the GoK did for coffee and tea farmers, 
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is much more direct, and has a greater bearing on people’s lives, as opposed to merely providing 
roads, as was the case with the GoK’s engagement with largely Luo sugar farmers. Water supply 
outcomes for period 1963 – 73 are discussed next. 
 
6.1.3.5 Water Supply Outcomes, 1963 – 73 
The GoK started providing figures for the amounts spent on rural water schemes, by the 
Ministry of Agriculture’s Water Development Division, from the year 1971. Results of the 
GoK’s efforts towards the provision of this essential commodity, during this historical phase of 
this study, 1963 – 73, therefore, begin from 1971 and were as captured in figure 6.9 below.  
 
 
Figure 6.9: Cost of Operational Rural Water Schemes by Province, 1971- 73 (K£). 
Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Economic Surveys 1971 – 73  
1971
1972
1973
0 50000 100000 150000 200000 250000
 
 
Amount (K£)
Y
e
a
r
 Western
 R.Valley
 Nyanza
 N. Eastern
 Eastern
 Coast
 Central
 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
196 
 
As depicted in figure 6.9 above, the GoK’s effort towards provision of rural water supply during 
the historical phase 1963 – 73 was acutely lopsided, especially in favour of Eastern, Central and 
Coast Provinces. As of 1973, the proportions of government expenditure towards this cause were 
as follows: Eastern (31%); Central (23%); Coast (21%); Western (13%); Rift Valley (6%); North 
Eastern (4%); and, lastly, Nyanza (2%). Nyanza Province got the least amount of government 
funding with regard to provision of rural water supplies during this historical phase of this study; 
the Water Development Division did not pay any heed to equality of access to opportunity. There 
is a very strong possibility that opposition politics played an immense role in the dismal 
allocations to Nyanza Province, where the Luo reside. The subsequent historical phase of this 
study, 1973 – 83, is examined in detail, next.    
 
6.2 1973 – 83: The Era of the Exposure of the Uncertainties of Capitalism in Kenya 
6.2.1 State of the Kenyan Economy, 1973 – 83   
 The world monopoly capitalist system, in which “independent” Kenya is firmly affixed, 
is characterized by great ambiguity, especially for developing countries whose economies are 
agriculture-based. In this regard, Kenya’s predicament lies in the fact that it is over dependent on 
coffee and tea for its foreign exchange. Whenever the weather is unfavourable, and/or the world 
prices of these two main exports fall, its economy is shaken. On the other hand, the country’s 
most vital import commodity, oil, is notoriously volatile in the world market: oil prices have 
been known to drastically increase by up to four or five times, as was the case in 1974 and 1975, 
and this equally wobbles the country’s economy. The period 1973 – 83, which will go down in 
Kenya’s economic history as one in which the uncertainties associated with capitalism were 
explicitly laid bare for all to see, was indeed complex; it featured two presidents, two finance 
ministers and several Sessional Papers and Development Plans. The strategic and powerful 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning changed hands between Kikuyu politicians when 
James Gichuru handed the docket over to Mwai Kibaki in 1970; the latter, who would retain this 
position until 1981, would steer Kenya through one of its toughest economic phases.  
 
As the country prepared itself to enforce policies that would lead to “an improvement in 
the quality of life of [its] poorer people” (GoKH, 1973, p. 137) and create an enabling 
environment for “the attainment of social justice and equity” (GoKH, 1974, p. 465), it was, 
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owing to the uncertainties that characterize the world monopoly capitalist system, suddenly hit 
by the adverse swing phenomenon. During an adverse swing, an occurrence that is extremely 
difficult to predict, the prices of a country’s imports rise faster than the prices of its exports in the 
world market. The year 1974 epitomized this phenomenon in Kenya: “While import prices rose 
by 61 per cent, export prices rose only 30 per cent” (Republic of Kenya Budget Speech 
[RoKBS], 1975, p. 1). This led to a recession, in 1975, which was accompanied by, amongst 
other challenges, a fall in income per capita and a very precarious balance of payments position. 
  
 Even as Kenya went about restructuring its economy in a bid to lessen its reliance on 
imports, a strategy espoused by Sessional Paper No. 4 of 1975, and the East African Community 
(EAC) disintegrated, the country’s fortunes changed in 1977 as narrated by Finance Minister 
Mwai Kibaki: 
 
This year, I am happy to say the position is significantly different. Our own export prices, 
particularly coffee and tea, have risen faster than the prices we pay for exports. The terms 
of trade have swung back in our favour and are now better than they were in 1972. The 
balance of payments, which in recent years has been of so much concern to us, is, as of 
now, in substantial surplus. The recent rains have been abundant and although some areas 
face the problem of clearing up after flood, the country as a whole looks forward to 
abundant harvests. (RoKBS, 1977, p. 1)  
 
The coffee boom of 1977 led to considerable inflationary problems, owing to “too much money 
chasing too few goods” (RoKBS, 1977, p. 1), and effectively came to an end in 1978; the 
momentum it had restored to the country’s economy was quashed in 1979, a year which saw a 
sharp rise in the price of crude oil in the world market. During this same year, President Moi 
demonstrated compassion by introducing a milk supply programme geared towards nourishing 
primary school children, and he launched the country’s Fourth Development Plan for years 1979 
– 83. However the country, unsurprisingly, continued to experience unfavourable trends in its 
balance of payments throughout the remainder of this historical phase under review. Perhaps a 
further demonstration of the modern-day slavery that the forces behind the world monopoly 
capitalist system have imposed on Africa and other countries in the developing world, Kibaki 
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“arranged with a consortium of major banks in London to provide a Euro-currency loan of $200 
million to finance the import content requirements of some projects in the new Development 
Plan” (RoKBS, 1979, p. 2). Similar simultaneous discussions with the IMF and World Bank, 
geared towards securing credit facilities to improve the balance of payments position, were held 
by the Kenyan Finance Minister (cf. RoKBS, 1979, p. 2). Like his predecessor, Kenyatta, Moi 
would soon discover that he was not truly in charge of affairs: external forces, more powerful 
than him, were the ones to determine whether his economic agenda for the nation would 
materialize or not. Several early challenges, among which were rain-shortage-induced electric 
power rationing and famine necessitating importation of food grain, would welcome Moi into the 
world stage as an African leader and introduce him to the dialectics existent in global power 
relations: would he play “puppet”? An assessment regarding this possibility will be conducted in 
the subsequent historical phases of this chapter. Table 6.2 and figure 6.10, below, depict the 
performance of Kenya’s economy, in terms of GDP growth, during the period 1973 – 83.  
 
Table 6.2: Kenya’s Economic Performance, 1973 – 83 
YEAR 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
GDP GROWTH (%) 6.5 3.6 1.0 5.0 7.3 5.7 3.1 2.4 4.5 3.3 3.9 
Source: Republic of Kenya Economic Surveys, 1973 – 83  
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Figure 6.10: Kenya’s GDP Growth Rate, 1973 – 83. 
Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Economic Surveys, 1973 – 83  
 
The ups and downs experienced by developing economies, owing largely to external 
circumstances, are clearly discernable from table 6.2 and figure 6.10 above. Developing 
countries, especially those in Africa, are never fully in control of their destinies no matter how 
much credit they obtain from international financial institutions. This particular decade was 
relatively poor, in terms of economic performance, in comparison to the preceding historical 
phase. The decade’s average growth rate was lower at slightly above 4%. The highest GDP 
growth rate was recorded in 1977 when coffee prices in the world market skyrocketed. All the 
borrowing the GoK engaged in during the preceding historical phase of this study did not 
translate to the envisaged economic growth. The development initiatives carried out by the GoK 
from 1973 to 1983 are summarized next.  
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6.2.2 GoK Development Initiatives and Projects, 1973 – 83  
As alluded to in section sub-section 6.1.3 above, it is in the details (outcomes) that the 
puzzle of the negative consequences of political marginalization/exclusion is solved. Although 
the generalized scrutiny of the big projects, undertaken by the GoK, may help the observer to 
ascertain whether successive Kenyan governments adhered to the principles of regional balance, 
it cannot be fully relied upon as a mechanism for analysing “equity”. Accordingly, in this sub-
section and the remaining historical phases discussed in this chapter, I will examine the 
development initiatives and projects undertaken by the GoK, not solely with the aim of exploring 
Luo inclusion/exclusion, but also with the general view to give a summary of the state’s 
activities and, hopefully, make the historical phases of this chapter more meaningful.  
 
In the twilight years of Jomo Kenyatta, which coincided with a recession that was 
followed by a brief economic boom, the GoK adopted Sessional Paper No. 4 of 1975, which 
outlined “measures aimed at tackling the balance of payments problem and other associated 
economic issues” (RoKBS, 1980,  p. 4). The measures outlined in the policy paper included the 
following: re-structuring of the country’s economy to make it less susceptible to the 
unpredictable and hostile nature of the world monopoly capitalist system by substituting 
unnecessary imports through the adoption of export-led industrialization; modification of fiscal 
and monetary policies to facilitate greater production, domestically, and exert a pull on more 
inflows of external capital; gradual shift of focus from use of petroleum-based energy to 
alternative sources of energy like power alcohol, solar energy and hydro and geothermal 
electricity; and more support for the agricultural sector geared towards involving the 
incorporation of idle land and the enhanced exploitation of underutilized land, for greater 
production of merchantable oversupplies of both food crops and export commodities (RoKBS, 
1980, p. 4). The last of the aforementioned policy measures, which resonates relatively more 
with the needs of the citizen at the grassroots level, was accomplished in part by loans granted by 
the state to the Cereals and Sugar Finance Corporation. This Parastatal was in turn tasked with 
the responsibility of “movement of wheat and maize” and “expansion of agricultural production 
through crop financing and agricultural credit” (RoKBS, 1980, p. 4). In congruence with the 
aims of this state corporation, the Sessional Paper on Food Policy, published during financial 
year 1980/81, called for “improved agricultural planning . . . [and] the need to improve rural 
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infrastructure including rural access roads, marketing of agricultural products and inputs, 
agricultural credit, agricultural extension services and prices” (GoKH, 1981, p. 204). The GoK, 
therefore, in addition to the loans accorded to traders for commercial activities, provided credit 
facilities to assist small-scale farmers in their crop production endeavours (GoKH, 1982, p. 313).  
 
The disintegration of the EAC in 1977 proved to be enormously costly for the GoK, for it 
brought to the fore additional and unplanned for financial obligations. It necessitated the 
following economic rearrangements, amongst others, as explained by Kibaki in 1977: 
 
[I]ncreased defence expenditure as a result of the heightened tension around our borders, 
but also the burden of a new airline because of the collapse of the East African Airways; 
the burden of a railway, vital to our economic interests, which had been allowed to run 
down to a dangerous level through disputes in the East African Community. (RoKBS, 
1977, p. 6) 
 
These increased burdens, arising out of EAC’s 1977 collapse epitomize the need for African 
countries to unite in order to maximize their chances of survival in a world configured to serve 
the selfish interests of a few individuals and entities. Such desired African unity, would 
presumptively increase Kenya’s and other African countries’ chances of getting better trade deals 
in the world market, a feat the continent failed to accomplish during the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) held in India, in 1968, as captured in the 
words of James Gichuru, “independent” Kenya’s first Finance Minister:    
 
The virtual failure of the UNCTAD Conference in New Delhi earlier this year is very 
disappointing. The attitude of a number of industrial countries showed little sense of the 
urgency of the needs of the developing countries and Kenya, as a country with a rapidly 
expanding manufacturing sector, must be particularly disappointed that so little concrete 
progress has so far been made in the direction of giving preferences to the manufactured 
exports of developing countries. (GoKH, 1968, p. 1136) 
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In an era where the instability associated with capitalism as a mode of production was exposed in 
Kenya, leading to strict control in government spending especially with regard to infrastructure 
projects like roads, the GoK oversaw the following major development initiatives among others: 
the Mombasa–Nairobi Oil Products Pipeline, the Gitaru Hydro-Electric Scheme, the Sabaki 
Water Scheme at the Coast, Upper Tana and Bura Irrigation Schemes, new and/or expanded 
sugar factories at Mumias, Nzoia and South Nyanza, new Nairobi and Mombasa Airport 
Terminals, new aircraft for Kenya Airways, and new locomotives for Kenya Railways. An 
analysis of the results of some of these public investments follows next. 
 
6.2.3 An Analysis of the Outcome of GoK Public Investment, 1973 – 83  
Since Moi’s Development Plan of 1979 to 1983 was geared towards “the alleviation of 
poverty through the creation of income earning opportunities for every Kenyan and the provision 
of other basic needs, such as nutrition, health, education, water and housing” (RoKBS, 1977, p. 
8), I will maintain the strategy employed in examining the outcomes of public investment in sub-
section 6.1.3 of the previous historical phase. My focus remains on the five socio-economic 
indicators/parameters: education, health, housing, water supplies, and electricity. 
 
6.2.3.1 Education Outcomes, 1973 – 83  
The outcome of the GoK investment in primary education during the historical phase 
1973 – 83 was as shown in figure 6.11 below. 
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Figure 6.11: Primary School Enrolment by Province, 1973 - 83. 
Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1973 – 83  
 
Several noteworthy trends emerge from the 1973 – 83 outcome: first, towards the twilight years 
of Mzee Jomo Kenyatta, enrolment figures in Nyanza and Western Provinces took a dip; 
secondly, after Moi ascended to power, from 1978, there was a remarkable increase in enrolment 
numbers at primary school level across Kenya’s eight provinces; third, Rift Valley Province, 
which became the new turf of the president, Moi, rose dramatically from position four to take the 
lead, country-wide, in terms of primary school enrolment in Kenya; fourth, Central Province, 
Kenyatta’s backyard, which was at the helm in 1973, stood at position four in 1983, despite also 
witnessing a steady increase in enrolment numbers. From these findings, the following 
conclusions can be drawn: first, in comparison to his successor, Moi, Kenyatta was more 
unfavourably disposed towards the Luo; second, there is certainly a link between state control 
and access to education at primary level; third, the Kenyatta Administration policies had 
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favoured the Kikuyu to the point where the advantage they yielded from control of state power 
vis-à-vis primary education, had reached an optimum point – this explains their dwindling 
dominance in primary school enrolment despite continual steady growth in Central Province; 
and, fourthly, Moi made sure, within the first five years of his tenure, that equality of access to 
the opportunity of primary education translated into equality of participation in primary 
education for other Kenyans not of Kikuyu descent. The enrolment figures at the secondary 
school level over the same period were as depicted in figure 6.12 below. 
 
 
Figure 6.12: Secondary School Enrolment by Province, 1973 – 83. 
Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1973 – 1983      
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demise of Kenya’s founding father. Apparently, it would take a relatively longer period of time 
for Moi to beget a semblance of equality of participation in the opportunity of secondary 
education for non-Kikuyu Kenyans, compared to primary education. By the end of the historical 
phase 1973 – 83, Nyanza stood second in enrolment at the secondary education level; it was 
followed by Eastern, Rift Valley, Western, Nairobi, Coast and North Eastern  in that order. 
Notably, whilst Nairobi stood at position two in the previous historical phase of this study, it was 
ranked sixth by the end of 1983. This means that during the historical phase 1973 – 83, parents 
all over Kenya had realized the importance of secondary education as a precondition for 
advancement in life and were making greater efforts towards securing it for their children. 
Nairobi’s stagnation and dwindling fortunes can also be explained by the fact that the city lacks 
the boarding school facilities that most parents desire at this level of education. The health 
provision outcomes for historical phase 1973 – 83 are examined next. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
206 
 
6.2.3.2 Health Provision Outcomes, 1973 – 83  
 
 
Figure 6.13: Attendance at Family Planning Clinics by Province, 1973 – 83. 
Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1973 – 1983  
 
The outcome of family planning clinic attendances, depicted in table 6.13 above, shows a great 
lack of adherence to the principle of equality of access to opportunity; there are huge disparities 
in favour of Nairobi and Central Provinces as opposed to the rest of Kenya. Nairobi’s 
prominence as the commercial and industrial capital undoubtedly explains its appearance at the 
top of almost every socio-economic outcome. If Nairobi is put aside, and North Eastern ignored 
(owing in part to religious reasons for shunning the practice), the two protagonists in the Kenyan 
story – Kikuyus (Central) and Luos (Nyanza) appear at the two extreme ends of the outcome of 
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healthcare provision with regard to family planning services. Central’s prominence in this 
statistic may well mean that family planning services were readily available to the Kikuyu; on 
the other hand, Nyanza’s position suggests that access to these services during this historical 
phase was difficult for the province’s inhabitants due to “half-hearted” commitment by the 
responsible government department. Again, it would seem, regions that oppose the state are 
considered last when it comes to the provision of services, whilst those that support it come first. 
GoK provision of hospital beds and cots, by province, during the period 1973 – 83, is as depicted 
in figure 6.14 below.   
 
 
Figure 6.14: Hospital Beds and Cots by Province, 1973 – 83. 
Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1973 – 83 
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Although Nairobi, Rift Valley and Central, in that order, dominated the scene in terms of the 
number of beds and cots per province as of 1983, the greatest growth in capacity during this 
historical phase of this study was exhibited by Nyanza. This could be taken to mean that, at least 
in terms of providing hospital bed capacity to its citizens, the GoK paid no heed to the political 
inclination of Kenyans, generally, and to that of the Luo, in particular. Housing provision 
outcomes are examined next.  
 
6.2.3.3 Housing Provision Outcomes, 1973 – 83  
NHC figures for houses completed, by province, from 1973 to 1983 were as captured in 
figure 6.15 below.  
 
 
Figure 6.15: No. of Houses Completed by NHC by Province, 1973 – 83. 
Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1973 – 83 
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Of the total of 20,710 units constructed to provide affordable housing to low-income earners, 
Nairobi got a significant allocation of 45%; it was followed by Rift Valley (19%), Western 
(13%), Coast (8%), Central (5%), Nyanza (4%), Eastern (3%), and North Eastern (0.2%), 
respectively. Although equality of access to the opportunity of affordable housing was gravely 
lacking, it does not seem like politics had anything to do with the apportionment of limited 
government resources towards the provision of this essential social good – houses appear to have 
been provided in accordance with relevance and need. Indeed, Nairobi is the greatest employer 
of Kenyans who would fall under the targeted category of low-income-earning citizens. A look 
at electricity provision outcomes for this particular historical phase of this study follows next. 
 
6.2.3.4 Electricity Provision Outcomes, 1973 – 83 
The patterns for electricity sales by area, a representation of the combination of the 
purchasing power of various “ethnic groups”, and GoK provision of street lighting during the 
period 1973 – 83, are given in figure 6.16, below.   
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Figure 6.16: Electricity Sales - Small Consumer Lighting, Domestic Consumption and 
Street Lighting by Area, 1973 – 83 ('000 kWh). 
Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1973 – 83  
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distant second, it was closely followed by Eldoret, Kisumu and Kitale (wherein the Luo interests 
were catered for); Rift Valley brought up the rear. Nairobi’s dominance as a consumer of 
electricity arises from the fact that the region is the bastion of Kenya’s economy: it serves as the 
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areas in which Kenya’s most important cash crops are grown, disproportionate street lighting in 
favour of the area was provided by the GoK to safeguard the foreign exchange interests of the 
country; moreover, due to trade in commercially-viable crops, the area’s residents – GEMA 
communities – naturally accumulated more wealth and were in a greater position to pay for 
installation services. Second, another reason closely related to the Theory of Uneven 
Development may be that the area naturally benefited by virtue of its proximity to the capital 
city, as opposed to other regions like Nyanza. Third, owing to the fact that the region was, and 
continues to be, the backyard of Kenya’s state controllers, it was highly favoured in the provision 
of street lighting in a deliberate but subtle manner, in a bid to perpetuate the hegemonic position 
it holds over the rest of Kenya. The fact that the precise figures of both Mt. Kenya (Kenyatta’s 
home) and Nyanza (Odinga’s political base) are not given by the GoK’s statisticians is suspect; it 
could be a move aimed at shrouding the favouritism accorded to the supporters of the state, and 
the “punishment” meted out to its opponents. If the third view is the reason why precise statistics 
are not given, then the argument espoused in the theoretical framework of this thesis, that 
whoever lacks political power cannot chart their own economic destiny and is at the mercy of the 
custodian of the state, holds some water. Also, the third view is in congruence with the 
arguments espoused in chapter five, that there seems to be a subtle, well-calculated strategy to 
keep the Luo completely outside mainstream societal affairs in Kenya. A look at water supply 
outcomes, during historical phase 1973 – 83, follows next.   
 
6.2.3.5 Water Supply Outcomes, 1973 – 83  
GoK expenditure on rural water schemes, by province, progressed as depicted in figure 
6.17, below, during the historical phase 1973 – 83. 
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Figure 6.17: Cost of Operational Rural Water Schemes by Province, 1973 – 83 (K£). 
Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Economic Surveys 1973 – 83  
 
Figure 6.17, above, shows great disparities and lack of equity in the allocation of funding for 
rural water supply during phase 1973 – 83. Central Province, Jomo Kenyatta’s turf, consistently 
received steady funding, whilst the investments in Rift Valley, Coast and North Eastern virtually 
stagnated throughout this historical phase. Perhaps a calmative pointer to the ardent Luo activist, 
it is noteworthy that the outcomes of rural water supply during the second decade of Kenya’s 
“independence” show an overwhelming percentage increase in the GoK investment in Nyanza 
Province. Indeed, the greatest beneficiary, in terms of growth, was Nyanza: it is safe to say that 
during the period 1973 – 83, when the Water Department made amends for what seemed to be 
outright discrimination of the Luo in the provision of rural water supply during the first phase of 
this chapter, 1963 – 73. The third historical phase of this study, 1983 – 1993, follows next.  
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6.3 1983 – 93: The Era of Export-oriented Industrialization and Rationalization of 
Expenditure in Kenya 
6.3.1 State of the Kenyan Economy, 1983 – 93  
The volatility of capitalism, as showcased in the preceding historical phase discussed in 
this chapter, is such that economies, especially those of developing countries like Africa’s, are 
often characterized by “a cycle of a boom with inflation, followed by stabilization and recession” 
(RoKBS, 1986, p. 7). Instabilities associated with capitalism, coupled with reduced access to 
external sources of funding and epitomized by a constantly precarious balance of payments 
position, prompted Kenya in historical phase 1983 – 93 to adopt fundamental structural changes 
in a bid to steady its economy and position it for the desired domestically-driven renewed 
growth. This era – seen largely as a “different phase of development where repayments of both 
domestic and external debt w[ould] take an increasingly large share of available Government 
revenues” (RoKBS, 1983, p. 7) – would see the GoK make bold moves to further “promote 
exports and . . . reduce the nation’s dependence on imports” (RoKBS, 1983, p. 4). Some of these 
measures included the following: adjustment of the shilling exchange rate on both the import and 
export fronts; reinstatement of the export compensation scheme; according priority to credit 
facilities, in conjunction with commercial banks, for exporters; loosening protection accorded to 
producers; and reducing restrictions on imports (RoKBS,1983). Also, in order to lessen 
dependence on food imports, in times of famine associated with unfavourable weather 
conditions, the GoK embarked on building strategic food reserves in accordance with the 
recommendations of the Food Policy Paper. Other measures taken in order to stimulate domestic-
induced economic growth and to help the country gain more control over its destiny included the 
increase of interest rates for the purposes of “stimulating savings and . . . discourag[ing] the use 
of credit for marginal purposes, excessive imports and the accumulation of unneeded stocks” 
(RoKBS, 1983, p. 5). 
 
 The above audacious measures, which depict a frustrated nation’s efforts to disentangle 
itself from an oppressive global economic order, or at least to lessen the burdens imposed upon it 
by the uncertainties characterizing the world monopoly capitalist system, were to be enshrined in 
the Fifth Development Plan launched by Moi in December 1983, during Kenya’s 20th 
independence anniversary, and Sessional Paper No. 1 of 1986, the latter of which largely became 
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the blueprint for Kenya’s economic development throughout the remainder of the period 1983 – 
93. Moi’s bold move rubbed feathers wrongly on the international stage and served to further 
expose the hypocritical underbelly of the forces behind the juggernaut that is the world 
monopoly capitalist system. During period 1983 – 93, as already explained, Kenya’s bid to gain 
control of its destiny was to be accomplished by “restructur[ing] [its] industry away from 
production for import substitution under the protection of high tariffs and quantitative 
restrictions, to production oriented towards the export market” (RoKBS, 1990, p. 5). Besides the 
measures specified above, export-oriented industrialization was, in turn, to be accomplished 
through the establishment of Export Processing Zones (EPZs). Although the World Bank and the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) agreed to assist in financing these 
EPZs, western/industrialized economies remained largely closed to African countries’ exports, as 
lamented by George Saitoti – Kenya’s fourth Finance Minister – in 1991: 
 
The failure of the Uruguay round on GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) to 
conclude an agreement on global trade was a further disappointing event in 1990. It is 
regrettable to note that while many developing countries, including Kenya, are striving to 
end trade restrictions and to lower import duties, industrial countries, have failed to 
reciprocate by opening their markets wider to both our manufactured and agricultural 
exports. A renewal of the GATT negotiations should therefore be high on the 
international economic agenda for the coming year. (RoKBS, 1991, p. 3)   
 
Table 6.3 and figure 6.18, below, depict Kenya’s economic performance from 1983 to 1993. 
 
Table 6.3: Kenya's Economic Performance, 1983 – 93 
YEAR 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
GDP GROWTH (%) 3.9 0.9 4.1 5.7 4.8 5.2 5.0 4.5 2.2 0.4 0.1 
Source: Republic of Kenya Economic Surveys, 1983 – 93  
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Figure 6.18: Kenya’s GDP Growth Rates, 1983 – 93. 
Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Economic Surveys, 1983 – 93  
 
Although 1984 recorded a very poor performance, owing largely to a dismal, drought-related 
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world monopoly capitalist system, such as the disintegration of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR), and the Gulf War I, which conspired to ripen and arrange the stage for the 
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this chapter, 1993 – 2003. 
 
1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
 
 
G
D
P
 g
r
o
w
th
 (
%
)
Year
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
216 
 
Noteworthy, as a complementary measure to its export-oriented industrialization 
programme, the GoK, during the period 1983 – 93, embarked on a drive to rationalize its 
expenditure in order to improve productivity and renew economic growth. The goals of this 
rationalization initiative were threefold: “to concentrate development on fewer projects”; to 
“ensure that the projects . . . undertake[n] [we]re the very best . . . highly productive, contributing 
directly to economic growth or delivering public services at the lowest possible cost”; and, to 
“ensure that the development projects, once completed, ha[d] adequate resources to function at 
full capacity” (RoKBS, 1986, p. 9). Thus, the mantra “fewer projects, better projects, and more 
adequate recurrent financing” (RoKBS, 1986, p. 9) became the driving force behind the 
initiative. I now turn my focus to the development projects and initiatives undertaken by the Moi 
Administration, from 1983 to 1993.        
 
6.3.2 GoK Development Initiatives and Projects, 1983 – 93  
 Contrary to his popular depiction as an iron-fisted African leader (cf. e.g., Brown, 2001; 
Nepstad, 2011), the findings of this research show that there has never been a Kenyan President 
as compassionate and pro-poor people as Moi: his development agenda, during this particular 
phase, was mainly geared towards the betterment of the lives of the citizens at the grassroots 
level of society, and had a more widespread element of direct engagement as opposed to 
Kenyatta’s. Some of his development initiatives are hereby highlighted. First, on the 1st of July, 
1983, Moi inaugurated a new grassroots-oriented policy and movement – the District Focus for 
Rural Development (DFRD) – geared towards balancing urban and rural development in the 
country. This bottom-up approach would give citizens in all the districts of Kenya a say in the 
development of their communities: in conjunction with the District Development Committees 
(DDCs) citizens would identify their most pertinent problems/issues and obtain funding from the 
central government’s ministries for projects to address them. By 1984, the year in which 
relations with neighbours Uganda and Tanzania normalized, and the Preferential Trade Area for 
Eastern and Southern African states (PTA) was inaugurated, measures were being put in place to 
fund the DFRD projects directly from the District Treasuries to make the programme more 
efficient (RoKBS, 1984). The DDC co-ordinated development programme prioritized “small-
scale infrastructure” including “urban water supplies, rural electrification systems, and basic site-
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and-service schemes” aimed at “boost[ing] private economic activities of all kinds in the rural 
areas” (RoKBS, 1985, p. 10). 
 
 Secondly, in order to boost the efforts of workers in the informal sector – “self-employed 
persons and very small firms in manufacturing, trade and other services” (RoKBS, 1985, p. 10) – 
Moi granted them loans. He advised the Treasury to liaise with Kenya Commercial Bank (KCB) 
to devise a scheme targeted at financially facilitating the efforts of jua kali (very small-scale) 
workshops, traders and manufacturers, among others. The GoK would act as guarantor to the 
loans, eliminating the need for collateral, which the beneficiaries in all likelihood did not have 
anyway. Thirdly, in order to supplement growth in agriculture as a sector, the Moi 
Administration launched the Rural Trade and Production Centre (RTPC) Programme. Through 
the RPTC Programme – it was hoped – market centres and dynamic small towns would spring up 
leading to the desired element of rural-urban balance. The envisioned RPTCs would be “small 
towns that process[ed] and market[ed] output from farms in the [particular rural] area[s] 
offer[ing] services and supply inputs to farmers; and creat[ing] jobs for part-time farmers and 
full-time rural workers” (RoKBS, 1987, p. 13). The RPTCs would be funded by the central 
government through the District Development Fund (DDF) established on July 1, 1987 and 
administered by the Ministry of Planning and National Development. Through the DDF, Moi’s 
Government “work[ed] within District Focus to channel funds from interested aid donors into 
roads, water and power supplies and other infrastructure that support[ed] the growth of private 
small industry and services” (RoKBS, 1987, p. 13). The DDF would also be used to facilitate 
DDC initiatives. Later on, “finance[s] for the construction of Nyayo sheds to accommodate jua 
kali artisans and workshops located in appropriate rural areas” (RoKBS, 1987, p. 13) were 
incorporated in the DDF scheme, too. Fourthly, in 1990 President Moi launched the Rural 
Enterprise Fund, which was to be overseen by the DDCs; he gave a start-up capital of Ksh. 150 
million for the programme aimed at the development of small-scale enterprises (RoKBS, 1990, 
p. 15). 
 
Some of the major GoK projects associated with this era include the following: purchase 
of materials associated with the national grid extension (electricity); facilitating petroleum 
storage facilities; Kiambere Hydroelectric Power Project; Turkwell Hydroelectric Project; 
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leasing of planes for Kenya Airways; precooling facilities for EU-bound horticultural products; 
Nairobi Water Supply Project; Coast Water Supply Project; Geothermal Energy Project; and 
Smallholder Coffee Improvement Project; and Universities Investment Project. An examination 
of the outcome of Moi’s efforts, with regard to education, health, housing, electricity and rural 
water supplies, during the period 1983 – 93, follows next. 
 
6.3.3 An Analysis of the Outcome of GoK Public Investment, 1983 – 93  
Perhaps a result of the power struggle between the Moi Government and the forces 
behind the world monopoly capitalist system, accountability and transparency on the part of the 
Kenyan state appears to have diminished rapidly and systematically during the latter stages of the 
historical period 1983 – 93. Due to the global events that opened up Africa to neoliberalism at 
the end of this historical phase – especially the disintegration of the USSR47 – Moi lost his nerve. 
Not only had the little control that he wielded over Kenyan affairs vis-à-vis the globalists behind 
the world monopoly capitalist system dwindled overnight, his administration was going to be 
under scrutiny like never before. Moreover, with the re-introduction of multi-partyism in Kenya 
in 1991, thanks largely to the same forces behind the world monopoly capitalist system, his days 
in power were numbered. Moi would seemingly make the most out of the limited time left to 
benefit/enrich himself and his cronies, for the presidential terms limit restricted his tenure to a 
maximum of ten years following the 1992 General Election.
48
 It is not inconceivable, therefore, 
that the supposed looting of state coffers that characterized Moi’s latter years in power involved 
the appropriation of monies obtained from privatization of state corporations and the cooking of 
financial books, following the pocketing of monies apportioned for the development of public 
utilities such as water projects, boreholes, dams and pans. This is probably one of the reasons 
why his statisticians stopped giving specific details regarding the outcomes of public investment 
in areas like water supply and education in the Economic Surveys. Accordingly, analysis of 
outcomes of public investment, in this particular historical phase of this study, will only provide 
                                                          
47
 The communist threat had made Kenya important to the West, both as a model African capitalist nation and a 
strategic location along the Indian Ocean Coast from which naval operations, regarding Middle Eastern oil, could be 
carried out in case of war (cf. Khapoya & Agyeman-Duah, 1985; Mazrui, 2004). 
48
 For further insights into the manner in which state coffers were allegedly looted under Moi, the possible 
beneficiaries, and the supposed magnitude of theft sanctioned by Kenya’s second president, see WikiLeaks (2007). 
The looting of Kenya under President Moi. Retrieved from 
https://wikileaks.org/wiki/The_looting_of_Kenya_under_President_Moi (accessed 11 September 2016).  
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specific/detailed comparative analysis vis-à-vis the Luo and the rest of Kenya, wherever 
provincial figures have been reported by the GoK. 
 
6.3.3.1 Education Outcomes, 1983 – 93  
The outcome of public investment by the GoK with regard to primary school enrolment 
during period 1983 – 93 is captured in figure 6.19 below, which also compares the situation in 
1983 with that in 1993.  
 
 
Figure 6.19: Primary School Enrolment by Province, 1983 – 93. 
Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1983 – 1993  
As of 1993, figure 6.19 above shows, Rift Valley, Nyanza (of which Luo Nyanza is a large 
component), Eastern and Central Provinces led in terms of primary school enrolment in that 
order. Regarding the rate of growth of primary school enrolment, which is crucial for this study, 
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North Eastern Province led from the front, whilst Nairobi brought up the rear. Notably, the 
remaining six provinces do not show any appreciable growth difference; this suggests that there 
was stability and equity in terms of access to the opportunity of primary education. In this regard, 
therefore, the Luo are not justified to cry foul – at least not during this historical phase of this 
chapter. The provincial figures for secondary school enrolment, by province, during the years 
1983 and 1993 are given in figure 6.20, below.  
 
 
Figure 6.20: Secondary School Enrolment by Province, 1983 – 93. 
Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1983 – 93  
Overall, figure 6.20, above, shows that there was a minimal increase in enrolments during the 
decade 1983 – 93, indicating that, although the GoK’s efforts to provide its citizens with a better 
education were bearing fruit, the introduction of neoliberalism was somehow taking its toll on 
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the parents of Kenya. Whilst there were enrolment increases in Coast, Eastern, Rift Valley and 
Western, the other four provinces, Nairobi, North Eastern, Central and Nyanza recorded 
declines. The biggest enrolment gain was recorded in Rift Valley (state power) whilst the largest 
drop was recorded in Nairobi (lack of adequate boarding schools prompting many to study 
upcountry in other provinces). The greatest transition rate from primary to secondary school was 
recorded in Central Province (bastion of capitalism from colonial times) whilst the least was in 
North Eastern (shunned by colonial administrators and successive Kenyan Governments owing 
partly to its unfavourable climate and soils) underlining Oloo’s (2004) argument that capitalism, 
by its very nature, has led to unequal development in Kenya. Noteworthy is the fact that the 
immense advantage held by Central Province in the previous historical phases of this study – 
1963 to 1973 and 1973 to 1983 – was greatly eroded during Moi’s first fifteen years in power. In 
this sense, there was greater equity, in terms of participation in the opportunity of secondary 
education, during the historical phase 1983 – 93. Health Provision outcomes during this 
particular historical phase are discussed next.   
 
6.3.3.2 Health Provision Outcomes, 1983 – 93 
The health provision outcomes, in terms of family planning services, during this 
historical phase of this study, were as depicted in figure 6.21, below. The GoK provides statistics 
on this socio-economic indicator only to the year 1987; accordingly, this marks the end of the 
analysis of family planning as a mechanism of gauging health provision outcomes in this study.  
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Figure 6.21: Attendance at Family Planning Clinics by Province, 1983 – 87. 
Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1983 – 87  
 
Nevertheless, of the total number of first time visits and revisits recorded (3,395,756) during the 
period 1983 – 87, Central Province was dominant at 25.5%, followed closely by Rift Valley at 
24.0%; Nairobi (18.1%), Eastern (13.8%), Nyanza (6.8%), Western (6.0%), Coast (5.7%) and 
North Eastern  (0.1%), followed in that order. Evidently, there was no adherence to equality of 
access to this important GoK provision – the turfs of communities that have held power in Kenya 
benefited the most. The statistical progression of hospital beds and cots by province, during this 
historical phase of the study, was as given in figure 6.22 below.   
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Figure 6.22: Hospital Beds and Cots by Province, 1983 – 93. 
Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1983 – 93  
 
The country recorded a total growth of 30.2% in its number of beds and cots from 1983 to 1993, 
indicating notable progress on the part of the GoK in its efforts towards providing healthcare 
services to its citizens. Moi’s health policies, it would seem, were more favourable towards the 
historically marginalized North Eastern Province, where the greatest growth rate (240.2%) in the 
number of hospital beds and cots was recorded; North Eastern was followed by Western 
(74.0%), Rift Valley (45.6%), Eastern (24.9%), Coast (19.1%), Central (17%) and Nyanza 
(13.6%), respectively. Nyanza’s poor performance, in this regard, could partly be explained by 
the fact that this historical phase succeeded the botched coup attempt of 1982, which was largely 
a Luo affair. It is possible that the GoK became reluctant to expand socio-economic services to 
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the Luo in the aftermath of that significant event. A look at housing provision outcomes during 
this historical phase, 1983 – 93, is next. 
       
6.3.3.3 Housing Provision Outcomes, 1983 – 93  
The GoK housing provision outcomes for the period 1983 – 93 were as depicted in figure 
6.23 below. 
 
 
Figure 6.23: No. of Houses Completed by NHC by Province, 1983 – 93. 
Sources: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1983 – 93 
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(11.7%); Eastern (8.5%); Western (7.3%); Coast (3%); and North Eastern (2.5%). If we assume 
that the NHC housing units apportioned for Nyanza Province were constructed in Luo Nyanza, 
then political inclination did not play a role in determining access to low-cost housing provision 
during this historical phase of the study. Electricity provision outcomes for period 1983 – 93 are 
discussed next.    
 
6.3.3.4 Electricity Provision Outcomes, 1983 – 93 
Figure 6.24, below, represents the amalgamated figures for electricity sales, for purposes 
of small consumer lighting, domestic consumption and street lighting, by area, for the period 
1983 – 93.   
 
Figure 6.24: Electricity Sales - Small Consumer Lighting, Domestic Consumption and 
Street Lighting by Area, 1983 – 93 ('000 kWh). 
Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1983 – 93   
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There was a steep rise in the consumption of electricity by Nairobi and Mt. Kenya dwellers 
during historical phase 1983 – 93. This indicates a rise in the standards of living for the residents 
of these areas. The figures also show a modest rise in electricity consumption and provision of 
street lighting by the GoK, at the Coast and in the Rift Valley, indicating modest increases in the 
living standards of the areas’ inhabitants. Regarding Eldoret, Kisumu and Kitale’s figures, 
wherein Luo Nyanza’s statistics would be situated, there was no significant change to report. 
Certainly, the living standards of Luo Nyanza residents were not improving meaningfully, for if 
that were the case, they would have been in a position to afford more electricity. The main 
inference to be drawn from figure 6.24 above is that economic development during the period 
1983 – 93 was greatly dependent on proximity to Nairobi, the capital, where most of the 
country’s decisions on allocation of resources were made and development initiatives were 
initiated. This is why the country’s current devolved system of government is crucial; it enables 
locals to determine the kinds of investment that best suit their economic needs. Equally 
important, the GoK’s decision to amalgamate electricity consumption and provision figures, for 
different regions, hampers in-depth analysis of the interplay between politics and development. 
In all GoK statistics regarding the provision of electricity, for instance, figures for Kenyatta’s 
home province are lumped in with Nairobi’s, preventing the observer from obtaining precise 
figures on GoK efforts to invest in what has largely been a state-friendly region in the post-
independence era. It is very possible that precise figures for the traditional homeland of the Luo 
were purposefully omitted: it may also be that the GoK effort, in comparison especially to 
Nairobi and Mt. Kenya, was meagre and, therefore, embarrassing to the state; or there was a 
deliberate ploy by GoK statisticians to conceal from the public a well-calculated strategy to deny 
the community basic services that could boost its socio-economic welfare. Nevertheless, the 
installation/provision/consumption disparities between Nairobi and Central, as a single entity, 
and the rest of Kenya, are mind-boggling and serve to showcase the uneven development that 
arises from capitalism as a mode of production. Water supply outcomes for period 1983 – 93 are 
examined next.   
 
6.3.3.5 Water Supply Outcomes, 1983 – 93   
From 1985, the GoK stopped issuing statistics on numerical and cost distribution of rural 
water supply schemes, which have been very crucial thus far in the comparative analysis of the 
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outcome of public investments, with regard to water, opting instead for an amalgamated form of 
reporting expenditures and inputs under the title “Development expenditure on water supplies 
and related services.” In view of that fact, no comparative analysis shall be made of the outcomes 
of water provision for the period 1983 – 93; suffice it to say that “[b]etween 1990/91 and 
1994/95, the Ministry [of Water Development] had implemented and/or rehabilitated 1,579 water 
projects, 11,389 boreholes, 916 dams and 448 pans” (Republic of Kenya Economic Survey 
[RoKES], 1995, p.124). The succeeding historical phase of this study, 1993 – 2003, is examined 
next. 
 
6.4 The Era of Neoliberalism in Kenya, 1993 – 2003   
6.4.1 State of the Kenyan Economy, 1993 – 2003  
 The latter stages of historical phase 1983 – 93 were characterized by a ferocious power 
struggle between the controllers of the Moi state and the world monopoly capitalist forces, and 
served to pave the way for the introduction of neoliberalism as an economic ideology in Kenya. 
The first hint that Moi’s country would finally bow to the yearnings of the globalists – by 
seemingly disavowing its homespun export-oriented industrialization blueprint – and adopt the 
external calls for privatization and complete liberalization of the Kenyan economy, came out 
during the 1989 Budget Speech, in which Finance Minister Saitoti stated that Kenya would, in its 
“long-term strategy to improve efficiency and to raise production”, consider “shift[ing] more of 
the activities of production and distribution to the private sector, while finding ways to raise 
productivity of those resources that continue to be used in the public sector” (p. 6). However, as 
perviously stated, neoliberalism would not be adopted in Kenya without a “fight”; in 1990, 
Saitoti seemed to do a volte face on his earlier stance when he declared that: 
 
[T]he development of a country must mean the development of all its people and 
consequently, whatever programme or project is implemented it must have the welfare of 
the people as its main objective. Our planning process has placed priority on rural 
development programmes and the provision of such basic services as education, health 
and water supplies. We are therefore convinced that the economic strategy which we 
have chosen for ourselves is the right one. Our faith in the principles enunciated in the 
Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965 remains unshaken. We will reject the uninformed and 
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misguided arguments of those who would like us to change our course and place our hard 
won independence in peril. We will be guided by our own experience in determining how 
best to respond to the development needs of our people. (RoKBS, 1990, p. 1)  
 
The above remarks, in which the minister appears to be suggesting that neoliberalism was a new 
form of colonialism, came at a time when Kenya was “the sixth most indebted nation in sub-
Saharan Africa and yet remain[ed] one of only four countries which ha[d] not had to reschedule 
its debt in the past eight years” (RoKBS, 1991, p. 8). Kenya’s pride and tough stance would, 
however, be soon thereafter undone by the constriction of funds from donors, in November 1991, 
as captured in the 1992 Budget Speech:     
 
The multi-lateral donors suspended funding under quick disbursing programme aid 
pending the re-establishment of fiscal discipline. On the other hand bilateral donors, who 
mainly finance projects, made diverse decisions. Some cut their aid frames, others 
delayed commitments to further assistance, while yet others maintained their finance 
levels to ongoing projects. (p. 5) 
 
Moi’s government would, inevitably, eventually bow to the bullying tactics of the forces behind 
the world monopoly capitalist system and proceed to “re-establish financial discipline”, which 
would end up causing tremendous hurt and pain in the lives of many ordinary Kenyans, such as 
had never been witnessed since “independence”. Soon after the external demands for re-
establishment of “financial discipline” were made in 1992, plans for the privatization (“take 
over”) of Kenya’s numerous parastatals49 began in earnest; it would be accompanied by reforms 
in the civil service, which would eventuate in the retrenchment of many public servants during 
period 1993 – 2003. This was the situation in Kenya when Moi, who emerged triumphant in the 
1992 General Election, selected Musalia Mudavadi, in 1993, to direct the country’s economy and 
finances in this new age, the age of neoliberalism.  
 
                                                          
49
 At the beginning of the 1990s, Kenya had over 395 commercially-oriented and regulatory parastatals; the 
government was a majority owner in over half of these enterprises. By December, 1991, 22 companies were wound 
up, divested either through the exercise of pre-emption rights or sold through an open tender system to the highest 
bidders. Thirteen companies were processed for sale through the same method in March 1992. Also, arrangements 
were underway to sell Government’s shareholding in three companies already listed in the Nairobi Stock Exchange.   
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 In Kenya’s age of neoliberalism, the priority of the GoK, which had already succumbed 
to pressures from global capitalist forces, shifted from “export-oriented industrialization” to the 
vigorous pursuit of the liberalization of its economy (1993 Budget Speech). The GoK’s vision 
and plan of action was eclipsed by the new, neoliberal agenda that was described in various ways 
as follows: “liberalization and structural adjustment . . . [to] . . . [open] up the economy to private 
enterprise and to international competition” (RoKBS, 1995, p. 1);  “progressive liberalization 
and structural adjustment, together with the eradication of social injustice and poverty in all its 
forms” (RoKBS, 1995, p. 9); and “enhance the environment for private sector development” 
(RoKBS, 1997, p. 27). By May 1995, 61 out of the 207 public enterprises that had been 
earmarked for privatization in 1993 had been dispensed with; they generated around K£120 
million that was shared amongst the Treasury and a couple of holding corporations (RoKBS, 
1995, p. 13). And by 1996, a further 82 had been divested yielding “K£249 million to the 
Treasury, and K£125 million to the public sector holding companies” (RoKBS, 1996, p. 8). As if 
to gather campaign money in readiness for the 1997 General Election, the “64 non-strategic 
parastatals remaining out of the original 207 scheduled for privatization w[ould] be divested 
during the remaining part of 1996 and during 1997” (RoKBS, 1996, p. 8). On the civil service 
front, a total of 54,262 state employees had been retired, most of them against their will, by 
February 1997; this represented well over 20% of the June 1993 staffing levels (RoKBS, 1997, p. 
3).  
 
Such was the magnitude of the harshness of this new economic system which, ironically, 
had been imposed upon Kenya to “eradicate social injustice and poverty in all of its forms” 
(RoKBS, 1995, p. 9). The forces behind the world monopoly capitalist system would compel 
Kenya to meet an additional requirement: ensure “a healthy and educated workforce” (RoKBS, 
1995, p. 2). This was aimed at finding suitable stewards to help take care of their interests as the 
“new owners” of the country’s economy. This behaviour is typical of the bourgeoisie/dominant 
class in capitalist arrangements; and global monopoly capitalists, owing largely to their 
increasing control of the world, are geared towards ensuring that education serves to make 
students good servants of the newly established world economic order: production of “equals”, 
and encouragement of “independent thought” that could eventuate in socio-economic-political 
revolutions, is not part of their agenda whatsoever. Consider the fallacy of the effects of 
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neoliberalism, expressed below, before I examine Kenya’s economic performance in the 
country’s neoliberal age: 
 
Nevertheless, there is clear evidence now that countries which have been vigorously 
pursuing structural adjustment programmes, liberalizing their exchange rates and 
increasing the degree of private ownership of their economies have tended to grow faster 
and on a more sustainable basis than those countries which have implemented these 
reforms halfheartedly or not at all. (RoKBS, 1995, p. 3)   
 
Table 6.4 and figure 6.25, below, depict Kenya’s economic performance from 1993 to 2003. 
 
Table 6.4: Kenya’s Economic Performance, 1993 – 2003 
YEAR 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
GDP GROWTH (%) 0.1 3.0 4.9 4.6 2.3 1.8 1.4 0.3 1.2 1.1 1.8 
Source: Republic of Kenya Economic Surveys, 1993 – 2003  
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Figure 6.25: Kenya’s GDP Growth Rates, 1993 – 2003. 
Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Economic Surveys, 1993 – 2003  
 
Overall, the figures depicted in table 6.4 and figure 6.25, above, show no superior performance 
when compared to those of the preceding historical phases examined in this chapter; in fact, the 
figures are relatively dismal. Notably, the economy seemingly takes a hit during election time – 
financial years 1992/93, 1997/98 and 2002/2003 – reinforcing the contentions of this research 
that multi-party democracy, an associate of capitalism, is problematic for Africa. It is evident 
that the main effect of Kenya’s neoliberalism age, nondescript as it may be to the undiscerning 
eye, was the transfer of the control of the country’s economy from the nation’s government to 
the “world government” (forces behind the world monopoly capitalist system/globalists). The 
fact that the IMF and the World Bank have become the world’s economic police, and the control 
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they wield over Kenya and other developing countries, comes out clearly in the following 
statement issued by Mudavadi’s successor, Finance Minister Simeon Nyachae, in 1998: 
 
[I]t is in our best interest to collaborate and work particularly with the Bretton Woods 
institutions because of their importance in the global-economic relations. What makes 
their role critical is that most donor countries and foreign investors require to know the 
rating, by these two institutions, of a country seeking financial support and debt relief 
from them before they can sanction it. Consequently, the snowballing effect when we 
disagree with them can be disastrous. An agreement with the two institutions opens many 
financial support doors, including quick disbursing funds and foreign direct investments. 
(RoKBS, 1998, p. 5)   
 
Whilst the political elite in Kenya may have benefited from divestiture of state corporations, by 
corruptly looting the proceeds thereof, the masses (Kenyan citizens) were largely left to wallow 
in squalor and misery. Indeed, as Moi prepared to hand over power to Kibaki in 2003, the 
country’s economy was literally on its knees; excessively high interest rates, poor roads, power 
supply shortages and insecurity, amongst other challenges, prevailed in Kenya. Moreover, crime, 
“ethnic” tensions, increased unemployment, and poverty seized its citizens, 52% of whom lived 
below the poverty line. And neoliberalism had also opened up doors for further 
commercialization of education and health, making these services more difficult to access (cf. 
RoKBS, 1996, p. 13; RoKBS, 2000, p. 1). The following sub-section takes a look at the GoK’s 
development initiatives and projects during the period 1993 – 2003. 
 
6.4.2 GoK Development Initiatives and Projects, 1993 – 2003  
As early as 1993, President Moi had perceived the ills of neoliberalism and the structural 
adjustments it advocates; evidence of this is to be found in the exceptional actions he took to 
protect the welfare of the poorer sections of Kenyan society. Moi’s compassionate measures, for 
instance, were embodied by an allocation of K£110 million in the 1993/94 financial year, which 
was meant for  
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[i]mplementing a number of special programmes such as paying bursaries for fees in 
secondary schools for children of poor parents, increasing supply of drugs and other 
materials for health services in rural areas, improving maintenance of water projects in 
rural areas and providing for food security (for the supply of maize), particularly in the 
arid and semi-arid regions. (RoKBS, 1993, pp. 33 – 34)  
 
Also, from 1995, through District Trade Officers the GoK established suitable training schemes 
for jua kali sector players, while at the same time urging them to merge some of their 
establishments to form sustainable endeavours. The training schemes were geared towards 
helping these informal sector players to deal with various challenges including low productivity, 
inconsistent quality control, inadequate access to credit facilities, constricted product and 
customer markets, and poor management skills and market organization, all of which contributed 
to high rates of business transience (1995 Budget Speech). Youth unemployment, a perilous 
socio-economic challenge faced by the country, also concerned the Moi Government. In a bid to 
lessen the pain caused by this menace, funding was provided in 1995 to enable young Kenyans 
to acquire technical skills by way of vocational training in the country’s higher education 
institutions, including Youth Polytechnics and Harambee Institutes of Technology. Moreover, 
the yearly entry into the country’s NYS was increased by 1,000 to make a total of 3,000 annual 
entrants (RoKBS, 1995). 
 
Government involvement at the grassroots level of society also featured funding in the 
rural areas for rehabilitation of minor roads and stock routes, crop storage facilities, human and 
livestock access to unpolluted water, expansion of immunization and school feeding 
programmes, enhancement of healthcare services at both locational and district levels, and 
establishment of workshops especially for women artisans (RoKBS, 1996, p. 12). Indeed, it is his 
effort in the area of local government reforms that Moi will mostly be remembered for; to 
support the local authorities in their mandate of provision of services such as waste disposal, 
water supply, sewerage, roads, and public health, his government introduced the Local Authority 
Transfer Fund (LATF) in January 2000. The objective of LATF, which involved the transfer of 
2% of income tax collections to the local authorities, was to “simultaneously increase the 
resource base of local authorities and to enhance their governance capacities through a number of 
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conditions imposed on their financial management performance” (RoKBS, 2001, p. 18). Moi’s 
move not only further showcased his sensitivity towards the needs of the struggling masses, but 
also served as a de facto confession that Kenyatta’s incapacitation of local government 
authorities during the first historical phase of this chapter, period 1963 – 73, was ill-advised. 
Even though Kibaki would maintain LATF and implement CDF, he was just fulfilling what his 
predecessor had contemplated and started; this makes Moi, arguably, the most compassionate 
president in Kenya’s history. 
 
The big projects and programmes that were undertaken during Kenya’s neoliberal age 
include the following: rehabilitation of the Moi International Airport in Mombasa; upgrading of 
facilities at the Jomo Kenyatta International Airport (JKIA); completion of the Eldoret Airport; 
construction of the 75 megawatt diesel powered station at Kipevu; the extension of the 
Mombasa-Eldoret oil pipeline to Malaba and on to Kampala; the Nairobi-Mombasa Road 
Rehabilitation Project; the Kenya Urban Transport Infrastructure Project; National Women 
Development Programme; the Emergency Programme for Rehabilitation of Infrastructure; 
Energy Sector Reform and Power Development Programme; the Olkaria II Geothermal Project; 
the Third Gitaru Plant on Tana River Basin; the El Nino Project; and rural electrification under 
various projects. The next sub-section analyses the outcome of some of these GoK initiatives, 
projects and programmes, vis-à-vis Kenya in general and the Luo community in particular – with 
the focus on education, health, housing, electricity and water supplies. 
              
6.4.3 An Analysis of the Outcome of GoK Public Investment, 1993 – 2003  
6.4.3.1 Education Outcomes, 1993 – 2003  
Enrolment figures and patterns at the primary school level during the period 1993 – 2003 
were as depicted in figure 6.26 below. 
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Figure 6.26: Primary School Enrolment by Province, 1993 – 2003. 
Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1993 – 2003 
  
As shown in figure 6.26, above, the dominance of Moi’s Rift Valley Province continued in 
earnest, reinforcing the proposition in the theoretical framework in chapter two that political 
power is a vehicle to prosperity in Africa. By the time Moi was abdicating power at the end of 
2002, Central Province, which is home to the Kikuyu who, alongside the Luo, were staunch 
advocates of return to multi-party democracy in 1991, had been overtaken by Western Province 
and stood at position five, overall, in terms of enrolment. This indicates, as proposed in chapter 
two’s theoretical framework, that there is a strong link between opposition politics and dwindling 
socio-economic fortunes in Africa. It should be noted, however, that what appears to be 
inequality in terms of access to the opportunity of primary education, such as the huge disparity 
between enrolment figures in Rift Valley and North Eastern, has to do with demographics; whilst 
the former is Kenya’s most populous province, for instance, the latter is the country’s least 
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populated region. Enrolment levels at secondary school level, during period 1993 – 2003 were as 
shown in figure 6.27 below.   
  
 
Figure 6.27: Secondary School Enrolment by Province, 1993 – 2003. 
Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1993 – 2003 
 
There was a steady rise in enrolment figures over the decade for all provinces except Nairobi, 
which, as indicated earlier in this chapter, is often unsuitable for seekers of boarding schools at 
this level for it largely lacks such facilities. This outcome indicates that there was equality in 
terms of access to the opportunity of secondary education during this historical phase of this 
study. It is also noteworthy that by the time Moi was preparing to hand over power to Kibaki, his 
Kikuyu successor from Central, the enormous advantage that the new president’s province had 
wielded since independence over the rest of Kenya in terms of secondary school enrolment had 
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been substantially eroded. In fact, there was not much difference between Rift Valley, Central, 
Eastern and Nyanza – the four leading provinces – as Kibaki took over the reins of power in 
2003. Apparently, Moi’s policies of instituting special programmes, especially bursaries for fees 
in secondary schools for children of poor parents, had succeeded in establishing and ensuring 
equity. Health provision outcomes are discussed next.     
 
6.4.3.2 Health Provision Outcomes, 1993 – 2003 
 
 
Figure 6.28: Hospital Beds and Cots by Province, 1993 – 2003. 
Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1993 – 2003   
 
Figure 6.28 above shows that there was an exponential increase in the number of hospital beds 
and cots in Nyanza Province, where the greatest growth over the period 1993 – 2003 was 
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witnessed. Moi’s Rift Valley also experienced impressive growth rates, albeit to a lesser extent. 
Modest growth was witnessed in all the other provinces, an indication that the funding that Moi 
provided for the enhancement of healthcare service at both local and district levels was meeting 
its objective in a non-partisan manner. As of 2003, Rift Valley held a narrow edge over Nyanza 
in terms of this public provision; Central, Nairobi, Eastern, Western, Coast and North Eastern 
followed in that order. Housing provision outcomes are discussed next.  
 
6.4.3.3 Housing Provision Outcomes, 1993 – 2003  
The NHC investment in the provision of affordable housing for Kenyans during the 
period 1993 – 2003 was as captured in figure 6.29 below. 
 
 
Figure 6.29: No. of Houses Completed by NHC by Province, 1993 – 2003. 
Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1993 – 2003  
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A paltry 1,643 housing units were developed by the state corporation over a period of ten years, 
indicating that, in addition to the scarce resources available for this venture, neoliberalism had 
annihilated the GoK’s aspiration to improve its effort in this regard, for external forces had 
imposed upon Kenya the ideology of profit-oriented real estate development. Eastern, North 
Eastern and Nyanza got no allocations whatsoever during this particular historical phase of the 
study: the greatest beneficiary was Nairobi (80% of the total housing units provided), followed 
by Central (8.1%), Coast (6.8%), Western (3.7%) and Rift Valley (1.5%). When all factors are 
considered, however, it is difficult to find evidence of corruption on the basis of political 
inclination. Electricity provision outcomes are examined next.        
 
6.4.3.4 Electricity Provision Outcomes, 1993 – 2003  
The GoK provides consistent electricity sales figures – for purposes of small consumer 
lighting, domestic consumption and street lighting, by area – till the year 2000. These are as 
represented in figure 6.30 below. 
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Figure 6.30: Electricity Sales - Small Consumer Lighting, Domestic Consumption and 
Street Lighting by Area, 1993 – 2000 ('000 kWh). 
Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1993 – 2000  
 
Predictably, there were no pattern differences vis-à-vis 1983 – 93, the previous historical phase 
examined in this study. Nairobi and Mt. Kenya continued their domination of the sphere of 
electricity consumption, an indicator of greater financial wherewithal in relation to the rest of 
Kenya. The coastal area was a distant second; Rift Valley was third and Eldoret, Kisumu and 
Kitale – wherein Luo Nyanza lies – third. The disparities are informed by the uneven 
development that arises out of the adoption and pursuit of capitalism as a mode of production. I, 
nonetheless, maintain that the lack of more precise statistics from the GoK regarding electricity 
consumption hampers more meaningful analysis. Notwithstanding this hurdle, the patterns 
depicted in figure 6.30 above are testament to the fact that the legacy of uneven development that 
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was bequeathed to independent Kenya was, and remains, very difficult to reverse or overcome. 
The outcome of Moi’s rural electrification endeavours during this historical phase of this study is 
captured in figure 6.31 below. 
 
 
Figure 6.31: Rural Electrification by Area, 1996 – 2000 ('000 kWh). 
Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1996 – 2000  
 
The greatest beneficiaries of Moi’s rural electrification endeavours were Central and Eastern 
Provinces; Nairobi is definitely not rural and, therefore, the Nairobi and Mt. Kenya category 
largely represents the interests of the GEMA communities, which vehemently opposed Moi 
especially during the beginning of this historical phase of the study. This indicates that in 
implementing his rural electrification agenda, Moi paid no heed to “ethnicity” and political 
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affiliation. Rift Valley, Moi’s turf, was the second greatest beneficiary of this GoK provision; 
Western – wherein lies Luo Nyanza – was third and Coast brought up the rear. Of Moi’s 
contributions towards Kenya’s development, rural electrification was one of the most significant; 
Kibaki would adopt it and the current Jubilee Administration also pursues it. Water supply 
outcomes are examined next.   
 
6.4.3.5 Water Supply Outcomes, 1993 – 2003 
As this particular historical phase of the chapter came to an end, “about 75.0 per cent of 
the urban population and nearly 50.0 per cent of rural population had access to safe drinking 
water” (RoKES, 2004, p. 138). During the period 1993 – 2003, in keeping with the tenets of 
neoliberalism, the GoK began to embrace the commercialization of the delivery of essential 
services such as clean drinking water. As a result, individuals and companies started to dominate 
the water sector in the urban areas, as the GoK’s policy regarding this public provision in rural 
areas “shift[ed] towards low cost community based water projects that w[ould] in future be 
initiated and managed by local communities” (RoKES, 1997, p. 138). Accordingly, the GoK, in 
collaboration with other stakeholders, turned its water provision efforts to the establishment and 
maintenance of water purification points (WPPs) and drilling of boreholes across the country. 
Figure 6.32, below, gives the provincial breakdown of borehole provisions from 1996 to 2003. 
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Figure 6.32: Number of Boreholes Drilled in Rural Areas by Province, 1996 – 2003. 
Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1996 – 2003  
 
Of the combined total of 1,338 boreholes provided by the GoK from 1996 to 2003, the 
apportionment, in terms of percentages, from the greatest beneficiary to the least, was as follows: 
Rift Valley (32.2%); Eastern (23%); Central (14.9%); Nyanza (14.5%); Coast (8.2%); North 
Eastern (5.3%); and Western (1.9%). Besides being the largest in terms of area, the former Rift 
Valley was the most populous province in Kenya; it is, therefore, injudicious to reflexively 
conclude that it was favoured. On the other hand, North Eastern, which is by far the driest area of 
Kenya, was definitely in need of more boreholes. It is not clear what criterion the GoK and its 
partners employed in according this provision to rural Kenyans. However, one thing is 
indisputable: neoliberalism hurt the aspirations of the common citizen in Kenya insofar as the 
right of access to clean drinking water was concerned, by shifting the responsibility from the 
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GoK to the largely uncontrolled and unaccountable private sector. The final historical phase of 
this study, 2003 – 13, is examined next. 
 
6.5 2003 – 13: The Era of Socio-economic Oriented Investment, and the Establishment of 
Neoliberalism’s Support Structure in Kenya 
6.5.1 State of the Kenyan Economy, 2003 – 13  
The period 2003 – 13, generally considered the Kibaki era, was one in which two 
governments held sway, in quick successive fashion, in Kenya: the National Rainbow Coalition 
(NARC) Government (2003 – 2007); and the Grand Coalition Government (2008 – 2013). The 
former had Kibaki governing the country absolutely, as President, whilst the latter had him 
sharing power with PM Raila Odinga, in an arrangement arrived at following the violence that 
marred the country in the aftermath of the bungled 2007 General Election. Before examining the 
activities of these governments further, it is important to note that when Moi handed over power 
to Kibaki, the country was in a very dire state economically, owing partly to the fact that 
neoliberalism does not lead to pro-poor economic growth and partly to the inordinate corruption 
on the part of Kenya’s second president and his cronies. Indeed, as Kibaki took over the reins of 
power, there was no money in the Treasury; moreover, domestic public debt stood at Kshs. 251.5 
billion, while Kenya was externally indebted to the tune of Kshs. 377.7 billion (RoKBS, 2003, p. 
2). The structural adjustments, in relation to the rationalization of the Moi government’s 
expenditures, were seemingly done for mere exhibition purposes for they obviously failed 
miserably insofar as meeting their intended goals. Also, relations between Kenya and the forces 
behind the world monopoly capitalist system became sour at the end of Moi’s tenure, partly 
because of the President’s reluctance to privatize Telkom Kenya – the telecommunications 
business of the Kenya Post & Telecommunications Corporation – “development partners”, who 
had “suspended the disbursement of committed funds in 1997”, did it “again in November, 
2000” (RoKBS, 2001, p. 2).  
 
Having witnessed the negative effects of the power struggle between Moi and the 
globalist forces, and in full cognizance of the fact that the latter’s neoliberalist blueprint for the 
country was there to stay, Kibaki, who seemingly loved his country like Moi, acted wisely; he 
struck a good balance between national and external interests. Indeed, Kibaki’s economic design 
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was of such nature that he neither fully antagonized the international financial institutions nor 
completely sold out the interests of his largely impoverished people: the policy document that 
would guide his economic approach during his first term in power, entitled “Economic Recovery 
Strategy for Wealth and Management Creation 2003 – 2007” (ERS), became underpinned by, 
amongst others, the objectives of “channelling more budgetary resources to growth and poverty 
reduction areas”, “developing a foreign aid policy that targets poverty reduction, avoids 
crowding out of the private sector, enhances transfer of technology while strengthening and 
promoting domestic institutions”, and “restoring and maintaining sound relations with 
development partners” (RoKBS, 2003, p. 6). Together with the ERS, Vision 2030, which became 
the Grand Coalition Government’s economic blueprint, prioritized investment in the following 
sectors of the country’s economy: education, health, agriculture, rural development and 
infrastructure. Whilst investment in the pro-poor socio-economic sectors of education, health, 
agriculture and rural development was targeted at improving the conditions of the largely 
impoverished citizens of Kenya, critical physical infrastructure, particularly roads, rail, power 
and port modernization, would not only serve to “transform Kenya into [the envisaged] high 
middle-income country” (RoKBS, 2008, p. 30), but also – perhaps in inadvertent fashion – 
establish neoliberalism’s support structure in the country. This balanced approach, which 
enjoyed goodwill from numerous bilateral and multilateral donor agencies, yielded the economic 
results depicted in table 6.5 and figure 6.33, below. 
 
Table 6.5: Kenya’s Economic Performance, 2003 – 13 
YEAR 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
GDP GROWTH (%) 1.8 4.3 5.8 6.1 7.0 1.7 2.6 5.6 4.4 4.6 4.7 
Source: Republic of Kenya Economic Surveys, 2003 – 13  
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Figure 6.33: Kenya’s GDP Growth Rates: 2003 – 13. 
Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Economic Surveys, 2003 – 13 
 
As table 6.5 and figure 6.33 above show, Kibaki’s strategy of balancing the interests of 
his fellow Africans with those of the largely Western-based forces behind the world monopoly 
capitalist system seems to have been working from 2003 to 2007 when Kenya held a hotly-
disputed General Election. Indeed, by the year 2007 Kenya was financing “about 95% of [its] 
budget from [its] own resources” (RoKBS, 2007, p. 5), making the need for external funding less 
relevant. However, in corroboration of my argument in chapter two of this thesis, that democracy 
is problematic for Africa owing to the exogenous and bogus ideological construct, “ethnicity”, 
the GDP growth rate took a nosedive in 2008, in the period that followed Kenya’s post-election 
violence. After the major disruption associated with the elections, the economy appeared to be on 
an upward trend, only to be halted again by another element that showcased the uncertainty of 
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capitalism as an economic system; the major global recession of 2009, which remains second in 
severity only to the Great Depression of 1929 in modern history. The remainder of the historical 
phase (years 2010 to 2013) saw considerable GDP growth rates, but nothing near the 10% 
envisaged in Kenya’s Vision 2030, cementing further the fact that “faster”, “sustainable” 
economic growth (RoKBS, 1995, p. 3), that supposedly comes with neoliberalism, is nothing but 
a sham. The finer details of some of Kibaki’s socio-economic development initiatives, during 
historical phase 2003 – 13, follow next. 
 
6.5.2 GoK Development Initiatives and Projects, 2003 – 13  
If ever Moi felt that multi-party democracy had thwarted his attempts to fully 
demonstrate the compassion he had for Kenyans, by cutting short his 24-year stint in power, then 
he would not need to worry too much in retirement: indeed, in a relatively shorter period of ten 
years, and in spite of the setback of post-election violence, his successor would borrow some of 
his Nyayo era ideas, blend them with a few nuanced and contemporaneous concepts, and bring 
the Kenyan dream closer to fruition. In his quest to reduce poverty and bridge the enormous gap 
between the rich and the poor in Kenya, Kibaki engaged in a robust development agenda that not 
only targeted the poor, but also other societal stakeholders such as youths, farmers, rural area 
dwellers, the marginalized, Nairobians, businessmen, and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), 
among others. 
 
The most significant of Kibaki’s socio-economic development initiatives was, 
undoubtedly, the introduction of Free Primary Education (FPE) in January 2003. Owing to FPE, 
gross enrolment in primary schools increased from 90.8% in 2002 to 100.5% in 2003 (RoKBS, 
2003, p. 4); and by the time Kibaki’s first term was coming to an end in 2007, enrolment had 
increased by over 1.5 million pupils (RoKBS, 2007, p. 6). By the financial year 2012/13, out of 
the Ksh. 233.1 billion allocated to the education sector – which was also used for the payment of 
teachers, provision of various facilities in public universities, purchase of computers for schools, 
Early Childhood Development (ECD) support, provision of classrooms in both primary and 
secondary schools, and free day secondary education – Ksh. 8.3 billion was set aside for FPE 
(RoKBS, 2012, p. 13).  
 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
248 
 
Also, in order to reduce poverty in rural and urban areas and to promote regional 
development, Kibaki upheld the LATF initiative that Moi had introduced in 1998, albeit with 
stricter accountability requirements on the part of the Local Authorities. In fact, “budgetary 
allocation more than doubled from Kshs. 3.0 billion in 2002/03 to Kshs. 6.5 billion in 2006/07 
and [wa]s projected to rise to Kshs. 9.2 billion in 2007/08” (RoKBS, 2007, p. 7). Another game 
changer, of the calibre of FPE, was the CDF initiative, which was introduced in 2004. Speaking 
about CDF funds, which were divided equally amongst all the constituencies in Kenya and 
administered under the stewardship of MPs, Finance Minister David Mwiraria had this to say in 
2004: 
 
Now that we have established the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) and provided 
Ksh. 4.5 billion in the coming financial year for this Fund, what better leadership could 
we offer to our people than to use the CDF funds efficiently to address the urgent needs 
of the poor and vulnerable in our constituencies. Let us show by action that projects we 
select for funding are pro-poor and address the most urgent basic needs such as provision 
of water, building of classrooms and health facilities, etc. (RoKBS, 2004, p. 47) 
 
Over the years CDF would, as a precursor to the devolved government system introduced by the 
new Kenyan Constitution in 2010, finance various construction works throughout the country; 
indeed, through the CDF framework, Finance Minister Uhuru Kenyatta would, in 2009, allocate 
“Kshs. 22 billion, an equivalent of Kshs. 105 million per constituency as conditional Economic 
Stimulus for Resilience Package toward financing infrastructure development covering education 
and healthcare, and other development projects” (RoKBS, 2009, p. 12). 
 
Concerning healthcare provision, the Kibaki Administration put in place reforms 
throughout his tenure aimed at “enhanc[ing] access and affordability of basic health services 
with special emphasis on the poor and vulnerable” (RoKBS, 2004, p. 27). Furthermore, Kibaki 
intensified endeavours to escalate services such as immunization and availability of essential 
drugs in order to reach a greater number of Kenyans and, hopefully, reduce mortality rates in 
children aged below five and HIV/AIDS patients. Part of this work was carried out in 
conjunction with private sector and faith-based organizations, and civil society (RoKBS, 2004). 
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By the end of Kibaki’s first term, “over 1,000 additional dispensaries had been built 
countrywide, budgetary allocation for drugs increased by 72% and over 4,080 additional health 
personnel [had] been deployed to rural and needy areas to scale up health services” (RoKBS, 
2007, p. 18). 
 
The provision of cost effective, reliable electricity and safe water were also important 
items on Kibaki’s development agenda. In a move geared towards encouraging investments in 
the generation and distribution of electricity, the GoK put in place various tax incentives during 
the period 2003 – 13. Moreover, in addition to the rural electrification levy charged as part of 
electricity bills, Kibaki scaled up provisions for rural electrification during his tenure (RoKBS, 
2003, p. 33). Kibaki’s commitment to this cause was captured in the 2008 Budget Speech made 
by Finance Minister Amos Kimunya: 
 
[C]onscious of the need to promote rural development to stem rural-urban migration, we 
aggressively implemented a comprehensive rural electrification programme in the last 
four years. Going forward, we are committed intensifying [sic] the rural electrification 
programme countrywide by making fully operational the Rural Electrification Authority. 
I have, accordingly, allocated Kshs. 6.8 billion toward rural electrification, including the 
installation of mini-grids and grid extension covering trading centres, schools and health 
facilities. (RoKBS, 2008, p.11)         
 
With reference to the provision of safe water, mainly geared towards supporting livelihoods in 
Arid and Semi-arid Lands (ASAL), in the 2010 Budget Speech Uhuru highlighted that   
 
[t]o enhance supply of water for crop irrigation and livestock, I have allocated Kshs. 2 
billion under the Ministry of Regional Development for the construction of about 25 
medium size dams in arid parts of the country. I have also allocated Kshs. 375 million 
toward constructing mini-flood control dams and disilting of water pans in northern 
Kenya. This initiative will reduce the suffering of our people living in these areas from 
frequent floods. (RoKBS, 2010, p. 20) 
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 In a bid to unlock the potential of the county’s economy and to smooth out activities 
associated with agricultural production, the GoK embarked on an exercise to improve and extend 
the national road network through the Roads 2000 Programme, which was initiated during the 
2004/05 financial year. By 2007, the GoK had achieved the following results: 228 km of periodic 
road maintenance; 287 km of rehabilitated roads; 116 km of completely new sections; 580 km of 
routine road maintenance; and about 572 km of rural roads improvement under this roads 
programme (RoKBS, 2007, p. 15). Also, “715 kilometres of roads were constructed, 1,112 
kilometres rehabilitated and 1,142 kilometres maintained” (RoKBS, 2010, p. 11), between 2009 
and 2010, according to the GoK.    
 
Agriculture, considered a priority area with a high potential for economic growth under 
both the ERS and Vision 2030, underwent various sectoral reforms during the Kibaki era chief 
among which was the “rationalization of the rules and functions of key agricultural institutions to 
minimize duplication” (RoKBS, 2003, p. 18). In a bid to encourage their good governance, the 
Kibaki administration engaged cooperatives more and granted them full tax benefits. Moreover, 
the Kenya Cooperative Creameries (KCC) was purchased back by the state and its proprietorship 
reinstated to farmers. Following the restructuring of the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC), 
the government offered Ksh. 1.5 billion to the institute to facilitate farmers’ loans (RoKBS, 
2005, p. 13). Other measures taken by the government included the “revival of institutions such 
as the Kenya Farmers Association [KFA]” and the “strengthen[ing] of agricultural research and 
extension systems through the implementation of the Kenya Agricultural Productivity Project, 
with the support of the World Bank” (RoKBS, 2005, p. 13). In addition to steps and measures 
aimed at reviving the cotton sub-sector, and improving the productivity of the pyrethrum and 
coffee sub-sectors, the GoK “explore[d] the possibility of writing off non-performing loans 
advanced to the Co-operative movement by the Co-operative Bank” (RoKBS, 2003, p. 19). With 
regard to cereal and sugar farmers, who often faced stiff competition from cheap imports of these 
products by certain preferred traders, protective measures were introduced to the effect that “no 
trader [would] be allowed to import commodities free of duties and taxes, unless such 
commodit[ies] [were] duty free in the tariff” (RoKBS, 2003, pp. 17 – 18). 
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 In keeping with Moi’s compassionate – but perhaps obligatory – inclinations toward the 
largely unemployed Kenyan youth, Kibaki established a Youth Enterprise Fund in 2006 “to 
enable young people to access credit to start or scale up small and medium scale enterprises and 
to develop their entrepreneurial skills and create job opportunities” (RoKBS, 2006, p. 23). To 
this end, a sum of Ksh. 1 billion was allocated in the financial year 2006/07 (RoKBS, 2006, p. 
23); and a further Ksh. 250 million was added to its account in the following year (RoKBS, 
2007, p.22). Additional funding would follow throughout the remainder of Kibaki’s tenure in 
power. In the same breath, and in demonstration of concern for Kenyan women, the GoK also 
“establish[ed] a Kshs 2.0 billion Women Enterprise Development Fund with an initial injection 
of Kshs 1.0 billion in 2007/08” (RoKBS, 2007, p.22). Corporate bodies were called upon to 
contribute to these schemes whose objective was to give power to women and youth (RoKBS, 
2007, p.22).  
 
In a strategy that could be interpreted as an attempt to balance its development efforts, the 
Kibaki Administration simultaneously engaged in a vigorous infrastructure expansion 
programme. In order to decongest the major urban centres in Kenya, for instance, the GoK built 
by-passes in Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu, Nakuru and Eldoret. Nairobi got three by-passes – 
Southern, Eastern and Northern (RoKBS, 2004, p. 24). Additionally, “in order to reduce traffic 
jams and transport related costs [that hurt] businesses as well as the poor urban dwellers” 
(RoKBS, 2009, p. 10), the Nairobi Commuter Railway System was modernized. And, to meet 
the needs of Kenya’s growing economy, funds were set aside for the construction of a standard 
gauge railway line; this initiative, which upon completion will see Kenya connect easily with her 
neighbours, is on-going in 2017 under the Jubilee Administration. Another infrastructure venture 
was the modernization of the Port of Mombasa, supported by the Japanese Government. The aim 
of this initiative, which would include “dredging the Port of Mombasa to allow bigger ships to 
dock”, was to ensure efficiency and competitiveness in the service of “Kenya and its hinterland” 
(RoKBS, 2008, p. 10). To “improve significantly the quality of bandwidth available for global 
connectivity, [and] reduce cost of telecommunication” (RoKBS, 2008, p. 11) the Grand Coalition 
Government undertook an undersea cable project to link Kenya with the rest of the world. Also, 
in partnership with the private sector, the Kibaki-Raila Coalition oversaw the installation of the 
National Fibre Optic Network, meant to “provide universal access, close the digital divide 
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between rural and urban areas, and open up all parts of the country for commerce and trade” 
(RoKBS, 2008, p. 11). Such was the full-bodied nature of Kibaki’s infrastructural undertakings, 
which this study contends, served to set up the support structure for neoliberalist endeavours to 
thrive in Kenya; Moi’s successor, seemingly, had come to reconcile himself with the reality that, 
going forward, largely due to the “world economic police”, the private sector would be expected 
to be the engine of “growth” and “sustainable” development in the country, as is evident in the 
following statement:  
 
Mr. Speaker, that development partners are important to our development effort cannot 
be overemphasized. First, the Bretton Woods Institutions are considered the world 
opinion setters. Therefore, reaching a working agreement with them is necessary for 
attracting foreign direct investments. Secondly, many bilateral donors require a country 
to have a program with IMF before they can extend certain types of financial support, 
such as budget support. (RoKBS, 2004, p. 4) 
 
In concluding this sub-section, therefore, I reiterate that Moi’s mismanagement of the Kenyan 
economy, especially during his latter years in power, was not necessarily because of professional 
ineptitude, but the result of a surreptitious power struggle between the latter and the forces 
behind the world monopoly capitalist system. Kibaki managed to steer the Kenyan economy 
better than did Moi, not merely because of his superior knowledge in economics and finance, but 
chiefly because of the goodwill he enjoyed from global capitalist forces. Indeed, Kibaki partly 
acceded to the latter’s neoliberalist demands by largely pursuing a socio-economic agenda 
favourable for the development of structures that would uphold this extreme form of capitalism. 
An analysis of the outcome of Kibaki’s public investment efforts follows next.  
 
6.5.3 An Analysis of the Outcome of GoK Public Investment, 2003 – 13 
As Kibaki’s first term came to an end in 2007, the GoK claimed that “the largest 
reductions in poverty incidence outside Nairobi was recorded in Nyanza, Eastern and Western 
Provinces where the poverty incidence declined by 33%, 23% and 21%, respectively” (RoKBS, 
2007, p. 7). If these figures and assertions are trustworthy, then it is understandable that the 
observer should be confounded by the fact that six out of eight Kenyan Provinces (including 
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Nyanza and Western) voted overwhelmingly against Mwai Kibaki in the disputed 2007 General 
Election: despite being declared winner by a small margin, the latter only beat Raila Odinga in 
Eastern (a GEMA region) and his native Central Province. Such feelings of resentment on the 
part of most Kenyans toward a leader who was supposedly pro-poor as shown in sub-section 
6.5.2, above, call for further scrutiny of the outcomes of public investment, which follows 
shortly. Whilst appraising the NARC and Grand Coalition Governments, the last Finance 
Minister under Kibaki, Njeru Githae, presented the achievements of the Kibaki era as follows: 
 
i) Economic recovery with real GDP growth rising from a low of 0.8 percent in 2002 to 
7 percent in 2007. The domestic and external shocks of 2008 and 2009 adversely 
affected growth, but following a return of peace in the country, our economy 
rebounded in 2010 and remained resilient in 2011 despite the challenges we went 
through. We now project a growth of 5.2 percent in 2012; 
ii) Increased the number of children going to school under the free primary education 
programme from 5.9 million in 2003 to 10 million; 
iii) Provided tuition fee for 2 million more in secondary schools and increased by three-
fold the number of students in university; 
iv) Increased the number of people accessing [Antiretroviral] ARV drugs to 350,000, up 
from just 10,000 in 2003; and distributed close to 20 million mosquito nets 
forestalling a malaria epidemic; 
v) Tarmacked over 2,700 kilometres of roads, rehabilitated over 4,000 kilometres of 
road and connected to the electric grid 1.7 million Kenyans, up from 700,000 in 2002; 
vi) Distributed over Ksh. 100 billion under CDF, which financed construction of more 
than 1,000 health centres, 10,000 classrooms, numerous roads, security posts as well 
as water and fish projects throughout the country; 
vii) Introduced the Women and Youth Enterprise Funds, [Small and Medium-sized 
Enterprises] SME Fund and Agri-Business Fund to provide accessible credit to 
women, youth and other small business enterprises and expand employment; and 
viii) Revived and expanded irrigation projects throughout the ASAL areas to enhance food 
security (RoKBS, 2012, pp. 3 – 4)  
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Kibaki’s performance, if examined at a policy level at least, would generally be deemed 
reasonable and inclusive by most measuring standards. Moreover, Kenya’s third president 
appears to have taken into account the interests of the Luo more than his two predecessors: he 
tried to address the issue of cheap sugar imports, which affected Luo Nyanza farmers and other 
Kenyans (RoKBS, 2004, p. 18); he was also concerned with the issue of severe flooding that 
characterizes the Lake Victoria Basin and saw the need to rehabilitate neglected irrigation 
schemes, important for the production of cotton and rice, some of which lie in Luo Nyanza, like 
Ahero and Kano (RoKBS, 2004, p. 18); he considered Luo Nyanza in his road construction, 
maintenance and rehabilitation projects, for instance the Mau Summit-Kericho-Kisumu section, 
Kangode-Kitui Road, the Kisumu-Kakamega-Webuye Road, and Rangala-Siaya-Bondo and 
Ndori-Luanda Roads (RoKBS, 2004, p. 23); and included fish leather processing in Kisumu, 
Homa-Bay and Migori, and fruit processing in Kendu-Bay, whilst piloting industrial innovation 
under his SME growth programme (RoKBS, 2008, p. 13). Kibaki’s accommodation of Luo 
interests could have been the result of political maturity on the part of Kenyans, who have 
continuously demanded accountable leadership and equitable distribution of national resources, 
especially since the promulgation of the country’s new constitution in 2010. Moreover, his 
Grand Coalition Government partner, Raila Odinga, may have pushed for inclusion of the Luo 
and other Kenyans in GoK development plans during the period 2008 – 13. The population of 
Kenya, as Kibaki began his second term, was as given in table 6.6, below.  
 
Table 6.6: Kenya Population by Province, 1999 and 2009 
  Year Growth 
Province 1999 2009 No. (%) 
Nairobi 2,143,254 3,138,369 995,115 46.4 
Central 3,724,159 4,383,743 659,584 17.7 
Coast 2,487,264 3,325,307 838,043 33.7 
Eastern 4,631,779 5,668,123 1,036,344 22.4 
North-Eastern 962,143 2,310,757 1,348,614 140.2 
Nyanza 4,392,196 5,442,711 1,050,515 23.9 
Rift Valley 6,987,036 10,006,805 3,019,769 43.2 
Western 3,358,776 4,334,282 975,506 29.0 
TOTAL 28,686,607 38,610,097 9,923,490 34.6 
Source: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 2000, pp. 19 – 20; 2014, pp. 4 – 7  
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The figures shown in table 6.6 above have been considered, where appropriate, alongside other 
possible determinants of public provision proportions, such as state power, “ethnicity” and 
political inclination, in the outcome analysis that follows next: emphasis remains on education, 
health, housing, electricity and water supply.   
 
6.5.3.1 Education Outcomes, 2003 – 13 
The outcome of the GoK investment in primary education, during the historical phase 
2003 – 13, was as presented in figure 6.34 below. 
 
 
Figure 6.34: Primary School Enrolment by Province, 2003 – 13. 
Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 2003 – 2013 
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As evidenced in figure 6.34 above, the FPE programme started by Kibaki in 2003 yielded 
desired results; there was continuous overall growth in enrolment numbers over the decade that 
followed his gesture. A particularly good year, in 2011 the overall growth rate was extremely 
high. As Kibaki prepared to exit the political scene, there were well over 10 million pupils 
enrolled in primary school in Kenya. Kibaki did a great deal to improve access to education 
opportunities, at the primary level, and addressed the challenges faced by the Luo and other non-
Kikuyu Kenyans, during the reign of Jomo Kenyatta, with finality. The provincial enrolment 
figures in figure 6.34 above show that Rift Valley had a healthy lead in terms of taking 
advantage of the opportunity accorded by the FPE initiative. The high enrolment numbers in the 
Rift Valley are probably the result of the region’s populous nature. Nyanza, the province in 
which Luo Nyanza lies, was second, Eastern third, Western fourth and Central fifth. Coast, 
Nairobi and North Eastern followed Central in that order. The dismal numbers in North Eastern, 
though expected, are a cause for concern; the province’s residents, who seldom live sedentary 
lives for they are mainly nomadic pastoralists, could be interfering with the invaluable 
opportunity of access to education accorded to their children by the GoK. In general, politics did 
not play any role in hampering equality of access to the opportunity of participation in primary 
education during Kibaki’s reign. The enrolment outcomes at the secondary school level, during 
Kibaki’s tenure, were as shown in figure 6.35 below.     
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Figure 6.35: Secondary School Enrolment by Province, 2003 – 13. 
Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 2003 – 13  
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has been to examine the manner in which education developed following the leader’s gesture. 
Although secondary school fee requirements continue to be a hurdle for many Kenyans, the 
findings of this research in this particular historical phase show that owing, partly, to the 
introduction of free tuition, enrolments at this stage have been steadily increasing. There is, 
therefore, little room, if any, for the Luo to cry foul in this regard; Kibaki’s policies improved the 
community’s chances at obtaining an education. The next sub-section examines the health 
outcomes during the period 2003 – 13. 
 
6.5.3.2 Health Provision Outcomes, 2003 – 13 
The GoK ceased to provide statistics on the number of hospital beds and cots, by 
province, after the previous historical phase of this study, 1993 – 2003. Accordingly, in gauging 
the outcome of health provision by the Kibaki Administration, this sub-section turns to the 
number of health institutions, by province, as depicted in figure 6.36 below.    
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Figure 6.36: No. of Health Institutions by Province, 2003 – 13. 
Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 2003 – 13  
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their interests were well attended. Moreover, with devolved CDF funds, the various regions of 
Kenya had considerable decision-making power and significant economic wherewithal to 
determine their destinies.  
 
Table E35 (see Appendix E) shows the full immunization coverage rate of under-one 
year old children, by region, during the period 2008 – 13. The immunization coverage for 
Nairobi and Central Provinces was very strong, steady, and never fell below the national 
coverage rate throughout Kibaki’s second term in office. It is possible to argue that the wielders 
of state power ensured that their home area was well taken care of, in terms of provision of this 
essential health service; however, Central Province’s relatively well-off position, owing to its 
capitalist ventures and its proximity to Nairobi, could have contributed to the region’s 
comfortable situation. Poverty emasculates people to the point where they may find it difficult to 
take their children to a hospital for immunization at the prescribed time; this is, generally, not the 
case in Central. Poverty in some parts of the Rift Valley and in most areas of North Eastern 
could have had a hand in determining immunization coverage in the two regions for, while the 
latter only managed to outdo the national coverage rate in 2008, the former fell below the 
national coverage rate throughout the period in question. Coast and Eastern Provinces fared well, 
with each failing to surpass the national coverage level only on one occasion. On the other hand, 
Western’s performance, which was rather modest, saw the region’s immunization coverage fall 
below the nation’s in 2008, with a similar occurrence projected in 2012. As for Nyanza Province, 
where the Luo reside, the coverage was above the national rate during the years 2008 and 2009; 
however, in 2010 and 2011 the coverage was substandard, falling below the national rate. By 
2012, though, Nyanza was expected to lead from the front for it was projected that every child 
under the age of one would have been immunized, fully, in the province. As with education, it is 
not possible to make a strong case for discrimination of the Luo community during the Kibaki 
era, especially during the period in which Kibaki shared power with Odinga, with respect to 
health service provision. Housing provision outcomes are discussed next.       
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6.5.3.3 Housing Provision Outcomes, 2003 – 13  
 
Figure 6.37: No. of Houses Completed by NHC by Province, 2003 – 13. 
Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 2003 – 13 
 
The trends for the housing units completed by the NHC in the country’s various provinces during 
the period 2003 – 13 are as shown in figure 6.37 above. In comparison with the previous 
historical phase, 1993 – 2003, there was a substantial growth of 63.7% in the number of houses 
completed for occupation by low income earners all over the country. This growth, 
notwithstanding,  the GoK effort of 2,691 housing units, for a population of 40 million citizens, 
was woefully inadequate.  These grim statistics testify to the resource scarcity that bedevils 
Africa largely due to the restrictions imposed by the global economic system, in which the 
continent is firmly affixed, and the selfishness of global capitalists. Nevertheless, the greatest 
beneficiary in terms of unit numbers allotted was Nairobi (80.5%); it was followed by Nyanza 
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(6.6%), Coast (6%), Central (3.4%), Western (3%), and Rift Valley (0.6%), respectively. Eastern 
and North Eastern were unlucky to miss out in historical phase 2003 – 13. Electricity provision 
outcomes are examined next. 
 
6.5.3.4 Electricity Provision Outcomes, 2003 – 13 
The outcome of the rural electrification initiative during the tenure of Kibaki was as 
depicted in figure 6.38 below. 
 
 
Figure 6.38: Rural Electrification by Area, 2003 – 13 (million kWh). 
Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 2003 – 13  
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During historical phase 2003 – 13, it would seem, previously disenfranchised communities like 
the Luo began to gain increased access to electricity supply and connectivity. Western area, 
under which Luo Nyanza is categorized, consistently edged out Nairobi and Mt. Kenya area – 
Kibaki’s GEMA turf – albeit narrowly, in terms of rural electrification. This implies that, during 
the reign of the NARC and Grand Coalition Governments, the living standards of rural Kenyans 
improved. The Coast area, however, performed relatively poorly in rural electrification during 
this historical phase of the study; as far as its residents are concerned, there was no equality of 
access for them to this opportunity of rural electrification. A look at the water supply outcomes 
concludes the outcomes analysis for this historical phase, 2003 – 13; it is next.    
 
6.5.3.5 Water Supply Outcomes, 2003 – 13  
Figure 6.39, below, gives the provincial breakdown of borehole provisions from 2003 to 2012. 
 
Figure 6.39: No. of Boreholes Drilled in Rural Areas by Province, 2003 – 12. 
Source: Constructed from Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 2003 – 12 
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Of the total of 1,170 boreholes drilled by the GoK and its partners, during the period 2003 – 12, 
Eastern (28.5%) and Rift Valley (25.2%) were the greatest beneficiaries – numerically. They 
were followed by North Eastern (17.8%), Nyanza (8.9%), Central (8.4%), Coast (6.2%), and 
Western (5%), in that order. Nairobi residents, who largely have access to tap water and who 
continue to enrich the pockets of neoliberalists, do not require boreholes as such; this explains 
their omission in this regard. The borehole provision for the president’s home area, a cheerless 
8.4%, indicates that state power did not necessarily determine proportions in the allocation of 
this provision. In any case, as explained in sub-section 6.4.3.5 above, local communities were 
expected to initiate water projects as the GoK began to gradually withdraw from providing this 
essential commodity with the advent of neoliberalism. Moreover, Central Province, owing to a 
combination factors such as fortune (suitability for commercial agriculture) and proximity to the 
capital and state power, is relatively wealthy; its residents have increased access to tap water and 
require fewer boreholes. Based on these findings, it is hard, if not impossible, to make an 
argument for discrimination against the Luo by the central government as regards water 
provision during Kibaki’s tenure in office. The conclusion of this chapter, which comprises a 
general summary of the findings, on public provision in relation to state power and opposition 
politics, and vis-à-vis the theoretical framework outlined in chapter two, follows next.  
 
6.6 Summary of Findings and Conclusions Vis-à-vis the Study’s Theoretical Framework 
A brief summary of how the findings of this chapter relate to the theoretical framework, 
vis-à-vis each of the five indicators of socio-economic development examined in this study, is 
now sequentially presented. It is organized in five sub-sections, viz.: i) Education, State power 
and Opposition Politics; ii) Healthcare Provision, State Power and Opposition Politics; iii) 
Housing Provision, State Power and Opposition Politics; iv) Electricity Supply, State Power and 
Opposition Politics; and v) Water Supply, State Power and Opposition Politics.  
 
6.6.1 Education, State Power and Opposition Politics  
Pertaining to the outcomes of the GoK’s investment in education from 1963 – 2003, the 
findings of this study strongly support the theoretical proposition that political power is a vehicle 
to socio-economic prosperity in Africa, since whoever controls the state decides how scarce 
resources will be allocated. This study finds that before the introduction of FPE by Kibaki in 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
265 
 
2003, there were very strong links between state control and access to education at both the 
primary and secondary levels of education in Kenya. From 1963 – 73, when Jomo Kenyatta was 
in power, his home province, Central, enjoyed a healthy lead over the rest of Kenya in primary 
school enrolment. Over the same period, Central Province’s participation in the opportunity of 
secondary school education was also overwhelmingly dominant over the rest of Kenya. In the 
decade that Moi took over the reins of power, 1973 – 83, his home province, Rift Valley, rose, 
appreciably, to top the enrolment rankings. Rift Valley’s dominance in primary school enrolment 
would continue consistently to 2003 and coincided with dwindling fortunes in Central, which no 
longer wielded state power. The fortunes of Rift Valley Province, vis-à-vis secondary education, 
also improved significantly when Moi rose to power; during the period 1973 – 2003, the 
province would come to achieve parity with Central in this sphere and would finally surpass the 
latter in 2003. Opposition politics does not appear to have played a significant role in 
determining education outcomes with regard to the Luo, for Nyanza was consistently in the top 
half in both categories during the period under study. The findings regarding healthcare are 
examined next. 
 
6.6.2 Healthcare Provision, State Power and Opposition Politics 
The findings of this study regarding the family planning services component of 
healthcare are in congruence with the following two propositions, which are outlined in the 
theoretical framework: first, that political power is a vehicle to socio-economic prosperity in 
Africa; second, that the “ethnic groups” that control state power, owing to the politicization of 
“ethnicity” in Africa, do not allocate the dominated groups an equitable share of the national 
resources. During the historical phase 1963 – 73, this study shows, there was a strong link 
between state control and access to family planning services; President Jomo Kenyatta’s 
homeland, Central, was the greatest beneficiary of this state provision if Nairobi is not 
considered. During the same period, Nyanza, home to the Luo “dissenters”, performed dismally, 
appearing in the bottom two in consistent fashion. In the succeeding historical phase of this 
study, 1973 – 83, the two protagonists, Central (Kikuyu) and Nyanza (Luo) appear at the two 
extreme ends of the outcome of this crucial healthcare provision component, underlining the link 
between political inclination and access to state healthcare services. 
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The findings on the hospital bed and cot component of healthcare provision largely 
support the Theory of Uneven Development, which argues that capitalism leads to simultaneous 
concentrations of wealth and capital, on the one hand, and poverty and oppression on the other. 
With particular reference to Nairobi and North Eastern, the period 1963 – 73 was one in which 
the number of hospital beds and cots in the two provinces showcased the fact that capitalism 
leads to uneven development across regions at the nation-state level. Although, generally, the 
study shows that there was no strong link between political inclination and the provision of 
hospital beds and cots, the period 1983 – 93 is an exception: in what could be interpreted as a 
result of the botched coup attempt of 1982, Nyanza witnessed the least growth in this category 
over the decade, amongst all of Kenya’s provinces, lending credence to the proposition that 
opposition politics has hampered economic development in Luo Nyanza. The findings on 
housing provision in relation to the theoretical framework follow next. 
 
6.6.3 Housing Provision, State Power and Opposition Politics 
The story of the GoK’s provision of affordable, decent housing for Kenyans totally 
supports the Theory of Uneven Development, especially as espoused by Mandel (1968) who has 
argued that skewed socio-economic development associated with capitalism is partly the result of 
prolificacy differences amongst animals and soils, and fortuitous happenings in life and nature 
(as cited in Bond, 1999). It is about strategy, logic and suitability, and has nothing to do with 
state-instigated political machinations and/or opposition politics. Nairobi was absolutely 
dominant, as a recipient of this awfully scarce GoK provision, not least because it is the nation’s 
industrial and commercial centre. Logically, a gigantic portion of the country’s low income 
earners work in the city – these are the ones to whom affordable housing is mostly targeted. 
There is no way in which a province, like North Eastern, an unattractive region characterized by 
unfavourable climate and soils, and mostly the abode of nomadic pastoralists, would have been 
prioritized in the allocation of this GoK provision, amid the reality of scarce state resources. 
Certainly, throughout the period 1963 – 2013, political inclination and state power did not 
determine the allocation of this state provision; apportionment of this woefully limited resource 
was heavily dependent on relevance and strategy. If anything, Nyanza, an opposition stronghold, 
was the greatest beneficiary during the historical phase 1983 – 93 of this study. Noteworthy, 
after the forceful introduction of neoliberalism, the GoK seemingly lost its zeal and desire to 
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provide this service: the magnitude of this provision dwindled drastically from 8,575 housing 
units during 1983 – 93 to a paltry 1,673 in phase 1993 – 2003, Kenya’s first decade under 
neoliberalism. A summary of the study’s findings on the GoK’s electricity provision vis-à-vis the 
theoretical framework is next. 
6.6.4 Electricity Supply, State Power and Opposition Politics 
Electricity provision by the GoK was consistently heavily skewed in favour of Nairobi 
and Mt. Kenya throughout the period covered in this research, 1963 – 2013. Within the Theory of 
Uneven Development, these findings can be interpreted in two ways: first, through Oloo’s (2004) 
assertion that during colonial times, the British pursued a policy of uneven development 
flagrantly and unashamedly. Nyeri, which is situated in the Mt. Kenya area, was a white settler 
area from whence the British colonialists generated electricity. This meant that, upon 
independence, the area’s natives – President Jomo Kenyatta’s Kikuyu “ethnic group” – were 
better poised to obtain this provision for the concomitant infrastructure was already there. 
Second, still rooted in Oloo’s (2004) perspectives on uneven development, capitalism leads to 
socio-economic inequalities between different regions in a given country. The fact that Nairobi is 
the industrial, commercial and political capital of the nation automatically predisposes its 
residents to access higher living standards in comparison with other Kenyans. They are therefore 
in a better position to afford electricity. 
 
However, since the GoK does not provide the precise electricity provision and 
consumption figures, especially those of both Mt. Kenya (Kenyatta’s home) and Nyanza 
(Odinga’s political base), we cannot rule out the possibility that the skewed provisions represent 
favouritism towards state supporters and punishment towards dissenters. The GoK has a habit of 
engaging coffee and tea farmers – largely from Mt. Kenya region – more meticulously, 
according the latter credit facilities and, often, writing off their debts.
50
 This has had the effect of 
financially empowering this group – largely comprising Kikuyus – and uplifting its living 
standards, making it relatively better positioned to afford electricity. On the other hand, Luos 
who are historically largely sugar and cotton farmers have often been dealt major financial blows 
by both the GoK and the world economic system. The GoK often allows haphazard importation 
                                                          
50
 See, for instance, Ngige, F. (2016, November 30). Reprieve for farmers as President Uhuru Kenyatta cancels Sh 
2.4b debts. Standard Digital. Retrieved from https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000225215/reprieve-for-
farmers-as-president-uhuru-kenyatta-cancels-sh2-4b-debts (accessed 17 February 2017).  
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of sugar, and second-hand clothing – these are dumped into the country, thanks to the WTO 
liberalization of world trade. In the first budget speech of the NARC Era, Finance Minister 
David Mwiraria aptly captured this aspect of poor governance when he stated, about sugar and 
cereals, that: 
 
[P]referred traders have been allowed to import some of these commodities free of duties 
and taxes and sell them cheaply at the expense of local producers. This practice has 
consistently driven producer prices below remunerative levels, thus undermining farmers’ 
incomes while discouraging local production. (RoKBS, 2003, p. 18) 
  
Indeed, carelessness, ineptitude, corruption and “malice”, on the part of the GoK, have had the 
effect of slowly but surely killing the sugar and cotton industries in Kenya. This has, in turn, 
taken away from the source of livelihood of Luos, and other Kenyan sugar and cotton farmers, 
impairing their living standards and robbing them of the ability to pay for electricity installation 
services altogether. A summary of the study’s findings on the GoK’s provision of rural water 
supply, vis-à-vis the theoretical framework, is next. 
 
6.6.5 Water Supply, State Power and Opposition Politics  
The findings of this research suggest that there was a strong link between politics and 
access to rural water supply funding, with reference to the Luo, in historical phase 1963 – 73. In 
the period after the Odinga-Kenyatta fallout, Nyanza received the least amount of funding from 
the GoK’s Department of Water. This supports the proposition that “ethnic groups” that control 
state power, in Africa, do not allocate the dominated groups – usually the “rebellious” ones – an 
equitable share of the national largesse. The next chapter –chapter 7 – concludes this thesis and 
highlights its key findings and assertions. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions and Policy Recommendations  
7 Broad Overview of this Thesis 
This thesis has been a deviation from the prevalent scholarly practice that largely 
conceptualizes “ethnicity”, vis-à-vis the Luo, through the lens of Lonsdale’s (cf. Berman and 
Lonsdale, 1992) notion of “moral ethnicity”. Deriving from the premise that “ethnicity” is not 
only a spurious ideological construct, but also an exogenous imposition on the aboriginal people 
of Africa, by mostly European colonizers and anthropologists, it has been inspired by Mafeje’s 
(1971) contention that, since Africa has “been successfully drawn into a capitalist economy and a 
world market” (p. 258), “ethnicity” has to be explained and conceptualized differently, with 
modern conditions in mind. Accordingly, it has positioned Kenya’s “ethnic” problem within the 
spectrum of profit and the push for globalism and contends that it is through the lens of the 
incessant, insatiable pursuit of profit by society’s elite class that contemporary scholarship 
should seek to theorize and understand the problem of “ethnicity”. It submits that warped 
ideologies characterize the various epochs of human history – slavery, colonialism and the post-
independence era – and have been continuously morphed and employed by society’s elite class 
to safeguard and perpetuate the structural determination of capital.  
 
Concerned about the specifics of the negative consequences of “ethnic” instigated 
political marginalization in Kenya, and seeking to establish why the Kenyan governing structures 
and practices persist in promoting “ethnicity” despite its existential problems for particular social 
groups, this study was conducted to meet three broad objectives, viz.: i) to examine the Luo 
perspective of the influence of political exclusion on their socio-economic and cultural 
development since independence; ii) to explain the marginalization of the Luo by examining the 
proportion of GoK investment in Nyanza during the period 1963 – 2013 to enhance their 
effective participation in governance structures at a grassroots level and their concomitant socio-
economic development; and iii) to construct a conceptual framework to explain why “ethnicity” 
is strongly correlated with the crisis of state power in Kenya and why it has become a pervasive 
problem in the African country during the period under study. 
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To attain these objectives, I adopted a pragmatic approach: current literature on 
“ethnicity” and governance in Africa was critically examined with the view to inform a 
structured survey/questionnaire and FGD guide. Through these survey instruments, participants 
expressed their understandings and experiences regarding the consequences of ethnic-based 
governance on socio-cultural-economic development. Historical records – Economic Surveys, 
Statistical Abstracts and Budget Speeches – and contemporary world events were also examined 
and analysed to satisfy the objectives of this study. This final chapter presents a summary of the 
findings vis-à-vis the research questions, assumptions/hypotheses, and the conceptual and 
theoretical frameworks presented in chapters one and two, and outlines the salient conclusions of 
this study. Besides this synopsis, it comprises five sections, as follows: an integration of the 
quantitative and qualitative results, conclusions, policy recommendations, contribution to 
knowledge, and suggestions for further research. These key take-away points of this research are 
now sequentially presented. 
 
7.1 Integrating the Quantitative and Qualitative Results 
This section summarizes and compares the results of the study vis-à-vis its first four 
assumptions/hypotheses, which were mainly tested through the quantitative survey and FGDs. 
The quantitative and qualitative views of the respondents largely support the study’s first 
assumption that the Luo have enjoyed minimal public investment from the GoK because of 
opposition politics making them relatively poor compared to other communities; 60.5% of the 
survey respondents either agree or strongly agree with the proposition that the Luo have been 
short-changed by the central government in Kenya when it comes to the provision of public 
investment during the period under study (11.94% took a neutral stance, while 27.56% either 
disagreed or strongly disagreed with this proposition). On the other hand, a significant portion of 
the FGD respondents were of the opinion that, due to opposing the GoK, Luo Nyanza has 
witnessed outright economic sabotage instigated by the state. They contended that economic 
incapacitation of Luo Nyanza has been carried out surreptitiously – and with impunity – over the 
years. They cited the following examples of sabotage: disruption of rice irrigation schemes at 
Nyando, Kano and Ahero; the lack of support for the sugar industry, particularly the impairment 
of Miwani, Muhoroni and Chemelil sugar factories throughout the post-independence era; 
closure and relocation of production plants such as the Kenya Breweries in Kisumu; the 
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incapacitation of the Molasses Project in Kisumu; and the establishment of fish processing 
industries in Central Kenya, some hundreds of miles away from Lake Victoria. These state 
orchestrations, they argued, have had a devastating economic effect on Luo Nyanza over the 
years, particularly because they have left many Luos jobless, idle and economically 
incapacitated.  
 
With reference to the study’s second assumption – that political exclusion has led to the 
fostering of intra-“ethnic” ties amongst the Luo – both the quantitative and qualitative results 
were negative. The study finds that political exclusion in the period under study has instead 
weakened intra-communal ties amongst the members of the community. A majority of the 
respondents (52.75%) indicate that influential Luos do not assist fellow Luos to access economic 
opportunities – 15.69% took a neutral stance, while 31.57% either agree or strongly agree with 
the proposition. Despite having been politically excluded for much of the period during which 
Kenya has been independent, it seems that most Luos have not developed feelings of oneness 
and/or empathy towards fellow Luos. The majority of respondents (49.44%) do not feel that it is 
better for a Luo to marry a fellow Luo – on this issue 12.19% are neutral while 38.38% either 
agree or strongly agree. Seemingly, political exclusion during the period under study has not 
translated into strong feelings of exclusivity, in the area of marriage, amongst the Luo. Similarly, 
the FGDs revealed that the Luo perspective on whether Luos help each other given the 
predicament they collectively face – the economic derivatives of political exclusion – is almost 
completely negative. Narratives from the discussions held with members of the community 
disclose an overwhelming phenomenon that can, perhaps, best be described as “self-hate”. This 
“self-hate” phenomenon seemingly thrives amongst both the community’s political leaders and 
the ordinary Luo citizens at the grassroots level, as well. These findings of self-loathing amongst 
the Luo negate the second assumption of this thesis, which is based on Carr’s (1995) contentions 
that a direct co-relation between economic dissatisfaction and the strengthening of “ethnic” 
roots. The explanation of this strange phenomenon may lie in the subjugation process employed 
by ruling elites as described by wa Thiong’o (1986), and captured in chapter two of this thesis. 
According to wa Thiong’o (1986), society’s dominant groups often use subtle psychological 
forms of violence to aid in the maintenance of oppressive economic orders. Psychological 
violence has often involved the belittling of the subservient people’s culture, and is aimed at 
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destroying it and influencing or distorting the manner in which the latter view themselves vis-à-
vis the dominant groups – cultivation of self-hate. A self-loathing people, it has been thought, are 
easy to manipulate and control. Somewhere along the process of subjugation, wa Thiong’o 
(1986) argues, the oppressors’ cultures rise to dominate those of the oppressed; often, the 
dominated peoples come to define themselves via the alien cultural parameters forcibly 
introduced to their societies. Kenyatta’s deculturalization technique, which introduced the 
Kikuyu notion of civility – male circumcision – to the Kenyan political arena, seems to have had 
a detrimental psychological effect on the Luo, by inflicting self-hate amongst a majority of the 
community’s members and weakening their intra-ethnic ties as a result.  
 
With regard to the third assumption of this study – which contended that political 
exclusion has translated into economic difficulties for the Luo, limiting their chances of 
ascending to power in Kenya – the following can be deduced from the results of the quantitative 
survey: access to, or denial of economic opportunities for a Luo in Kenya is a matter of a coin-
toss; the issue of discrimination when it comes to better jobs and opportunities is legitimate, but 
not a grave concern for the Luo; it is neither easy nor difficult for the Luo to get promoted at the 
workplace on the basis of “ethnicity” – the situation looks more like a matter of fate; and the 
majority of Luos do not believe that their living standards would be better if they were from 
another “ethnicity”. These largely neutral findings of the quantitative phase may be explained by 
the fact that slightly over 50% of the survey respondents were youthful Luos below the age of 
thirty; moreover, 32.5% of these respondents were aged between 15 and 20 years and are yet to 
venture into the job market or employment scene. Also, owing to their age, a majority of the 
respondents, who were beneficiaries of the policies Kibaki implemented from 2003 to 2013 – 
such as free primary education – did not have the experience of life during the Kenyatta and Moi 
eras. The qualitative results, however, reveal a stronger support for the third assumption of this 
study. FGD participants stated that they continuously face tremendous difficulties with regards to 
the following: access to credit from financial institutions like banks, access to government funds 
and grants, access to government contracts and tenders and obtaining employment in the civil 
service. Most Luos feel that their de facto leader, Raila Odinga, faces a tumultuous task if he is 
to dislodge his Uhuru Kenyatta-led Kikuyu opponents who, owing to protracted control of state 
power, have become comparatively well-heeled over time. Participants lamented that Kikuyus 
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have continuously utilized their largely ill-gotten wealth to corrupt the country’s electoral body, 
the IEBC, by bribing its officials. They contend that Luo leader, Odinga, is not in a position to 
use the same devious mechanisms, for he lacks the requisite financial wherewithal. These 
contrasting findings regarding this particular assumption bring to light the importance of the 
insights contained in the Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic 
Performance and Social Progress (CMEPSP), which argued that “. . . statistics may not be 
capturing some phenomena, which have an increasing impact on the well-being of citizens” 
(Stiglitz, Sen & Fitoussi, 2009, p. 8) and further validate the research design that was adopted for 
this study.    
 
Concerning the study’s fourth assumption, both the study’s quantitative and qualitative 
results suggest that there is a very strong link between political exclusion and the adoption of 
alien cultures among the Luo – 52.5% of the respondents, for instance, have either adopted the 
practice of male circumcision or heard of a fellow Luo who has gone through the procedure. Due 
largely to politically-instigated “othering”, the Luo community of Kenya is increasingly adopting 
a practice that it has not been historically associated with. The likelihood that the entire 
community will adopt it in the near future is real. The quantitative results indicate that the 
adoption of this alien culture of circumcision in Luo Nyanza is occurring in uniform fashion. On 
the other hand, while many cosmopolitan Luos might be adopting this rite of passage, the 
phenomenon is occurring inconsistently. This finding is somewhat strange, given that one would 
expect cosmopolitan Luos, who reside alongside members of other “ethnic groups”, to be under 
more pressure to “conform”. It would seem that, as the FGDs revealed, the Luo in Nyanza has 
been more consistent in adopting the practice owing to other reasons such as health. Indeed, most 
GoK and NGO initiatives that link the practice to health, such as Kenya’s Ministry of Health’s 
VMMC Programme, mainly target Luo Nyanza. 
 
The fact that the qualitative and the quantitative results for the most part matched each 
other, with respect to the study’s research assumptions, boosted the trustworthiness of the 
findings even as it also suggested that the research design adopted for this study was valid as 
well as reliable. The fact that the research findings were largely harmonious also bestowed 
credibility to the implemented research strategy. Indeed, according to Creswell and Clark (2011), 
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MMR is crucial because “the combination of quantitative and qualitative data provide a more 
complete understanding of the research problem than either approach by itself” (p. 8). Based on 
the study objectives summarised in section 7.1 above, I will now draw the main conclusions of 
this study. 
 
7.2 Conclusions 
The evidence presented in the preceding chapters reveals that there are legitimate reasons 
for the Luo of Kenya to feel that the GoK has short-changed them in the provision of public 
goods during the period under study. I will now briefly present the specifics of the 
marginalization of the Luo vis-à-vis GoK investment in Nyanza during the period 1963 – 2013, 
as revealed by the scrutiny of historical records examined in this study. During the historical 
phase 1963 – 73, this study shows, there was a strong link between state control and access to 
family planning services; President Jomo Kenyatta’s turf, Central, was the greatest beneficiary of 
this state provision if Nairobi is not considered. During the same period, Nyanza, home to the 
Luo “dissenters”, performed dismally, appearing in the bottom two positions in consistent 
fashion. In the succeeding historical phase of this study, 1973 – 83, the two protagonists, Central 
(Kikuyu) and Nyanza (Luo) appear at the two extreme ends of the outcome of this crucial 
healthcare provision component, underlining the link between political inclination and access to 
state healthcare services, in this particular regard. Although, generally, the study shows that there 
was no strong link between political inclination and the provision of hospital beds and cots, the 
period 1983 – 93 is an exception: in what could be interpreted as a result of the botched coup 
attempt of 1982, Nyanza witnessed the least growth in this category over this decade, amongst 
all of Kenya’s provinces, lending credence to the proposition that opposition politics has 
hampered economic development in Luo Nyanza. The findings of this research suggest that there 
was a strong link between politics and access to rural water supply funding, with reference to the 
Luo, in the historical phase 1963 – 73. In the period after the Odinga-Kenyatta fallout, Nyanza 
received the least amount of funding from the GoK’s Department of Water. This corroborates the 
proposition that “ethnic groups” that control state power in some African countries do not 
allocate the dominated groups – usually the “rebellious” ones – an equitable share of the national 
largesse. Thus, from a historical standpoint, evidence for the marginalization of the Luo owing to 
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their opposition politics, lies in the following two broad categories of public provision – 
healthcare and rural water supply. 
 
Notwithstanding the evidence presented above to support the argument that opposition 
politics has hindered the socio-economic development of the Luo of Kenya, this study finds that 
the playing field is gradually being leveled owing to constitutional changes, especially through 
the aspect of devolution of state resources instituted by the 2010 Constitution that pays no heed 
to the political predispositions of communities. During the Kibaki era, the GoK appears to have 
performed better with regard to ensuring equity in the provision of public services and the 
allocation of scarce state resources. More importantly, the current president, Uhuru, has been 
mandated by the country’s new constitution to share the national bounty in accordance with the 
recommendations of the Commission on Revenue Allocation (CRA). The voyage towards social 
justice in Kenya has been an intriguing one. Figure 7.1 below depicts this journey, from strong 
centralized governance in Kenya to devolved government, from “independence” to 2013 and 
beyond: it shows how the combination of Luo-led opposition and pressure from globalists has 
benefited, perhaps inadvertently, the ordinary Kenyan citizen at the grassroots level of society.  
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Figure 7.1: From Centralization to Devolution, in Kenya, 1963 to 2013 and Beyond. 
Source: Author (2017) 
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As shown in figure 7.1 above, the blend of Luo-led opposition to the GoK, spearheaded 
by Jaramogi and later his son Raila, and pressure from the world monopoly capitalist forces – 
inadvertently, intentionally or a combination thereof – has transformed Kenya, albeit gradually, 
from a strongly centralized state to the devolved system of government prevalent in the country 
today. Whilst Jomo Kenyatta centralized state power and emasculated local authorities, Moi 
began the gradual reversal of the founding father’s posture by introducing LATF; Kibaki went a 
notch higher, by adding the School Bursary Fund (SBF) and CDF to LATF and following the 
promulgation of Kenya’s new constitution in 2010, Uhuru Kenyatta, upon assuming power in 
2013, would preside over a country governed by the principle of devolution of state resources. 
Figure 7.1 above is in congruence with one of the various Luo perspectives, on the interplay 
between political marginalization and economic development, discussed in chapter five’s sub-
section 5.2.5, which holds that opposition politics has, in fact, led to the development of not only 
Luo Nyanza, but to the whole of Kenya. Proponents of this school of thought argue that the Luo-
led struggle against oppression by the GoK has culminated in devolution of state resources, 
which is benefitting all citizens by ensuring the equitable distribution of the national bounty. 
However, this study finds that there is still a problem of access to opportunities and resources at 
the individual level, where ethnic-based discrimination appears to persist in grave fashion. FGD 
participants lamented that Luos get limited or no access to employment, especially in the public 
sector, government tenders and development funds, and loans from financial institutions; if this 
issue is addressed, I posit, much of the tension prevalent in contemporary Kenyan society could 
dissipate.  
 
There appears to be a ferocious power struggle between various factions of capital – the 
African nationalist bourgeois class, which largely controls the Kenyan state, and the globalist 
forces behind the world monopoly capitalist system. This struggle could well explain why the 
Kenyan governing structures and practices persist in promoting “ethnicity” despite its existential 
problems for particular social groups, for it is possible that globalists are working clandestinely 
with leaders of disenchanted “ethnic groups” to further their interests in Africa. Whilst the 
Kenyan capitalists seek economic independence and autonomy, the globalists appear hell-bent on 
subjugating the former. In fact, as shown by the historical records examined in this study, the 
story of Kenya has been one of continuous Western interference in the nation’s socio-economic-
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political affairs often to the detriment of its citizens. Western interference is not always open and 
direct; often, it is carried out in a subtle manner and serves to sabotage Kenya’s/Africa’s efforts 
at progress and independence. During the historical phase 1963 – 73, for instance, Kenya would 
face challenges with regard to the settlement of its largely landless citizens and a perpetually 
precarious balance of payments position. However, instead of industrial countries – under the 
grip of globalists – offering help in the form of provision of markets for Kenya’s produce, it put 
in place restrictive trade measures against the country’s goods. The globalist-controlled West 
insisted on aid; the problem with this “assistance” is that external debt obligations arising from it 
would mainly serve to cripple the country’s development agenda. Moreover, desperation arising 
from this consequence would further cement Kenya’s submissiveness and expose the country to 
the whims of the IMF and World Bank – the cryptograms of the world monopoly capitalist 
(globalist) forces – which were enforced in Kenya in the 1990s through neoliberalism and its 
associated structural adjustments. During the period 1973 – 93, Kenya would shift its strategy 
from production aimed at import substitution to export-oriented industrialization; this was to be 
implemented largely through the establishment of EPZs. Although the World Bank and the 
USAID agreed to assist in financing these EPZs, western/industrialized economies remained 
largely closed to the country’s exports. And during the period 1993 – 2003, Moi’s government 
would be bullied into accepting and adopting neoliberalism against its will. The West would 
force Kenya to abandon its export-oriented industrialization blueprint and adopt the globalist call 
for privatization and complete liberalization of the country’s economy. To enforce neoliberalism 
on Kenya, bilateral and multilateral donors would suspend funding and call for “financial 
discipline”. Finally, during the period 2003 – 2013, Kibaki would be forced to adopt an 
economic agenda that would ensure the development of infrastructure that would support the 
pursuit of neoliberalist interests in Kenya. Such have been the intrigues of the power struggle 
between the two fractions of capital which, I contend, make leadership in Africa and elsewhere 
in the Global South a difficult task. The fifth assumption of this study therefore holds some truth: 
the strong correlation between “ethnicity” and the crisis of state power in Kenya could be partly 
attributed to the machinations of the global capitalists and western interference in the country’s 
affairs. This view tends to prevail, especially, when one considers that as Moi prepared to vacate 
power in 2002 following a decade of implementation of structural adjustments associated with 
neoliberalism, crime, “ethnic” tensions, increased unemployment, and poverty grew amongst 
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Kenya’s citizens, 52% of whom lived below the poverty line (cf. RoKBS, 1996, p. 13; RoKBS, 
2000, p. 1). 
With regard to the indicators of socio-economic development examined in this study, a 
strong case for capitalism and uneven development that accompanies this economic posture can 
be made in relation to electricity supply and housing. Electricity provision by the GoK was 
consistently, heavily skewed in favour of Nairobi and Mt. Kenya throughout the period covered 
in this research, 1963 – 2013. Within the Theory of Uneven Development, these findings can be 
interpreted in two ways: first, through Oloo’s (2004) assertion that during colonial times, the 
British pursued a policy of uneven development flagrantly and unashamedly. Nyeri, which is 
situated in the Mt. Kenya area, was a white settler area from whence the British colonialists 
generated electricity. This meant that, upon independence, the area’s natives – President Jomo 
Kenyatta’s Kikuyu “ethnic group” – were better poised to obtain this provision for the 
concomitant infrastructure was already there. Second, still rooted in Oloo’s (2004) perspectives 
on uneven development, capitalism leads to socio-economic inequalities between different 
regions in a given country. The fact that Nairobi is the industrial, commercial and political 
capital of the nation, automatically predisposes its residents to access to higher living standards 
in comparison with other Kenyans; they are therefore in a better position to afford electricity. On 
the other hand, the story of the GoK’s provision of affordable, decent housing for Kenyans 
totally supports the Theory of Uneven Development, especially as espoused by Mandel (1968) 
who has argued that skewed socio-economic development, associated with capitalism, is partly 
the result of prolificacy differences amongst animals and soils, and fortuitous happenings in life 
and nature (as cited in Bond, 1999). It is about strategy, logic and suitability, and has nothing to 
do with state-instigated political machinations and/or opposition politics. Nairobi was absolutely 
dominant, as a recipient of this awfully scarce GoK provision, not least because it is the nation’s 
industrial and commercial centre. Logically, a gigantic portion of the country’s low income 
earners work in the city – these are the ones for whom affordable housing is mostly targeted. 
There is no way in which a province, like North Eastern, an unattractive region characterized by 
unfavourable climate and soils, and mostly the abode of nomadic pastoralists, would have been 
prioritized in the allocation of this GoK provision, amid the reality of scarce state resources. 
Certainly, throughout the period 1963 – 2013, political inclination and state power did not 
determine the allocation of this state provision; apportionment of this woefully limited resource 
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was heavily dependent on relevance and strategy. If anything, Nyanza, an opposition stronghold, 
was the greatest beneficiary during the historical phase 1983 – 93 of this study. Noteworthy, 
after the forceful introduction of neoliberalism, the GoK seemingly lost its zeal and desire to 
provide this service: the magnitude of this provision dwindled drastically from 8,575 housing 
units during historical phase 1983 – 93, to a paltry 1,673 in the phase 1993 – 2003, Kenya’s first 
decade under neoliberalism.  
 
A strong link between state power and access to public goods and services is detectable 
in the Kenyan case, too. Notwithstanding the fact that coffee and tea are the country’s largest 
exports and, therefore, should logically be prioritised by the GoK, the Budget Speeches show 
what appears to be outright favouritism towards the growers of the aforementioned crops – 
Kikuyus and Kalenjins – as opposed to sugar growers, like the Luo, during the period 1963 – 73. 
Whereas the GoK limited its engagement with sugar-growing areas, such as Nyanza, to the 
provision of roads, it would engage further and more meaningfully with coffee and tea farmers 
by providing credit facilities and agricultural extension services to the latter. It may be argued 
that the provision of roads, no matter how essential and well-intentioned, is an obligatory 
exercise that does not directly intervene in an individual’s life; facilitation of loans for small-
scale holdings is much more direct and has a greater bearing on people’s lives. Coupled with the 
“questionable” importation of sugar undertaken by the GoK towards the end of this period, 
avoidance of the aforementioned direct engagement with communities like the sugar-growing 
Luo, leaves the Jomo Kenyatta-led GoK susceptible to allegations of favouritism towards its 
enthusiasts – mainly members of the Kikuyu “ethnic group”.  There is more historical evidence 
that shows a strong link between state power and access to public goods and services during the 
period under study: during the period 1963 – 73, for instance, the greatest beneficiary of primary 
education was the president’s backyard – Central Province – which experienced a continuous 
steady rise in enrolment figures. In a trend similar to the one depicted in the primary school 
category, the president’s backyard led in the secondary school enrolment numbers, which were 
characterized by a steady rise throughout the period 1968 – 73. With regard to the family 
planning programme, the greatest beneficiary besides Nairobi, during the historical phase 1963 – 
73, was Central Province, Jomo Kenyatta’s home area. During historical phase 1973 – 83, when 
Moi ascended to power, there was a remarkable increase in enrolment numbers at the primary 
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school level; Rift Valley Province, which was the new turf of the president, from 1978 rose 
dramatically from position four to take the lead, country-wide, in terms of primary school 
enrolment in Kenya. Concerning rural water supply, during historical phase 1973 – 83, Central 
Province consistently received steady funding, whilst the investments in Rift Valley, Coast and 
North Eastern virtually stagnated throughout this historical phase. The biggest enrolment gain, in 
secondary education during the historical phase 1983 – 93, was recorded in Rift Valley Province, 
President Moi’s home turf. And, during the period 1993 – 2003, the dominance of Moi’s Rift 
Valley Province in terms of primary education continued, in earnest, strengthening the 
proposition in the theoretical framework in chapter two that political power is a vehicle to 
promote prosperity in Africa. 
 
Last but not least, according to the findings of this study, there is not much evidence to 
support Kuria’s (2011, para. 2) assertion that “since independence, the political leadership of the 
region has held the people hostage to a self-defeating ideology of blaming everybody except 
themselves for the region’s woes”; his argument may be challenged as soft. From the FGDs, one 
can somehow argue in support of Kuria (2011) when it comes to the phenomenon of “self-hate” 
amongst the Luo. The findings of this study indicate that this “self-hate” phenomenon prevails, 
far and wide, amongst the Luo, from the grassroots level to the national level of Kenyan society. 
Moreover, some participants alleged, the community’s political leaders, under the stewardship of 
Raila Odinga, the country’s former PM and now Official Leader of the Opposition, have been in 
the vanguard of feeding and perpetuating this absurd phenomenon. During his tenure as the 
country’s PM, some participants contend, a large portion of the few lucky Luos who held high 
ranking public service positions were either axed or demoted. Seemingly, Luo leadership 
comprises envious, selfish individuals, who seldom cherish the successes of their kin; on the 
contrary, they appear to relish the prospects of seeing fellow Luos positioned below them, status-
wise, all the time. These revelations, especially with regard to the character of Raila, indicate that 
it is perhaps time for the Luo community to seek alternative leadership and unyoke itself from 
the control of the Odinga family. Jaramogi’s son could be exploiting the Kenyatta-Odinga rivalry 
and using the Luo electorate for his own personal ambition and gain. However, those Luos who 
allege that Luo Nyanza has experienced outright economic sabotage for opposing the Kenyan 
state hold a different view. To camouflage this punitive posture, such Luos contend, the GoK has 
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appointed and worked with a few Luo “Uncle Toms” (Luo leaders who are mainly driven by 
personal enrichment and do not have the interests of the community at heart). Accordingly, 
Odinga comes across as a defiant figure who has refused to sanctify socio-economic-political 
injustice. According to some FGD participants, “Uncle Toms” have, over the years, been made 
part of the oppressive Kenyan state to quell disquiet amongst the Luo whilst simultaneously 
legitimizing the state’s iniquities. They are given no space to function independently and bring 
about meaningful change in their people’s lives – they are “toothless bulldogs”. The Odingas, 
proponents of this school of thought maintain, are legitimate since they have often declined to 
accept posts in oppressive governments, and chosen the people’s side in a bid to bring about the 
desired societal changes. This perspective of Odinga challenges Kuria’s (2011) portrayal of Luo 
politicians as poor leaders and the community as a collection of aimless whiners. It makes 
Kuria’s understanding of a competent leader seem like an individual who unquestionably bows 
to an oppressive socio-economic-political order; similarly, it casts his understanding of a 
progressive community as one that “suffers peacefully”. Some policy recommendations arising 
out of this research are briefly discussed next. 
 
7.3 Policy Recommendations 
In view of the historical findings of this research, and based on the opinions of the 
various survey respondents and FGD participants, and an examination of contemporary society’s 
socio-economic-political events, the following recommendations should be considered if Kenya 
is to make a bold and meaningful step towards overcoming societal uncertainty and contradictory 
social relations of power, predicated upon the highly subjective and bogus concept of 
“ethnicity”, which have served to encourage the “oppression” of “ethnic groups” considered to 
be “dissident”.  
 
To partly address the problem of access to opportunities and resources at the individual 
level, where ethnic-based discrimination appears to persist in grave fashion, especially in terms 
of access to employment in the public sector, the GoK should adhere more to the principles of 
the new constitution that advocate for regional balance in state appointments. This could help 
ease the tensions prevalent in contemporary Kenyan society. It is difficult for Kenyans to love 
their country when they feel that they have no stake in it; there is evidence to show that 
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successive governments of independent Kenya have largely given the Luo, and other 
communities considered to be pro-opposition, a wide berth regarding participation in governance 
structures at the national level. What is more, political participation in governance structures at 
the national level still appears to be determined by a community’s real or perceived political 
stance even under Kenya’s new constitution. Of the 18 Cabinet Secretaries and 26 Principal 
Secretaries appointed by President Uhuru and his deputy, Ruto, at the beginning of their tenure, 
for instance, only three – Raychelle Omamo (Defence Cabinet Secretary), Peter Oganga Mangiti 
(Principal Secretary, Planning) and Colleta Akinyi Suda (Principal Secretary of Education, 
Science and Technology)
51
  – were from the Luo community (the leading opposition “ethnic 
group”). Luo participation in government at the national level was thus limited to these three 
individuals only. On the other hand, about 90% of the top officials of the Jubilee Government, 
including Parastatal heads, are either Kikuyu or Kalenjin.
52
 The Kikuyu, under Uhuru’s 
government, control the following strategic positions of governance, in addition to the 
Presidency: Kenya Defence Forces (KDF), National Intelligence Services (NIS), Criminal 
Investigations Department (CID), Attorney General, Solicitor General, Registrar General, Head 
of Public Service, Devolution and Planning Ministry, National Defence College, Speaker of 
National Assembly, Independent Police Oversight Authority (IPOA), National Youth Service, 
the Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA) and the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK). The situation in 
Kenya is akin to what Attafuah (2009) refers to as the “winner-takes-all” “democratic” system. 
These conditions, in which one or two “ethnic groups” dominate all facets of government, are 
not suitable for “equitable” socio-economic development and harmonious co-existence in a 
society considered to be “ethnically” heterogeneous. 
 
The principles of regional balance should also be adhered to with regard to the allocation 
of funds under schemes such as the Youth Enterprise Development Fund and the Women 
Enterprise Fund, which are meant to facilitate credit access for young people and women, in a 
bid to support their SME initiatives and develop their entrepreneurial skills. This will ensure 
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equality in terms of access to opportunity and most likely guarantee equality in the outcome of 
participation in the opportunity. This is especially so, for this research has found that the 
surname of applicants plays a significant role in determining who will get access to these funds. 
Owing to the easily identifiable Luo surnames, members of the community are experiencing 
tremendous difficulties in their quest to access these government funds.  
Although it may prove difficult, given the “ethnicized” nature of the Kenyan state, which 
is dominated by members of two “ethnic groups” – the Kikuyu and Kalenjin – measures should 
be instituted to ensure free, fair, credible and verifiable election processes, to make election 
results acceptable to all. Officials of the electoral body, associated with any opaque electoral 
processes and corruption, should never be allowed to remain in office. The electoral body should 
be totally independent, and state of the art technology should be employed in voter registration, 
the voting itself, the tallying and the relaying of results. The typical delay that characterizes the 
announcement of the final presidential tallies in Kenya, should be eliminated for the elections to 
pass the credibility test. 
 
Strict devolution of state funds to the country’s 47 counties should be adhered to for this 
will ensure that communities, especially those that are excluded from participation in national 
government processes, get an alternative avenue of contributing to decisions geared towards their 
socio-economic development at the grassroots level. Devolved funding will also ensure that 
every “ethnic group” stands an opportunity of obtaining business opportunities from the local 
government – tenders and contracts. This way, the fate of communities will be less pegged to 
their surnames and more dependent on genuine competition and merit. Moreover, engaging 
constituents more in determining how devolved funds, including CDF, will be used, gives them a 
sense of ownership of their socio-economic destiny and ensures that important projects are 
prioritized. 
 
Employers in the private sector – especially multinationals and other corporate entities – 
should be encouraged to ensure regional balance in their employment policies and practices as 
much as they can; in fact, those private enterprises that adhere to regional balance principles 
should be given incentives such as tax deductions. This will help combat the ill effects of the 
historically-informed prejudices and stereotypes, such as the circumcision myth, which 
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according to the findings of this study is playing a noticeable role at the grassroots level, in 
diminishing ordinary Luos’ chances of earning a decent living and obtaining anticipated and 
commensurate reward for effort and hard work. 
 
Kenya should engage the West cautiously, for industrialised countries, which are largely 
behind the activities of the international financial institutions that keep Africa in constant debt, 
have demonstrated time and time again that they do not have the best interests of humanity at 
heart. During the latter half of the 20th century, for instance, industrialised countries 
continuously frustrated Africa’s efforts aimed at gaining access to their markets by implementing 
strong protectionist measures and policies to prevent competition from Africa’s exports. And 
when the WTO Treaty came into play, liberalizing world trade, they engaged in serious dumping 
activity, filling Africa with under-priced or subsidized imports, thereby harming the performance 
of the continent’s industries. Specifically, no African country should purport to be engaging the 
West on behalf of other African countries; for instance, African countries should desist from the 
habit of signing trade treaties that have implications for the rest of the continent, unilaterally. The 
continent needs to speak in one voice under the auspices of regional bodies such as the Economic 
Community of Western African States (ECOWAS), the Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA), the EAC and the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC). It is important for Kenya to involve and work with other African countries even as it 
pursues its own foreign policy initiatives for, united, Africa stands; divided, it is even more 
vulnerable to the machinations of the globalists. Also, to curtail further “take-over” of Kenya by 
external forces, or at least slow it down, Kenyans must be given first priority when it comes to 
privatization of commercial public enterprises and major parastatals, for the purpose of 
mobilization of capital for expansion, modernization and rehabilitation.
53
 Such programmes 
should be carried out under appropriate regulatory frameworks that emphasize the affirmative 
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action required to guarantee domestic participation; this will help in ensuring that national 
interests are protected.        
 
7.4 Contribution to Knowledge 
Methodologically, theoretically and conceptually, this study proffers empirically-driven 
insights that would enhance development policy and practice at both the grassroots and national 
levels. With reference to methodology, the procedure adopted for tackling the emotive subject of 
ethnic-based governance in Africa, which makes room for the inclusion of experiential, 
epistemological and historical knowledge, is novel and, as such, may be applied in contexts other 
than Kenya. Thus, this procedure, discussed in Chapter 3, contributes to the existing 
methodologies that aim to examine the socio-cultural-economic consequences of political 
marginalization/exclusion in Africa. Moreover, following in the footsteps of Pikkety (2014), who 
urges against “talking about inequalities . . . without citing any source whatsoever or any 
methods for comparing one era with another . . .” (p. 16), I have based this study on what could 
be considered “objective data” (Pikkety, 2014, p. 16) – GoK Statistical Abstracts, Economic 
Surveys and Budget Speeches – and, hopefully, taken the discussion on “ethnicity” and the 
provision of public goods in Kenya further. Theoretically, the eclectic approach, which fuses 
various propositions emanating from existent literature, allows for the extensive review of the 
interplay between the concepts of “ethnicity”, political power, freedom and economic 
development; this approach also contributes to existing and on-going discourses on African 
governance, generally, and on how to analyse the negative socio-economic consequences of 
political marginalization in Africa, specifically. Conceptually, the framework to understand 
“ethnicized” politics in Kenya uncovered in chapter 5, which emanated largely from the FGDs, 
illuminates our understanding of the complex nature of global power relations vis-à-vis Africa. 
This framework has advanced our understanding of the violence associated with elections in 
Kenya by looking beyond “ethnic” rivalry and extending the discourse to the power struggle 
between the indigenous African bourgeois class and the globalist forces behind the world 
monopoly capitalist system. Moreover, “given that there is no agreement amongst scholars 
concerning how ‘governance’ should be conceptualized” (Jose, 2014, p. 12) and the consequent 
fact that “there exists a need to create . . . conceptual [frameworks for the] analysis of 
governance” (Jose, 2014, p. 3) the conceptual framework unveiled in chapter 5 contributes 
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towards filling an existent gap in scholarship on governance, especially in Africa. Accordingly, 
researchers and students will find the effective application of this framework to understand 
“ethnicized” politics in Kenya equally illuminating.       
 
Finally, this study has successfully examined and highlighted the consequences of 
political marginalization/exclusion in Kenya/Africa with special reference to governance, and 
socio-economic development policies, as it brings to light specific issues that need to be 
examined if the historically-informed inequities and disparities regarding socio-economic 
development in Kenya/Africa are to be addressed systematically and holistically. 
 
7.5 Suggestions for Further Research 
From the research conclusions, it is evident that one of the significant issues that merit 
further research is the current status and developments around what appears to be a ferocious 
power struggle between the African nationalist bourgeois class in Kenya and globalists. Whilst 
the Kenyan president, Uhuru Kenyatta, was once considered an “enemy” of the West, his 
relationship with the latter appears to have undergone a dramatic facelift; an international 
observer mission, led by former US Secretary of State John Kerry, for instance, gave a clean bill 
of health to the 8 August 2017 Kenyan general election, in which Kenyatta was announced 
winner despite the process being marred by numerous irregularities and illegalities. Ever since 
Uhuru’s “triumph” at the ICC, the Kenyan president is increasingly assuming the role of Africa’s 
“superman”. As if to acknowledge this fact, Barack Obama – the 44th US President whose father 
was Kenyan/Luo – after snubbing Uhuru for a protracted time period, during which the latter 
struggled to disentangle himself from the ICC cases he faced, paid a visit to his father’s 
homeland in July 2015 to attend a global entrepreneurial summit and “hold talks on trade and 
investment, and also security and counter-terrorism”.54 He was followed in quick pursuit by Pope 
Francis, who visited the country in November 2015 “to discuss issues close to his heart in Kenya 
. . . , including poverty, the environment and the need for interfaith dialogue” and “to challenge 
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the countr[y’s] political leaders on corruption”.55 In May, 2016, Israeli PM, Benjamin 
Netanyahu, visited Nairobi where he stated that “he has set breaking the automatic majority 
against Israel in international forums as a strategic goal for the country, and that upgrading 
Israel’s position in the African Union will go a long way toward achieving that goal”.56 And 
Uhuru Kenyatta promised him that “Kenya w[ould] work to restore Israel’s observer status at the 
African Union because Israel is a critical partner in the battle against terrorism, the most serious 
challenge facing the world today”.57 The Indian Premier, Narendra Modi, landed at JKIA in July 
2016 in a visit seen by many as “seek[ing] to boost trade relations, health deals and cultural 
connections”.58 In what was the first visit by a Japanese Premier in the last 15 years, Shinzo Abe 
travelled to Kenya to participate in the sixth summit of the Tokyo International Conference on 
African Development (TICAD) held in Nairobi in August 2016: during this TICAD summit, 
“Japanese and African leaders [wer]e expected to aim to adopt the Nairobi Declaration, which 
would focus on how to enhance areas such as education in the continent to tackle the threat of 
terrorism”.59 Uhuru Kenyatta has definitely become one of the continent’s foremost leaders – a 
reference point on African issues, some would say. 
 
Given that evidence exists beyond reasonable doubt that Western countries have in the 
past propped up and supported African dictators and, in conjunction with the latter, plundered 
Africa’s resources,60 it is important that the newfound status of Kenyan President, Uhuru 
Kenyatta, be investigated. Indeed, the pertinent question that African governance analysts are 
going to have to review is whether the Kenyan President is, in fact, colluding with globalists, 
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whose actions increasingly point towards the desire to establish a “New World Order” in which 
transnational capital will transplant national sovereignty. Why did Kenya blatantly betray fellow 
Africans, and other countries that face the same predicament as the East African nation, such as 
Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) by “exclud[ing] ‘African issues’ from the 
agenda while simultaneously pushing through the Expansion of the Information Technology 
Agreement (ITA), which benefits US corporations” (Campbell, 2016, Introduction section, para. 
1) at the 10th WTO Ministerial Conference held in Nairobi in December 2015? Did Uhuru 
Kenyatta actually triumph at the ICC or was a deal struck behind the scenes to let him off the 
hook in exchange for questionable actions such as the aforementioned cynical and misguided 
move? Industrialized countries have never been fully and genuinely willing to let developing 
countries participate completely in international trade and the GoK has always lamented this 
painful reality. For instance, about the GATT, the WTO precursor, Finance Minister Saitoti 
stated in 1989, that:  
 
A new round of GATT negotiations started last year, but encountered great difficulties, 
particularly in the area of liberalizing trade in agricultural products…It is extremely 
important for us in the developing world that the GATT negotiations make substantial 
headway because an important part of these negotiations concerns us directly. From our 
own perspective, it is ultimately a question of whether the industrial countries are 
genuinely willing to let developing nations participate fully in international trade. 
(RoKBS, 1989, p. 2)  
 
And in 1991, he continued to bemoan the country’s situation with regard to world trade: 
 
It is regrettable to note that while many developing countries, including Kenya, are 
striving to end trade restrictions and to lower import duties, industrial countries have 
failed to reciprocate by opening their markets wider to both our manufactured and 
agricultural exports . . . [W]hile the GATT struggles to keep the world trading system 
open, Europe marches towards its economic integration in 1992, with uncertain 
consequences for the rest of the trading world. North America, in response to this and to 
the continuing challenge from Japan, seeks its own trading bloc. The US and Canada 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
290 
 
have already signed a free trade agreement and Mexico has broken out of its protective 
shell to propose a similar treaty with the US. Developing countries in particular, and 
others in the world, will continue to benefit most from an open trading system. If 
however, the world is dividing into blocs, this intensifies the challenge to countries like 
Kenya, which must become competitive enough to export around and through any trade 
barriers thrown up by regional groupings. (RoKBS, 1991, pp. 3 – 4)       
 
Given Kenya’s awareness of the fact that Western countries have been in the habit of forming 
regional groupings, as evidenced above, to sabotage Africa’s efforts on the international trade 
front, it is baffling that Uhuru Kenyatta recently betrayed the EAC by going against the region’s 
intentions of trade on a region to region basis, and unilaterally ratifying the EU Economic 
Partnership Agreement (EPA), which has the appearance of a trap aimed at deindustrializing 
Africa,
61
 since “[i]mports from the EU into the region are dominated by machinery and 
mechanical appliances, equipment and parts, vehicles and pharmaceutical products”.62 It may be 
argued by some that the EPA “will [shield] the country from heavy taxes on exports to the 
European Union”,63 but it is evident that divide-and-conquer tactics are very much at play and 
are increasingly being applied by the forces behind the world monopoly capitalist system, which 
have perfected the art of bullying developing nations. Given that Raila Odinga, for some reason, 
continuously fails to ascend to power in Kenya, one might wonder if the exploitative capitalists 
have run out of patience with Kenya’s former premier and made Uhuru their new “darling”. 
Last but not least, this study established that, despite his portrayal as an iron-fisted African 
dictator (cf. e.g., Brown, 2001; Nepstad, 2011), President Moi was actually a compassionate, 
pro-poor leader who did all he could to shield his people from the ills of neoliberalism; indeed, to 
the Afro-optimist, Moi will be remembered best as an intelligent patriot who loathed neo-
colonialism. His style was different from Jomo Kenyatta’s; he was not in the habit of 
constructing roads for farmers and declining to establish initiatives that would grant the latter 
direct access to credit facilities – at least from a Luo standpoint. The development programmes 
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and projects he initiated and launched were geared towards directly engaging the citizens at the 
grassroots level of society. His demeanour as president depicts a character who advocated a 
move towards self-sufficiency and self-dependence; indeed, he urged Kenyans, and Africans at 
large, to work towards a shift from the position of always being at the mercy of external 
circumstances, to a posture of optimism with action that would see them take control of their 
own destiny, as captured in the 1989 Budget Speech: “We have improved our administrative 
capability to respond to crises, and strengthened our willpower to confront and deal with 
emerging problems by using our own resources” (p. 1). Future generations will be fed with 
horror stories about Africa and its leadership; and they will fall prey to the Afro-pessimists’ 
prejudiced portrayals and depictions of the continent, if they do not understand how the world 
monopoly capitalist forces function to undermine and sabotage the efforts of African leaders and 
peoples. In view of this looming danger, fresh scholarly works on Africa, by Africans, conducted 
through a decolonized prism, need to be encouraged; I suggest that new works be commenced on 
the character and leadership styles of Moi and the other Kenyan Presidents, with reference to the 
reality of the juggernaut that is the world monopoly capitalist system. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A 
STRUCTURED QUESTIONNAIRE 
SECTION A: GENERAL INFORMATION 
Please give the answers in the spaces provided. 
1. Gender:    Male              Female 
                           
2. Age:             15-20      20-30 
 
  30-50     50 and above 
3. Marital status: 
Single       Married 
 
Separated      Divorced 
 
Widow(er)     
 
4. Highest level of education: 
Primary      Secondary    
    
College      University   
 
Post graduate      Others (specify)   
 
5. Occupation: 
Employed      Self employed        
  
Unemployed      Student  
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SECTION B: CULTURAL FACTORS 
6. I have heard the argument that an uncircumcised man cannot be a leader. 
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 
     
7. If your answer in 6 above is ‘Agree’ or ‘Strongly Agree’, did you hear this from a politician? 
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
8. I have been ridiculed or heard a Luo being ridiculed because of the circumcision issue. 
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
9. I have (or know of Luos who have) thought of or have already undergone circumcision, to 
avoid ridicule or to feel a greater level of acceptance and approval from my colleagues from 
other ethnic groups. 
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
SECTION C: ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES 
10. Have you ever been denied an opportunity, employment or otherwise, because of being Luo? 
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
11. I would hold a higher rank job and have access to better opportunities if I were not a Luo. 
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 
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12. Promotion opportunities for Luos are limited at my workplace. 
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
13. My living standards would be better if I was not a Luo. 
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 
       
SECTION D: STRENGTHENING OF ETHNIC ROOTS 
14. Given a position of influence, I would carry out affirmative action and give Luos 
opportunities, so that they can catch up with the GEMA and Kalenjin, who have held power 
before. 
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
15. Luos in positions of power/influence help fellow Luos to access economic opportunities. 
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
16. It is better for a Luo to marry a fellow Luo than a non - Luo.      
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
SECTION E: MINIMAL PUBLIC INVESTMENT 
17. Luo Nyanza would be more developed economically if Luos were not politically excluded by 
the central government. 
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 
Thank you for your Co-operation.  
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APPENDIX B 
FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION GUIDE 
Thank you for agreeing to participate. The purpose of this study is to examine the socio-cultural 
and economic factors arising out of political exclusion and domination with the view to 
understand the historically-driven forms of exclusion from effective participation in governance 
structures at grassroots level and their consequences/impact on Kenya since independence. 
We are very interested to hear your valuable opinion on political exclusion, in Kenya, and how it 
has influenced your daily lives. We hope that with the insights gained from you can be utilized in 
aiding the Luo community to liberate itself from restrictions and limitations that exist in power 
relations. 
 
We would like to tape the focus groups so that we can make sure to capture the thoughts, 
opinions, and ideas we hear from the group. The information you give us is completely 
confidential, and we will not associate your name with anything you say in the focus group. No 
names will be attached to the focus groups and the tapes will be destroyed as soon as they are 
transcribed. 
 
You may refuse to answer any question or withdraw from the study at any time. We understand 
how important it is that this information is kept private and confidential. We will ask participants 
to respect each other’s confidentiality. 
 
If you have any questions now or after you have completed the questionnaire, you can always 
contact a study team member like me, or you can call the project team leaders whose names and 
phone numbers are on this form. 
  
Please sign below to show that you agree to participate in this focus group. 
_________________________________ 
Signature of participant 
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1. Let us begin this discussion by hearing your thoughts on tribalism. What is your 
understanding of tribalism and have you experienced it in your daily life? How?  
2. What are your views on circumcision and politics in Kenya? Have you heard of the argument 
that an uncircumcised man cannot be a leader, and if so, where did you hear of this? 
3. Have you heard Luos being ridiculed in Kenya because of the circumcision issue and how 
does it make you feel? 
4. Have you or your close relatives, or your Luo acquaintances, undergone circumcision? If so, 
why, since it is not part of your/their culture? If not, would you/they contemplate it for 
reasons other than medical? 
5. What are your experiences in seeking employment in public and private sectors? What about 
other opportunities like scholarships and bursaries? 
6. Would you say you have experienced discrimination when it comes to bursaries, scholarships 
and/or employment opportunities? How? 
7. Do you think that Luos who are in influential positions in society help their fellow Luos to 
access economic opportunities? Why? 
8. Would you vote for a presidential candidate from another ethnic group if a Luo was also 
running for the presidency? Why? 
9. Are you married to a fellow Luo? Why or why not? If not married, will ethnicity be a factor 
to you when considering a life partner? 
10. Do you think that the government, before devolution was instituted in 2013, discriminated 
against Luo Nyanza in terms of allocation of public investment/resources? Why? 
 
 
  
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
324 
 
APPENDIX C 
STUDY AREA 
Contextualizing the Study of the Luo in Kenya 
This section contains contextual background information on the eight counties in which 
the study took place, in terms of the following parameters: location, size, physiographic 
conditions, demographic profiles, and administrative and political units. Information on land use, 
climate, economy, infrastructure, access to health and literacy is also provided. It begins with an 
examination of the Luo Nyanza Counties and concludes with the four cosmopolitan counties of 
Nairobi, Mombasa, Nakuru, and Uasin Gishu. 
  
Luo Nyanza in Socio-historical Geographical Context 
Luo Nyanza, as already alluded, comprises four counties: Kisumu, Homa Bay, Migori 
and Siaya. It is part of the former Nyanza Province and is located in the western part of Kenya. 
Luo Nyanza is depicted in Figure C1, below. These counties are thereafter discussed, 
individually, below. 
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Figure C1: Map of the Former Nyanza Province Depicting Luo Nyanza Counties 
 
Source: Wikimedia Commons (2015
64
). 
 
Kisumu County in socio-historical geographical context. Kisumu County roughly 
extends over an area of 2,085.9 km
2 and is located within latitudes 0° 20’ and 0° 50’south and 
longitudes 33° 20’ and 35° 20’east. A further 567 km2 of the county is covered by water 
(Agricultural Sector Development Support Programme [ASDSP], 2014).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
64
 This map has been retrieved from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Nyanza_Counties_-_Kisumu.jpg 
(accessed 17 November 2015).   
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Figure C2: Map of Kisumu County (Population density) 
 
Source: Commission on Revenue Allocation [CRA], 2011, p. 17. 
 
Kisii, Nyamira and Homa Bay Counties border Kisumu County to the south, while Kericho 
County borders it to the east, Nandi County to the north-east, Siaya County to the west and 
Vihiga County to the north-west (ASDSP, 2014). Kisumu County is depicted in Figure C2, 
above. Kisumu County comprises six sub-counties as follows: Muhoroni, Nyakach, Nyando, 
Kisumu North, Kisumu West and Kisumu East. And there are seven constituencies in Kisumu 
County, namely: Muhoroni, Nyakach, Nyando, Seme, Kisumu Central, Kisumu West and 
Kisumu East. As at 2009, Kisumu County’s population stood at 968,909 persons – 474,687 
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males and 494,222 females.
65
 Although the majority of the inhabitants of Kisumu County are 
Luo, other ethnic groups – mostly the Luhya – are to be found there in small numbers. There is 
also a considerable Indian community in the county, which first inhabited Kisumu at the advent 
of colonialism. This community provided labour during the construction of the railway line. 
Although English and Kiswahili are spoken widely in the county, Dholuo is prepotent. Owing to 
its location on the shores of Lake Victoria, fishing dominates Kisumu’s economic sphere. The 
out-dated technology and techniques employed, however, hinder the industry’s complete 
evolution. The equipment utilized includes hooks, traps, nets and motor boats. Fish ponds are 
increasingly becoming popular in Kisumu County too. ASDSP (2014) puts the number of 
fishermen in the county at 3,275 and that of fish farming families at 189. Amongst the fish 
species produced are Tilapia, Nile Perch and Omena (Rastrineobola argentea) (ASDSP, 2014). 
About sixty-two per cent of Kisumu County’s households looks to crop farming as an income 
source. Agriculture is largely practiced on small parcels of land, with the average land holding 
size being 1.6 acres. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
65
 See the 2009 Kenya Population and Housing Census, available at 
http://www.knbs.or.ke/index.php?option=com_phocadownload&view=category&id=109:population-and-housing-
census-2009&Itemid=599 (accessed 12 December 2015).  
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Table C1: Kisumu County Facts and Figures 
General Information (2009) Kisumu Rankᵃ Kenyaᵇ 
Population (2009) 968,909 12 821,491 
Population (1999) 804,289 11 610,355 
Annual population growth rate, 1999-2009 (%) 1.86 37 3.14 
Surface area (km²) 2,086 40 12,368 
Population Density 2009 (people per km²) 464 8 66 
Poverty rate, based on KIHBS (%) 47.8 21 66 
Poverty gap, based on KIHBS (2005/06) 14.2 21 19 
Share of urban population, 2009 (%) 52 4 29.9 
Urban population in largest towns (2009) 
   Kisumu 388,311 3 
 Awasi 93,369 24 
 Ahero 50,730 46 
 Oyugis 35,451 68 
 Muhoroni 34,457 70 
 Kendu Bay 14,747 105 
 Chemelil 7,888 136 
 Maseno 5,103 170 
 Access to Infrastructure Kisumu Rankᵃ Kenyaᵇ 
Improved water (% of households 2009) 60.1 29 66.5 
Improved sanitation (% of households 2009) 87.4 26 87.8 
Electricity (% of households 2009) 18.3 9 22.7 
Paved roads (% of total roads 2012) 14.2 5 9.4 
Good/fair roads (as % of total roads) 38.0 36 43.5 
Service Coverage Kisumu Rankᵃ Kenyaᵇ 
Delivered in a health centre 45.6 15 37.5 
Qualified medical assistant during birth 46.1 15 37.6 
Had all vaccinations 68.6 33 75.0 
Adequate height for age 76.4 2 59.8 
Can read & write 65.8 30 66.4 
Attending school, 15 - 18 years 77.4 18 70.9 
ᵃAll rankings are in descending order i.e. highest to lowest 
  ᵇAll entries in the 'Kenya' column show County averages 
  Source: CRA, 2011, p. 17; CRA, 2013, p. 17. 
    
On the other hand, the average agricultural parcel is about 1.0 acres (ASDSP, 2014). Population 
pressure is leading to further subdivision of the small land parcels resulting in uneconomical land 
sizes. The major subsistence crops include kales, groundnuts, potatoes, finger millet, sorghum, 
maize, beans and cotton. Cash crops include rice (grown largely at the Ahero Irrigation Scheme 
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and to a lesser extent at the Kabongo Irrigation Scheme, both in Nyando Constituency) and 
sugarcane (mainly grown in Muhoroni). Two rainy seasons characterize Kisumu: short rains 
during the months of August and September, and long rains in the April/May period. The 
average yearly maximum temperature ranges from 25˚C to 35˚C, while the average yearly 
minimum temperature ranges from 9˚C to 18˚C (ASDSP, 2014). Table C1, above, provides a 
breakdown of the demographic facts, alongside other important statistics regarding the County of 
Kisumu. 
  
Homa Bay County in socio-historical geographical context. Homa Bay, the second of 
the Luo Nyanza counties to be profiled, lies in the south-western part of Kenya alongside Lake 
Victoria; the county is located between longitudes 34˚ and 35˚ east and latitudes 0˚15’ and 0˚52’ 
south. Homa Bay extends over an area of about 4,267 km², of which 1,227 km² is covered by 
water. To the west of the county, lie Lake Victoria and the Uganda Republic. Nyamira and Kisii 
Counties are located to the east of Homa Bay while Siaya and Kisumu Counties are located to 
the north (ASDSP, 2014). The county comprises six sub-counties, viz. Rachuonyo South, 
Rachuonyo North, Homabay, Ndhiwa, Mbita and Suba. Similarly, the following eight 
constituencies are to be found in Homa Bay County: Kabondo Kasipul, Kasipul, Karachuonyo, 
Rangwe, Homabay Town, Ndhiwa, Mbita and Suba (Kenya Open Data, 2015; ASDSP, 2014). 
As of 2009, Homa Bay County’s population stood at 963,794 persons – 501,340 females and 
462,454 males (Kenya Population and Housing Census, 2010). In 2012, the population of this 
county was estimated to be 1,038,858 persons (498, 472 males and 540,386 females). In 2015, it 
is thought to be around 1,119,769 and it is expected to reach 1,177,181 in 2017 (ASDSP, 2014). 
Figure C3, below, depicts Homa Bay County. 
     
 Two rainy seasons characterize Homa Bay’s climate: the long rains are witnessed from 
March to June, whilst the short rains are experienced from August to November. Annual rainfall 
ranges from 700 to 800mm. The long rainfall experienced from March to June has a 
dependability standard of 60 per cent and ranges from 250 – 1,000mm in quantity. The region 
receives anywhere from 500 to 700mm of rainfall during the short rain season (ASDSP, 2014). 
The situation in this county, with regards to the availability of land for agricultural use, is notably 
far much better than it is with Kisumu County. According to ASDSP (2014), the average farm 
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size in Homa Bay County is six acres. Small-scale farmers have, at their disposal, 4 acres, whilst 
the typical large-scale farmer in Homa Bay has about 10 acres to work on. Moreover, 48 per cent 
of landowners have title deeds and only three per cent of the county’s residents are landless 
(ASDSP, 2014). Perhaps strikingly, given the scarcity of land elsewhere in Kenya, the cost of 
land in Homa Bay, according to ASDSP (2014) is extremely affordable. 
  
Agriculture is the mainstay of the Homa Bay economy; it contributes immensely to the 
county’s food security and household income. About 74 per cent of the labour force is employed 
in the agricultural sector, which comprises various sub-sectors as follows: agriculture, fisheries 
development, lands, co-operative development and marketing, livestock development, forestry 
and wildlife (ASDSP, 2014). Food crops grown include the staples – maize and beans – and 
sweet potatoes, cassava, millet, sorghum, kales and peas. The cash crops grown there include 
sunflower (Suba), potatoes (Kasipul and Kabondo Kasipul), pineapples (Rangwe), and sugarcane 
(Ndhiwa).  
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Figure C3: Map of Homa Bay County (Population Density)  
   
Source: CRA, 2011, p. 8.  
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Table C2: Homa Bay County Facts and Figures 
General Information (2009) Homa Bay Rankᵃ Kenyaᵇ 
Population (2009) 963,794 13 821,491 
Population (1999) 751,332 13 610,355 
Annual population growth rate, 1999-2009 (%) 2.49 26 3.14 
Surface area (km²) 3,183 26 12,368 
Population Density 2009 (people per km²) 303 17 66 
Poverty rate, based on KIHBS (%) 44.1 15 47.2 
Poverty gap, based on KIHBS (2005/06) 15.2 24 19 
Share of urban population, 2009 (%) 14 36 29.9 
Urban population in largest towns (2009) 
   Homa Bay 58,936 38 
 Awendo 17,992 92 
 Mbita Point 11,989 109 
 Sindo 6,362 149 
 Access to Infrastructure Homa Bay Rankᵃ Kenyaᵇ 
Improved water (% of households 2009) 38.6 44 66.5 
Improved sanitation (% of households 2009) 61.4 36 87.8 
Electricity (% of households 2009) 3.3 42 22.7 
Paved roads (% of total roads 2012) 0.2 38 9.4 
Good/fair roads (as % of total roads) 42.9 26 43.5 
Service Coverage Homa Bay Rankᵃ Kenyaᵇ 
Delivered in a health centre 39.8 17 37.5 
Qualified medical assistant during birth 37.0 20 37.6 
Had all vaccinations 50.3 45 75.0 
Adequate height for age 53.7 33 59.8 
Can read & write 73.3 20 66.4 
Attending school, 15 - 18 years 83.2 9 70.9 
ᵃAll rankings are in descending order i.e. highest to lowest 
  ᵇAll entries in the 'Kenya' column show County averages 
  Source: CRA, 2011, p. 8; CRA, 2013, p. 8. 
            
Enormous prospects exist for cotton in the sub-counties of Rangwe, Homabay Town, Mbita and 
Karachuonyo (ASDSP, 2014). Similarly, it would seem, with better development planning and 
leadership, the future looks promising for the agro-processing industry, particularly for nut 
processing, and the processing of roots and fruits like avocados, guavas, pineapples and guavas. 
The county’s government is investing substantially in the establishment of fish auction centres 
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and is said to be considering the possibilities of processing fish within the locality. Investments 
in irrigation and sugarcane farming could also do the county a lot of good (ASDSP, 2014). About 
18,300 people and 3,600 families are involved in fishing, which is an important economic 
activity in the county. The fish types harvested include clarias, tilapia, and the Nile Perch 
(ASDSP, 2014). Table C2, above, provides a breakdown of the demographic facts, alongside 
other important statistics regarding the County of Homa Bay. 
           
Migori County in Socio-historical Geographical Context. Migori County – which lies 
between longitudes 34˚ and 34˚ 50’ east and latitudes 0˚ 24’ and 0˚ 40’ south – extends over an 
area of 2,596.5 km², of which 478 km² is covered by water. Predictably, it is also located in 
south-western Kenya. To the west of this county lies Lake Victoria. To the north of it is the 
County of Homa Bay, to its east Narok and Kisii Counties, while the United Republic of 
Tanzania is to be found to its south. Migori comprises seven sub-counties as follows: Migori, 
Nyatike, Kuria East, Kuria West, Awendo, Uriri, and Rongo. It also consists of further 
administrative and political units at a lower level, as follows: 23 divisions, 76 locations, and 174 
sub-locations (ASDSP, 2014). With a high, varying altitude that ranges anywhere from 1,140m 
(shores of Lake Victoria in the sub-county of Nyatike) to 4,625m (Uriri Sub-County), Migori is 
largely covered by undulating hills and comprises but a few stretches of flat land. Amongst the 
hills found in Migori County are the following: Nyakune (4,625m), Ogengo (4,300m) and God 
Sibwoche (1,475m) in Uriri Sub-county; God Kwer (1,420m), Mukuro (1,454m) and Nyabisawa 
(1,489m) in Migori Sub-county; God Kwach (1,340m) in Nyatike Sub-county; Renjoka (1,592m) 
in Kuria West Sub-county; and Maeta (1,733m) in Kuria East Sub-county (ASDSP, 2014). 
Figure C4, below, depicts Migori County.       
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Figure C4: Map of Migori County (Population Density) 
 
Source: CRA, 2011, p. 27.  
 
Though predominantly Luo, Migori County is nearly as diverse as Kisumu County. Its 
other inhabitants include members of the Kisii, Kuria, Somali and Luhya ethnic groups. 
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Members of the Arab, Indian and Nubian communities are also to be found there in lesser 
numbers. As at the year 2009, Migori had a population of 917,170 persons: 444,357 (48.6 per 
cent) males and 472,814 (51.4 per cent) females (Kenya Population and Housing Census, 2010). 
Its population was estimated to be 1,028,028 persons in 2012, 1,152,165 in 2015, and is expected 
to reach the 1,243,272 mark by 2017 (ASDSP, 2014). Of the 1,800 km² of arable land in Migori 
County, 60 per cent is under cash crop farming, 30 per cent under food crops, and the remaining 
10 per cent is fallow (ASDSP, 2014). The strikingly sizeable dormant land is the result of the 
unreliability of rainfall, especially in Nyatike and Kuria Constituencies. Unlike Homa Bay 
County, a great portion of the land in Migori is yet to be arbitrated; owing to this, about 60 per 
cent of the residents do not hold title deeds. Communal ownership of land is thus prevalent. On 
average, small-scale farms amount to three acres in size, while the average large-scale farm is 
about seven acres in size (ASDSP, 2014). 
   
 Agriculture plays a huge role in the county’s economy for about 80 per cent of its 
inhabitants derive their livelihood from it. Maize, beans, sorghum, finger millet, cassava and 
sweet potatoes are the main food crops grown in the county. The cash crop scene is dominated 
by tobacco and sugarcane. Sporadic dry spells, such as those experienced in Nyatike Sub-county, 
often hamper agricultural efforts and production. In addition to beekeeping, livestock – 
particularly traditional breeds like Zebu cattle, the East African goat and indigenous chicken – 
are bred in the county. Modern farming, though very uncharacteristic, is practiced by a small 
number of Migori residents (ASDSP, 2014). Table C3, below, provides a breakdown of the 
demographic facts, alongside other important statistics regarding the County of Migori.  
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Table C3: Migori County Facts and Figures 
General Information (2009) Migori Rankᵃ Kenyaᵇ 
Population (2009) 917,170 16 821,491 
Population (1999) 666,784 16 610,355 
Annual population growth rate, 1999-2009 (%) 3.19 17 3.14 
Surface area (km²) 2,596 34 12,368 
Population Density 2009 (people per km²) 353 13 66 
Poverty rate, based on KIHBS (%) 46.7 19 47.2 
Poverty gap, based on KIHBS (2005/06) 19.0 30 19 
Share of urban population, 2009 (%) 34 10 29.9 
Urban population in largest towns (2009) 
   Rongo 82,066 31 
 Migori 53,100 42 
 Kehancha 30,109 73 
 Sori 8,964 127 
 Muhuru Bay 6,254 151 
 Access to Infrastructure Migori Rankᵃ Kenyaᵇ 
Improved water (% of households 2009) 47.8 39 66.5 
Improved sanitation (% of households 2009) 66.8 34 87.8 
Electricity (% of households 2009) 5.3 36 22.7 
Paved roads (% of total roads 2012) 0.5 33 9.4 
Good/fair roads (as % of total roads) 55.0 10 43.5 
Service Coverage Migori Rankᵃ Kenyaᵇ 
Delivered in a health centre 32.5 22 37.5 
Qualified medical assistant during birth 35.1 22 37.6 
Had all vaccinations 51.6 44 75.0 
Adequate height for age 61.5 23 59.8 
Can read & write 75.2 17 66.4 
Attending school, 15 - 18 years 79.6 13 70.9 
ᵃAll rankings are in descending order i.e. highest to lowest 
  ᵇAll entries in the 'Kenya' column show County averages 
  Source: CRA, 2011, p. 27; CRA, 2013, p. 27. 
    
Siaya County in socio-historical geographical context. Siaya, which extends over an 
area of 2,530 km², is the final county in Luo Nyanza to be profiled in this study. Lying between 
latitudes 0˚ 26’ South and 0˚ 18’ North and longitudes 33˚ 58’ and 34˚ 33’ East, it bordered by 
Kisumu County to the East, the County of Vihiga to the North East, Kakamega County to the 
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North West and Lake Victoria to the South. It comprises six sub-counties, viz. Gem, Rarieda, 
Ugunja, Ugenya, Siaya (Alego Usonga) and Bondo. Furthermore, it has 28 electoral wards and 
the following six constituencies: Rarieda, Bondo, Ugenya, Siaya (Alego Usonga), Ugunja and 
Gem (ASDSP, 2014). The county was inhabited by 443,318 females and 398,364 males, in 2009, 
translating into a total population of 841,682 persons (Kenya Population and Housing Census, 
2010). In 2012, the population was estimated to be 885,762 persons. It will reach 964,390 
persons (given the current growth rate of 1.7 per cent per annum) by 2017 (ASDSP, 2014). 
     
 Siaya County comprises 2,059 square kilometres of arable land. The average small-scale 
farm size varies from 1.02 Ha (Siaya Sub-county) to 3.0Ha (Bondo Sub-county). On average, a 
large-scale farm in the county measures around 7.0 Ha in size. The number of farmers with title 
deeds stood at 259,124 in 2012. Most families in the county have their ancestors to thank for the 
land they own – it was bequeathed to them by the latter. Landlessness, thus, is an extremely rare 
phenomenon in Siaya (ASDSP, 2014). The urban area of Siaya County, in which business/office 
premises, residential buildings and other infrastructure are based, measures 424.9 km². Two 
rainfall seasons characterize Siaya: the long rainy season (experienced between March and June) 
and the short rainy season (experienced between September and November). Annual rainfall 
ranges between 800 and 2,000mm. Temperatures, dependent on altitude, vary from 21˚C to 
22.5˚C in the north-eastern part of the county along Lake Victoria. Temperature varies ranges 
from 16 – 29˚C in the south. Humidity is high: it ranges from 52% (afternoon) to 73% (morning) 
with a mean annual evaporation rate of 1,800 – 2,200mm (ASDSP, 2014). Figure C5, below, 
depicts Siaya County. 
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Figure C5: Map of Siaya County (Population Density) 
 
Source: CRA, 2013, p. 38. 
 
Table C4, below, provides a breakdown of the demographic facts, alongside other important 
statistics regarding the County of Siaya.  
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Table C4: Siaya County Facts and Figures 
General Information (2009) Siaya Rankᵃ Kenyaᵇ 
Population (2009) 842,304 21 821,491 
Population (1999) 718,964 15 610,355 
Annual population growth rate, 1999-2009 (%) 1.58 40 3.14 
Surface area (km²) 2,530 37 12,368 
Population Density 2009 (people per km²) 333 14 66 
Poverty rate, based on KIHBS (%) 35.3 10 47.2 
Poverty gap, based on KIHBS (2005/06) 11.8 13 19 
Share of urban population, 2009 (%) 11 44 29.9 
Urban population in largest towns (2009) 
   Bondo 33,468 72 
 Siaya 22,586 83 
 Usenge 10,098 117 
 Ugunja 7,242 140 
 Yala 6,412 148 
 Ukwala 5,187 167 
 Ndori 2,522 208 
 Access to Infrastructure Siaya Rankᵃ Kenyaᵇ 
Improved water (% of households 2009) 46.7 40 66.5 
Improved sanitation (% of households 2009) 82.7 28 87.8 
Electricity (% of households 2009) 4.3 39 22.7 
Paved roads (% of total roads 2012) 0.7 29 9.4 
Good/fair roads (as % of total roads) 50.5 17 43.5 
Service Coverage Siaya Rankᵃ Kenyaᵇ 
Delivered in a health centre 47.4 13 37.5 
Qualified medical assistant during birth 52.0 12 37.6 
Had all vaccinations 64.8 40 75.0 
Adequate height for age 56.2 31 59.8 
Can read & write 66.2 29 66.4 
Attending school, 15 - 18 years 72.9 26 70.9 
ᵃAll rankings are in descending order i.e. highest to lowest 
  ᵇAll entries in the 'Kenya' column show County averages 
  Source: CRA, 2011, p. 38; CRA, 2013, p. 38. 
    
Agriculture is the cornerstone of the Siaya economy: the majority of the residents – unemployed 
youths, farmers and value chain players alike – derive income and livelihood largely from this 
sector. Besides the fact that it provides food and nutrition for the local community, the sector’s 
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surplus is sold in local markets; moreover, the sector provides vital raw materials for agro-based 
industries in the county. The food crops grown in the county cover 150,000 ha of land and 
include the following: vegetables, sorghum, beans, cowpeas, millet, sweet potatoes and cassava. 
The main cash crops are sugarcane, rice and cotton – these occupy an area of 2,500 ha. Grain 
amaranth, palm oil, irrigated rice, passion fruits and chilli are gradually becoming important. 
Watermelons, oranges, pawpaw, mangoes and bananas are some of the vegetables grown in 
Siaya County. Livestock kept in the county include the following: pigs, sheep, rabbits, donkeys, 
local and dairy goats, upgrade dairy cows and zebu cattle. Fish varieties include omena, Nile 
perch and Tilapia – in addition to Lakes Victoria, and Kanyoboli, these are sourced from dam 
fisheries. Value chain enterprises include peanut butter, mango and passion fruit production – 
these are increasingly being commercialized. And fish is processed, on a small scale, at Usenge. 
The next section profiles the “cosmopolitan” counties which have been simultaneously studied in 
this research. In these counties – Nairobi, Mombasa, Nakuru and Uasin Gishu – the Luo is not 
demographically dominant.  
  
The Cosmopolitan Counties in Socio-historical Geographical Context 
Nairobi County in Socio-historical Geographical Context. Nairobi is undoubtedly the 
most significant of the 47 counties of Kenya: it serves as the republic’s industrial, commercial 
and political capital. With a total area of 696.1 km² and an altitude of 1,798 m above sea level, it 
lies between latitude 1˚ 18’ South and longitude 36˚ 45’ East. It borders Machakos County to the 
east, Kiambu County to the North and West, and Kajiado County to the South (ASDSP, 2014). 
Nairobi comprises nine sub-counties, viz. Kamukunji, Makadara, Njiru, Westlands, Langata, 
Dagoretti, Kasarani, Starehe and Embakasi.   
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Figure C6: Map of Nairobi County (Population Density) 
 
Source: CRA, 2013, p. 30. 
 
Figure C6, above, depicts Nairobi County. The following are Nairobi’s seventeen constituencies: 
Ruaraka, Starehe, Mathare, Kibra, Kamukunji, Roysambu, Makadara, Kasarani, Langata, 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
342 
 
Westlands, Embakasi South, Embakasi North, Embakasi West, Embakasi East, Embakasi 
Central, Dagoretti West, and Dagoretti East. There are eighty-five electoral wards in Nairobi 
County (ASDSP, 2014). As of the year 2009, the county’s population stood at 3,138,369 persons 
(1,533,139 females and 1,605,230 males) (Kenya Population and Housing Census, 2010). In 
2012, it was estimated to be 3,517,334 persons, with a mean density of 5,060 persons per square 
kilometre. It is projected that the density will rise to 6,119 persons per square kilometre by the 
end of 2017 (ASDSP, 2014). 
  
 Nairobi’s role as a formal sector wage employer in Kenya is gargantuan – over 85 per 
cent of the country’s formal sector employees work in this county (ASDSP, 2014). The 
manufacturing industry is the biggest employer. It is followed by other sectors in the following 
order: trade; restaurants and hotels; construction; and, transport and communication. The Nairobi 
Central Business District and the Industrial Area (along Mombasa Road) are the most significant 
formal employment zones in the county. Whilst demand for land in Nairobi remains colossal, the 
availability of this natural resource is absolutely scarce in the county. The county’s total area is 
696.1 km² of which 50 per cent comprises residential areas (175.6 km²) and open land (198.8 
km²). The remaining half is utilized for urban agriculture, recreation, and industrial purposes, 
besides being occupied by water bodies, infrastructure and ravine areas. Increase in residential 
establishments has drastically reduced land meant for urban agriculture; owing to this, Nairobi is 
increasingly becoming dependent on other counties for its food requirements (ASDSP, 2014). 
   
Agriculture, though, remains the driving force of the country’s economy. Besides 
household food, it provides agro-based industries with raw materials. Food crops grown in 
Nairobi include the following: maize and beans (on a small scale), kales, cassava, sweet potatoes 
and Irish potatoes. Livestock kept include goats, sheep, cattle, bees, pigs, donkeys, poultry and 
rabbits. Fish farming is practiced by about 500 households. Fish ponds in the county cover an 
area of approximately 180,000 m² and the main species farmed are catfish, tilapia and common 
carp (Nairobi City County Government [NCCG], 2014; ASDSP, 2014). According to the NCCG 
(2014), a total of 152 tonnes of fish with a value of Ksh. 24.3 million was harvested in 2013. 
Income generated from crop production stood at Kshs. 64 million in 2012: while maize and 
beans contributed a total of Kshs. 49 million, potatoes – sweet and Irish – contributed a 
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combined total of Kshs. 11.4 million. Income from milk and beef was Kshs. 428 million 
(ASDSP, 2014).      
Quarrying is the main mining activity in the county, for Nairobi has limited mineral 
resources. It is conducted on a small scale in fifteen quarries based in Embakasi and Njiru areas, 
which produce hard core, ballast and natural building stones. There are three gazetted forests in 
Nairobi, viz. Ngong Road Forest, Nairobi Arboretum and Karura. Karura – the largest – covers 
1,041 ha and contains 605 species of wildlife that include three antelope species (NCCG, 2014; 
ASDSP, 2014). Nairobi is close to many tourist attractions in East Africa generally, and Kenya 
in particular. Major tourist attractions in the county include the Nairobi Safari Walk, the Nairobi 
National Museum, Karen Blixen Museum and the Nairobi Gallery. The county’s numerous 
impressive hotels cater for its tourists ((NCCG, 2014; ASDSP, 2014). Nairobi’s annual rainfall 
ranges from 638 mm to 899 mm, with an average of 786.5 mm. The climate is fairly cool, owing 
to the county’s high altitude – the annual temperature ranges from 10˚C to 29˚C (ASDSP, 2014). 
Table C5, below, provides a breakdown of the demographic facts, alongside other important 
statistics regarding the County of Nairobi.  
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Table C5: Nairobi County Facts and Figures 
General Information (2009) Nairobi Rankᵃ Kenyaᵇ 
Population (2009) 3,138,369 1 821,491 
Population (1999) 2,143,254 1 610,355 
Annual population growth rate, 1999-2009 (%) 3.81 10 3.14 
Surface area (km²) 695 45 12,368 
Population Density 2009 (people per km²) 4516 1 66 
Poverty rate, based on KIHBS (%) 22.5 2 47.2 
Poverty gap, based on KIHBS (2005/06) 6.9 6 19 
Share of urban population, 2009 (%) 100 1 29.9 
Urban population in largest towns (2009) 
   Nairobi 3,133,518 1 
 Access to Infrastructure Nairobi Rankᵃ Kenyaᵇ 
Improved water (% of households 2009) 83.1 5 66.5 
Improved sanitation (% of households 2009) 98.7 10 87.8 
Electricity (% of households 2009) 72.4 1 22.7 
Paved roads (% of total roads 2012) 44.1 1 9.4 
Good/fair roads (as % of total roads) Unavailable Unavailable 43.5 
Service Coverage Nairobi Rankᵃ Kenyaᵇ 
Delivered in a health centre 78.9 3 37.5 
Qualified medical assistant during birth 71.7 4 37.6 
Had all vaccinations 91.0 3 75.0 
Adequate height for age 65.8 15 59.8 
Can read & write 97.7 2 66.4 
Attending school, 15 - 18 years 69.0 31 70.9 
ᵃAll rankings are in descending order i.e. highest to lowest 
  ᵇAll entries in the 'Kenya' column show County averages 
  Source: CRA, 2011, p. 30; CRA, 2013, p. 30. 
    
Mombasa County in Socio-historical Geographical Context. Mombasa County lies 
between longitudes 39˚ 34’ and 39˚ 46’ East and between latitudes 3˚ 56’ and 4˚ 10’ South. It 
covers a land area of 229.9 km² and a water mass of 65 km² (Mombasa County Government 
[MCG], 2013, p. 3). Mombasa County borders Kilifi County to the north, the Indian Ocean to the 
east, Kwale County to the south, and the Counties of Kilifi and Kwale to the west (MCG, 2013). 
Mombasa County comprises six sub-counties, namely: Changamwe, Likoni, Mvita, Jomvu, 
Nyali and Kisauni. It also has thirty county assembly wards, twenty locations and thirty-five sub-
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
345 
 
locations as its administrative and political units (MCG, 2013, p. 38). Figure C7, below, depicts 
Mombasa County. With about 486,924 males and 452,446 females, Mombasa’s population stood 
at 939,370 persons in 2009. The population density was 6,131 persons per km² (Kenya 
Population and Housing Census, 2010). The county’s population was estimated to be 1,051,825 
persons in the year 2012 (with a population density of 6,640.5 persons per km²) and is expected 
to rise to 1,242,908 persons in 2017 (MCG, 2013, pp. 14 – 15). Monsoon winds play a role in 
shaping the county’s climate. There are two rainfall patterns: short rains come in October and 
last through December (averaging 240 mm); the long rains (averaging 1, 044 mm) come in the 
month of April and last through June. The county’s mean annual rainfall is 640 mm. Mean 
annual temperatures range from 22.7˚C to 33.1˚C. With a mean temperature of 33.1˚C, February 
is the hottest month. July, with a minimum average of 22.7˚C, is the coolest (MCG, 2013, p. 7). 
 
 Land tenure is more complicated in Mombasa than the other regions covered in this 
study. It takes the following three major forms: private, public and community-owned land. 
Besides, other tenure forms are prevalent. First, private individuals have ‘unofficially’ occupied 
land owned by the government. Second, conspicuous squatting – occupation of private land, on a 
temporary basis, without authorization – persists. Third, land hitherto allotted on a short-term 
basis to certain groups of people (for instance, customary owners dislodged by government 
projects) is currently inhabited by their descendants.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
346 
 
 
 
Figure C7: Map of Mombasa County (Population Density) 
 
Source: CRA, 2013, p. 28. 
 
Also, a considerable percentage of land in the county is owned by absentee landlords who have 
leased it to local institutions and residents. This has resulted in the lack of protracted security for 
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developed properties. Thus, land administration and human settlement remain problematic in 
Mombasa (MCG, 2013, p. 42).  
 The most crucial employers in Mombasa are the Kenya Ports Authority, the GoK, 
Container Freight Terminals, the hotel industry and private institutions such as banks. The 
services sector – ship repair, clearing and forwarding firms, container freight stations, shipping 
lines, grain bulk handling and shipping lines – is also a notable employer. Oil refineries, car 
assembly plants, export processing, flour mills and glassware characterize the manufacturing 
industry in Mombasa and provide employment to the county’s residents (MCG, 2013, p. 29). The 
county’s labour force, 61 per cent of which is youthful, stood at 545, 303 persons in 2009 (Kenya 
Population and Housing Census, 2010). Mombasa’s rate of unemployment is high – 15 per cent 
– and results from a poor performing economy and the lack of suitable skills among other 
reasons (MCG, 2013, p. 22). The City of Mombasa is an ancient town endowed with various 
tourist attractions and world heritage sites like Fort Jesus Museum, a United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage Site. Other 
attractions include Mombasa Marine Park, Butterfly Pavilion, Haller Park, the Likoni Ferry 
Services, the Gigantic Elephant Tusks mould, the old port, old town and numerous sandy 
beaches. With over 200 registered hotels and lodges, a total bed capacity of around 8,000, and 
mean yearly bed occupancy of 64 per cent, Mombasa County is a popular tourist destination 
(MCG, 2013, p 30). 
       
The major crops grown in Mombasa County include millet, vegetables, maize, sorghum, 
cassava and cucurbits. While food crops cover an area of 400 ha, cash crops occupy 500 ha. 
Despite this, Mombasa imports food and other agricultural products. The cost of food is high; 
most low-income earners struggle to meet their nutrition needs (MCG, 2013, p. 33). Table C6, 
below, provides a breakdown of the demographic facts, alongside other important statistics 
regarding the County of Mombasa.  
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Table C6: Mombasa County Facts and Figures 
General Information (2009) Mombasa Rankᵃ Kenyaᵇ 
Population (2009) 939,370 15 821,491 
Population (1999) 665,018 17 610,355 
Annual population growth rate, 1999-2009 (%) 3.45 14 3.14 
Surface area (km²) 219 47 12,368 
Population Density 2009 (people per km²) 4,289 2 66 
Poverty rate, based on KIHBS (%) 37.6 11 47.2 
Poverty gap, based on KIHBS (2005/06) 8.7 7 19 
Share of urban population, 2009 (%) 100 2 29.9 
Urban population in largest towns (2009) 
   Mombasa 938,131 2 
 Access to Infrastructure Mombasa Rankᵃ Kenyaᵇ 
Improved water (% of households 2009) 75.0 14 66.5 
Improved sanitation (% of households 2009) 99.6 18 87.8 
Electricity (% of households 2009) 59.0 2 22.7 
Paved roads (% of total roads 2012) 24.7 2 9.4 
Good/fair roads (as % of total roads) 32.0 41 43.5 
Service Coverage Mombasa Rankᵃ Kenyaᵇ 
Delivered in a health centre 68.9 5 37.5 
Qualified medical assistant during birth 73.2 3 37.6 
Had all vaccinations 90.3 5 75.0 
Adequate height for age 84.3 1 59.8 
Can read & write 85.8 9 66.4 
Attending school, 15 - 18 years 53.6 41 70.9 
ᵃAll rankings are in descending order i.e. highest to lowest 
  ᵇAll entries in the 'Kenya' column show County averages 
  Source: CRA, 2011, p. 28; CRA, 2013, p. 28. 
    
Significant numbers of livestock are kept in the county for both domestic and commercial 
purposes. These include cattle, poultry, goats and sheep. Moreover, the county comprises 65 km² 
of open water and an Exclusive Economic Zone that extends 200 nautical miles into the Indian 
Ocean. This zone is extremely promising as a fishing ground. Mombasa also comprises fourteen 
fish landing sites and a single fish processing plant. Despite its proximity to the Indian Ocean, 
the county seldom realizes its annual fish harvesting potential of 994,718 metric tonnes due to 
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the lack of sophisticated fishing equipment and storage facilities (MCG, 2013, p. 34). 
Mombasa’s vital location as a seaport has somewhat worked to the disadvantage of the county in 
other ways. Its location, for instance, makes it prone to vices such as drug trafficking. The youth 
of Mombasa are infamous for their association with drugs; this has not only affected the quality 
and availability of labour but also cemented the prevalence of HIV/AIDS in the county. The 
latter arises out of shared syringes and other factors (MCG, 2013, p. 26). 
 
Nakuru County in Socio-historical Geographical Context. The county of Nakuru lies 
between latitudes 0˚ 13’ and 1˚ 10’ South and longitudes 35˚ 28’ and 35˚ 36’ East, and covers a 
land mass of 7,495.1 km². It is located in the Great Rift Valley where it borders seven other 
counties as follows: Nyandarua to the east, Kajiado and Kiambu to the south, Narok to the south-
west, Baringo and Laikipia to the north and Kericho to the west (ASDSP, 2014; Nakuru County 
Government [NCG], 2013, p. 14). For its administrative and political units, Nakuru comprises 55 
wards and 11 constituencies, in addition to the following nine sub-counties: Rongai, Subukia, 
Nakuru North, Kuresoi, Gilgil, Njoro, Naivasha, Nakuru and Molo (ASDSP, 2014; NCG, 2013, 
pp. 23 – 26). The county’s total population, according to the Kenya Population and Housing 
Census (2010), was 1,603,325 persons in 2009: this figure represented 798,743 females and 
804,582 males. The county’s population was estimated to be 1,756,950 in 2012, 1,925,296 in 
2015, and it will reach 2,046,395 persons in 2017 (NCG, 2013, p. 27). Figure C8, below, depicts 
Nakuru County.  
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Figure C8: Map of Nakuru County (Population Density) 
 
Source: CRA, 2013, p. 31. 
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Nakuru, a cosmopolitan county, is ethnically diverse: its populace comprises members of various 
ethnic groups including the Kikuyu, Kamba, Kalenjin, Kisii, Luo, Luhya, and others. About 38 
per cent of Nakuru residents live in towns; the outstanding 62 per cent live in the rural areas of 
the county. Population distribution is largely influenced by the following factors: soil fertility, 
pasture, infrastructure, rainfall, security, proximity to urban set-ups, economic opportunities, and 
availability of natural resources (NCG, 2013, pp. 32 – 33). The majority of Nakuru residents 
depend on land for their livelihood. There are few large-scale landowners; on average, they each 
hold 263 ha of land. Small-scale land ownership is dominant with the average landholding size 
being 0.77 ha. In the urban areas, the average landholding size is 0.05 ha. Over 70 per cent of 
lands in Nakuru County have title deeds. Landlessness is not as rife as the case is with Mombasa 
County; only 20 per cent of the county’s households are considered to be landless (NCG, 2013, 
pp. 40 – 41). 
      
 Nakuru’s resilient and diverse ecological system plays a significant role in upholding and 
boosting the county’s agricultural and tourism sectors, besides providing abundant water for its 
residents. Its notable feature, the Mau Escarpment, averages 2,400 m in altitude and hosts the 
majority of the county’s numerous forests. River Njoro, which drains into Lake Nakuru making 
the latter a suitable habitat for its famed flamingos, originates from the Mau (NCG, 2013, p. 21). 
The hot springs in Olkaria are another Nakuru notable; they are an invaluable source of 
geothermal power for Kenya in general, and the county in particular. Nakuru’s climate, largely 
influenced by the county’s ecological system, is characterized by a bimodal pattern of rainfall. 
The county experiences short rains from October to December; on the other hand, long rains 
begin in March and persist through the month of May. Temperature ranges from lows of 12˚C 
(June and July) to highs of 29.3˚C (December to early March) (NCG, 2013, pp. 22 – 23). 
     
The agricultural sector in Nakuru provides employment for most of its residents and is 
divided into the following sub-sectors: food and cash crop farming (including horticulture and 
floriculture), fish farming and livestock keeping. The major food crops produced in Nakuru 
include wheat, beans, maize and Irish potatoes. Various fruits and vegetables are grown in the 
county including peas, onions, peaches, French beans, strawberries, kales, leeks, asparagus, 
tomatoes, carrots, apples, cabbages and citrus fruits. Cash crops grown include tea, pyrethrum, 
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barley, wheat and flowers. Horticulture – particularly floriculture – is proving to be very feasible, 
in an economic sense; Homegrown and Oserian in Naivasha and Subati in Subukia are some of 
the successful flower farms in Nakuru County (NCG, 2013, p. 43). Livestock reared in the 
county include dairy cattle, poultry, sheep, goats, bees and rabbits – dairy farming is enormously 
significant as an income earner (NCG, 2013, p. 45). Though Lake Naivasha is the major fish 
source in the county, fish farming is also practiced in individual and communally-owned ponds 
and water reservoirs. It is estimated that there are 1,500 fish ponds in Nakuru rearing tilapia, 
trout and catfish. Lake Naivasha is a major source of black bass, common carp and tilapia (NCG, 
2013, pp. 46 – 47). The mining industry in Nakuru is dominated by diatomite, which is obtained 
at Kariandusi along the Nairobi – Nakuru Highway. Other mining activities include sand 
harvesting, hot water harnessing (for geothermal power purposes) and quarrying. There is 
nothing else of importance in this sector. Table C7, below, provides a breakdown of the 
demographic facts, alongside other important statistics regarding Nakuru County. 
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Table C7: Nakuru County Facts and Figures 
General Information (2009) Nakuru Rankᵃ Kenyaᵇ 
Population (2009) 1,603,325 4 821,491 
Population (1999) 1,187,039 4 610,355 
Annual population growth rate, 1999-2009 (%) 3.01 19 3.14 
Surface area (km²) 7,495 19 12,368 
Population Density 2009 (people per km²)  214 21 66 
Poverty rate, based on KIHBS (%) 40.1 12 47.2 
Poverty gap, based on KIHBS (2005/06) 12.1 16 19 
Share of urban population, 2009 (%) 46 6 29.9 
Urban population in largest towns (2009) 
   Nakuru 307,990 4 
 Naivasha 169,142 9 
 Molo 40,651 60 
 Giligil 35,293 69 
 Njoro 23,551 82 
 Mai Mahiu 11,230 112 
 Subukia 7,309 139 
 Dundori 5,221 166 
 Salgaa 4,740 174 
 Mau Narok 4,357 178 
 Bahati 3,833 184 
 Rongai 2,215 213 
 Olenguruone 2,119 214 
 Access to Infrastructure Nakuru Rankᵃ Kenyaᵇ 
Improved water (% of households 2009) 66.4 24 66.5 
Improved sanitation (% of households 2009) 97.0 16 87.8 
Electricity (% of households 2009) 34.0 5 22.7 
Paved roads (% of total roads 2012) 3.1 11 9.4 
Good/fair roads (as % of total roads) 31.1 42 43.5 
Service Coverage Nakuru Rankᵃ Kenyaᵇ 
Delivered in a health centre 51.4 12 37.5 
Qualified medical assistant during birth 50.5 13 37.6 
Had all vaccinations 64.3 41 75.0 
Adequate height for age 49.3 40 59.8 
Can read & write 83.2 10 66.4 
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Attending school, 15 - 18 years 74.7 22 70.9 
ᵃAll rankings are in descending order i.e. highest to lowest 
  ᵇAll entries in the 'Kenya' column show County averages 
  Source: CRA, 2011, p. 31; CRA, 2013, p. 31. 
    
Tourism is vibrant in Nakuru. There are no less than three national parks in the county. These are 
Hell’s Gate National Park, Mt. Longonot National Park and Lake Nakuru National Park, where 
tourists can sample the following wild animals among others: white and black rhinos, giraffes, 
cheetahs, buffalos, hippos, baboons, monkeys, impalas, gazelles and pelicans. Moreover, Lake 
Nakuru has, besides its two major flamingo species, about 422,341 lesser flamingos, and 78 
greater flamingos (NCG, 2013, p. 52). In terms of employment in the county, the majority of the 
wage earners are to be found in the private sector and specifically in the following sub-sectors: 
construction, wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants, academic institutions, public 
transport, and flower, tea and coffee farms. About 14 per cent of the county’s population is self-
employed and 24 per cent of the total labour force is unemployed (Kenya Population and 
Housing Census, 2010). 
  
Uasin Gishu County in Socio-historical Geographical Context. Uasin Gishu County 
extends over a land area of 3,345 km². It is located between latitudes 0˚ 03’ South and 0˚ 55’ 
North and longitudes 34˚ 50’ East and 35˚ 37’West. The county comprises six sub-counties, viz. 
Kapseret, Kessess, Moiben, Ainabkoi, Soy and Turbo. Within these sub-counties are 51 locations 
and 97 sub-locations. It borders Elgeyo Marakwet County to the East, Kericho County to the 
South, Trans Nzoia County to the North, Baringo County to the South East, Kakamega County to 
the North West and Nandi County to the South West (UGCG, 2013, p. 1). The total population 
of the county was 894,179 persons in 2009 (Kenya Population and Housing Census, 2010). The 
county’s economically active age-group (15 to 64 years) represented 55.7 per cent of the total 
population in 2012. On the other hand, persons aged between 0 and 14 years accounted for 41.4 
per cent of the county’s total population. The county, therefore, has an inflated dependency ratio. 
It exhibits great prospects, at the same time, in terms of the labour force. By the year 2017, the 
county should be inhabited by 1,211,853 persons, given its population growth rate of 3.8 per cent 
(UGCG, 2013, p. 2). Figure C9, below, depicts Uasin Gishu County.   
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Figure C9: Map of Uasin Gishu County (Population Density) 
   
Source: CRA, 2013, p. 44.  
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Uasin Gishu is one of Kenya’s most cosmopolitan counties; it is home to nearly all the ethnic 
groups in the country. The Kalenjin, though, are the predominant group in this part of Kenya. 
Eldoret East is mainly inhabited by the Nandi and Keiyo while the Marakwet are to be found 
along Uasin Gishu’s border with Elgeyo Marakwet County. The Nandi, Kikuyu and Luhya 
dominate Eldoret West while Wareng is mainly occupied by the Nandi and Kikuyu. Europeans 
and Indians are also to be found in the urban areas of the county. Kenyans from other ethnic 
groups, over time, have migrated to the county to work in various capacities in the farms, 
railway, business and agro-based industries (UGCG, 2013, p. 46). 
  
The average land holding in the county’s rural areas is 5 hectares; in the urban areas, 
especially Eldoret Municipality, it is 0.25 hectares. Landlessness, however, persists in Uasin 
Gishu: the landless include squatters who live in gazetted forests, immigrants from other Kenyan 
counties, and those that have sold their family land (UGCG, 2013, p. 3). The arable land in Uasin 
Gishu measures 2,995 km²; on the other hand, 332.78 km² is hilly and rocky (non-arable), 23.4 
km² is water mass and 196 km² is urban land (UGCG, 2013, p. 4). Rainfall, which peaks in May 
and October, averages 900 mm to 1,200 mm annually. Temperature ranges from 8.4˚C to 26.2˚C, 
with a mean of 18˚C. The following food crops characterize the agricultural scene in Uasin 
Gishu, where the average farm size ranges from 2 to 10 acres: maize, finger millet, Irish 
potatoes, beans, wheat, sorghum, tomatoes, kales, cabbages, carrots, onions, passion fruit and 
avocados. Cash crops include coffee, sunflower and pyrethrum (UGCG, 2013, pp. 4 – 5). On 
average, Uasin Gishu, widely regarded as Kenya’s bread basket, produces 4.5 million bags of 
maize and 1 million bags of wheat annually (UGCG, 2013, p. 7). Production of fish is 
increasingly taking root in the county where, currently, there are about 1,728 operational fish 
ponds covering a land mass of 486, 900 km². Annual production from these ponds stands at 593, 
000 kg of fish, worth Ksh. 285, 900, 000 (UGCG, 2013, p. 12). Table C8, below, provides a 
breakdown of the demographic facts, alongside other important statistics regarding the County of 
Uasin Gishu.  
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Table C8: Uasin Gishu County Facts and Figures 
General Information (2009) Uasin Gishu Rankᵃ Kenyaᵇ 
Population (2009) 841,179 17 821,491 
Population (1999) 622,705 19 610,355 
Annual population growth rate, 1999-2009 (%) 3.62 11 3.14 
Surface area (km²)  3,345 23 12,368 
Population Density 2009 (people per km²) 267 19 66 
Poverty rate, based on KIHBS (%) 51.3 27 47.2 
Poverty gap, based on KIHBS (2005/06) 11.4 10 19 
 Share of urban population, 2009 (%) 39 9 29.9 
Urban population in largest towns (2009) 
   Eldoret 289,380 5 
 Moi's Bridge 14,596 106 
 Matunda 10,031 119 
 Burnt Forest 4,925 172 
 Jua Kali 3,427 192 
 Turbo 2,831 201 
 Access to Infrastructure Uasin Gishu Rankᵃ Kenyaᵇ 
Improved water (% of households 2009) 88.9 3 66.5 
Improved sanitation (% of households 2009) 98.0 12 87.8 
Electricity (% of households 2009) 27.9 6 22.7 
Paved roads (% of total roads 2012) 1.5 20 9.4 
Good/fair roads (as % of total roads) 50.6 16 43.5 
Service Coverage Uasin Gishu Rankᵃ Kenyaᵇ 
Delivered in a health centre 30.1 26 37.5 
Qualified medical assistant during birth 30.5 26 37.6 
Had all vaccinations 72.7 29 75.0 
Adequate height for age 74.9 5 59.8 
Can read & write 81.5 12 66.4 
Attending school, 15 - 18 years 83.0 10 70.9 
ᵃAll rankings are in descending order i.e. highest to lowest 
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ᵇAll entries in the 'Kenya' column show County averages 
  Source: CRA, 2011, p. 44; CRA, 2013, p. 44. 
 
   Uasin Gishu is renown, on a worldwide scale, as the “city of champions” – majority of Kenya’s 
athletes come from this county. The county’s administrators are looking to make use of this tag 
to boost its tourism industry, which is yet to be fully developed. Nonetheless, Uasin Gishu 
currently boasts of 120 hotels, lodges and guesthouses, which have a combined capacity of 2,492 
beds (UGCG, 2013, pp. 36 – 38). Perhaps more importantly, historical land grievances, which 
date back to the colonial days, continue to bedevil Uasin Gishu. The land issues have been 
intertwined with politics and are amongst the major sources of incessant conflict witnessed in the 
region. These land issues are widely regarded as being the major reason behind the 2008 post-
election violence in Kenya (UGCG, 2013, p. 41). This contextual profile of Uasin Gishu County 
concludes the examination of the geographical area in which the study was conducted. 
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APPENDIX D 
QUANTITATIVE SURVEY RESULTS 
Table D1 
Awareness of Circumcision being fronted as a Prerequisite Leadership Trait 
Response Frequency Percentage Cumulative Percentage 
Strongly Agree 495 30.9 30.9 
Agree 322 20.1 51.1 
Neutral 112 7.0 58.1 
Disagree 344 21.5 79.6 
Strongly Disagree 327 20.4 100.0 
Total 1600 100.0  
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017) 
 
Table D2 
Politicians Made me Aware (n=817) 
Response Frequency Percentage 
Strongly Agree 379 46.4 
Agree 337 41.2 
Disagree 73 8.9 
Strongly Disagree 28 3.4 
Total 817 100.0 
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017). 
Table D3 
Circumcision and Ridicule 
Response Frequency Percentage Cumulative Percentage 
Strongly Agree 464 29.0 29.0 
Agree 464 29.0 58.0 
Neutral 169 10.6 68.6 
Disagree 343 21.4 90.0 
Strongly Disagree 160 10.0 100.0 
Total 1600 100.0  
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017). 
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Table D4 
Adoption of Alien Culture of Circumcision 
Response Frequency Percentage Cumulative Percentage 
Strongly Agree 404 25.3 25.3 
Agree 436 27.3 52.5 
Neutral 231 14.4 66.9 
Disagree 345 21.6 88.5 
Strongly Disagree 184 11.5 100.0 
Total 1600 100.0  
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017). 
 
Table D5 
Denial of Economic Opportunity/Employment for Being Luo 
Response Frequency Percentage Cumulative Percentage 
Strongly Agree 288 18.0 18.0 
Agree 373 23.3 41.3 
Neutral 312 19.5 60.8 
Disagree 440 27.5 88.3 
Strongly Disagree 187 11.7 100.0 
Total 1600 100.0  
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017). 
 
Table D6 
Belief that Being Luo has denied them Better Jobs and Opportunities 
Response Frequency Percentage Cumulative Percentage 
Strongly Agree 222 13.9 13.9 
Agree 256 16.0 29.9 
Neutral 570 35.6 65.5 
Disagree 355 22.2 87.7 
Strongly Disagree 197 12.3 100.0 
Total 1600 100.0  
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017). 
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Table D7 
Promotion Opportunities are Limited for Luos at my Workplace 
Response Frequency Percentage Cumulative Percentage 
Strongly Agree 106 6.6 6.6 
Agree 164 10.3 16.9 
Neutral 955 59.7 76.6 
Disagree 239 14.9 91.5 
Strongly Disagree 136 8.5 100.0 
Total 1600 100.0  
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017). 
 
Table D8 
My Living Standards would be better if I were not Luo 
Response Frequency Percentage Cumulative Percentage 
Strongly Agree 212 13.3 13.3 
Agree 248 15.5 28.7 
Neutral 324 20.3 49.0 
Disagree 526 32.9 81.9 
Strongly Disagree 290 18.1 100.0 
Total 1600 100.0  
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017). 
 
Table D9 
I would carry out Affirmative Action to help Luos Catch Up 
Response Frequency Percentage Cumulative Percentage 
Strongly Agree 572 35.8 35.8 
Agree 330 20.6 56.4 
Neutral 207 12.9 69.3 
Disagree 264 16.5 85.8 
Strongly Disagree 227 14.2 100.0 
Total 1600 100.0  
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017). 
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Table D10 
Influential Luos Assist Fellow Luos to Access Economic Opportunities 
Response Frequency Percentage Cumulative Percentage 
Strongly Agree 210 13.1 13.1 
Agree 295 18.4 31.6 
Neutral 251 15.7 47.3 
Disagree 503 31.4 78.7 
Strongly Disagree 341 21.3 100.0 
Total 1600 100.0  
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017). 
Table D11 
Marriage between fellow Luos is better than Intermarriage 
Response Frequency Percentage Cumulative Percentage 
Strongly Agree 359 22.4 22.4 
Agree 255 15.9 38.4 
Neutral 195 12.2 50.6 
Disagree 427 26.7 77.3 
Strongly Disagree 364 22.8 100.0 
Total 1600 100.0  
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017). 
 
Table D12 
Luo Nyanza would be more Economically Developed if not for Exclusion by Central 
Government 
Response Frequency Percentage Cumulative Percentage 
Strongly Agree 634 39.6 39.6 
Agree 334 20.9 60.5 
Neutral 191 11.9 72.4 
Disagree 284 17.8 90.2 
Strongly Disagree 157 9.8 100.0 
Total 1600 100.0  
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017). 
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Table D13 
Awareness of Circumcision being fronted as a Prerequisite Leadership Trait * Residence 
Cross Tabulation 
 
Residence 
Total 
Luo Nyanza 
Counties 
Cosmopolitan 
Counties 
Awareness of 
circumcision being 
fronted as a prerequisite 
leadership trait 
strongly agree 235 260 495 
Agree 131 191 322 
Neutral 88 24 112 
Disagree 138 206 344 
strongly disagree 208 119 327 
Total 800 800 1600 
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017). 
 
Table D14 
Politicians made me aware * Residence Cross tabulation  
 
Residence 
Total 
Luo Nyanza 
Counties 
Cosmopolitan 
Counties 
Politicians made me 
aware 
strongly agree 133 195 328 
Agree 131 206 337 
Neutral 466 368 834 
Disagree 45 28 73 
strongly disagree 25 3 28 
Total 800 800 1600 
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017) 
Table D15 
Circumcision and Ridicule * Residence Cross tabulation  
 
Residence 
Total 
Luo Nyanza 
Counties 
Cosmopolitan 
Counties 
Circumcision and 
ridicule 
strongly agree 228 236 464 
Agree 194 270 464 
Neutral 116 53 169 
Disagree 159 184 343 
strongly disagree 103 57 160 
Total 800 800 1600 
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017) 
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Table D16 
Adopting the Alien Culture of Circumcision * Residence Cross tabulation  
 
Residence 
Total 
Luo Nyanza 
Counties 
Cosmopolitan 
Counties 
Adopting alien culture 
of circumcision 
strongly agree 236 168 404 
Agree 214 222 436 
Neutral 111 120 231 
Disagree 128 217 345 
strongly disagree 111 73 184 
Total 800 800 1600 
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017) 
 
Table D17 
Denial of Economic Opportunity (Employment) for being Luo * Residence Cross tabulation  
 
Residence 
Total 
Luo Nyanza 
Counties 
Cosmopolitan 
Counties 
Denial of economic 
opportunity 
(employment) because 
of being Luo 
strongly agree 113 175 288 
Agree 175 198 373 
Neutral 143 169 312 
Disagree 239 201 440 
strongly disagree 130 57 187 
Total 800 800 1600 
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017) 
Table D18 
Belief that being Luo has Denied them Better Jobs and Opportunities * Residence Cross 
tabulation 
 
Residence 
Total 
Luo Nyanza 
Counties 
Cosmopolitan 
Counties 
Belief that being Luo has 
denied them better jobs 
and opportunities 
strong agree 121 101 222 
Agree 127 129 256 
Neutral 182 388 570 
Disagree 228 127 355 
strongly disagree 142 55 197 
Total 800 800 1600 
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017) 
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Table D19 
Promotion Opportunities Limited for Luos at Workplace * Residence Cross tabulation  
 
Residence 
Total 
Luo Nyanza 
Counties 
Cosmopolitan 
Counties 
Promotion opportunities 
limited at workplace 
strongly agree 80 26 106 
Agree 132 32 164 
Neutral 265 690 955 
Disagree 199 40 239 
strongly disagree 124 12 136 
Total 800 800 1600 
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017) 
 
Table D20 
My Living Standards would be better if I were not Luo * Residence Cross tabulation  
 
Residence 
Total 
Luo Nyanza 
Counties 
Cosmopolitan 
Counties 
My living standards 
would be better if I 
were not Luo 
strongly agree 126 86 212 
Agree 103 145 248 
Neutral 157 167 324 
Disagree 240 286 526 
strongly disagree 174 116 290 
Total 800 800 1600 
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017) 
 
Table D21 
I would carry out Affirmative Action to help Luos Catch Up * Residence Cross tabulation  
 
Residence 
Total 
Luo Nyanza 
Counties 
Cosmopolitan 
Counties 
I would carry out 
affirmative action to 
help Luos catch up 
strongly agree 318 254 572 
Agree 192 138 330 
Neutral 109 98 207 
Disagree 114 150 264 
strongly disagree 67 160 227 
Total 800 800 1600 
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017) 
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Table D22 
Influential Luos Assist Fellow Luos to Access Economic Opportunities * Residence Cross 
tabulation 
 
Residence 
Total 
Luo Nyanza 
Counties 
Cosmopolitan 
Counties 
Influential Luos assist 
fellow Luos access 
economic opportunities 
strongly agree 145 65 210 
Agree 137 158 295 
Neutral 137 114 251 
Disagree 226 277 503 
strongly disagree 155 186 341 
Total 800 800 1600 
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017) 
Table D23 
Marriage between Fellow Luos is better than Intermarriage * Residence Cross tabulation 
 
Residence 
Total 
Luo Nyanza 
Counties 
Cosmopolitan 
Counties 
Marriage between 
fellow Luos is better 
than intermarriage 
strongly agree 213 146 359 
Agree 147 108 255 
Neutral 111 84 195 
Disagree 184 243 427 
strongly disagree 145 219 364 
Total 800 800 1600 
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017) 
Table D24 
Luo Nyanza would be more economically Developed were it not for Exclusion by Central 
Government * Residence Cross tabulation 
 
Residence 
Total 
Luo Nyanza 
Counties 
Cosmopolitan 
Counties 
Luo Nyanza would be 
more developed 
economically were it 
not for exclusion by 
central government 
strongly agree 350 284 634 
Agree 145 189 334 
Neutral 80 111 191 
Disagree 143 141 284 
strongly disagree 82 75 157 
Total 800 800 1600 
Source: Author’s fieldwork (2017)  
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APPENDIX E 
STATISTICS FROM HISTORICAL RECORDS 
Table E1 
Primary School Enrolment by Province, 1965 – 73 
Province 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
Central 238,001 251,305 273,558 296,863 311,970 349,378 371,913 407,762 443,509 
Coast 57,523 59,631 65,719 71,642 76,805 83,983 87,445 96,102 103,107 
Eastern 199,107 204,462 226,687 242,059 269,652 289,867 315,454 339,582 370,555 
Nairobi 45,096 49,728 52,977 55,060 60,944 61,238 67,523 71,786 76,375 
N. Eastern 912 2,090 1,822 2,389 3,301 3,432 4,668 5,048 6,377 
Nyanza 162,299 191,337 196,821 221,138 206,462 234,912 248,990 269,764 291,128 
R.Valley 161,272 144,902 165,325 174,597 183,233 202,992 228,797 250,975 279,119 
Western 146,679 139,961 150,270 145,932 169,930 201,787 200,708 234,900 245,847 
Total 1,010,889 1,043,416 1,133,179 1,209,680 1,282,297 1,427,589 1,525,498 1,675,919 1,816,017 
Sources: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1965 – 73 
 
Table E2 
Primary School Enrolment by Province, 1973 – 83 
Province 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Central 443,509 531,675 558,133 571,583 584,734 616,064 663,015 696,968 699,039 715,236 741,258 
Coast 103,107 149,778 156,927 160,156 163,225 170,664 210,328 230,221 242,432 254,888 273,174 
Eastern 370,555 515,624 545,877 543,222 572,635 601,851 706,654 752,844 748,142 768,958 807,902 
Nairobi 76,375 83,430 83,400 84,738 86,342 91,540 94,202 97,984 102,266 105,549 107,706 
N. Eastern 6,377 7,200 6,965 7,507 9,234 9,487 10,590 12,171 12,109 14,097 15,456 
Nyanza 291,128 562,511 606,895 550,580 554,450 518,346 767,249 785,537 777,413 814,010 835,762 
R.Valley 279,119 454,185 494,699 530,646 556,948 571,667 706,262 781,847 826,481 859,425 931,468 
Western 245,847 401,475 431,259 446,185 447,281 415,275 539,946 569,057 573,280 587,982 611,096 
Total 1,816,017 2,705,878 2,884,155 2,894,617 2,974,849 2,994,894 3,698,246 3,926,629 3,981,162 4,120,145 4,323,822 
Sources: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1973 – 83  
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Table E3 
Primary School Enrolment by Province, 1983 – 93 
Province  1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Central 741,258 750,373 828,310 822,710 847,973 864,380 901,027 878,534 883,256 901,989 905,698 
Coast 273,174 281,867 300,203 321,584 331,571 338,026 348,589 358,898 360,204 365,057 352,900 
Eastern 807,902 812,751 847,257 901,498 931,629 970,968 998,373 1,018,506 1,043,760 1,050,217 1,023,780 
Nairobi 107,706 110,902 123,573 127,507 133,794 139,391 179,829 146,565 149,565 152,384 122,626 
N. Eastern 15,456 16,284 19,932 23,460 28,301 29,492 31,094 34,811 34,221 33,793 26,343 
Nyanza 835,762 833,067 907,590 911,805 955,916 932,067 982,293 977,996 979,098 1,020,864 1,045,759 
R.Valley 931,468 959,224 1,021,610 1,061,721 1,111,308 1,141,712 1,213,097 1,232,845 1,254,890 1,267,692 1,192,267 
Western 611,096 615,243 653,939 673,147 690,848 707,545 734,837 744,164 751,002 771,992 759,023 
Total 4,323,822 4,379,711 4,702,414 4,843,432 5,031,340 5,123,581 5,389,139 5,392,319 5,455,996 5,563,988 5,428,396 
Sources: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1983 – 93  
Table E4 
Primary School Enrolment by Province, 1993 – 2003 
Province  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Central 905,698 898,262 951,010 903,944 911,009 894,583 864,889 896,898 869,079 816,264 904,770 
Coast 352,900 339,864 352,579 368,004 369,851 362,593 379,729 389,070 423,622 387,875 486,629 
Eastern 1,023,780 1,030,429 1,020,805 1,042,091 1,060,872 1,110,163 1,134,707 1,132,145 1,139,823 1,158,529 1,309,807 
Nairobi 122,626 153,668 157,080 154,946 153,640 155,834 159,897 164,289 171,231 177,208 217,167 
N. Eastern 26,343 35,272 25,106 35,892 35,272 44,693 48,134 47,835 48,193 48,902 66,773 
Nyanza 1,045,759 1,075,373 991,687 966,508 1,064,126 1,008,587 1,075,780 1,024,909 1,141,060 1,089,804 1,339,895 
R.Valley 1,192,267 1,245,464 1,263,127 1,303,057 1,354,439 1,400,759 1,433,626 1,527,131 1,579,171 1,500,659 1,779,789 
Western 759,023 778,676 783,604 793,048 811,673 850,951 797,422 780,848 809,809 883,501 1,054,694 
Total 5,428,396 5,557,008 5,544,998 5,567,490 5,760,882 5,828,163 5,894,184 5,963,125 6,181,988 6,062,742 7,159,524 
Sources: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1993 – 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table E5 
Primary School Enrolment by Province, 2003 – 13 
Province  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Central 904,770 910,806 903,638 882,429 888,236 911,340 975,561 998,879 916,249 935,080 944,662 
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Coast 486,629 556,013 585,543 600,041 643,355 658,860 689,798 717,570 745,096 760,411 768,202 
Eastern 1,309,807 1,371,680 1,379,909 1,378,210 1,480,629 1,538,785 1,565,188 1,584,804 1,506,892 1,537,863 1,553,621 
Nairobi 217,167 229,252 237,858 234,819 319,000 320,102 245,939 347,024 450,399 459,655 464,366 
N. Eastern 66,773 69,958 70,891 81,182 98,629 115,287 138,172 151,992 271,247 276,820 279,658 
Nyanza 1,339,895 1,321,901 1,324,239 1,334,597 1,441,735 1,508,264 1,576,779 1,740,900 1,561,995 1,594,098 1,610,434 
R.Valley 1,779,789 1,833,990 1,951,235 1,998,278 2,185,054 2,191,341 2,270,971 2,418,905 2,661,775 2,716,481 2,744,320 
Western 1,054,694 1,101,162 1,143,972 1,122,557 1,273,510 1,333,640 1,365,127 1,421,137 1,447,447 1,477,194 1,492,333 
Total 7,159,524 7,394,762 7,597,285 7,632,113 8,330,148 8,577,619 8,827,535 9,381,211 9,561,100 9,757,602 9,857,596 
Sources: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 2003 – 13  
Table E6 
Secondary School Enrolment by Province, 1968 – 73 
Province 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
Central 22,800 29,000 29,000 32,100 37,100 41,700 
Coast 8,900 10,500 11,800 13,500 14,400 15,400 
Eastern 11,100 13,800 17,300 19,400 23,500 24,700 
Nairobi 22,700 22,900 23,700 24,300 25,300 25,600 
N. Eastern 100 100 200 200 300 400 
Nyanza 12,900 15,500 16,700 18,500 22,300 23,000 
R.Valley 12,200 13,700 15,400 18,000 20,400 22,300 
Western 10,600 11,700 12,800 14,800 18,600 21,700 
Total 101,300 117,200 126,900 140,800 161,900 174,800 
Sources: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1968 – 73  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table E7 
Secondary School Enrolment by Province, 1973 – 83 
Province  1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Central 41,700 51,400 55,600 66,700 78,200 87,400 94,600 105,800 92,400 98,800 119,500 
Coast 15,400 17,400 16,400 16,500 19,000 19,600 20,700 23,100 27,300 29,200 28,600 
Eastern 24,700 35,400 38,500 45,100 54,500 63,200 67,900 71,100 66,000 70,100 84,400 
Nairobi 25,600 21,100 22,900 28,000 29,500 31,400 30,000 30,400 32,200 34,400 38,500 
N. Eastern 400 400 500 600 700 700 1,000 1,500 1,300 1,400 1,500 
Nyanza 23,000 28,800 31,800 46,100 50,500 62,400 65,800 70,900 77,600 83,000 86,900 
R.Valley 22,300 21,400 29,200 34,500 40,800 46,700 53,400 58,800 60,100 64,300 68,600 
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Western 21,700 20,200 31,900 42,800 47,100 50,300 51,000 54,300 53,100 56,800 65,700 
Total 174,800 196,100 226,800 280,300 320,300 361,700 384,400 415,900 410,000 438,000 493,700 
Sources: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1973 – 83  
Table E8 
Secondary School Enrolment by Province, 1983 – 93 
Province  1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Central 119,500 124,800 92,500 101,700 110,400 107,800 140,200 124,700 125,300 122,000 118,000 
Coast 28,600 26,900 21,000 27,600 31,600 35,500 40,400 41,500 39,500 40,000 30,000 
Eastern 84,400 89,600 64,400 75,900 98,800 99,800 115,300 113,400 121,000 125,000 104,000 
Nairobi 38,500 31,700 25,300 31,000 29,900 30,500 34,200 35,900 33,900 34,000 15,000 
N. Eastern 1,500 1,300 1,200 1,900 2,200 2,400 3,100 3,400 3,500 1,200 1,000 
Nyanza 86,900 80,800 67,800 72,100 90,300 89,100 97,500 90,900 95,000 89,000 81,000 
R.Valley 68,600 80,800 75,400 89,000 92,600 99,600 121,700 119,800 122,200 95,000 111,000 
Western 65,700 75,000 54,400 59,500 66,500 75,500 88,300 88,900 73,800 62,900 71,000 
Total 493,700 510,900 402,000 458,700 522,300 540,200 640,700 618,500 614,200 569,100 531,000 
Sources: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1983 – 93  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table E9 
Secondary School Enrolment by Province, 1993 – 2003 
Province  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Central 118,000 129,700 132,600 142,800 150,800 154,800 152,400 173,700 182,100 187,100 171,400 
Coast 30,000 37,000 35,400 37,400 37,100 34,500 36,700 52,400 41,100 41,900 49,500 
Eastern 104,000 112,900 114,600 116,500 121,500 124,500 136,700 133,300 140,600 145,100 166,900 
Nairobi 15,000 31,700 30,300 22,500 22,500 24,200 30,100 18,100 32,900 35,400 20,300 
N. Eastern 1,000 3,600 4,000 3,900 4,300 5,100 5,000 5,100 5,100 5,100 11,300 
Nyanza 81,000 105,200 112,700 115,800 119,800 126,200 122,200 136,100 140,000 149,900 155,800 
R.Valley 111,000 121,900 124,000 138,900 143,400 137,600 142,900 143,900 180,200 169,700 195,200 
Western 71,000 77,900 78,900 80,500 87,900 93,600 96,600 99,900 95,700 102,200 109,600 
Total 531,000 619,900 632,500 658,300 687,300 700,500 722,600 762,500 817,700 836,400 880,000 
Sources: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1993 – 2003  
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Table E10 
Secondary School Enrolment by Province, 2003 – 13 
Province  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Central 171,400 187,400 181,600 204,100 223,200 260,000 266,300 305,400 291,400 315,600 344,500 
Coast 49,500 55,500 48,800 58,500 65,300 68,000 68,800 84,600 93,600 101,600 111,900 
Eastern 166,900 174,300 173,600 183,500 214,000 244,000 266,900 317,200 337,500 365,100 399,200 
Nairobi 20,300 29,700 28,500 29,700 49,700 58,900 58,000 67,700 40,600 43,100 54,800 
N. Eastern 11,300 5,600 6,100 7,800 9,000 11,900 12,100 17,000 22,100 24,000 26,000 
Nyanza 155,800 148,700 170,600 183,000 207,000 241,100 242,500 320,200 342,100 369,800 405,700 
R.Valley 195,200 205,600 206,900 243,200 266,300 315,300 381,000 380,400 391,900 425,600 467,200 
Western 109,600 118,400 118,100 120,300 145,700 183,000 212,000 216,800 248,300 270,100 295,000 
Total 880,000 925,200 934,200 1,030,100 1,180,200 1,382,200 1,507,600 1,709,300 1,767,500 1,914,900 2,104,300 
Sources: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 2003 – 13  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table E11 
Attendance at Family Planning Clinics by Province, 1970 – 73 
Province  1970 1971 1972 1973 
Central 38,966 48,400 53,034 60,519 
Coast 11,226 16,352 17,225 20,431 
Eastern 17,454 23,157 29,102 34,437 
Nairobi 59,098 62,212 81,386 101,221 
N. Eastern - - - - 
Nyanza 5,873 7,995 8,956 11,145 
R.Valley 11,895 15,118 17,006 18,215 
Western 4,319 6,522 9,071 13,368 
Total 148,831 179,756 215,780 259,336 
Sources: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1970 – 73 
Table E12 
Attendance at Family Planning Clinics by Province, 1973 – 83 
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Province  1973 1974 1975 1976 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Central 60,519 66,357 74,589 67,477 70,799 77,059 74,287 93,495 98,910 95,063 
Coast 20,431 23,168 23,996 23,219 28,006 30,501 15,172 24,688 39,408 30,151 
Eastern 34,437 36,441 41,331 48,169 56,708 59,889 41,674 49,556 61,134 67,556 
Nairobi 101,221 106,237 108,695 116,902 116,660 131,637 153,919 116,337 134,071 142,018 
N. Eastern - - - 426 635 620 263 587 1,007 981 
Nyanza 11,145 10,789 11,423 13,044 17,846 18,127 12,570 15,756 16,477 19,295 
R.Valley 18,215 20,741 21,042 22,918 31,164 34,928 28,942 34,558 40,005 43,594 
Western 13,368 16,708 17,648 13,645 17,747 18,599 4,426 16,329 16,961 15,728 
Total 259,336 280,441 298,724 305,800 339,565 371,360 331,253 351,306 407,973 414,386 
Sources: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1973 – 83 
Table E13 
Attendance at Family Planning Clinics by Province, 1983 – 87 
Province  1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Central 95,063 115,356 94,601 179,820 379,723 
Coast 30,151 26,250 7,292 8,382 122,021 
Eastern 67,556 83,206 83,110 144,996 90,537 
Nairobi 142,018 135,720 136,859 95,694 104,097 
N. Eastern 981 1,082 805 710 651 
Nyanza 19,295 22,585 22,369 - 166,754 
R.Valley 43,594 47,195 46,992 29,388 647,445 
Western 15,728 20,475 1,547 6,660 159,048 
Total 414,386 451,869 393,575 465,650 1,670,276 
 Sources: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1983 – 87  
Table E14 
Hospital Beds and Cots by Province, 1970 – 73 
Province  1970 1971 1972 1973 
Central 2,188 2,732 2,725 2,910 
Coast 1,846 1,809 1,659 1,884 
Eastern 2,286 2,284 2,755 2,407 
Nairobi 3,346 3,661 4,267 4,390 
N. Eastern 188 108 168 235 
Nyanza 1,672 1,717 1,767 1,745 
R.Valley 2,696 3,139 2,882 3,072 
Western 1,286 1,261 1,827 1,543 
Total 15,508 16,711 18,050 18,186 
Sources: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1970 – 73  
Table E15 
Hospital Beds and Cots by Province, 1973 – 83 
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Province  1973 1974 1975 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Central 2,910 3,169 3,587 3,680 3,758 4,004 4,511 4,351 4,512 4,512 
Coast 1,884 1,524 1,567 2,146 2,420 2,512 2,512 2,930 2,930 2,930 
Eastern 2,407 2,711 3,022 2,826 3,177 3,630 3,630 3,827 3,882 3,882 
Nairobi 4,390 2,994 2,994 3,469 3,919 5,043 5,053 5,165 5,598 5,598 
N. Eastern 235 241 241 347 313 348 348 354 354 366 
Nyanza 1,745 1,657 2,128 4,005 4,065 3,873 4,025 4,025 4,053 4,066 
R.Valley 3,072 2,958 3,739 4,599 4,679 4,954 4,954 4,987 4,987 5,212 
Western 1,543 1,680 1,955 1,776 2,377 2,558 2,668 2,469 2,728 2,728 
Total 18,186 16,934 19,233 22,848 24,708 26,922 27,701 28,108 29,044 29,294 
Sources: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1973 – 83 
Table E16 
Hospital Beds and Cots by Province, 1983 – 93 
Province  1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Central 4,512 4,848 4,848 4,848 4,848 4,883 5,030 5,060 5,170 5,170 5,280 
Coast 2,930 3,005 3,005 3,065 3,065 3,186 3,276 3,366 3,491 3,613 3,491 
Eastern 3,882 4,287 4,337 4,457 4,457 4,601 4,745 4,769 4,769 4,803 4,849 
Nairobi 5,598 5,610 5,610 5,690 5,690 5,696 5,696 5,886 6,021 6,162 6,314 
N. Eastern 366 414 414 414 414 414 414 414 429 491 1,245 
Nyanza 4,066 4,114 4,114 4,234 4,234 4,259 4,259 4,283 4,373 4,403 4,618 
R.Valley 5,212 5,844 5,844 6,004 6,004 6,250 6,330 6,474 6,729 6,729 7,587 
Western 2,728 2,764 2,764 2,644 2,644 2,694 2,784 2,834 2,944 2,989 4,747 
Total 29,294 30,886 30,936 31,356 31,356 31,983 32,534 33,086 33,926 34,360 38,131 
 Sources: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1983 – 93  
Table E17 
Hospital Beds and Cots by Province, 1993 – 2003 
Province  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Central 5,280 5,324 6,400 6,606 7,009 7,218 7,513 7,826 7,112 7,412 8,314 
Coast 3,491 2,781 3,818 3,991 4,136 4,227 4,421 4,579 4,703 4,891 5,011 
Eastern 4,849 4,881 5,724 6,168 6,361 6,516 6,736 6,952 7,421 7,687 7,822 
Nairobi 6,314 5,879 6,225 6,373 6,487 6,691 7,005 7,287 7,936 8,191 7,998 
N. Eastern 1,245 1,224 1,447 1,451 1,498 1,501 1,537 1,537 1,610 1,707 1,914 
Nyanza 4,618 5,058 8,947 9,480 9,625 9,879 10,006 10,268 10,501 12,390 12,545 
R.Valley 7,587 7,751 9,818 9,928 10,158 10,401 11,240 11,752 11,921 11,922 12,832 
Western 4,747 4,373 4,775 5,334 5,567 5,753 5,920 6,215 6,336 6,457 6,971 
Total 38,131 37,271 47,154 49,331 50,841 52,186 54,378 56,416 57,540 60,657 63,407 
Sources: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1993 – 2003 
Table E18 
No. of Health Institutions by Province, 2013 – 13 
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Province  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Central 526 868 894 972 556 1,199 1,251 1,345 1,413 1,438 1,562 
Coast 440 550 566 624 717 723 770 754 852 873 883 
Eastern 837 824 849 925 1,079 942 1,106 1,256 1,441 1,548 1,877 
Nairobi 493 377 389 409 347 387 406 423 505 562 947 
N. Eastern 88 135 139 162 164 198 232 264 278 291 368 
Nyanza 548 494 509 601 761 716 773 745 932 965 1,092 
R.Valley 1,267 1,146 1,181 1,308 1,573 1,648 1,732 1,867 2,076 2,166 2,577 
Western 358 373 385 443 392 377 426 457 509 532 613 
Total 4,557 4,767 4,912 5,444 5,589 6,190 6,696 7,111 8,006 8,375 9,919 
 Sources: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 2003 – 13  
Table E19 
No. of Houses Completed by NHC by Province, 1968 – 73 
Province  1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
Central 180 119 322 - 6 34 
Coast 113 50 174 208 589 257 
Eastern - 121 50 - 16 34 
Nairobi 705 1,309 1,341 1,290 1,505 302 
N. Eastern - - - 8 26 6 
Nyanza 100 173 7 20 42 70 
R.Valley 307 247 192 177 314 153 
Western 63 - 85 34 - 238 
Total 1,468 2,019 2,171 1,737 2,498 1,094 
Sources: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1968 – 1973 
Table E20 
No. of Houses Completed by NHC by Province, 1973 – 83 
Province  1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Central 34 189 326 49 15 159 207 337 - - 187 
Coast 257 300 20 216 300 51 190 350 - 13 50 
Eastern 34 50 60 - - 51 - 249 - 70 98 
Nairobi 302 432 172 1 586 862 3,056 616 1,072 2,311 - 
N. Eastern 6 - - 26 - - - - - - - 
Nyanza 70 25 105 - 9 - - 286 106 180 - 
R.Valley 153 413 572 - - 300 461 1,417 - 354 302 
Western 238 32 181 25 6 121 171 272 1,557 - 50 
Total 1,094 1,441 1,436 317 916 1,544 4,085 3,527 2,735 2,928 687 
Sources: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1973 – 83  
Table E21 
No. of Houses Completed by NHC by Province, 1983 – 93 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
 
375 
 
Province  1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Central 187 - 45 95 111 166 - 357 - 40 - 
Coast 50 13 50 - 50 - - - 68 - 23 
Eastern 98 2 - 253 248 - - - 128 - - 
Nairobi - 284 - - 85 - 367 1,069 2 - - 
N. Eastern - - - - - - - 212 - - - 
Nyanza - 1,900 169 52 40 - 105 - - - - 
R.Valley 302 199 745 115 42 63 149 25 - 40 - 
Western 50 - - - - - 384 - 90 102 - 
Total 687 2,398 1,009 515 576 229 1,005 1,663 288 182 23 
Sources: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1983 – 93 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table E22 
No. of Houses Completed by NHC by Province, 1993 – 2003 
Province  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Central - - - 26 35 - - 42 - - 30 
Coast 23 66 - - - - - 22 - - - 
Eastern - - - - - - - - - - - 
Nairobi - 952 16 1 - 53 - 120 - 173 - 
N. Eastern - - - - - - - - - - - 
Nyanza - - - - - - - - - - - 
R.Valley - - - - - - - - - 24 - 
Western - 60 - - - - - - - - - 
Total 23 1,078 16 27 35 53 - 184 - 197 30 
Sources: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1993 – 2003  
Table E23 
No. of Houses Completed by NHC by Province, 2003 – 13 
Province  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Central 30 - 24 - - 38 - - - - - 
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Coast - - 161 - - - - - - - - 
Eastern - - - - - - - - - - - 
Nairobi - - 160 230 230 40 116 310 215 488 376 
N. Eastern - - - - - - - - - - - 
Nyanza - - - 69 69 - - - 40 - - 
R.Valley - - 15 - - - - - - - - 
Western - - - - - - - 80 - - - 
Total 30 - 360 299 299 78 116 390 255 488 376 
Sources: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 2003 – 13  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table E24 
Electricity Sales - Small Consumer Lighting, Domestic Consumption and Street Lighting by 
Area, 1966 – 71 '000 kWh 
Area 1966 1967 1968 1971 
Nairobi and Mt. Kenya 81,698 81,815 84,490 94,798 
Coast 16,794 17,448 18,277 21,996 
R.Valley 4,877 5,032 5,372 6,204 
Eldoret 1,066 1,089 1,160 1,307 
Kisumu 3,077 3,448 4,101 5,874 
Kitale 493 505 565 634 
Total 108,005 109,337 113,965 130,813 
Sources: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1966 – 71  
 
Table E25 
Electricity Sales - Small Consumer Lighting, Domestic Consumption and Street Lighting by 
Area, 1973 – 83 '000 kWh 
Area 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1983 
Nairobi and Mt. Kenya 105,496 114,874 125,565 129,718 144,362 250,071 267,070 278,392 332,196 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
 
377 
 
Coast 26,217 29,112 30,341 31,012 33,777 65,144 69,008 72,579 85,112 
R.Valley 6,839 7,144 8,653 8,910 8,765 21,586 23,443 25,044 32,121 
Eldoret, Kisumu and Kitale 9,477 10,488 12,420 11,213 13,511 30,381 36,185 34,232 40,609 
Total 148,029 161,618 176,979 180,853 200,415 367,182 395,706 410,247 490,038 
Sources: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1973 – 83  
 
Table E26 
Electricity Sales - Small Consumer Lighting, Domestic Consumption and Street Lighting by 
Area, 1983 – 93 '000 kWh 
Area 1983 1984 1985 1987 1988 1989 1992 1993 
Nairobi and Mt. Kenya 332,196 353,181 365,725 433,444 463,473 492,792 567,558 604,822 
Coast 85,112 88,404 98,070 112,351 116,426 126,844 150,281 148,379 
R.Valley 32,121 32,854 36,188 37,179 40,261 45,542 82,414 89,517 
Eldoret, Kisumu and Kitale 40,609 45,082 50,185 55,294 64,637 71,329 59,337 60,282 
Total 490,038 519,521 550,168 638,268 684,797 736,507 859,590 903,000 
Sources: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1983 – 93  
 
Table E27 
Electricity Sales - Small Consumer Lighting, Domestic Consumption and Street Lighting by 
Area, 1993 – 2000 '000 kWh 
Area 1993 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Nairobi and Mt. Kenya 604,822 685,200 725,009 775,900 795,000 710,100 
Coast 148,379 202,900 215,293 224,125 189,800 187,000 
R.Valley 89,517 101,900 111,575 112,625 110,600 101,400 
Eldoret, Kisumu and Kitale 60,282 71,500 74,443 73,100 74,000 71,100 
Total 903,000 1,061,500 1,126,320 1,185,750 1,169,400 1,069,600 
Sources: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1993 – 2000 
Table E28 
Electricity Sales - Small Consumer Lighting, Domestic Consumption and Street Lighting by 
Area, 2004 – 2013 '000 kWh 
Area 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Nairobi and Mt. Kenya 1,037 1,018 1,038 1,330 1,405 1,416 1,582 1,582 1,801 2,143 
Coast 247 258 262 325 343 362 393 404 419 469 
Eldoret, Kisumu and Kitale 233 227 226 345 344 351 398 544 507 733 
Total 1,517 1,503 1,526 2,000 2,092 2,129 2,372 2,530 2,727 3,345 
 Sources: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 2004 – 2013  
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Table E29 
Rural Electrification by Area, 1996 – 2000 '000 kWh 
Area 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Nairobi and Mt. Kenya 56,000 52,858 56,000 57,000 52,000 
Coast 6,000 16,857 13,000 14,000 11,000 
R.Valley 39,000 45,855 46,000 39,000 36,000 
Western 37,000 34,860 32,000 28,000 20,000 
Total 138,000 150,430 147,000 138,000 119,000 
Sources: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 1996 – 2000 
Table E30 
Rural Electrification by Area, 2004 – 2013 million kWh 
Area 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Nairobi and Mt. Kenya 78 78 82 105 111 126 135 135 139 214 
Coast 10 10 10 15 17 18 21 21 22 24 
Western 88 88 92 121 122 135 155 152 152 216 
Total 176 176 184 241 250 279 311 308 313 454 
 Sources: Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstracts 2004 – 2013  
 
Table E31 
Cost of Operational Rural Water Schemes by Province, 1971 – 1973 
Province  1971 1972 1973 
Central - - 200,000 
Coast 27,000 167,500 181,500 
Eastern 116,000 171,500 271,500 
N. Eastern 30,000 33,500 33,500 
Nyanza - 19,400 19,400 
R.Valley 32,270 36,200 56,200 
Western 54,000 44,000 110,000 
Total 259,270 472,100 872,100 
Sources: Republic of Kenya Economic Surveys 1971 – 73  
Table E32 
Cost of Operational Rural Water Schemes by Province, 1973 – 1983 
Province  1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Central 200,000 606,000 998,000 1,080,000 2,018,000 2,850,000 4,525,000 5,500,000 6,000,000 8,985,000 8,985,000 
Coast 181,500 202,000 345,000 381,000 381,000 249,000 399,000 454,000 454,000 454,000 454,000 
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Eastern 271,500 203,000 203,000 532,000 1,952,000 1,980,000 2,180,000 2,180,000 2,780,000 2,880,000 3,740,000 
N. Eastern 33,500 37,000 84,000 136,000 143,000 157,000 157,000 157,000 157,000 157,000 157,000 
Nyanza 19,400 292,500 605,000 605,000 2,725,000 3,128,000 3,198,000 3,198,000 3,198,000 3,198,000 6,698,000 
R.Valley 56,200 245,000 363,000 674,000 674,000 622,000 917,000 917,000 1,035,000 1,309,000 1,309,000 
Western 110,000 115,000 339,000 575,000 575,000 585,000 585,000 585,000 2,585,000 3,935,000 5,335,000 
Total 872,100 1,700,500 2,937,000 3,983,000 8,468,000 9,571,000 11,961,000 12,991,000 16,209,000 20,918,000 26,678,000 
Sources: Republic of Kenya Economic Surveys 1973 – 83  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table E33 
No. of Boreholes Drilled in Rural Areas by Province, 1996 – 2003 
Province  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Central 22 21 28 28 28 39 26 7 
Coast - 4 26 28 31 14 1 6 
Eastern 52 35 42 42 42 50 31 14 
N. Eastern 3 5 13 13 13 22 1 1 
Nyanza 53 - 36 43 46 5 9 2 
R.Valley 37 58 36 72 75 90 46 17 
Western - 1 6 6 6 2 4 - 
Total 167 124 187 232 241 222 118 47 
Sources: Republic of Kenya Economic Surveys 1996 – 2003 
Table E34 
No. of Boreholes Drilled in Rural Areas by Province, 2003 – 2012 
Province  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Central 7 9 28 26 7 7 5 3 3 3 
Coast 6 - 16 13 15 5 11 5 1 1 
Eastern 14 17 45 79 36 32 29 28 32 22 
N. Eastern 1 4 53 10 67 14 17 18 13 11 
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Nyanza 2 2 34 11 4 8 6 10 13 14 
R.Valley 17 28 27 56 32 34 26 23 18 34 
Western - 3 24 6 3 - 3 8 6 5 
Total 47 63 227 201 164 100 97 95 86 90 
Sources: Republic of Kenya Economic Surveys 2003 – 2012  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table E35 
Full Immunization Coverage (FIC) Rate of Under-One Year Old Children by Region, 2008 – 2012 
    2008   2009   2010   2011   2012* 
Region   No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Nairobi 
 
85,866 74 78,294 83 100,813 96 101,055 99 106,655 98 
Central 
 
104,194 86 101,419 92 113,729 96 99,213 86 101,225 86 
Coast 
 
90,773 75 81,761 71 103,914 87 97,781 80 112,506 89 
Eastern 
 
126,302 64 128,887 80 135,593 83 151,459 91 157,496 91 
N. Eastern 33,454 89 30,080 67 31,213 57 44,142 76 35,933 60 
Nyanza 
 
149,465 75 158,206 79 161,212 79 158,570 76 212,765 100 
R. Valley 228,243 64 240,943 71 254,228 70 261,478 71 306,793 75 
Western 
 
129,308 66 132,622 85 143,419 90 136,609 84 142,818 83 
National Coverage  947,605 71 952,212 78 1,044,121 81 1,050,307 80 1,176,191 85 
*Provisional 
          Source: Republic of Kenya Economic Survey 2013, p. 58 
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APPENDIX F 
 
INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
 
RESEARCH TITLE:  ETHNICITY, GOVERNANCE AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: A CASE STUDY OF KENYA AND ITS LUO 
COMMUNITY, 1963 – 2013. 
 
I have read the information presented in the information letter about a study being 
conducted by Omulo, Albert Gordon Otieno towards the Doctoral Programme at the 
School of Government (SOG) at the University of the Western Cape. 
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This study has been described to me in a language that I understand and I freely and 
voluntary agree to participate.  My questions about the study have been answered. 
 
I understand that my identity will not be disclosed and was informed that I may withdraw 
my consent at any time by advising the student researcher.   
 
With full knowledge of all foregoing, I agree to participate in this study. 
Participant Name   : __________________________________ 
Participant Signature   : __________________________________ 
Date     : __________________________________ 
Place     : __________________________________ 
 
Student Researcher   :  Omulo, Albert Gordon Otieno. 
Student Researcher Signature  :  _________________________________ 
Student Number   :  3523464 
Mobile Number   :  +27 63 212 2962; +27 62 789 0514  
Email     :  omuloalbert@gmail.com 
 
I am accountable to my supervisor :  Sr. Prof. John J. Williams 
School of Government (SOG) 
Telephone    :  +27 21 959 3807 
Fax     :  +27 21 959 3826 
Email     :  jjwilliams@uwc.ac.za 
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